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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS A MODERN ROLE FOR LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT LAW
It is now accepted that multimodal transport plays a key role in international trade and 
commerce, yet its’ liability regime is uncertain and unpredictable. A sound liability regime is 
essential to bring certainty and enhance the development of this mode o f transport.
In international trade, goods may be carried in a variety of ways; by sea, road, and rail or by 
air. These are not the only ways that goods are carried. Increasingly, goods are being carried 
by a combination o f modes, which has come to be known as multimodal transport.
As long as international transport continues, damage and loss to goods carried will occur; 
such incidences are usually followed by a variety of claims and compensations. When such 
loss or damage occurs during carriage by a single mode, the liability o f the carrier is regulated 
by one of the international transport conventions. However, when such loss or damage occurs 
during multimodal carriage, there is no such regulation available. What might apply is one of 
the international conventions applicable in unimodal transport, if the loss or damage can be 
localised to a particular mode. This stems from the fact that these conventions are mandatory 
and multimodal transport is regarded as a combination of modes. When it is not possible to 
predict when loss or damage occurred, the problem it creates is uncertainty and 
unpredictability as to the liability regime applicable.
Following the attempts made over the past decades, in which attention has been focused on 
seeking a predictable liability regime in multimodal transport through existing mandatory law 
and model contracts, a consensus has emerged that unimodal solutions cannot be used to solve 
multimodal problems.
In the light of these discussions, this thesis argues that multimodal transport is different and 
deserves a liability regime that will reflect its nature and bring about predictability.
And the conclusion favoured in this work is a leadership role for multimodal transport, to lead 
rather than be led by unimodal transport.
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INTRODUCTION
The research underlying this thesis began with the question: Why is there no 
predictable liability regime in multimodal transport?
International trade, advances and improvements in transport technologies have all 
contributed greatly to the increasing popularity of multimodal transport, and although 
it is widely acknowledged as the transport mode of the future, there are no adequate 
laws governing it. Consequently, multimodal transport is now receiving widespread 
interest, much attention, and concern as different groups and bodies seek to find 
adequate laws to govern it.1
In the past decade, the recognition and importance of this mode has greatly increased 
and it is now commonly accepted that there is a need for certain and predictable rules 
for the enhancement and furtherance of multimodal transport. Numerous questions 
exist as to how this mode should be governed, and although there is a consensus as to 
the need for such certain and predictable laws, there are clearly divergent views as to 
what it should constitute.
This is because the current debate on multimodal transport, the solutions proposed, 
and the literature available has been “anchored” on the basic realization that unimodal 
concepts and constructs should prevail in multimodal transport. This is very much 
driven by the presumed need not only to avoid conflict with existing unimodal 
transport conventions, but also to maintain current practices within multimodal 
transport.2 The question then arises: how will unimodal concepts translate in practice 
to concrete solutions within multimodal transport? More importantly, what sort of 
legal practices will best solve the uncertain problem in multimodal transport?
These thesis attempts to answer these questions in the context o f the reality of 
multimodal transport today, specifically it discusses the relationship between 
unimodal transport and multimodal transport.
It argues that the law applicable in unimodal transport cannot be transplanted 
piecemeal to multimodal transport without appropriate modifications or amendments. 
Further it argues that some o f the assumptions on which the debate has been based 
ought to be reassessed, as there are mostly grounded on unimodal concepts. It is also
1 The different attempts at drafting uniform laws to cover Multimodal transport are dealt with in 
chapters 4 and 5.
2 This is adequately covered in Chapter 2
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asserted that as the debate has been framed on a fear of conflict within conventions, 
and a wish to adhere to known concepts in transportation, it has failed to fully 
recognize the full impact and potential of this mode for bringing into force a liability 
regime that would cover not only multimodal transport, but also include unimodal 
transport. On this basis, the thesis addresses the question of what liability regime 
should apply to support certainty and predictability while underpinning growth within 
multimodal transport usage.
In order to do this, the thesis analyses the principle of presumed liability as the basis 
of liability used within multimodal transport, and argues that the use of this liability 
basis has been one of the hurdles to achieving a predictable liability regime in 
multimodal transport. The thesis discusses whether multimodal transport as currently 
structured, addresses the real risks allocation inherent in moving goods using multiple 
modes. It suggests that the current structure has developed as a quick response to the 
problems as they arise and was not specifically formulated to cater for multimodal 
transport. Like unimodal transport, the current structure in multimodal transport is 
based on the particular mode(s) used, thereby linking modes with conveyance. By so 
doing, it fails to move coherently beyond the requirements of the individual modes 
used, to the global concept o f carriage which is non-mode specific. The thesis argues 
that a more appropriate basis of liability which would bring about certainty and 
predictability would be strict liability with exceptions. On the basis o f recent research, 
the author argues that this basis will be acceptable within transport circles as it will 
specifically address the particular problems of multimodal transport.
This thesis suggests that in this light, multimodal transport ought to take a more active 
part in the legal regulation o f transportation, much in the way o f one liability regime 
that will be applicable to all modes of transport regardless o f mode to support 
predictability and certainty within global transportation.
The ability to transport goods from one country to another is what makes international 
trade possible. Goods may be transported by air, land or sea. There are specific legal 
rules that apply where goods are carried by any one of these methods. For example, 
The Hague Rules, The Hague Visby Rules or the Hamburg Rules would normally 
govern carriage by sea whilst the CMR and the CIM would govern carriage by road
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and rail respectively. In certain cases however, goods may be carried by a 
combination o f sea, air or land. In other words, a multiple mode o f transportation is 
used now commonly referred to as multimodal transport. Multimodal transport, which 
is the carriage of goods by more than one mode of carriage, now dominates all other 
modes of transport and is now considered to be the most dynamic method of carrying 
goods and the focal point in the overall globalization of the law o f carriage of goods. 
More and more, goods are being carried under a multimodal transport contract 
because the focus on carriage is no longer on what modes will be used but that goods 
are carried to their destination.3
Liability in transportation until recently was modally based because the history of 
carriage of goods was based on the different modes of carriage used. This was a 
product of the particular times in which these liability regimes were developed. The 
technical and physical constraints of the times meant that goods where carried 
unimodally; poor transport interface points, poor road infrastructures, inadequate rail 
services and less than adequate air services for bulk cargo all conspired to maintain 
the status quo. Therefore different liability rules were developed for the carriage of 
goods by sea,4 land5, air,6 and rail.7 With the different advancements in transport 
technology, combining modes for carriage has become the most popular method of 
carrying goods, and mode specification in transport contracts has lost its place. 
Technological revolution in transportation brought about important innovations. A 
major aspect of this has been the increase use of transport containers. This has 
improved the ways of carrying goods and has made the single contract for multiple 
modes attractive to all shippers. A major advantage o f multimodal transport is that the 
shipper has to deal with only one contract, one document and one carrier, even though
3 UNCTAD Secretariat: Multimodal transport: The feasibility o f  an legal instrument 
(U N C T A D /SD TE /TL B /2003/1) p. 4
4 The International Convention for the Unification o f  Law Relating to B ills o f  Lading, 1924 (Hague 
Rules), as amended by The Hague Visby Protocol o f  1968 and the SDR Protocol o f  1979.
5 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage o f  Goods by Road 1956, as amended by the 
Geneva Protocol 1980 (CMR)
6 The Warsaw Convention for the unification o f  certain Rules relating to international Carriage o f  
goods by air, 1929. As amended by the Hague Protocol, 1955 and o f  recent, the Montreal Convention 
on the unification o f  certain rules for carriage by air, 1999.
7 Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for the International Carriage o f  Goods by Rail (CIM), 
Appendix B to the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), 1980.
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the goods are being carried by different modes. Additionally, container ships are fast
o
and therefore allow fast cargo discharge.
However, the use o f multimodal transport is not without its difficulties. A particular 
difficulty arises where the goods are transported in containers. This is because in such 
cases it is not always possible to identify the stage where loss or damage occurred, 
since the goods are encased in the container. Consequently, liability for damage which 
depends on the law applicable to the mode of transport at the time o f damage becomes 
difficult to establish.
In transportation, liability issues occupy an important place. The questions that 
invariably come up in carriage cases are: how much am I liable for? What is my 
exposure and limit? And who pays for what damage? Within multimodal transport, 
these issues are even more complex because of the added problem of multiple 
liabilities. Multimodal transport comprises of different legs each representing 
unimodal transport to which different international conventions; national legislation 
and regional laws apply. Each mode involved in this transport thus has a different 
liability regime. Thus when loss occurs in three different modes, three different 
liability regimes will potentially apply, this normally happens when the loss or 
damage is gradual, occurring over a number of modes which also brings into focus the 
problem of the application of multiple modes to a single loss or damage. These 
liability regimes have introduced minimum mandatory standards in their respective 
modes, where no such rules apply; we are faced with a plethora of diverse national 
laws applying to the different aspects o f the transport. When any international or 
national law does not cover loss or damage, then standard contracts apply. At other 
times, these regimes leave liability gaps where no law applies, and at other times two 
or more rules are applicable to the same loss or damage.
Multimodal transport thus has no predictable liability regime, but a complex array of 
liability rules regulating it.
A further difficulty arises from the fact that multimodal transport is often used in 
cases o f international transport. This brings into play multi-jurisdictional problems.
8 A problem associated with this speed is the fact that goods are deemed to arrive before the documents 
leading to problems o f  waiting for the documents in which case no freight is earned or taking the risk 
o f  delivering without documents; Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd  v. Ram bler Cycle Co Ltd [1959] A C. 576 (Privy 
Council)
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This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is no uniform set of international 
rules in multimodal transport as exists in unimodal transport.9
The existence of different international laws, national laws and regional agreements 
has created unpredictability and disunity at the international level. The shipper will 
not know which liability regime, which limits of liability or which system of law will 
apply in the event of loss or damage. In the case of unimodal transport, when loss or 
damage occurs, there are rules under which such loss or damage will be investigated 
to allocate liability. In multimodal transport, especially those carried in containers, 
there is usually no way of pinpointing where loss occurs and who is responsible. 
There is therefore a need for uniformity and predictability.10 This lack of uniformity is 
disadvantageous to multimodal transport as it impedes growth and results in 
additional cost to stakeholders11. Disharmony caused by the multiplicity of liability 
regimes in multimodal transport has become a burning issue because o f the increasing 
use and importance o f multimodal transport.12 This disharmony has three facets:
-No uniform set of rules.
-A Plethora of applicable international, regional and national rules potentially
applicable.
-A liability regime, which can only be determined post facto.
Discontent with this aspect of multimodal transport has prompted a search for a 
solution to the problem. Within the past 30 years we have seen numerous attempts at 
drafting sets of rules to regulate multimodal transport, yet this area is still without a 
set of uniformly acceptable international laws. The United Nations Convention on 
Multimodal Transport 1980 was the first international convention in this field, but it 
failed to attract the requisite number of ratifications to bring it into force.13 Since then 
there has been no other such effort. What abounds in this area is the model contract 
drawn up by international private organizations.14
9 For example in carriage o f  goods by sea the Hague Rules deal with cases o f  jurisdiction
10 UNCTAD, Implementation o f  multimodal Transport Rules (UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2 and Add: 1)
11 For example lost in localising loss or damage
12 J. M. Alcantara, “The new regim e and multimodal transport” [2001] LMCLQ 399
13 Privately constituted Rules had been drawn before this convention by the ICC, in continuance o f  that 
theme, the ICC and UNCTAD also prepared a set o f  Rules for multimodal transport. These Rules are 
all contractual and subject to any applicable mandatory convention and thus not effective in achieving 
uniformity.
14 UNCTAD/ICC Rules, Combiconbill, The Multimodal transport document issued by the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) revised in 1995.
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Legal scholars and international organizations have also made efforts in the search for 
a solution to this problem. Indeed, a large number of legal literatures on multimodal 
transport are centred on finding a solution to this problem.15 The proposals that have 
so far been advanced are for the most part based on extending the liability regime for 
unimodal transport onto multimodal transport, depending on where the loss is 
localized.16 These proposals in essence simply maintain the status quo whereby the 
liability regime in multimodal transport is the same as unimodal transport. That is to 
say, where loss or damage is localized to a particular mode o f transport, the liability 
regime applicable to that mode of transport will be applicable to that loss.17 The effect 
of this approach is that multimodal transport is being equated to unimodal transport 
even though multimodal transport is different.18
The aim of this thesis is three fold.
Firstly, it provides a cursory explanation of the problem of an uncertain liability 
regime in multimodal transport.
The first chapter discusses the nature of multimodal transport, its principal concepts, 
and its doctrines. The chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of multimodal 
transport, suggesting that there is an emerging consensus relating to the importance of 
separating multimodal transport from its different constitutive modes, and argues that 
this has an important role on how multimodal transport is eventually regulated. This 
chapter also highlights the important role played by the multimodal transport contract 
in furthering the understanding of the basic concept o f multimodal transport. This 
chapter concludes by suggesting that multimodal transport should be understood 
differently from the ‘chain contract’ it is perceived to be to allow its liability regime 
to reflect its realities.
15 A. Diamond, ‘Liability o f  the carrier in m ultimodal transport ’ ’, In International Carriage o f  goods; 
some legal problems and possible solutions’ ed. Schmitthoff and Goode, 1989 London. R. De Wit, 
M ultimodal Transport, London 1996.
U) The answers to the questionnaire conducted by UNCTAD to facilitate a new convention on 
multimodal transport shows overwhelming preference for the basis already in use in unimodal 
transport.
17 D. Faber, ‘The problem s arising from  multimodal transport ’ [1996] LMCLQ 503, Per Vestergard 
Pedersen. M odern Regulation o f  unimodal and multimodal transport o f  goods (2000) 285, M arius 35
18 Multimodal transport is different because o f  the fact that multiple modes are envisaged.
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In furtherance of the discussions o f the problems encountered in multimodal transport, 
Chapter 2 considers the role played by the different parties to the multimodal 
transport contract and examines the problems o f an uncertain liability regime 
triggered by difficulties in identifying the liable party. Specifically, it examines suit 
against the performing carrier and the impact of The Starsin case on such claims.
The third chapter discusses the uncertain liability regime currently applying in 
multimodal transport. Dwelling on the premise that multimodal liability is inherently 
unpredictable and lacks uniformity, this chapter seeks to clarify this problem by 
examining the actual regimes that potentially apply in multimodal transport cases. It 
also attempts to go into the details as to the problems of the uncertain liability regime 
in multimodal transport; showing how and why the present legal liability regime 
consists of a complex array of international conventions, national laws, and standard 
contracts designed basically for unimodal transport. This chapter also addresses the 
potential negative impact of a plethora of liability regimes applicable to multimodal 
transport.
It addresses the basis of liability and its role as a central issue o f whether the regime 
as currently structured addresses the risk allocation in an equitable way between the 
parties, especially the impact of the exception clauses. It argues that this basis of 
liability is inappropriate within multimodal transport. This chapter will also 
specifically discuss the varying limits of liability within the different transport 
conventions. This is discussed in the context of the applicability of one limit of 
liability to a multimodal transport contract which includes different modes of 
transport with different limits of liability.
Specifically, this chapter examines the system o f international soft law based on the 
ICC combined transport document and the UNCTAD/ICC document for Multimodal 
transport. The rules are designed to address the problems o f the uncertain liability 
regime in multimodal transport, but do so in an incomplete manner, and thus the 
existing legal landscape needs to be reviewed in order to appropriately address the 
current structure o f liability in multimodal transport. Unfortunately, this system of 
soft laws does not form a coherent system in the same way in which an international 
convention would.
The chapter concludes that the current liability regime in multimodal transport fails to 
adequately address the needs o f multimodal transport and that the individual
16
conventions that have tried to cover multimodal transport have done so within their 
various modes, not completely covering multimodal transport.
Secondly, the thesis seeks to identify the proposed solutions put forward:
Chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis analyze the international response to the problem of 
multimodal transport. The 1980 United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport 
is discussed in chapter 4. Specifically, it looks at the key elements of this liability 
convention drawing out the basic reasons for its rejection, and comments on its status 
and future as a viable convention in multimodal transport.
In continuation o f this theme, Chapter 5 discusses the key focus o f recent international 
effort within the United Nations agencies. Specifically, it addresses the UNCITRALS 
Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea].
A review of the work carried out within different national legislatures to put in place 
laws governing multimodal transport are assessed and their relative merits as viable 
solutions in responding to the needs of multimodal transport discussed.
It is identified in the thesis that the proposed solutions have so far been unable to 
solve the multimodal transport problem. It is asserted here, that this is due to the 
attachment these proposals have to unimodal liability concepts and therefore do not 
meet the aspirations o f multimodal transport.
Chapter 6 in response to these problems considers a new liability theory in 
multimodal transport, based on a uniform and strict liability regime. Building on the 
foundations laid down in chapters one to three, chapter six looks at the sort o f liability 
theory appropriate in multimodal transport.
The final chapter looks forward and addresses the reform o f multimodal transport 
liability. It focuses on the role a new liability principle will play within multimodal 
transport. Specifically, it discusses the concept of strict liability as one of the concepts 
that need to be considered in developing a full and efficient transparent multimodal 
transport regime. It is asserted here that such a regime will address and solve most of 
the pertinent problems in multimodal transport.
Specifically, it argues that although the better solution would be an international 
mandatory convention on multimodal transport, it will take time to draw such a 
convention and even when drawn, it will take a longer time to go through the different
17
parliaments for ratification. As a result, alternative solutions must be considered in the 
short term while the quest for such a regime continues. Tetley’s reasoning in this 
might be considered, ‘a short and long track’ for a search for such legislation.19 In this 
light, a non-mandatory regime is proposed the short term preferably in the fashion of 
the proposed UNECE draft in which special considerations will be given to the issue 
of conflict o f conventions and current practices within transportation.
This thesis concludes by arguing that a new liability theory, which takes into 
consideration the specificity of multimodal transport while circumventing the 
shortcomings o f various problems in multimodal transport, will indeed constitute a 
formidable instrument. While such an instrument may call for a re-think or adjustment 
of the different liability provisions in unimodal transport conventions, it is hoped that 
it will eventually also be the instrument of choice covering both unimodal and 
multimodal transport contracts.
METHODOLOGY
In addressing the issues raised by this research, the thesis applies a largely traditional 
legal approach in reviewing and analyzing the existing related literature, together with 
primary and secondary legal sources. In addition to this traditional methodology, the 
thesis also relies to an extent on documents from the different UN agencies, notably 
UNCITRAL, UNCTAD and UNECE. Overall in terms of approach, the thesis tries to 
be interactive.
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
It is not possible within the scope of this work to analyse all the components of 
multimodal transport. Besides the time constraints, this would also involve the input 
of a multidiscipline team. This work is thus not claiming to investigate all aspects of 
multimodal transport; it seeks to apply a new liability theory to the factual situation of
19 Tetley, “Reform o f  carriage o f  Goods -T he UNCITRAL DRAFT & SENATE COGSA ‘9 9 ’- LETS 
HAVE A TWO -T R A C T  APPROACH” [2003] 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1-144
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loss, damage, and delay to goods carried in multimodal transport. Therefore it will not 
address some o f the problems that apply to multimodal transport: such as the 
problems relating to documentary sales transactions, documentary liability and 
logistical and computer problems in the transfer of goods at interface points and just 
in time delivery services. This work however, intends to identify the key issues that 
appear to impede or prevent predictability in multimodal transport and seeks to 
answer the questions that arise.
This study is primarily based on English law although the subject is truly 
international. However, some consideration is given to civil law and U.S. law where 
this is of particular relevance.
Multimodal transport is changing rapidly and different countries are modifying and 
adopting national legislation to address this problem. International organizations are 
currently also in session trying to solve this problem. O f particular note here, is the 
work of UNCITRAL on its Transport draft instrument (UNCITRAL draft convention 
on the Carriage o f Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea] in which some of the provisions 
have not been crystallized which makes it difficult not only to understand but also to 
comment effectively on those provisions). And the just proposed draft of the UNECE 
which has not yet been deliberated on. The outcome of these deliberations may 
warrant that some positions taken are modified or amended. It is therefore important 
to define a point in time to which this work is valid. Most o f the information was 
gathered up to and including the end of 2006.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTERNATIONAL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT: CONCEPT NATURE
This chapter seeks primarily to demonstrate that the inadequate understanding of the 
concept of multimodal transport is at the root of the liability problem in this mode. As 
evidence of the impact of this misunderstanding, this chapter discusses the definition 
o f multimodal transport within current legal literature and shows that adopting the 
current approach of chained contracts led to the adoption o f unimodal concepts in 
multimodal transport. This has obviously led to a confusing legal situation in which 
uncertainty and unpredictability reigns as each potential liability regime becomes 
applicable depending on the loss or damage history.
The purpose o f this chapter is to examine the definition(s) o f multimodal transport; 
the contention here is that an understanding of the pertinent concepts in multimodal 
transport allows for the development o f rules aimed at encouraging actions that 
support certainty in the quest for a uniform liability regime in multimodal transport. 
Multimodal transport that is perceived as a chain of unimodal modes as opposed to a 
single independent mode of carriage is also interpreted in terms o f unimodal 
principles. As a result it emulates unimodal concepts and constructs and imposes 
unimodal solutions to its problems. It is asserted here, that this fact constitutes a 
controversial issue within multimodal transport. In this light an outline of the 
pertinent concepts of multimodal transport are highlighted as a background to the 
differences that will be drawn between multimodal and unimodal liabilities. The 
objective is to show that multimodal transport is different from unimodal transport 
and ought to be treated differently.
This chapter will discuss the scope and nature of multimodal transport through its
definitions as provided within the different legal instruments on multimodal 
21transport. Through these definitions, we will examine the nature of multimodal
20 Prof Dr. K.F. Haak, “The harmonisation o f  intermodal liability arrangements” 5lh IVR Colloquium- 
Vienna- 27-28 January 2005 p.2
21 Notably the ICC, UNCTAD/ICC rules and the multimodal transport conventions. It must be noted 
that there are no legally binding instrument covering multimodal transport at this time.
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transport in order to show that multimodal transport is different from unimodal
5 22transport and much more than the “chained contract”.
We will then briefly discuss the multimodal transport contract. By critically 
examining this contract we will further lend support to the fact that the multimodal 
transport contract is different from the usual unimodal contracts in the transportation 
of goods. It is a “New Specie” of transport contract not a possible amalgamation of 
unimodal transport contracts chained into one.
We will further examine the definitions of the different contracts within unimodal 
transport conventions, to show that multimodal transport is excluded from these 
definitions because it is different.
At the end o f this chapter, we will conclude that, although multimodal transport 
contracts are undoubtedly implemented through the different modes o f transport, there 
are basically different and should be treated differently.
1.1 HISTORY OF MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
Multimodal transport has its origins in the through and successive transport contracts. 
Successive and through transport concepts, are concepts where either numerous 
carriers engage in the same mode effect carriage under one contract, or where one 
carrier contracts to carry goods over parts of the transport while contracting with other 
carriers for other parts of the carriage as agents for the shipper. In both the above 
cases, the carriers involve assume responsibility for their parts o f the transport.
In the case of through transport, the carrier acting as agent, enters into transport 
contracts with other carriers on behalf o f the cargo interest, making the latter a party
99to these contracts. In such a case when loss or damage occurs, the cargo concern has 
to identify the carrier who is legally liable. If the goods are containerised it might be 
difficult to identify the carrier under whose charge loss or damage occurred. However, 
even when the cargo concern can so localise, he might find himself faced with an 
unknown carrier in another country facing unfamiliar laws. On the other hand, if loss 
is unidentified, the cargo concern finds himself in the unenviable situation of having 
to sue all carriers concern at enormous financial cost. The through transport concept 
essentially entails a situation in which the carrier enters into a contract with the cargo
22 Prof. K.F. Haak, The Harmonisation o f  intermodal liability arrangements, 5th IVR Colloquium- 
Vienna, 27-28 January 2005. p.3, Ramberg J, “The Future Law o f  Transport Operators and Service 
Providers [2004] 46  Scandinavian Studies in Law, 135, p. 137
23 D Faber, “ The Problems arising from multimodal transport “ [1996] LMCLQ pg 503
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concern to ensure that his goods are carried from one point to another in some 
instances door-to-door. He further takes on himself the responsibility of contracting 
with other carriers possibly in other modes of transport to carry the goods of the 
shipper in furtherance of the original transport contract. What he does not do, is 
assume responsibility for the acts of the other carriers, while the multimodal transport 
carrier would assume responsibility throughout carriage. Within this thesis, it is this 
difference between the through transport contract and the multimodal transport 
contract which is highlighted.
1.2 CONTAINERISATION AND MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
Although multimodal transport undoubtedly existed long before containerisation was 
recognised as a transport concept, there is little doubt that the use of containers was 
essential to the growth of multimodal transport. This assertion rests on the fact that, 
the term multimodal transport gained increased popularity with the advent of the 
container in the 1960’s.24 Before that time the exigencies o f carriage dictated that 
goods were carried unimodally due to the technology available to transportation. Thus 
carriage o f goods came to be described in terms of separate modes used and any 
reference to interface activities between modes was exceptional.
Transportation o f goods was about the different modes used to carry goods from one 
place to another, it was never about carrying goods using more than one mode. And 
when more than one mode was involved, it entailed unpacking and transferring goods 
from one mode to another: this usually was slow and led to loss, damage and at times 
theft during the interface points.
With the advent o f the container, the practice of carrying goods using different modes 
of carriage expanded to the extent that it is now considered to be the fastest growing
25method of transporting goods. The success of the container has shifted the focus of 
the carriage from the single mode to multiple modes of carriage. Presently, one of the 
obvious advantages o f the shipping container is that it makes loading and unloading 
easier, and enables rapid change from one mode to another.26
24 Pierre-Jean Bordahardy, “Containers: a conundrum or a concept? (2005) 11 JIML 342
25 Pierre-Jean Bordahardy, “Containers: a conundrum or a concept? (2005) 11 JIML 342
26 F. Broeze, The Globalisation o f  the Oceans: Containerisation from the 1950’s to the Present 
(Research in Maritime History No. 23- International Maritime Economics history Association St John’s 
Newfoundland 2002) ch .l ‘A  concept and its realisation’ pp. 9-25 for a detailed examination o f  the use 
o f  containers.
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The multimodal transport concept is a concept, which usually invokes different things 
to different people depending on their particular background. To the transport logistic 
specialists, it conjures up a carriage in which different modes are used to carry goods 
preferably in containers to their destination. To the lawyer it invokes a type of 
carriage in which one carrier assumes responsibility for the carriage o f goods to a 
particular destination irrespective of whether he is physically involved in the carriage 
or not and irrespective o f the mode(s) used. The first type of multimodal transport is 
purely physical and depends on the container; the second type that is contractual is 
more concerned with the legal implications of such carriage. Both are however, linked 
in that while physical multimodal transport can stand alone, contractual multimodal 
transport invariable finds itself linked to the physical side because o f the prevalence 
of multimodal transport contracts in which the container is used. It is therefore 
pertinent that both concepts are examined before a definition o f this concept is 
attempted.
Technical multimodal transport is the physical transportation of goods from one place 
to other using different modes o f transport; this type of carriage was greatly 
encouraged by the prevalence of the use of containers.27 The advent of the sea 
containers actually provided the impetus for the further development o f multimodal 
transport. These containers were considered at that time to be the greatest innovation 
in the field of transportation of goods since the innovation of the steam engine, easing 
greatly the transfer of goods at interface points between modes and encouraging 
parties to use different and multiple modes. The main stay o f technical multimodal 
transport can be said to be the container, because although multimodal transport 
existed long before its introduction, its use only became widespread with 
containerisation. This was based on the fact that the physical act o f using containers 
safeguarded the goods and greatly reduced the risks o f loss and damage during 
carriage which at the time constituted the main problem in the transfer of goods at
27 Hugh M. Kindred, Mary R, Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997) pp. 12-13. In which the Container is viewed as a large metal box that can be loaded at the 
shippers premises to be carried by road, rail, container ships (and in some cases by air). During 
transportation the goods are not physically handled.
28 Plinio Manca, “The legal outline o f  carriage by containers [1968] 3 ETL 491. Containerisation 
changed the transport landscape in the 1960s. See also, Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, “International 
Ocean Shipping and Risk allocation for cargo loss, damage and delay” J Transt’I. L. & Policy p.4, 
Johnathan B.L.K, Jervell III, Anthony Perl, Patrick Sherry, Joseph S, Szyliow icz, “ Symposium on 
Intermodal Transportation; Intermodal Education in Comparative Perspective” (2000) 27 Transp. L.J. 
419 at p.420
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interface points between modes.29 Containerisation can in this way therefore be said
to be the cornerstone of a developing multimodal transport, accounting for the fact
that most multimodal transport contracts use the container as the physical unit in
which goods are transported, Bisset Stated that,30
“The theory o f  intermodal transport is based on the consolidation
o f several break-bulk units into a single interchangeable transportation unit
that can be carried via a combination o f  modes o f  transportation under
a single document and a single freight charge, from the shippers warehouse.
The container is the interchangeable unit, which it was hoped would 
Prove to be the integrating element o f  an intermodal system
Legal multimodal transport on the other hand is synonymous to contractual 
multimodal transport, in which one person contracts to transport goods from one place 
to another using more than one mode and accepts responsibility for the goods 
throughout this carriage.
1.3 THE DEFINITION OF MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT31
Although it can be argued that Multimodal transport is essentially the international 
carriage o f goods by more than one mode of transport during a single, seamless 
journey in which one carrier assumes legal and physical responsibility for the goods,
32there is no consensus definition of multimodal transport. Despite this generally used
29 Roger de Cadt, “The Container and the Overseas Trade”, [1968] ETL p.533. De Orchis, M.E. “ 
Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal muddle3 [1982] ETL p 691 .Simon Seymour, “ The Law o f  
Containers” (1974) JMLC p 564
30 Tallman Bisset, “ The operational Realities o f  Containerisation and the effect on the package 
limitation” Containerisation International (1988) p 26
31 Multimodal transport, combined transport, intermodal transport, integrated transport are synonymous 
and there is no basic difference in meaning. Multimodal transport is used in this work in imitation o f  
the United Nation Convention on International Multimodal Transport 1980. However De Wit, R, 
Multimodal Transport, Lloyds o f  London Press 1995, Para, 1.3 is o f  the opinion that multimodal 
transport differs slightly from combined transport, which is a term used to describe combinations in the 
same mode o f  transport. Intermodal transport is also used to describe this type o f  carriage although it is 
more prevalent in cases where goods are moved in the same unit unloaded for further transportation by 
another mode. TRANS/W P.24/2000/1 .Clarke, “ Multimodal transport in the new millennium” (2002) 1 
WMU Journal o f  Maritime Affairs p 71., UNCTAD Review o f  Maritime Transport 1997 (UNCTAD  
RMT(97/1)
32 W. Brad Jones, C. Richard Cassady, Royce O. Bowden, “Developing a standard definition o f  
Intermodal Transportation” (2000) 27 Transportation Law J. 345,
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definition the reality is based on the viewpoint of the definer.33 Different parties tend 
to define multimodal transport as a function of the particular activity there are 
involved in. Therefore, companies or entities involved in different modes define 
multimodal transport as a function of their modes. The Inland Transport Committee of 
The UNECE Secretariat defines “intermodal transport as where the major part o f  the 
European transport is by rail, inland waterway or sea and any initial and/or fina l legs 
carried out by road are as short as possible.” 34 This definition does not capture the 
essence of multimodal transport as it limits or specifies what it should be; by omitting 
air transport this definition falls short of a truly multimodal transport definition.
The Merriam-Webster defines [intermodal] transport as involving transportation by 
more than one form of carrier during a single journey.35
Diamond 36 defines multimodal transport as one “...that involves at least two different 
modes o f transport ”.
Xerri 37 defines [Combined Transport] as a contract "... whereby the carrier 
undertakes to transfer goods from  one place to another employing two or more modes 
o f transport ”. Likewise, Glass defines multimodal transport also in terms of multiple
o
modes used.
Rule 2(a)39 of the International Chamber of Commerce rules for a Combined 
Transport Document defines it as “the carriage o f  goods by at least two different 
modes o f  transport”. This stance is also followed in the United Nations Convention 
on Multimodal Transport 1980 Art ( l)40 where it is defined as “the carriage o f  goods 
by at least two different modes on the basis o f  a multimodal transport contract ”.
33 Ibid, p.346, see also the Eno Transportation Foundation “Top transport Issues in 1993” Results o f  a 
survey o f  major transportation Organisations for the first Annual Eno transportation leadership 
development conference, April 1993.
34 Terminology on Combined transport (Trans/W P.24/2000/A, 1.2.2000, Para 1.2) For the European 
railway industry, combined transport refers to bimodal transport by road and rail. 
(U NCTAD/SDD/M T7, Para. 64) CNC transport, a French company which carries multimodally also 
defines multimodal transport, as “the conveyance o f  goods via a combination o f  at least two transport 
modes within the same chain, during which there is no change in the container used for transport and in 
which the major parts o f  the journey are by rail, inland waterway, or by sea, whereas the initial and 
final part o f  the journey is by road and it is short as possible.” CNC transport, httpi/www.cnc- 
transport.com/uk/interrmodal/intermodal.html
35 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http:/www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
36 Diamond, supra note 12 at p35
37 Xerri, Supra note 12 at p 138
38 Glass, Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts (2004) P. 3
39 ICC Publication N o 298 [1975]
40 United Nations Conventions on International Multimodal Transport o f  Goods 1980, published in 
[1980] ETL, 361
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The general consensus from the five definitions of multimodal transport is that 
multimodal transport is defined in terms of the modes used. The conception here is 
that multimodal transport comprises of a ‘chain’ linking all the various modes into 
one contract.41 The question that presents itself here is the veracity of that assumption. 
A lot has been written about the controversy surrounding the definition and nature of 
the legal multimodal transport concept.42 At the centre o f this controversy is the need 
to explain the distinguishing features of multimodal transport, which differentiates it 
from uni modal transport.
So far three views have been advanced to explain the legal character of multimodal 
transport. Firstly, the most popular view regards multiplicity o f modes as its most 
distinguishing feature.43 According to this view, two or more modes of carriage have 
to be used for multimodal transport to be diagnosed. The second view regards 
multimodal transport as based on a non-specification of mode(s); according to this 
view there are instances in which some contracts are non specific as there are 
dissociated from the provisions of transport conventions.
The third view is that whenever modes are combined within a contractual framework; 
a new contract is formed which can no longer be regarded as a contract for each of the 
individual modes.
1.3.1 Multiplicity of Modes
The most widely use basis for defining multimodal transport is one that defines it in 
terms of multiple modes of transport.
Before analysing the implications of these various definitions it is imperative to 
understand what the concept of mode entails. Most definitions refer to “modes” and 
the question is what a mode is? What are the constitutive elements o f such a mode? Is 
the determinative criterion the conveyance (ship, truck or plane) or the method of 
carriage (air, sea, and road) or both?
41 Haak, supra note 20 p.3
42 Diamond, A, Liability o f  the carrier in Multi-modal transport’ in International Carriage o f  Goods: 
Some Legal Problems and Possible Solutions. Edited by C. Schmitthoff and R. Goode, 1988, London, 
p 35. M assey, E A, ‘A critical look at the TCM ’ (1971-72) 3 JMLC 725 Driscoll, W J, ‘The 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport: A Status report’ [1977] 9 JMLC 441. Xerri, A. 
‘Combined Transport: A new attempt at unification ‘[1980] Revue de D roit Uniforme, p i 38.
43 De Wit, R. Multimodal transport, (London 1995) at p. 18
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The Multimodal Transport Convention, 1980,44 Art 1(1) while defining multimodal 
transport as made up of multiple modes fails to define what a mode is, thereby leaving 
open the question o f what should constitute a mode. However, what were thought to 
be the existing modes were enumerated in the TCM,45 Art 1(2) as “Transport by sea, 
inland waterways, air, rail, and road”; without a determinative criterion as to what 
should constitute a mode in the future. From this restrictive definition, the conclusion 
to be drawn would be that the ranks of “mode” are closed, thereby eliminating any 
potential new means of carriage from qualifying as modes. Presently the increasing 
use of pipelines and barges in international transport highlights the question of modes: 
would these be modes?46 Within multimodal transport, this concept has been 
interpreted and supported variously, ranging from being based on the legal regime to 
the conveyance used.
1.3.1.1 Differentiation of Mode by Legal Regime
It has been suggested that the legal regime is the differentiating element in the 
determination of a mode of carriage47. The number of modes will thus be dependent 
on the number of legal regimes applicable to each contract o f carriage. It is asserted 
here that the use of a legal regime as a determinative factor is artificial, given that two 
different legal regimes might govern carriage carried on a single conveyance by a 
single carrier, or a single regime will apply although different carriers used different 
modes of carriage. For instance, a contract of carriage by road from one country to 
another, under the CMR might involve a situation in which two different modes are 
used; under Art. 2 (1) of the CMR if the vehicle is carried by sea unloaded, the CMR 
convention continues to apply. In such a case although that carriage is obviously 
[multimodal] carriage, only one legal regime is applicable. It is submitted here that 
this criteria is insufficient to define “mode”.
44 The United Nations defines a mode o f  carriage as the method o f  transport used for the movement o f  
goods e.g. by rail, road, sea or air. ECMT UNECE European Commission “Terminology on combined 
transport” www.cemt.org/online/glossaries/termcomb.pdf.
45 (TCM) Transport Combine de Marchandise, UN Doc Trans/370, see Massey, E A, ‘A Critical look at 
the TCM ’ (1971-2) 3 JMLC 725.
46 Mankadaby, ‘The Multimodal Transport Convention; A Challenge to Unimodal Transport’ (1983) 32 
1CLQ121 at 125
47 De Wit, R, Multimodal Transport, Lloyds o f  London Press, 1995 Par. 1.4
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This is a unimodal as well as a multimodal reality as laws have different scope of 
application and will always apply when the carriage falls within their scope of 
application.48
1.3.1.2 Differentiation of Mode by Conveyance
Conveyance is the traditional criterion used to differentiate mode: here ‘mode’ is seen 
as a method of carriage.49 This is due to the fact that transportation so far has been 
compartmentalised; and the different conveyances are associated with different types 
of carriages, i.e. ship-used in carriage by sea, planes-carriage by air, train-carriage by 
rail, and truck-carriage by road. Although this criterion is clear cut, it is not without 
ambiguities, i.e. Art 2 o f the CMR, states that the CMR governs carriage of goods 
carried by another conveyance, provided the goods are not off-loaded from the 
vehicle for such further carriage. Thus when a road vehicle is carried by sea, the CMR 
still applies and the carriage is considered to be carriage by road, although a ship and 
sea were also used.
1.3.1.3 Differentiation of Mode by Carriers
This distinction exists only in Italian Doctrine, where multimodal carriage is regarded 
as carriage involving two or more carriers involved in carrying the same unit load.50 
This means that multimodal carriage occurs whenever two carriers carried goods even 
when only one conveyance was used.51 This definition is also used by the Norfolk 
Southern, a rail provider, and defines [intermodal] as “the movement o f  trailers and 
container rail cars'”.52 This interpretation suggests only one mode o f carriage and 
therefore fails to capture the multimodal concept. This interpretation is therefore 
inappropriate.
48 Art 2 (1) o f  the CMR Art 2 (1) o f  the CMR
The conveyance used to transport goods has no status in multimodal transport. The MTO does not 
promise to carry by aircraft, ship, train or articulated road vehicle, he promises only to carry to a 
precise destination.
In unimodal transport, the underlying emphasis on conveyance is reiterated by the different 
conventions and is presumably an essential term o f  the contract in each case.
49 This is the definition favored by the United Nations multimodal transport handbook
50 This concept is usually understood as successive carriage
51 Xerri, supra note 12 p. 139. See also “Berlinbari ad Verruchi il Transporto combinato nueve 
problematiche’ in Terra di responsabilita e documentazione seminario sui Transporti Combinato, 
Geneva 1974, p. 17.
52 Intermodal for Norfolk Southern Corporation, http:/nscorp.com/nscorp/html/conrail/fmkbiner- 
over.html
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Within academia, De Wit53 contends that, the concept of mode is made up of two 
basic ingredients, the type of vehicle used and the medium used, one on its own 
cannot constitute mode and would not define efficiently the concept of multimodal 
transport.
Thus even within this concept in which multimodal transport is seen as dependent on 
the modes used, there is no universal standard by which modes are defined. What 
actually is a mode? It is a method of carriage, means of carriage, a branch of transport 
law or just a legal concept differentiating one type of carriage from another. The 
assertion here is that the use of mode as the determinative criteria in the definition in 
multimodal transport is based on the traditional forms of transport in which the 
different vehicles used in the transport was a determinative criteria, and not on any 
implications as to what multimodal transport was. This stance was supported by the 
regulation o f transportation along modal lines relating to the “hardware” rather than 
the “software” of transport.54 Each and every mode of transport was discussed in 
isolation, because exigencies of the time dictated that carriage was unimodal. 
However, the landscape o f transportation has changed from the case o f particular 
modes to contracts in which the emphasis is on “in time” deliveries as opposed to 
modes used.
1.3.2 Non-Multiplicity of Modes
Although the definition of Multimodal Transport highlights the fact that Multimodal 
transport is predicated on the potential use of two or more modes, there is no 
requirement that these modes be specified.55
This is because the specification of the mode of transport is not usually an essential 
requirement of the contract of carriage. The liberty to choose the modes used in the 
multimodal transport contract means that, most multimodal transport contracts will 
not include the mode(s) to be used.56 A distinction must here be made between a 
contract which specifies or clearly contemplates that particular mode(s) will be used 
and one in which the contract leaves open the choice of modes; although both might
53 De Wit Supra 46 Para 2.207, p. 171
54 Jan Ramberg, “The Future o f  Transport Operators and Service Providers,” [2004] 46 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law, 135 at p. 137
55 B Whebel, “The development o f  a combined transport document” [1972] 11 Diritto Marittimo 312, 
p.320
56 This liberty clause is essential in Multimodal transport.
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be multimodal transport, one would be restrictive as to the modes. This tendency of 
specifying the modes intended to be used is seen increasingly within unimodal 
transport contracts, in most cases the contract previews the use of another mode of 
transport and states it.57 While the other form, the non-specified method, is mostly 
found within Multimodal transport in which the carrier is not a unimodal carrier and 
does not need to specify any of the modes to be used. This may be the case in which 
the customer leaves the choice of carriage to the carrier. This non-specification of 
modes is what makes multimodal transport inherently different from unimodal 
transport.58
This second stand on the nature of multimodal transport, views it as an autonomous 
contract not based on the ‘chained’ concept. Early debate on the importance o f the use 
of different modes as a constitutive element in multimodal transport had 
conceptualised the issue of “modes” as one of little importance. The view here is that 
the multimodal transport concept is greater than the sum total o f the transport modes 
that might be chained together. It constitutes not only carriage but also all the 
activities that constitute total transportation; the promise to carry from A-B;59 
Ramberg states that
“It is not the combination o f various modes o f  transport as such that disconnects 
theContract from  existing international conventions, governing the respective 
branches o f  transport law, but rather the fact that the promise o f  transportation 
does not contain any reference to a particular mode ”60
Early recommendation on multimodal transport touched on the importance of 
modes. As far back as 1972,61 Lord Diplock had recommended that it might be 
better if the contract included a clause to the effect that the modes used were not 
stated. This question was also a moot point during the conference leading up to 
the TCM.62Stating the modes in the contract was not recommended on the ground 
that it would limit the freedom to choose mode(s) and limit the flexibility of the
57 This tendency is seen increasingly in Unimodal transport, a case in point is Quantum Corporation  v. 
Plane Trucking [2002] 2 L lo yd ’s. Rep 25.
58 Faber D “The problems arising from multimodal transport” [1996] LMVLQ 503 p. 504, Asariotis, 
European Commission, “Intermodal Transportation and the Carrier Liability” ( Report (1999), 5-11
59 Prof. K.F. Haak, The Harmonisation o f  Intermodal liability arrangements, 5th IVR Colloqium- 
Vienna, 27-28 January 2005 p.2
60 Ramberg; “Harmonisation o f  the Law o f  Carriage o f  Goods.” [1973] Scandinavian L R, p 312
61 Diplock (Lord), Genoa Conference on Multimodal Transport (1972) 74 Diritto Maritimo, pi 77.
62 Massey, supra, note 12 p 731
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carrier. The rationale behind this stance was that multimodal transport was not 
dependent on multiple modes, but was meant to address the problem of selecting 
the best mode o f transport or combination of modes when more than one mode 
can or should be used, thus to force carriers to choose would hamper the basic 
nature of multimodal transport.
This view was widely supported and gained such prominence that all multimodal 
transport contracts presently in use contain clauses to the effect that a choice as to 
the mode(s) to be used is not important.
Clause 6 (1) of COMBIDOC states that the “[CTO] is entitled to perform the 
transport. “...by any reasonable means, method and route ”.63 
The view expressed by this liberty clause has the effect o f endorsing the opinion 
that the critical feature o f multimodal transport is not multiple modes.
It is asserted here that the multimodal transport contract is basically one, which is 
non-specific and is dissociated from the particular modes of transport.64 These 
types of contracts are now hailed as the new types of transport contracts, which 
have overtaken the unimodal transport contract. It has been shown that within 
multimodal transport the cargo concern are less interested in specifying the modes 
to be used, content to let the carrier decide.65 Initially, shippers where quite 
happy with concluding contracts on particular modes of carriage; road, sea, air or 
rail, but with the development of modem ways of carrying, the mode of carriage 
has become irrelevant. The customer is content to conclude a non-specified modal 
transport contract.66 The move is now towards transport logistics, and the focus is 
on ensuring that goods are carried from one point to another through a 
combination of all the necessary ancillary services needed for the transport 
operation. These ancillary services o f warehousing, storage, distribution etc are 
now amalgamated within one contract with the MTO. It becomes increasingly 
obvious that the constructs of unimodal transport can no longer be implemented 
when such a variety o f services are concerned.
63 See also FIATA Combined transport document clause 12, “ The reserves to h im self the liberty as to 
the means, route and procedure to be followed”
64 Whebel B, “ The Development o f  the Combined Transport Document” [1972] II Diritto Marittimo, 
312, p.320
65 UNCTAD Doc, “Institutional and technological changed in transport/Logistic Field” (4th March 
1999) U NCTAD/SDTE/TIB/3, 5.
66 Ramberg J, Supra note 59 p 137
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The problem here is that, at the time of concluding such a contract, the parties 
would not know what liability regime would apply under the current framework of 
applicable regimes in multimodal transport. This is what has come to be known as 
the “multimodal transport problem”, where different transport conventions might 
apply to different aspects of the same contract. No such difficulty would apply if 
these conventions were limited to unimodal transport within their modes, because, 
they apply also to potential multimodal contracts once carriage commences a 
conflict situation might arise. Such a conflict is bound to arise whenever in 
exercise of such a liberty, only one mode of carriage is used. In such a case is the 
contract redefined as unimodal, or does it stay multimodal, although it was 
executed as unimodal? The mandatory application of most international 
conventions, ensure that such contracts may be subjected to a specific law once a 
mode is chosen to effect transport, and in cases where multimodal transport is 
used a “network” of laws become applicable. This issue was dealt with in the 
Montreal Convention 1999, under Art. 18 of the convention, all modes used will 
be deemed to be carriage by air if the contract reflects only intended carriage by 
air. The solution here is that the contract is determinative.67 
Under German legislation,68 the opposite view was taken, that once a mode is 
used which is different from the contractual mode, the regime applicable is that of 
the mode used not contracted. This view also reflects the question of 
nomenclature, can the parties derogate from a particular law by calling the 
contract something else?
In Street v. Moutford 69the question before the House of Commons was whether a 
“licence was really a licence and not a tenancy. If it was a tenancy it was subject 
to the Rents Act, but not if  it was a licence.
Lord Templeton was of the opinion that
“...If the agreement satisfied all the requirements o f  a tenancy, then the 
agreement produced a tenancy and the parties cannot alter the effect o f  the 
agreement by insisting that they only created a licence ”.
67 Art 18 reads as follow s, “ If a carrier, without the consent o f  the consignor, substitutes carriage by 
another mode o f  transport for the whole or part o f  a carriage intended by the agreement between the 
parties to be carriage by air, such carriage by another mode o f  transport is deemed to be within the 
period o f  carriage by air”
68 German Supreme Court, Subsection 413 H.G.B., 13th October 1983, Vers. R, 1984, 680, Transp. R, 
1984, 172
69 (1989) AC 809
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In carriage of goods the academic opinion favours the stance taken by The 
Montreal Convention, that the carrier has the freedom to choose the modes of 
transport and there is no reason why his liability should vary according to how he 
exercises this option; what applies is the contract choice.
De Wit interprets this clause as tailor made to cater for situations in which 
although the contract is multimodal its execution is eventually unimodal to 
preserve the integrity of the multimodal contract.70
The outcry against such an interpretation is based on its ability to allow 
circumvention of unimodal conventions, but it is highly unlikely that parties 
would seek to choose multimodal transport to circumvent any unimodal 
conventions.71
The increasing response to the problem within academia is that dismissal of the 
predominance o f modes in multimodal transport might have been mistaken. Firstly 
Glass72cautions that it is indeed “difficult to think away the modal association'1 or to 
draw a “bright line”73 in multimodal transport, for once one defines it in terms of 
modal non-subjectivity one is in the realms of unspecified contracts. 74 
It is contended here that this thinking is flawed. Multimodal transport is different from 
unimodal transport not because it entails two or more modes o f carriage. The concept 
of through carriage also entails two or more modes of transport but it is not called 
multimodal transport. The distinguishing feature of this mode is the fact that it does 
not specify that a particular mode of transport will be used. It is this liberty to use 
different modes unspecified that disconnects this mode from unimodal transport. 
Once the modes to be used are stated at the beginning of the contract, we find 
ourselves within the realms of unimodal transport, especially in light o f recent 
developments in case law. A case in point is the Quantum case75.
70 De Wit R, M ultimodal Transport, Lloyds o f  London Press, 1995 Para 1.4; Erik Rose., ‘The 
application o f  the Convention for the Carriage o f  Goods for Multimodal Transport’ 1988 LMCLQ 316 
& 329
71 De Wit, supra note 69
72 Glass; Multimodal transport, in Yates, International Contracts for the carriage o f  goods, 1996, Lloyds 
o f  London Press 6.4.1.3.
73 Glass, “Meddling in Multimodal Muddle? -a  network o f  conflict in the UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on the Carriage o f  Goods [wholly or partly] [by sea] [2006] JBL 307 p.315
74 Jan Ramberg, A paper presented in a seminar on multimodal transport in Ravenna June 1996, 
organised by the chamber o f  commerce in association with the Mediterranean Maritime Arbitration 
Association. See also R olf Herber, “Towards the Harmonisation o f  carriers liability (1992) 94 11 Diritto 
Marittimo 935. For a contrary view  see Ramberg, “Harmonisation o f  the law o f  Carriage o f  Goods 
[1973] Scandinavian L.R. p.312
75 Quantum v. Plane Trucking [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25
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1.3.2 A NEW CONTRACT
The third view is that whenever, modes are combined within a contractual framework; 
a new contract is formed which can no longer be regarded as a contract for each of the 
individual modes. This stance is the logical follow-on from the non-modally specified 
contracts. The logic here is that such multimodal transport contracts should be 
considered to be different from unimodal transport contracts. The Quantum case has 
modified this stance which is the most logical way of viewing multimodal transport.76 
In the case, the court considered that a multimodal transport operation might have two 
separate aspects where it would be possible to combine liability systems from 
different modes of transport.
In the case, the contract was for the carriage of goods from Singapore to Dublin under 
an air waybill. The first part was to be for the carriage by air from Singapore to Paris 
and the second part was by road from Paris to Dublin. During this carriage, goods 
where lost through theft preventing the goods from reaching their destination. At first 
instance, the court held that, The CMR did not apply to the contract, as Art. 1(1) of 
the CMR was limited to road contracts, therefore it was the nature o f the contract that 
must be examined, and that since there was a single air contract o f carriage pursuant 
to which the goods were carried from Singapore to Dublin the CMR was inapplicable. 
This reason was rejected on appeal.
The arguments were stated as,
“The CMR was applicable to an international road leg o f  a large contract where, (a) 
the carrier may have promised unconditionally to carry by road and on a trailer , (b) 
the carrier may have promised this but reserved either a general or limited option to 
elect fo r  some other means o f  carriage fo r  all or part o f  the way or (c) the carrier may 
have left the means o f  transport open either entirely or as between a number o f  
possibilities at least one o f  them being carriage by road; CMR was also applicable 
where the carrier may have undertaken to carry by some other means but reserved 
either a general option to carry by road. ”77
76 ibid
77 ibid at p. 39
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“CMR should apply to the whole o f  any multimodal transport regardless o f  whether 
any non- road leg was conducted by roll-on, roll-ojf transport; overall characteristics 
o f the whole contract would be to take agreed international road carriage outside any 
convention (Warsaw or CMR) in circumstances where the contract overall could not 
be characterised as primarily fo r  road carriage; and it would be inconsistent with the 
general European approach; contract would by their nature or terms two separate
78aspects and the present, despite the length o f  the air leg was ju st such a contract ’’ 
Mance L.J proceeded on the grounds that to characterise this contract otherwise 
would open up the “prospect o f  metaphysical arguments about the essence o f the 
contract, arguments best avoided’’79
80Most commentators on the CMR agree with this stance , on the grounds that any 
criteria based on the length of the carriage will add another dimension to the CMR. 
The approach of the Quantum case seems to be that the CMR would prevail under 
circumstances where the contract was not primarily for road carriage; thereby 
bringing the CMR in conflict with different conventions. O f particular note would be 
the position of the UNCITRAL draft instrument Vis-a Vis the CMR in the light of this 
case, because the scope of application of the draft instrument will coincide with that 
of this interpretation. It will be difficult to be able to state when one will apply as 
opposed to another. A case in point will be the carriage of goods from the UK to Italy; 
the first leg is for the carriage of goods to Dover and then by road to Italy. In this 
case, the Draft instrument will cover the whole carriage so would the CMR. In this 
light conflict would always exist in such cases.
A more conducive decision in the case of multimodal transport would have been the 
decision at first instance, which clearly sought to differentiate unimodal transport 
from multimodal transport. This stance coincides with the modem form of carriage in 
which it is the contract, which should be examined.
What should be clear is that multimodal transport should not be regulated using 
unimodal concepts as this will lead to conflict within laws. This provides ample 
reason for insisting on the non-specification of modes in multimodal transport
78 ibid p. 41
7y ibid, p 62
80 Clarke, International Carriage o f  Goods by Road: CMR (4th ed,. 2003) Para 15, Clarke, “The line in 
Law between Land and Sea”[2003] JBL 522, Theunis, International Carriage o f  goods by Road (CMR) 
London, 1987), p. 247
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contracts as any foray into mode specification undoubtedly will lead to the application 
of unimodal conventions and possible conflict of conventions.
1.4 An Evaluation of Multimodal transport
Arguably, the question that needs to be answered is whether the term multimodal 
transport is the right term to address the new way in which goods are carried today. 
Using the term multimodal invokes the concept of multiple modes and perpetuates the 
view that the industry is made up of different modes whose differences are more 
important than the overall carriage concept. This view which is widely accepted 
within the industry and academia today seems archaic given that the industry is 
changing into a highly integrated transport system.
During the first part o f the last century, the different modes carried goods on their 
own terms under their respective conventions which laid down basis liability rules. 
Containerisation has changed all that, now the focus has shifted from modal carriage 
to multimodal carriage.81 This trend is reflected within transportation itself in which 
shippers are no longer interested in modes but on timely deliveries.
The way goods are carried has been modified and maybe the term multimodal 
transport should also be modified to reflect the new concept by a more appropriate 
term which places emphasis on the basic embodiment of multimodal transport which 
is continuity. This of course will be wishful thinking as a change of name will not 
solve the Multimodal transport problem. However, even if such a name change was 
effectuated modalism will continue to play an important role in transportation. (The 
rich transportation history that exists is based on individual modes.) Recognising the 
force of this history and the attachment different parties have to their respective 
modes might explain why so far no attempts have been made to move beyond 
unimodal concepts to a concept that is free from modal attachments even in defining 
multimodal transport.
A closer look at the literature in transportation, paints a picture in which each mode 
stretches to accommodate multimodal transport. The changes in the way goods are 
being carried today calls for a change of thinking; away from modes. The reality of
81 Authur Donovan, “Intermodal transportation in Historical perspective” (2000)27 Transportation Law 
Journal 317 at p.318
82 See Art 2 CMR, Art 38 Montreal Convention for the carriage o f  Goods by air.
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multimodal transport shows that this is possible. Conceptually, this is one of the 
strengths of multimodal transport and deserves to be capitalised on. Multimodal 
transport has obviously departed from the attachment to modes; now calls should be 
centred on modal non-subjectivity in which modes are not mentioned. This obviously 
is the future of transportation.
1.5 THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CONTRACT
The multimodal transport contract is a contract whereby a single carrier, the 
multimodal transport operator, undertakes the carriage o f goods from one place to an 
ultimate destination with the possibility of using any mode or combination of modes
83against the issuance of a single transport document. *
The Multimodal Transport Convention 1980 defines the contract as one
“Whereby the [MTO] Multimodal Transport operator undertakes against the 
payment o f  freight to perform or procure the performance o f  international
tt84multimodal transport”
The ICC Rules for a Combined Transport document defines it as a
“Contract to carry and/or to procure the performance o f  [International] 
multimodal transport”.85 What inures from these definitions is the fact that this 
contract is not a contract to carry per se as found in unimodal transport, but a 
contract to effect carriage either by carrying or procuring or bo th86
1.5.1 THE ELEMENTS OF THE CONTRACT
The payment of freight and the international nature of the contract are common traits 
in all international contracts for the carriage of goods, and as such do not hold a 
special place in multimodal transport.
83 Xerri, A., supra note 12 at p 138, defines multimodal contracts as contracts, whereby the carrier 
undertakes to transfer goods from one place to another employing two or more modes o f  transport. This 
definition which lays emphasis on two or more modes o f  transport is concurred by Diamond QC, supra 
note 2 pp 35-37
84 Art 1 (3), o f  the UN Multimodal Transport Convention 1980
85 Rule 2 (b) ICC Publication N° 298, Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport Document.
86 The ICC Rules prefers the terms “and/or” between carry and procure, while the United Nations 
Conventions shows preference for “or” between carry and procure.
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The elements, from which different legal consequences flow, arise from the fact that 
the contract is to carry and or to procure carriage.
1.5.1.1 CONTRACT TO CARRY OR PROCURE
The Multimodal Transport Convention, the ICC Rules and the ICC/UNCTAD Rules 
on multimodal transport and all the contracts that incorporate these Rules have as a
87common element, the fact that the contract is to carry or to procure carriage.
This gives the MTO a wide margin; he can carry or procure carriage.
1. He can contract to carry
2. He can contract as a principal to procure carriage
3. He can contract to carry and procure
1.5.1.2 CONTRACT TO CARRY
The multimodal transport operator will contract to carry the goods to their final 
destination irrespective of actual carriage on his part. He takes on himself the physical 
and legal responsibility to ensure that the goods are carried to their final destination.
1.5.1.3 CONTRACT TO PROCURE
Initially procuring transport was the traditional domain of the freight forwarder as 
agents for shippers. For this reason a person who procured carriage was not 
considered to be a carrier under any of the conventions, as these conventions covered 
only contracts of carriage.
In multimodal transport procurement is placed on the same level as carriage and the 
fact that a person only procures carriage, will not affect his status as a carrier neither 
will it make any legal difference to the liabilities of the parties. Whether he contracts 
only to “procure” or to “carry” the MTO has the same responsibility as the carrier.88
1.5.1.4 CONTRACT TO CARRY AND PROCURE
87 Art 1(3) o f  the Multimodal transport Convention 1980
88 Schmitthoff, C, “The development o f  the Combined Transport Document” (1972) 74, II Diritto 
M arittimo, p 312
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The MTO can contract to do both: Carry and Procure. In this case he will carry over 
part of the carriage contract and procure the parts that he does not carry to others, 
but at all times being responsible for the goods under the contract until they are 
delivered at destination.89
The mandate to procure carriage is one of the elements that effectively differentiates 
multimodal transport from unimodal transport where the contract is usually only to 
carry goods. The importance of multimodal transport and the influence it has on 
unimodal transport is now influencing the concept of the carrier. 90 
The discussions and debates within unimodal transport now are including the 
concept o f the performing carrier as opposed to being limited to the contracting 
carrier; this is a reflection of the reality of multimodal transport within 
transportation generally. The Draft Convention on the carriage of goods by sea 
proposed by the UNCITRAL91 includes the concept of the performing carrier. It 
defines it as,
“A person who performs, undertakes to perform, or 
Procures to be performed any o f  a contracting carrier’s 
Responsibilities under a contract o f  carriage, at the request 
Of, or under the supervision or control of, the contracting 
Carrier, regardless o f whether that person is a party to,
Or identified in, or has legal responsibility under the 
Contract o f  carriage. ”
The performing carrier concept in unimodal transport acknowledges the 
importance of procuring carriage but does not go as far as to combine the two 
functions in one person.
1.5.2 THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT
89 Early transport cases clearly emphasised the divide between carrying and procuring carriage. Jones v 
European and G eneral Express (1920) 4 LiL. Rep 127 (CA), H eskell v Continental Express (1950) 83 
LiL. Rep 443 at 445
90 See Chapter 3 on the liable party under multimodal transport
91 See the report o f  the Commission at its thirty -third session, 2 June 2000, General Assembly Official 
Records, fifty-fifth session, Supplement No. 17 (A/55/17)
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From the definition of the contract, we see that the contract is to effect carriage from 
the place o f delivery to the place of destination in a situation in which more than one 
mode of carriage [may] be used. This contract could be executed using many modes, 
but it is a single contract between the consignor and the multimodal transport operator 
for carriage to a particular destination. It is not a chain o f contracts glued together to 
which different provisions in different unimodal conventions will apply. This contract 
is a seamless contract evidenced by one document irrespective o f who has the goods 
for carriage.
What makes this contract different is not the fact that two or more modes of carriage 
may be used, but the fact that it does not depend on the mode(s) to be used. This 
contract is based on a modal objectivity and not the modal subjectivity of unimodal 
contracts. The multimodal transport contract, which states the modes to be used is not
92a new innovation, it has always been a part of transportation. This is epitomised in 
the different provisions found under unimodal contracts catering for such contracts. 
Such contracts must be distinguished from the true multimodal transport contract, for 
while
Such contracts fall under the scope of application of unimodal transport 
conventions, the true multimodal transport does not,93 though some of these 
conventions cater for limited multimodal transport.
Art 31 of the Warsaw Convention states that
“In the case o f  combined carriage performed partly by any other mode o f  
carriage, the provision o f  this convention shall apply only to the carriage by 
air provided that the carriage by air falls within the terms o f  Art 1 .” 94 
The above provision means that only the part of the contract performed by air 
is governed by the Warsaw Convention, any other mode included will have to 
look elsewhere. This point was forcefully made at first instance in The
92 Stafford Allen & Son Ltd  v Pacific Steam Navigation Company [1956] \ \A o y d \K c p A 9 5 ,Crawford  
Law  v. Allan Lines [1912] AC 130, M oore v Harris [1870] 1 AC 318, Lufty L td  v Canadian Pacific 
Railway Co [1974] 1 L loyd’s Rep 106.
93 Erling Selvig, “Through carriage o f  goods by sea” (1979) 20 AJCL p 369.
94
The Warsaw Convention for the Unification o f  Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air
12 Oct 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol o f  1955.
The Warsaw Convention for the Unification o f  Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air
12 Oct 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol o f  1955
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Quantum case95 where the judge interpreted a contract in which the carriage 
was to be performed in two stages, by air and road as “essentially and 
predominantly” a contract for the carriage of goods by air, but held that the 
Warsaw convention could not apply to the road portion of the carriage.
Similarly, Act 2 (1) of the CMR, however, states that
“ Where the vehicle containing goods is carried over part o f  the 
journey by sea, rail, inland waterways or air.... and the goods are not 
unloaded from  the vehicle, this convention shall nevertheless apply to 
the whole o f  the carriage” 96 
This goes a little further than the Warsaw Convention, because it covers multimodal 
transport to the extent that another conveyance is used, for instance, a ship or a plane 
carries the vehicle. This is a common situation when goods are carried in a ferry from 
France to Britain, and the goods are not unloaded. However if under Article 2 the 
goods are damaged or loss through an act, which is exclusively considered to be due 
to sea carriage, the liability of the carrier will be determined by the sea convention 
applicable. Thus although multimodal carriage in the sense of two different methods 
of carriage is performed, the contract is governed by the CMR only to the extent that 
damage was caused during road carriage.
Neither the Hague Rules nor yet the Hague Visby Rules contain provision for 
multimodal transport.
The Hamburg Rules Art 1 (6) does so, it states that the,
“Contract which involves carriage by sea and also carriage by some other 
means is deemed to be a contract o f  carriage by sea fo r  the purpose o f  this convention 
only in so fa r  as it relates to carriage by sea ” 97
Under the CIM “Regular road and shipping services which are complementary to 
railway service and on which international traffic is carried to be included in the list
95 [2001] All E R 916, p.926, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 133, reversed [2002] EWCA Civ 350; [2002] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 25
96 (CMR) Convention for the International Carriage o f  Goods by Road, May 1956.
Transport.
97 Hamburg Rules (1978)
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referred to in Art 1” 98 are also covered by the convention, provided Art 48 is met. Art 
48 states that
"In rail, sea transport by the services referred to... each states may by 
requesting that a suitable note be included in the list o f  lines to which the convention 
applies ”.
The rail provision may be said to regulate multimodal transport more than any of the 
other convention, because a contracting state may by including road and sea services 
to the list make the CIM a multimodal type convention, as the CIM would regulate 
those other modes as if they were carriage by rail.
As seen above, each convention, though purporting to regulate multimodal transport, 
applied only to carriage performed under its scope of application and does not extend 
to other modes. This is very unsatisfactory because
(1) It allows documentary cover without the concomitant liability cover for the 
same contract.
(2) It allows a situation in which different legal regimes become potentially 
applicable to the same contract and
(3) It is deceptive in that with the exception of the Hamburg Rules they come 
under the heading of multimodal or combined transport giving the impression that 
they actually cover multimodal transport, which they do not.
It must be stressed here that the provisions in unimodal transport conventions do not 
solve the multimodal transport problems; their main aim is to ensure that they resolve 
the problems of multimodal transport contracts within their modes.99
The absence of a mandatory applicable regime in multimodal transport means that 
standard terms in the contract will dictate the obligations and liabilities of the parties. 
Multimodal transport is conducted mostly on the basis of standard form contracts 
issued unilaterally by the carrier (MTO); this usually means that the contract turns to 
be more favourable to the carriers. Thus arguably, the carrier can exclude liability 
arising from certain functions or parts of the contract performed by other carriers. 
Thus a cargo owner who engages the MTO to transport his goods under a multimodal
98 coTIF/CIM (Convention for the International Carriage o f  Goods by R a il) 1956 and 1980.
99 See Chap 2
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transport contract may find that the MTO is not liable for the whole carriage.100 The 
absence of such a mandatory standard for the contract might seem to pose difficulties 
in this mode. 101
A burning and pertinent issue within multimodal transport is the status o f the contract. 
Is it a contract “sui generic”, essentially different from unimodal transport contract, or 
is it a “chain contract” bridging the different unimodal transport contracts constituting 
it?102 This question is usually at the heart of any enquiry as to conflicts with other 
conventions. There are generally two arguments to support this principle.
The different legal opinions are based on two main facets.
(1) Firstly that the contract being a combination o f modes is dependent on 
modal rules and thus not sui generis.
(2) Secondly that because the contract is non-mode specific by nature it is 
not a contract of carriage but of procurement and therefore is not a 
contract of carriage sui generis.
The first group of legal commentators led by De Wit,103 while stating that multimodal 
transport is a mode of transport, and affirming the belief that the means o f carriage is 
less significant to the overall contract, concedes that once a carrier elects to use a 
particular mode, the contract is automatically subjected to the specific legal rules 
appropriate to that mode(s).
He is of the opinion that the contract is basically one of carriage. The MTO, who 
carries under a particular mode, does so in an additional capacity as carrier and should 
be subjected to the appropriate mandatory regime.
Led by Lord Diplock,104 those who hold that the contract is one o f procurement and 
not “sui generis” use conflict avoidance with other transport conventions as their 
reason.
100 It is hoped that market forces w ill ensure that the terms will be fair otherwise cargo concerns will 
take their business elsewhere.
101 These difficulties are not insurmountable, as the cargo concerns and insurers could put pressure on 
carriers by examining the contractual terms on offer and rejecting unreasonable ones.
102 E Selvig, “ The background to the convention “, Multimodal transport, The 1980 UN Convention, 
papers o f  a one day Seminar held at Southampton University Faculty o f  Law, 12th September 1980, A 
17; See also, David A Glass, “Meddling in the multimodal transport muddle? A network o f  conflict in 
the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage o f  Goods [wholly or partly] [by sea], [2006]
LMCLQ 307 p .3 13
103 De Wit., Multimodal Transport (1995) para 2.207
104 Lord Diplock, “The Genoa Seminar” (1972) II Diritto Marittmo p 179
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Lord Diplock states that the contract should be one to procure transport to reduce the 
risk of conflict with national laws, recommending that the MTO should restrict 
himself to “Storing the goods in containers (stuffing and stripping). Storing the loaded 
containers at intermodal points and transferring them from one mode o f transport to 
another”.
Lord Diplock believed that it would be preferable if the Multimodal carrier were a 
separate legal entity, separate from any of the carriers who physically execute the 
carriage. His Lordship’s statement, beyond indicating a personal disposition against 
the contract being one of carriage, isolates the aspect of the contract that in 
Schmitthoff s 105 opinion has impeded its acceptance as a separate contract. 
Schmitthoff s view is that, this contract is one of procurement of transport, the MTO’s 
duty being the use of reasonable care in the selection of « actual» carriers. Thus as a 
contract of procurement, he states that the different mandatory conventions would not 
apply to it.
More than any other feature, the fear of conflict has contributed to this confusion in 
multimodal transport. The analytical point of departure however is found within the 
conventions themselves, where by their own provisions they expressly exclude from 
their scope of application multimodal transport contracts. Thus, on the basis of the 
very conventions by which the multimodal contracts conflict they are excluded.106
While Diplock is o f the opinion that the Multimodal contract is not a contract of 
carriage sui generis, and Schmitthoff that it is not a contract of carriage at all, the 
multimodal transport contract is a contract sui generis and a contract of carriage. It is 
a contract of carriage because by the freedom of contract recognised under English 
law, the parties are free to contract on any terms agreeable to them, and as such the 
parties are free to state that their contract is for carriage or not, and from the nature of 
the contract there is no reason why such a restriction would be placed on the
105 Schmitthoff, “The Development o f  the Combined Transport Document” (1972) II Diritto Marittimo, 
312 p 314
106 Art 31 o f  the Warsaw Convention states that the Warsaw Convention would apply to any phase o f  a 
multimodal contract. The implication is that it will apply to the carrier by air when he executes the air 
phase but not to other modes o f  carriage (Article 1) Similarly Art 2 o f  the CMR deals with multimodal 
transport in circumstances in which goods are not unloaded.. In this case the contract though stating 
that other modes will be used is not a multimodal but a unimodal contract, with the promise that the 
vehicle must be carried unloaded
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multimodal transport contract. However, in spite of hostile academic opinion as to the 
status or the contract as sui generis, and the lack of judicial pronouncement on this, 
the majority of the countries in attendance at the United Nations Conference for the 
Convention on international multimodal transport, were of the opinion that the 
contract was “sui generis”.107
This was based on the fact that the multimodal transport was increasingly being seen 
as separate from unimodal transport with a separate legal regime, and thus no conflict 
was apparent.
A small group of countries were however not convinced that such a legal separation 
was possible, in the light of mandatory regimes applicable to the different sections of 
a multimodal carriage. To put their fears to rest, Art 30 (4) and Art 38 were passed to 
ensure a clear separation. (The provisions on non- derogation o f other international 
conventions, and the respect of rights and obligations secured under these 
conventions)108
The main premise here remains that the MT contract is a contract “sui generis”, this 
interpretation will per se break the link that this contract potentially has with 
unimodal transport.
It is contended here that this argument is tenable especially when examined from the 
basic tenets of multimodalism.
1.5.3 THE STATUS OF THE CONTRACT WITHIN UNIMODAL 
CONVENTIONS
The main thrust of academic and judicial opinion is that, unimodal transport 
conventions apply only to contract of carriage in their relevant modes.
Art 1 of the CMR refers to contracts for the carriage o f goods by road, Art 1 of the 
Warsaw Convention, “carriage of goods by air” and defines carriage in Art 1 (b) as an 
agreement to carry, while Art 1 and (b) of the Hague-Visby Rules also applies to 
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.
The multimodal transport contract is none of the above, it is a contract to effect 
carriage with the possibility of using a combination of modes or only one mode, and
107 E Selvig, supra note 101
108 See Chapter 4 which looks at the Convention
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as such does not fall within the ambit of these rules. Additionally the fact that the 
contract in some cases is one of procurement also brings the MTO outside the ambit 
of international mandatory provisions, although these unimodal conventions might 
well apply to contracts of procurement in instances in which an original contract of 
carriage becomes a contract of procurement. In Ulster Swift V. Taunton,109 the CMR 
carrier, decided to sub-contract the whole carriage to another carrier, and did not carry 
over any part of carriage. He was held to be the carrier and the contract one of 
carriage under the CMR, although only as successive carrier (Art 34) because he had 
contracted to carry, it was stated to be irrelevant how the contract was executed. This 
stems from the fact that the actual execution of the contract o f carriage is not in itself 
significant what is decisive is the classification under which carriage is effected
However, a multimodal transport contract in which the carrier contracts to carry as 
opposed to procure carriage, will not make the contract a unimodal contract, even if he 
carries exclusively by one mode, for the CMR like the Warsaw Convention, the CIM 
and the Hague Rules, apply only to contracts of carriage in their particular modes. The 
important element is the fact of the contract of carriage, thus the multimodal transport, 
which is carried using a single unimodal mode, does not change its status.
A corollary to this is the fact that a unimodal transport which is performed 
multimodally or by a different mode of transport does not make the contract multimodal 
and subjects it to the appropriate rules of either the multimodal regime or the other 
transport regime. When this happens, it brings into focus rules as to deviation from the 
original mode found in the contract.
1.5.3.1 DEVIATION BY MODE IN UNIMODAL TRANSPORT
The lack of adequate judicial opinion on modal diversion in unimodal transport as 
opposed to geographical diversion is down to the fact that it does not affect the 
applicability of the particular unimodal convention.
For instance a contract envisages the application of Art 2 of the CMR under which the 
goods should not be un-loaded from the vehicle for carriage by another mode, but the
109 (1977) 1 Lloyds Report 346 (CA)
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carrier unloads the vehicle. In this case, the CMR would be inapplicable per se because 
the goods were unloaded from the vehicle, and the carrier is in breach o f his contract to 
carry without unloading. However, it would be right to hold him liable under the CMR 
because
The CMR by Art 41 is non-derogatory to the detriment of the claimant and 
The carrier is in breach of his contract of carriage.
The parties did not enter into a contract with a liberty clause, but one under the CMR, 
which the claimant expects, will regulate their relationship.110
In a German case, the contract was for the carriage by road, but the carrier used rail to 
effect carriage.111 It was held that the law applicable as between carrier and consignor 
was the road convention, despite rail carriage, on the basis that a carrier by his breach 
cannot be allowed to be in a better position than he would have been had he performed 
the contract correctly.
Similarly in O.L.G. Bremen112 it was held that the Warsaw Convention continued to 
apply even though no air carriage was actually used, as the contract was for the carriage 
of goods by air. If it was held that the Warsaw Convention did not apply, we will find 
ourselves in a situation in which no transport convention will apply, because the CMR 
expressly states that it applies only to contracts of carriage by road, and this was not one 
for the carriage of goods by road, and thus fell outside the ambit o f application of the 
CMR.
The position of the claimant under the road regime was more favourable than under the 
air regime. The court allowed the claimant to recover under the road regime, on the 
grounds that the carrier should not be put in a better position, because o f the breach. 
Lord Atkin in Hain S.S.Co Ltd V. Tate &Lyle expressed a similar point of view.//J 
It is submitted here that, this is the right approach, for to endorse the implication of the 
German Supreme Court case would lead to unpredictability of the applicable legal 
regime when the contract is being concluded, because this will depend ultimately on the 
decision o f the carrier and not by the law that was envisaged by both parties.
110 See also Art 18 o f  The Montreal Convention 1999
'"Bundesgerichtohof BGH Vers R 13 Oct 1983, 1984 680. Transport R, 1984, 17, MDR 1985 125
112 OL G Hamburg, 2nd May 1985. Transport R, 1985, 425-428.
113 (1936) 55 Lloyds Law Report 159 (HL)
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It can however be argued that the decision in that case was meant as a deterrent to 
carriers for arbitrarily changing the modes envisaged and should not be taken as an 
indication of a trend in transportation.
Additionally, it is doubtful if any international convention would apply in such a case. 
For neither the CMR, the Hague-Visby Rules, nor the CIM/COTIF would apply to the 
fact of carriage without the appropriate contract and documentary formality, this leads 
us to the inevitable conclusion that in such cases no convention would be applicable, 
leaving the determination of the applicable law to the law of the forum.
1.5.4.2 DEVIATION BY MODE IN MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
While the liberty to choose modes adversely affects unimodal transport, it is the basis 
on which multimodal transport is built. It is “the distinguishing character” of 
multimodal transport and all existing contracts contain it. Even the Multimodal 
Transport Convention emphasises this liberty to choose and to change modes, in 
addition to stating that the parties have a right to choose between unimodal and 
multimodal transport.
Because of the liberty to choose modes the problems faced in unimodal transport due 
to deviation by mode does not exist in multimodal transport. This liberty is “all 
important” and is an off-spin of the flexibility of multimodal transport in which the 
MTO contracts to carry goods to their destination without specifying how the goods 
will be carried.
There are however cases in which the modes are specified and the question here is 
whether a deviation from the specified mode would lead to a penalty. The answer 
however is no! The freedom makes it possible for such a liberty to be exercised with 
utmost care, so that an MTO who uses a mode of transport which is so incompatible 
with the article carried should be liable for any loss or damage occasioned to the 
goods, as that will exhibit negligence thereby affecting his right to exceptions.
Such a contention would only be relevant in cases in which the claimants, sole 
contention is that the damage or loss was caused only as a result o f a wrong choice of 
mode, in which case the burden of proof will be on him. An example o f such a case 
would be a case in which the MTO has an option, for example, air or road, and he 
chooses road in a situation in which the terrain is so rough that any reasonable carrier 
would have known that loss would likely occur, and had he chosen air carriage no
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such loss might have been sustained. The liberty must thus be exercised with utmost 
care, but not to the point o f defeating the purpose of the contract.40 
This liberty to choose and change modes makes the multimodal contract different 
from unimodal contracts and makes Unimodal Conventions inapplicable to them per 
se. If the alternative were true and the Unimodal Convention were applicable to the 
Multimodal contract ex priopro vigore, we will be in a situation in which all these 
conventions would be potentially applicable, only waiting for the claim to be initiated 
to be triggered. This situation is however clarified by the Convention, which by 
stating their scope of application excludes the multimodal transport contract 
implicitly.
1.6 Conclusion
Although multimodal transport is invariably performed using unimodal transport, 
multimodal transport is basically different from unimodal transport. The use of 
unimodal solutions and concepts to solve multimodal transport is predicated on the 
fact that multimodal transport is viewed as made up of unimodal modes. This chapter 
has shown that the very nature of multimodal transport disconnects it from any 
notions that are unimodal.
Multimodal transport is increasingly being viewed as a new “species” of the transport 
contract, because it entails much more than carriage. It unites under a single contract 
of carriage the entire spate of ancillary contracts needed to carry goods from one place 
to another. In this light the solutions and constructs o f unimodal transport cannot cater 
for this new and enlarged transport mode.
Similarly, the unimodal transport conventions per se exclude this new carriage species 
from their scope o f application. This fact also dictates that the unimodal concept 
cannot be used to govern multimodal transport.
In conclusion, it must be admitted that recognising the limitations of the unimodal 
transport solutions to solve multimodal transport problems calls for new ways of 
looking at multimodal transport and proposing new solutions.
Multimodal transport in this light should be defined as the carriage o f goods from one 
place to another under a single contract of carriage and document. The aspect of
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multiple modes should be discarded to allow, the liability regime used in unimodal 
transport also to be discarded as it too will be shown to be inadequate in chapter two.
Intermodal transport in this sense is defined as the transportation of goods by several 
modes of transport where one carrier organises the whole transport from one point or 
port of origin via one or more interface points with a final destination. Depending on 
how responsibility for the entire transport is shared, different documents are used. 
This definition reflects the concept of through transport in which the carrier can 
assume responsibility only for the mode actually carrier by him. And multimodal 
transport is defined as where the carrier organising the transport assumes the 
responsibility for the entire door-to-door transport and issues a multimodal transport 
document.
On the above definitions what stands out is the fact that all the terms are used to 
define a situation in which goods are carried by more than one mode o f carriage; their 
difference lies more in the aetiology of the terms than in any practical reality. The 
appellation Combined transport is based on the 1973/1975 ICC Rules for combined 
carriage, while multimodal transport was officially used in the 1980 Multimodal 
transport Convention and later given legal recognition by the 1992 ICC/UNCTAD 
Rules for multimodal transport. In this thesis the term favoured is Multimodal 
transport in imitation of the 1980 convention.
Because of the lack of uniformity as to the terms used, to describe multimodal 
transport it is imperative that Multimodal transport is sufficiently differentiated from 
other like transport contracts such as successive and through transport concepts, 
where either numerous carriers engage in the same mode effect carriage under one 
contract, or where one carrier contracts to carry goods over parts of the transport 
contract while contracting with other carriers for other parts of the carriage as agents 
for the shipper. In both the above cases, carriage is not multimodal because the 
carriers involve assume responsibility for their parts of the transport.
In the case of through transport, the carrier acting as agent, enters into transport 
contracts with other carriers on behalf of the cargo interest, making the latter a party 
to these contracts.114 In such a case when loss or damage occurs, the cargo concern
114 D Faber, “ The Problems arising from multimodal transport “ [1996] LMCLQ pg 503
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has to identify the carrier who is legally liable. If the goods are containerised it might 
be difficult to identify the carrier under whose charge loss or damage occurred. 
However, even when the cargo concern can so localise, he might find himself faced 
with an unknown carrier in another country facing unfamiliar laws. On the other hand, 
if loss is unidentified, the cargo concern finds himself in the unenviable situation of 
having to sue all carriers concern at enormous financial cost.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PARTIES IN MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
From the definition of multimodal transport, one of the central tenets o f this mode is 
the factor of its single carrier liability.115 The nature o f this transport mode which 
dictates that carriage could be carried under different modes, brings into play the 
different potential carriers and transport specialist involved in a transport 
contract.116 Multimodal transport is attractive as it offers the shipper the possibility 
to rely on a single party, the multimodal transport operator who is the architect of 
the transport and the only one responsible for the pickup and delivery o f the goods; 
rather than having to deal with every modal carrier or transport specialist involved 
in the transport in case of loss, damage or delay to goods carried.
The identification of the party liable in multimodal transport is therefore of 
particular importance. It allows an identification of who has obligations under the 
contract and on whom an action for loss lies. This identification prevents 
inappropriate claims against parties not liable.117
A good deal of time is spent both at national and international levels identifying 
who the carrier is. At times the contractual carrier is said to be the shipowner, at 
others it is the charterers. Additionally, time is also spent pursuing other performing 
parties both in contract and tort because of the parts they play in the carriage
contract. This is a corollary of the fact that at times the transport document fails to
118identify the true carrier.
In multimodal transport, this identification is important because more parties are 
potentially implicated in the carriage of goods. A typical scenario would be one in 
which goods carried under a multimodal transport contract are lost or damaged
115 See Chapter 1 dealing with the definition o f  multimodal transport
116 The implication o f  this is that the MTO may contract out all or parts o f  the contract to other carriers, 
who may in turn also contract certain parts out. Identifying the liable party in this case is imperative 
especially in this field.
117 This normally has implications on the time limitation o f  claims, as this might lead to a time bar.
118 This account for the presence o f  identity o f  carrier and demise clauses in most contracts for the 
carriage o f  goods by sea
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during carriage, and the multimodal transport document has an illegible signature of 
an unknown person signing as agent.112 In such a case if  the carrier who delivered 
the goods insists that he is not the MTO, how does the cargo concern find the 
contracting MTO who is liable? This problem is indeed a thorny issue in the 
carriage o f goods by sea and even more so in multimodal transport when multiple 
carriers are involved.
In this chapter we will seek to answer the question of who the carrier(s) is under a 
multimodal transport contract, by examining the legal status o f the parties involved 
in a multimodal transport contract in an attempt to highlight the particular problems 
faced by them.
The reality of modem transportation dictates that the carrier is flexible enough by 
the presence of liberty to contract clauses or special clauses in which the parties are 
allowed to use different permutations of modes and carriers to offer the type of 
services that their client requires.120 In doing this, the modem carrier offers to carry 
goods to a stated destination and often reserves the right to use other modes and 
parties as deem appropriate, which brings into play the performing party. Initially 
this was the multimodal transport reality, presently it obtains in unimodal transport 
as well,121 which is proof of the importance of this ‘new way’ o f performing the 
carriage contract.
The absence of a mandatory convention in multimodal transport implies that each 
stage of the multimodal transport might be determined by different unimodal 
transport conventions. Before considering the provisions of the multimodal transport 
convention and other relevant multimodal transport instruments on the parties in any
119 Michael F Sturley, “Phantom Carriers and the UNCITRAL’s Proposed Transport Law Convention” 
[2006] LMCLQ, 427 at p.427
120 The Multimodal transport contract contains liberty to contract clauses to allow the MTO contract 
out all or parts o f  the contract o f  carriage which he cannot carry. Increasingly, a similar liberty exists in 
the different modes o f  transport. An example is the case o f  the IATA Standard waybill IATA RP 1601 
CSC(9) in which clause 8.1 states that “ .. .the carrier may use alternative carriers or aircraft and may, 
without notice and with due regard to the interest o f  the shipper use other means o f  transportation. 
Carrier is authorised to select the routing and all intermediate stopping places that it deems appropriate 
or to change or deviate from the routing shown on the face thereof.. .”
121 In most unimodal transport conventions, it is normal to find the definition o f  actual and successive 
carriers. See Article 1 (2) and (3) o f  the Warsaw Convention systems Convention and Montreal 
convention 1999
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detail, it is thus appropriate to examine the concept o f carrier in the other transport 
conventions .This is to provide a baseline for comparison and interpretation.
The first part of this chapter will thus focus on the different definitions and concepts 
that inform the concept of carrier in the different transport conventions, and the 
second part will examine the concept of the carrier in multimodal transport; this will 
include the MTO as the contracting carrier, the performing carrier and the other 
parties that the MTO makes use of in the course of a multimodal transport contract. 
O f particular concern is the impart on multimodal transport o f the new trend in 
transportation in which focus has moved from the single carrier to calls for joint 
carrier liability, especially in the light of the House o f Lords decision in The 
Starsin,122 and the on-going deliberations of the UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on 
Transport Law.
2.1 THE CARRIERS IN TRANSPORTATION CONVENTIONS
Under the different transport regimes, the concept of carrier is important and central 
to the liability for loss or damage to goods, however, some regimes more than others 
contain the definition of carriers and even rules as to their interpretation, while in 
others the status and definition of the carrier is assumed to be obvious and does not
1 7Tneed any definition or explanation.
2.1.1 The Carrier in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Normally under the carriage of goods by sea, the contracting carrier assumes the 
responsibility of carrying goods to their destination and is usually the party liable for 
loss or damage to goods. Consequently, he is defined in the Carriage Conventions;
Art 1 (a) of the Hague Visby Rules (HVR) defines the carrier as including
122 The Starsin, 122 Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and Others (The Starsin), 
[2003] I Lloyd’s Rep. 571, [2003] 2 All ER 785 ( House o f  Lords; Lord Bingham o f  Comhill, Lord 
Steyn, Lord Hoffman, Lord Hobhouse, o f  Woodborough, Lord Millett). Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. 
Agrosin Private Ltd. and others (The Starsin) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, Court o f  Appeal, Homburg 
Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and Others (The Starsin) [200] 1 L loyd’s Rep. 85 QBD ( 
Com Ct.) (Colman J)
123 An example o f  this is the CMR which contains no definition o f  the carrier.
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“ ...the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract o f  carriage with the 
shipper”
This definition is not very instructive and has given rise to 2 interpretations. There is 
firstly the suggestion that there can only be one carrier under the bill o f lading, and 
secondly there is the assertion that there is room for joint or plural carriers under the 
rules definition. The first suggestion rely on the words “who enters” and insists that 
this suggests that only one carrier is acceptable for one contract. The second 
assertion,124 relies on the word “includes” as pointing to the possibility of plural 
carriers, which could include not only owners and charterers but also others taking 
part in the carriage.125 This second suggestion is commonly referred to as Tetley third 
alternative,126 which regards carriage of goods as a joint venture between the 
shipowner and the charterer, because they share the responsibility of the carrier under 
the HVR.; responsibilities that cannot be contracted out of by virtue of Art 3 (8), of 
the Rules. Consequently, the shipowner and the charterer should be held jointly and 
severally responsible as carriers.127
The Hamburg Rules to avoid this conflict defines the carrier in Art. 1, as “any person 
by whom or in whose name a contract o f carriage o f  goods by sea has been concluded 
with the shipper”. This contract is wide enough to include the potential parties and 
allows for situations where the contract is either concluded by the carrier or an agent. 
The carrier is thus considered to be the party under the contract who undertakes to 
carry the goods from one place to another. However, in the case of the carriage of 
goods by sea, there are cases in which the identity of the carrier is not obvious from 
reading the bill o f lading. In such cases the “demise” and the “identity of carrier” 
clauses have the effect either of identifying the contractual carrier or contradicting the 
appearance of the carriers name on the bill of lading; and raise the question of who the 
real carrier is. This has an implication on the liability position of the parties. The 
question here is who is the carrier(s)?
124 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claim, 4th ed., Chap 10 see http:/Tetley.law.mcgill.ca/
125 M idland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1961] 2 L loyd ’s Rep. 365
126 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claim, 4th ed., Chap 10 see http:/Tetley.law.mcgill.ca/
127 The concept o f  joint responsibility for the carrier has not been accepted in English law.
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1282.1.1.1 The Demise and Identity of Carrier Clauses.
In English law, the identity of carrier and the demise clauses have been used to allow 
a party not considered as “the carrier” to free himself from responsibility under the 
contract of carriage. These clauses have been explained in two ways; the first 
argument is that the clause confirms the common law rule that the contract is between 
the shipper and the shipowner, indicating that the bills of lading are owners’ bills and
129therefore define who the carrier is.
The second approach is that such clauses are non-responsibility clauses violating Art 
3, rule 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules.
While American Courts and some Canadian decisions adhere to the second approach 
thereby making all performing carriers parties to the contract, the English courts have 
held demise clauses to be valid. The leading case under English law is The 
Berkshire,130 In this case the Shipowner and not the chatterer was sued under the bill 
of lading that also contained a demise clause. Brandon J., found that the owners alone 
were responsible because
“ ...the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill o f  lading purports to be a 
contract between the shipper and the shipowner and not one between the shipper and 
the charterers. ”131
This pronouncement was obviously obiter as the charterers were not party to the suit. 
The proper ratio decidendi was pronounced by Brandon, J. as,
“...the bill o f  lading contained a contract between the shipper and the 
shipowners and it follows that the receivers are entitled by virtue o f  the Bills o f  
Lading Act 1855 to sue the shipowners upon such a contract”
128 This clause was first introduced to curb the practice o f  suing charterers as opposed to ship owners
in an attempt to recover the full value o f  the loss or damage sustained. This was a result o f  the
unamended Merchant Shipping Act 1894, Section 503 not extending the benefit o f  the limitation o f
liability to charterers. The limitation was finally extended to demise charterers by Section 71 o f  the
Merchant Shipping Act 1906, and to other charterers by Art 6 o f  the 1957 Limitation Act.
The main purpose o f  the clause has now been achieved in the UK by means o f  legislation; The 
Contract(Rights o f  third Parties) Act 1999, but the clause still features strongly in bills o f  lading to 
cater for cases in which the parties do not adhere to such legislation
129 Reynolds, F. “The Dem ise Clause; The Jalamahon” [1988] LMCLQ 285, Stating the position in 
English Law as upholding the clause on the basis that it merely identifies the carrier
130 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep 185
131 ibid, at p. 188
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The logo on the bill of lading was clearly Ocean Wide Shipping Co. Ltd, but the 
contract had a demise clause and the master signed as agents for the ship owner. It 
was held that despite the logo of the Ocean Wide Shipping Company, the carriage 
contract by a combination of the demise clause and the signature was in fact between 
the ship owners as carriers and the cargo owners. Since the charterers were not party 
to the action, the question whether they could have been sued as the party whose 
name appeared on the bill of lading was not answered. Arguably, the charterers could 
also be sued if the consignee could establish the role played by them under the bill of 
lading and The Hague Rules in the loading and discharging of the goods.
The discussion in The Berkshire has been followed in The Jalamohan,132 where 
likewise the charterers were not party to the suit. More recently in The Ines133, the 
shipper sued the shipowner and the time charterers for misdelivery. The bill of lading 
contained an identity of carrier clause stating that the charterers signed the bill of 
lading only as agents for the carrier, although the bill of lading had the charterers 
name in large print on both sides of the bill o f lading. The shipowners denied liability 
claiming that the time charterers were the contracting carriers. Clark, J., following The 
Berkshire, gave effect to the identity of carrier clause, finding that the contract was 
between the shipper and the shipowners, the charterers being merely agents. The 
shippers claim in contract thus succeeded against the shipowners, while his claim in 
bailment against the charterers failed. However, in The Hector,134 the commercial 
court decided against giving effect to an identity of carrier clause in a bill o f lading. 
The shipowners sued for a declaration that they were not bound towards the voyage 
sub-charterers to deliver the goods under the bill of lading issued by an associate 
company of the sub-charterers. The bill of lading included an identity of carrier 
clause. The owners nevertheless argued that the bill was in fact a charterer’s bill of an 
intermediate time charter, as the bills issuance had not been authorised by them as 
owners, and particularly as it did not conform to the mates receipt, and was antedated 
contrary to the requirements of the applicable charterparty and letter of authority from 
the master.
132 (Ngo Chew Edible O il Pie. Ltd. V. Scindia Steam N avigator Co. Ltd.[1988] I L lo y d ’s Rep 443 See 
The Henrik S if  [1982] 2 L lo yd ’s Rep.456 at p .458. where the demise clause was accepted  as valid  
without discussion
133 (Pyram id SoundN. V. v. Brisse Schiffarts G m bH [1995] 2 L loyd ’s Rep. 144
134 [1998]2  L lo yd ’s Rep. 287
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The bill of lading also contained a typed stipulation on its face that the carrier was 
“US Express Line”. Thus although the signature of the bill o f lading for the master 
and the identity of the carrier clause could normally have engaged the responsibility 
of the owners, holding them as carriers and bound by the contract o f carriage, Rix, J. 
held that the contract was with the charterers not the owners. The Hector is interesting 
because it represents one of the first English cases to decide that a bill o f lading 
containing an identity o f carrier clause can be a charterer’s bill o f lading, making the 
charterer liable as the carrier.
The signature normally acts as an identification symbol, revealing who the carrier is 
either because he has personally signed and is therefore bound by the contract, or 
because it has been signed by one o f his agents.135 It is however, imperative that if 
the master intends to sign as agent it should be made abundantly clear in the 
document to avoid any confusion as to the status of the person signing.136 However 
in cases where the signature is unclear, attention should be focused on the stamp 
accompanying the signature. The signature and definition o f the carrier in the 
contract are still not determinative of the carrier's identity, if  all the other facts or
1 T7clauses in the contract point overwhelmingly to another as carrier.
The clause then seeks to identify the ship owner as the carrier who is liable under 
the contract and to remove the liability of any other person who is not the ship 
owner, usually the chatterer. This clause has thus been criticised as falling foul of 
Art III rule 8 as it seeks to reduce the liability of the charterer or other party below 
the level set by the rules.138
In multimodal transport the carrier is specifically defined with powers under the 
contract to sub-contract, while still retaining all responsibility for the goods. If the 
reasoning in The Berkshire was used to interpret a multimodal transport case, it 
would distort the spirit of the contract which points to one carrier irrespective of
135 Universal Steam Navigation v M cKelvie (1923) AC 492.
136 The Okehampton (1913) 29 TLR 438, 18 Com Cas 320.
137 The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325. Sec Nawchow Chemical Industries Co Ltd v Botany Bay 
Shipping Co (Aus) Pty Ltd (1982) 2 NSW LR 523 for a contrasting view.
138 Tetley, W. « The D em ise o f  the Demise Clause ” (1999) 44 M cgill L.J 807 at p .812  “ in 
particular, article 3(8) o f  the Hague and Hague Visby Rules prohibit non-responsibility clauses.
Identity of-of-carrier and dem ise clauses are not-too-subtle non-responsibility clauses ”
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how the carriage is performed. In the sense that the shipowner might be held 
responsible for loss occurring during land carriage because the multimodal transport 
document is issued by him. The question thus is if the MTO were to charter a ship, 
what will be his status? Will he be considered as the carrier or will the identity of 
carrier clause operate to make a shipowner liable as carrier? But, authority apart, 
even if such a demise clause was included it will be impotent, in the sense that the 
interpretation would still lead to the fact that the MTO is the carrier, following cases 
like The Venezuela,139 The Okehampton,140 and The Rewia.ul In The Venezuela, the 
bill o f lading stated that the sub-charterers (C.A.U.N.) or their associated company 
F.M.G., were to be carriers; Sheen J, held that the sub-carriers if  they did not wish 
to be seen as carriers, should have made it clear who the carriers were. The bill of 
lading was thus construed as a contract between the sub-charterers and the cargo 
owners, as the former could be regarded as operating the vessel. There was nothing 
in the bill o f lading to indicate that a time charter was involved, and in The 
Okehampton, the plaintiff through charterers, had signed the bills o f lading in their 
own names as principal. The contract was therefore with them as carriers, as there 
was nothing in their conduct to show that they acted as agent. In The Rewia it was 
finally settled that although, the legal position is that bills o f lading signed by the 
master binds the ship owner, if  it can be proved that the contract was made with the 
signer on behalf o f charterers and not owners, then the charterers will be regarded as 
carriers.142 The above 3 cases go to show that the clause will have no real effect if 
included in a multimodal transport document provided the document makes it 
abundantly clear who the carrier is. Thus ascertaining the identity of the MTO will 
have to be by definition and signature on the contract.
1 39
[1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 393. See also Harrison  v H uddersfield Steam ship Co (1903) 19 TLR 386.
140 (1913) 29 TLR 438, 18 Com Cas 320
141 [1991 ] 2 Lloyd's Rep 325.
Ibid L eggith L J at p 333.
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2.1.1.2 The Demise and Identity of Carrier Clause in Other 
Jurisdictions
Many jurisdictions have rejected the concept of the demise and identity of carrier 
clause, in rejecting these clauses some of these jurisdictions have accepted the 
concept of the multiple carriers comprising mostly of the shipowner and the charterer.
1. The United States
In the United States, two main approaches have been used to reject the identity of 
carrier and demise clauses; one requiring privity the other not requiring it.
In The M/V Gloria,143 the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal found that the time charterer and 
the shipowner were joint carriers; the time charterer by issuing bills o f lading and the 
shipowner by authorising the charterer to sign bills of lading for the master. It was 
stated that “generally, when a bill o f  lading is signed by the charterer or its agent fo r  
the master ’ with the authority o f  the shipowner, this binds the shipowner and places 
him within the provision o f  COGSA.”144 Similarly in The Unibulkfir,145 the question 
before the court was whether the charterers or shipowners were the carriers.
It was stated that,
“The statutory language o f  the COGSA itself supports a broad definition o f  
the term ‘carrier ”,
The statute it was opined had been drawn so as not to limit the terms to a party to a 
bill of lading or the contract of carriage, noting also that there can be more than one 
COGSA carrier in a given shipment. The courts did not hesitate to impose liability on 
the charterers or owners who are non-signatories to the bill of lading and who cannot 
in any way be said to have issued the bill of lading. The same stance seems to have 
been held in Japan.146
2. Canada
Canadian cases portray a mixture of both stances holding the shipowner and charterer 
jointly liable and also following the English position of one contract one carrier.
143 Pacific Employers Insurance Co.v. The M /V  Gloria 167- F. 2d.229 (5 Cir. 1985), 236-237
144 Ibid, at p.237
145 Joo Seng Hong K ong v. S.S. Unibulfir, 483 F  Supp.43. (S.D.N. Y. 1979) a t p. 46
146 Satori, K. “The Dem ise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 496
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In The Lara S ,147 Reed J, held that a shipowner and charterer were both liable where 
the bill o f lading was on the charterers form but signed on behalf of the owners. Reed, 
J. reasoned that the,
"...logic o f holding both the shipowner and the charterer liable as carriers 
seems entirely reasonable under a charter such as that which exists in the case. The 
master will have knowledge o f  the vessels and any particularities which must be taken 
into account when stowing good thereon. He supervises the stowage; he has 
responsibility fo r  the conduct o f the voyage and presumably also has knowledge o f  the 
weather conditions it would be usual to encounter. In such a case, it seems entirely 
appropriate to fine the master and therefore his employer, the shipper jointly liable 
with the charterers fo r  the damage arising out o f  the inadequate stowage”
Reed, J. by so doing sanctioned the principle of joint carriers under a single contract 
of carriage. However, later decisions in Canada reverted to the single carrier approach 
favoured by the English Courts; initially in Union Carbide v. Fedenav Ltd.,l4S and 
later in Jian Shang Co v. Great Tempo. SA,149
3) Civilian Jurisdictions
The demise and identity of carrier clauses are rejected in civil law jurisdictions. In 
France, the Cour d ’Appel d ’Aix, September 8th, 1994 (The Jessica J), DMF 1995, 52 
held that both the time charterer and the voyage charterers were carriers,
“ont la qualite de transporteur”. Also in Cour d ’Appel de Rouen,150 the time and 
voyage charterers were held liable as carriers.
Similarly, in Belgium, the shipowner has been held jointly and severally liable as 
carriers for cargo damage.151
147 Canastrand Industries v. Lara S [1993] 2 F.C. 553( Fed. Ct. Can.)
148 [1997] 131 F.T.R. 241 ( fed. Ct. C an)atp .265,
149 [1998] 3 F.C. 418 (Fed. C.A. Can.) and Voest-Alpine Starl Linz v. Federal Pacific Ltd. (1999) 174 
F.T.R. 69 (Fed. Ct. Can.)
150 June 14,1984 DMF 1985,351 at p. 358,
151 H of Van Bereop Te Brussels March 3, 1972; [1972] E.T.L. 992. See also Tetley, W. “Identity o f  the 
Carrier-The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 519 at p. 522
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2.1.1.3 The Landmark decision in The Starsin Case152
The foregoing paragraphs attest to the confusion that abounds in the carriage of goods 
by sea when it comes to identifying the carrier, especially in the presence of the usual 
identity of carrier and demise clauses which have come to be regarded as part of the 
standard from contracts in this domain.153
The decision of the House of Lords in The Starsin case has for now settled the law 
concerning the carrier. The question is if this decision will meet the reasonable 
expectation of the transportation fraternity.
In the case, The Starsin, owned by Agrosin Private Ltd. was demise chartered by 
Ovendale Shipping Ltd. In Oct 1995, Continental Shipping Ltd. (CPS), time chartered 
the Starsin from their owners Agrosin. In December 1995 the ship loaded plywood 
from 3 different ports in Malaysia for discharge in Antwerp and Avondale in the UK. 
On arrival damage was found which was attributed to the damp conditions during 
loading and to negligent stowage. The bill o f lading was on the CPS forms and signed 
as agents on behalf of CPS ‘as carriers’.
The bill of lading contained an identity of carrier clause in its clause 33, and a demise 
clause in its clause 35. The claimants claimed against the time charterers, but as CPS 
had become bankrupt at the time, the shipowners took their place in the cargo claim.
The initial action against the shipowners was based on the demise clause after failing 
in tort. The shipowners contended that they were contractual carriers. The issue within 
the House of Lords was “whether CPS or the shipowners were the carriers under the 
bill o f  lading. ”
The House of Lords held that, the printed identity of carrier and demise clauses on the 
reverse of the bill of lading were over-ridden by the words which had been added in
152 Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and Others (The Starsin), [2003] I Lloyd’s Rep. 
571, [2003] 2 All ER 785 ( House o f  Lords; Lord Bingham o f  Comhill, Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffman, 
Lord Hobhouse, o f  Woodborough, Lord Millett). Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. 
and Others (The Starsin) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437, Court o f  Appeal, Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. 
Agrosin Private Ltd. and Others (The Starsin) [200] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 85 QBD ( Com Ct.) (Colman J)
153 The erosion o f  the effects o f  the identity o f  carrier and demise clauses can also be traced through the 
trilogy o f  cases, starting with The H ector, [198] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 287, The Fletcha, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
and The Starsin supra note 151,
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the signature box on the front. This it was stated to indicate to the shipper or 
transferee of the fact that CPS the charterers were in fact the contractual carriers.
Lord Hobhouse stated that, the typed or stamped words in the signature box, 
“demonstrate a special agreement by which the parties have agreed that 
inconsistent clauses will be over-ridden.”
The House of Lords rejected the idea that the holder of the bill should have to read all 
the conditions on the back of the bill to discover with whom the contract of carriage 
was made, especially where the front of the bill clearly identified the carrier. In 
reaching this conclusion, the House of Lords sought to enforce common business 
sense within transportation. Lord Bingham stating that
“...business sense will be given to business documents’’ and that courts must 
seek to effect the contracts as intended, so as not to frustrate the reasonable 
expectations of businessmen.154 The House of Lords thus place more importance on 
the face of the bill of lading than to the small printed clauses at the back of the bill of 
lading, bringing it in line with international banking practices. 155 The House of Lords 
concluded that the bills were charterers’ bills and the shipowners could not be liable 
for any breach o f the contract of carriage.
The Lords in The Starsin, did not invalidate the 2 clauses, they simply declined to 
give it effect, based on the construction of the particular bill of lading which was in 
line with the commercial practice and expectations especially within banking circles.
2.1.1.4 Implications of the Starsin Case in the transportation Law
The House of Lords held in the case that the charterers were the carriers having 
signed the front of the bills of lading through agents as ‘carriers’, rather than the 
shipowners who were identified on the back of the bill of lading. The decision in all 
three courts circled around the question of the front and the back of the bill of lading 
which contained the identity and demise clauses.
154 The Starsin, [2003] 1 L lo y d ’s Rep 571 at p. 577
155 British Imex Industries L td  v. M idland Bank Ltd. [1958] I QB 542, where it was held that the 
general practice o f  the bank is not to examine the small print on the back o f  the bill. “It is o f  course 
true, as Mr Millingan pointed out, that the provisions govern relationships between issuing bank and 
beneficiary, not shipper or consignee and carrier. But it would be surprising and also unsatisfactory if  a 
practice accepted in one field were not accepted in another so closely related”
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The House of Lords while striving to conform to commercial practices in interpreting 
the identity of carrier failed to hold on another commercial practice; that of 
recognising the validity of joint and several carriers.
In modem transport practices, it is becoming increasingly impossible for carriers to 
perform all the different facets of the transport contract; loading, stowage, further 
carriage, stevedoring , custody, discharging by contracting with specialist parties who 
also form part of the overall transport.156 This modem transport practice is seen from 
the fact that the different jurisdictions are all interpreting the clauses as permitting the 
concept of joint carriers.
This concept of the joint carrier was explored by Rix L.J in the Court of Appeal, 
referring to it as “Another possibility: Owners liable as well as charterers? ” noting
“Nevertheless, I  raise in argument the possibility that there does not have to 
be a black and white choice between owners ’ bills and charterers ’ bill and that the 
true analysis in such a case may well be that the owners as well as the charterers are 
liable under the bills”. Unfortunately he further went on to state that “In the 
circumstances, where the point was never discussed below, it is not a part o f  the 
formal appeal, has arisen merely from an enquiry from the bench, and has had no 
real opportunity fo r  debate, I  would fo r  m yself be reluctant to make or take a decision 
based upon it ”157 This suggestion was rejected by the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman, 
stating that,
“I  do not think that any reasonable merchant or banker who might be 
assumed to be the national reader o f  this bill o f  lading would imagine that there was 
more than one carrier or that the carrier was anyone other than CPS”158 On the 
contrary in this modem times any merchant would expect that the contractual carrier 
would use other carriers to perform the carriage contract.
Rix L.J, in this case relied on the agency theory to support the joint carrier principle, 
although in the cases in the other jurisdictions where this has been sanctioned, it has 
been based on the joint liability of the carrier and the shipowner and the policy 
considerations under the Hague Visby Rules as seen in Art 3 (8).
156 Karan, H. The Carrier Liability under the International Maritime Conventions,; The Hague, Hague 
Visby,and the Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press Lewiston , N .Y.p.85
157 The Starsin [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 451, at p.452
158 The Starsin, [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 at p.590
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This stance has been clearly elucidated by Tetley,159 and has come to be referred to as 
Tetley’s ‘Third Alternative’, which is to the effect that the shipowner and the 
charterers share the responsibility of the carriage contract under The Hague Rules 
Arts. 2, 3 and 4 and any attempt to disclaim them by identity o f carrier or demise 
clauses will be invalid under Art3 (8). This concept was accepted and expounded in 
The Lara S160.
Apart form violating The Hague Rules, Tetley also expounded on the unfairness of 
burdening the third party with any agreements between the shipowner and charterer as 
to the apportionment of liability between them.
At this point, one can argue that rejecting the joint and several liabilities of the parties 
involved in carriage was greatly misguided for 3 reasons.
1- It is obviously the trend in modem transport for multiple carriers to take part 
in the carriage contract. Rejecting the concept results in action outside the 
mandatory rules, this could not have been the intention of the HVS.
2- Other jurisdictions have rejected this single approach; this point was not put 
forward in argument by counsel as noted by Rix L.J. This stance has been 
taken in the different jurisdictions as noted because it is seen as equitable to all 
the parties concerned, the claimants, the charterers and the shipowners.
3- An examination of the “travaux preparatoire” of The Hague Rules does not 
show any evidence that the single carrier option was the preferred one for the 
rules.161
It is arguable if the acceptance of the ‘joint and several’ liability of the parties 
involved in carriage would have greatly simplified this area o f the law, especially in 
the case of third party actions and the Himalayan clause.
It is regrettable that English Law lost a great opportunity to settle this issue once and 
bring it in line with other jurisdictions. The law would have been rendered more in 
line with commercial realities if the joint and several liability o f the parties as 
expounded by Rix L.J was accepted and the Lords had answered the question “who is 
the carrier’ not in the singular but in the plural.
159 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo claims Ch. 10 Whom to Sue? (4th ed.) http:/Tetley.law.mcgill.ca/
160 [1993] 2 F.C. 553 (Fed. Ct. Can.)
161 Sturley, M “The History o f  COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1 at p. 10 see Also 
Vanessa Rochester, “The Starsin-Tetley’s Third Alternative” Paper on Carriage o f  goods by Sea, 
unpublished.
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2.1.2 The Carrier under the UNCITRAL Draft Convention
The lack of uniformity within the carriage of goods was seen as an impediment 
within UNCITRAL, which in 1996 called for proposals for the uniformity of the law 
relating to the carriage of goods by sea. The Draft Instrument on the Carriage of 
Goods (wholly and partly) by Sea, hereinafter the Instrument, is meant to eventually 
provide a modem successor to the existing international conventions on the carriage 
of goods by sea; The Hague, Hague Visby and The Hamburg Rules.162 
Art 1.1 o f the Instrument, defines the carrier as a person
“ ...who enters into a contract o f  carriage with the shipper? ”
The draft in this respect follows the HVR’s where the carrier is a contractual person 
who enters into the contract either in its own name of through the agency o f others.
The Instrument also included within the ranks of carrier, the “performing party”, on 
whom is imputed the carriers liabilities. He is defined as ,
“ a person other than the carrier that physically performs or undertakes 
physically to perform any o f  the carriers responsibilities under a contract, including 
the carriage, handling, custody or storage o f  the goods to the extent that that person 
acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carriers request or under the carriers 
supervision or control. The term ‘performing carrier’ does not include any person 
who is retained by the shipper or consignee or is an employee, agent, contractor or 
sub-contractor o f  a person (other than the carrier) who is retained by the shipper. ” 
The phrase “undertakes physically to perform ’’ in the definition broadens the 
definition and brings within the scope of the Instrument all persons who could 
possibly take part in the carriage, such as loading, stowing, discharge etc.. This 
covers all persons who could be sued under the contract in tort or bailment, 
therefore bringing greater uniformity and reducing the number o f potential actions 
outside the Instrument.
A practical example will be a contract of carriage in which the carriage is for 
carriage from America to England with transhipment in Germany. The sea carrier 
performs the sea carriage to Germany where he contracts with a local sea carrier to
162 Revised Draft Instrument- UNCITRAL Instrument Document, A/CN.9/W G.III/W P.32, 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.36, www.uncitral.org (Working Group Transport)
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perform another part of the carriage. Damage occurs during the local carriage. In 
this case the local carrier will be the performing party and liable to direct action. 
Additionally, even in the event that the local carrier uses a chartered vessel, he and 
the vessel owner will be considered as performing parties and liable under the 
contract. 163
The question o f the identity of the carrier and the demise clause has not yet been 
settled in the draft Instrument. Presently Article 40(3) seeks to provide an answer to 
the problem of identifying the carrier. The Article though still in squared brackets 
reads as follows,
“[ I f  the contract particulars fails to identify the carrier but indicate that the goods 
will be loaded on board a ship, then the registered owner o f  the ship is presumed to 
be the carrier. The registered owner can defeat this presumption i f  it proves that the 
ship was under a bareboat charter at the time o f the carriage that transfers 
contractual responsibility fo r  the carriage o f the goods to an identified bareboat 
charterer.[If the registered owner defeats this presumption that it is the carrier 
under this article, then the bareboat charterer at the time o f  the carriage is 
presumed to be the carrier in the same manner as that in which the registered 
owner was presumed to be. ”] ] 164
It was noted in the final report of the Uniformity sub-Committee that the final 
decision on the identity of carrier clause was by consensus165 although there were 
initially alternative objection and suggestions.166 Alcantara o f Spain objected to 
imposing liability on a shipowner who was not the contracting carrier, while Prof 
Philip, contended that the shipowner was the person most likely to know the 
contracting carrier’s identity.167
163 Obviously, the phrase « undertakes physically to perform” brings the shipowners within the scope o f  
the instrument.
164 This Article was drafted by the CMI’s Sub-Committee on Uniformity o f  the Law o f  Carriage o f  
goods by Sea; this constitutes part o f  their final report in May 1999. See also M.F. Sturley, “ Phantom 
carriers and UNCITRAL’s proposed transport law Convention” [2006] LMCLQ 426 at p.428
165 1999 CMI Year Book, 115
166 1995 CMI Year book 237, Where Prof. Berlingieri raise the identity o f  the carrier clause inviting 
debate on it.
167 1996 CMI Year book 375
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At the moment the consensus among the working group is that the shipowner is 
presumed to be the carrier until be rebuts that presumption by identifying the 
contractual carrier.
The question that arose in the sphere of multimodal transport is in the case where no 
shipowner is identified in the transport document. What would that presumption be 
based on, who would be the carrier? The opinion expressed here was that in case of 
multimodal transport, the shipowner should still be presumed to be the carrier, as 
the MTO is likely to be an entity who does not own any means o f transport. 
However, the presumption would be limited to carriage within of goods by sea 
excluding damage before and after loading. The problem with this stance is the 
assumption that the different performing carriers would also be considered to be 
carriers and this will lead to problems when loss occurs during interface periods.168 
This provision it was noted was unsatisfactory, it is hoped that it will be resolved 
within the draft.169
The main objection to Article 40(3) is the imposition of liability on a party who is 
not a party to the contract, especially in multimodal transport. A practical example 
clearly explains this problem. Suppose, a multimodal transport operator contracts to 
carry goods from Chad via Cameroon to the US. It issues a bill of lading for this 
carriage without properly identifying himself in the contract. If the trailer carrying 
goods within the US has an accident leading to loss, it is indeed difficult to find a 
reason for imposing liability on the sea carrier when the MTO contracted with all 
the carriers separately meaning that the sea carrier had no connection with the road 
carrier.
The problem now lies between a choice of protecting the innocent public who would 
have taken the documents and the shipowner.
It is contended here that the issue of the shipowner been presumed to be the carrier 
will be adopted on the basis that he might be the only one in the position to know 
who the MTO is. His main duty would be to identify the MTO who is liable. The 
alternative would be to demand that the original consignor provide the information 
as to who the MTO is.
168 2001 CMI Y earbook 577
169 UN doc A/CN9/WGIII/WP70 (31 January 2006), Para 32
68
During the 13th Session o f the working party, the working group also explored the
170possibility o f differentiating the “Maritime and non-maritime performing parties”. 
The Maritime performing party was defined as one who performs any of the 
carrier’s responsibilities under the carriage contract during the maritime part of the 
carriage. The intention here was to ensure that all aspects of the maritime carriage 
fall within the Instrument, subjecting the maritime performing party to direct action 
under the Instrument as the carrier. While the inland carrier in his capacity as non- 
maritime performing party cannot be sued under the instrument. The multimodal 
approach of the Instrument must dictate that the definition of the performing parties 
is not limited to maritime carriers only. The clear intention o f the Instrument 
dictates that all modes are inclusive; therefore such a restrictive definition will not 
be acceptable within multimodal transport. The group had to decide whether to 
remove from the definition the concept of the non-maritime performing party.171
2.1.3 The Warsaw Convention Carrier
The main Warsaw Convention of 1929 contained no definition o f who the carrier 
was. The first definition of the carrier is found in the Guadalajara Convention of 
1961 supplementing the Warsaw Convention. It differentiates between the 
contracting carrier and the actual carrier.
It defines the contracting carrier as the person who “as principal makes an 
agreement fo r  the carriage ” governed by the international air convention with the 
consignor or with a person acting on his behalf.172 The Actual carrier is defined as 
the person who “performs the whole or part o f the carriage” contemplated by the 
agreement between the contracting carrier and the consignor by virtue o f authority 
from the contracting carrier. Such authority shall be presumed in the absence of 
authority to the contrary.
170 Para 28-33 A /CN.9/544
171 The fact that this work is still in the stages o f  discussions means that there are as yet no firm 
definitions
172 Art I (1) o f  the Guadalajara Convention, Art. 39 o f  the Montreal Convention 1999.
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The Guadalajara Convention by defining both the contracting and actual carrier 
clarifies the responsibilities of both, thereby eliminating the problem of who the 
carrier is. The actual carrier is not generally a party to the contract. However, in 
case of loss or damage during carriage performed by him, the convention extends 
the rights and liabilities o f the carrier to all sub-contracting carriers. Article 11 of 
the Guadalajara Convention states that both the actual and contracting carriers are 
liable for loss caused when goods are in the charge of the actual carrier for carriage; 
the actual carrier is liable for the part of the carriage performed by him and the
1 71contracting carriage for the entire carriage contemplated by the contract. ' If loss 
occurs during carriage by the actual carrier, the shipper has an option to either sue 
the actual carrier, the contracting carrier or both; jointly or severally. If only one 
carrier is sued, he has the right to require that the other be joined in the 
proceedings.174 The Montreal Convention 1999 like the 1929 convention does not 
define the term ‘carrier’ or any other person who ought to be governed by the 
Convention. Thus under this convention any one who performs the functions of the
carrier in international air transport is deemed to be the carrier.
2.1.4 The CMR and the COTIF/CIM Carrier
While the CMR does not define the carrier, the CIM defines both the contracting
and actual carriers. Art 3(a) defines the contracting carrier as the “carrier who 
enters into a contract o f  carriage with the consignor pursuant to these uniform 
rules, or a subsequent carrier who is liable on the basis o f  this contract. ”
Art 3(b) goes on to define the substitute carrier as, “a carrier who has not 
concluded the contract o f  carriage with the consignor, but to whom the carrier 
referred to in letter (a), has entrusted the whole or part the performance o f  the 
carriage by rail. ”
Both conventions deal with the position of the successive carrier. Art 34 of the 
CMR and Art 26 o f the CIM, both make the successive carrier party to the contract 
o f carriage under the terms of the contract by virtue o f their acceptance o f the goods
173 Art 40, Montreal Convention 1999
174 Art 111 Guadalajara 1961, Art 45 Montreal Convention 1999. As between the actual and 
contracting carrier, they could decide as to the rights and obligations including recourse action or 
indemnification. (Art X Guadalajara Convention 1961, Art 48 Montreal Convention 1999.)
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and the consignment note. Both conventions make the actual and contracting 
carriers jointly and severally liable for loss or damage occurring during carriage.175 
Thus, successive transport by different carriers whether or not performed by road is 
possible under the CMR, when it is covered by a single contract of carriage. The 
first carrier, the last carrier and all actual carriers, under whom damage occurred, 
may be liable for damage, loss or delay of the goods under the Conventions.
2.1.5 TheCM NI Carrier
The CMNI which is a more recent convention also defines both the contractual and 
actual carriers. Art 1(2) defines the contracting carrier as “Any person by whom or 
in whose name the contract o f  carriage has been concluded with a shipper”.
While Art 1 (3) defines the ‘Actual carrier’ as ‘‘any person other than the servant 
or agent o f  the carrier to whom the performance o f  the carriage or o f  part o f  such 
carriage has been entrusted by the carrier ”
Under the CMNI, both the carriers are covered by the convention and both share in 
the responsibilities and obligations of the contract under the convention. Both are 
thus jointly and severally liable for the loss or damage to goods during carriage.176
2.2 THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT OPERATOR (MTO)177
The Contractual carrier in multimodal transport is commonly referred to as the 
multimodal transport operator (MTO) or the combined transport operator (CTO).
He is defined in Rule 2b o f the ICC Rules for a Combined Transport Document as
175 The CIM and the CMR have a historical legal relationship which allows the interpretation o f  one to 
apply to the other.
176 Art 4(5) o f  the CMNI
177 The term [MTO] was first used in a Report o f  the International Sub-committee o f  the CMI 
(General Draft) published May 1967, to describe a person who enters into a contract involving two 
or more modes o f  transport.
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"a person (including any corporation, company or legal entityj issuing a 
combined transport document"
And a more authoritative definition in The United Nations Convention on 
Multimodal Transport defines the MTO in Art 1(2) as;
"any person who on his own behalf or through another person acting on his 
behalf concludes a multimodal transport contract and who acts as principal 
not as agent or on behalf o f  the Consignor or o f the carriers participating in 
the multimodal transport operation and who assumes the responsibility fo r  the 
performance o f  the contract."
The UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal transport Document, defines the MTO in 
rule 2.2 as,
“any person who concludes a multimodal transport contract and assumes 
the responsibility fo r  the performance thereof as carrier ”
The definition in the ICC rules lays emphasis on the issuance o f the document to 
acquire the status of a multimodal transport operator, while The United Nations 
convention and the UNCTAD definitions stress the fact that the MTO is one who 
concludes a multimodal transport contract and assumes the responsibility for the 
goods as principal. What stands out from the definitions is the fact that the MTO 
must assume the responsibility of the goods as principal making him personally 
liable for any loss or damage to the goods.
This difference in criteria stems from the fact that theoretically, there were no 
business entities that could be called “multimodal transport o p e r a to r s sea carriers 
owned ships, road carrier’s trailers, air carrier’s planes and rail carrier’s trains. The 
question is what the distinguishing feature of the multimodal transport carrier is. 
Multimodal transport for the most part is offered by carriers in all modes of 
transport, although it seems to be prevalent within carriage by sea. Given the fact 
that some o f the carriers involved in multimodal transport owned their conveyance 
while others did not, we see the multimodal transport convention depending on a 
different criterion, the contract for the multimodal transport o f goods from one place 
to another in which the multimodal operator assumes the responsibility for the
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goods. The distinguishing factor for the MTO is thus the voluntary assumption of 
the responsibility for carriage through-out the transport to the final destination. This 
stance reflects the custom in carriage cases which makes an international convention
1 78turn on the type o f service performed.
The MTO however as principal is given the added liberty o f deciding how to effect 
carriage. He might choose to:
(1) Effect the whole carriage personally
(2) Sub-contract the whole to other carriers or
(3) To personally carry some parts while contracting out other parts of
i 179the contract
This responsibility assumed by the MTO dictates that he possesses the ability and 
expertise to move goods from one place to another irrespective of the logistical 
arrangements required. Despite the fact that it is a pivotal fact that the multimodal 
transport operator uses other carriers, there is no definition o f the actual carrier in the 
multimodal transport convention, the UNCTAD/ICC rules however, includes actual 
carriers in the definition of “carriers” qualifying in Rule 2.3 the concept of carrier 
found under Rule 2.2, this rule defines the carrier as
“...the person who actually performs or undertakes to perform the 
carriage, or parts thereof whether he is identical with the multimodal transport 
operator or not ”
This additional definition of the carrier reflects the reality in multimodal transport, 
and brings to the forefront the real issue in multimodal transport; the question of who 
the carrier(s) is. Is there a possibility of joint carriers in multimodal transport?
The question here is the status not only of the multimodal transport operator but that 
of the ‘actual’ or performing carrier.
178 The Hague Visby Rules apply only to contracts covered by a bill o f  lading, w hile the Ham burg
rules turns on the contract o f  carriage.
179 The question o f  who becomes an MTO was discussed during the CMI drafting 
committee (1967) and delegates case to the conclusion, he must be one who assumes 
responsibility fo r  the goods throughout carriage irrespective o f  mode.
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2.2.1 The Identity of the MTO
As stated, the legal status of the Multimodal Transport Operator depends on the 
voluntary assumption of responsibility and liability for goods carried under a contract, 
evidenced by a multimodal transport document.
Also, the criteria for acquiring the status of MTO mean that one would find among its 
ranks not only individual unimodal carriers but freight-forwarders and transport 
contractors. This might raise questions as to the real identity o f the multimodal 
carrier; thus it is imperative that the MTO is identified for purposes of liability.
The normal way of determining who the Carrier is who has assumed such 
responsibility is by looking at the document evidencing the contract of carriage 
between the parties, paying particular attention to the definition of the MTO, the 
signature and any other clauses which might throw light as to the correct identity of 
the MTO.
The problem faced here is the fact that the transport document, usually a bill of lading 
which evidences the contract does not usually identify who the carrier is, especially in 
the presence of identity of carrier clauses and demise clauses, and therefore suffers
from the same problems faced in the carriage of goods by sea as to the identity of the
180carrier .
2.2.2 The Multimodal transport Carrier and Third Party Carriers
Under the principle o f Privity of contract, third parties are not parties to any contract 
and cannot be bound by the terms of that contract. However, in the field of 
multimodal transport, the third party carrier though not a party to the contract is an 
integral part o f the contract, and is implicated in the overall performance of the 
contract. He therefore finds himself in certain instances called upon to rely on the 
multimodal transport contract, when he is sued.
One o f the main tenets of multimodalism is the fact that although multiple parties 
can be involved in effecting the contractual carriage, only the MTO is the 
contractual party who assumes the responsibility for carriage.
180 See part infra, the problem o f  the identity o f  the carrier under the HVR
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The Multimodal Convention defines him as ‘any person ’, the ICC rules as ‘a 
person’ and the ICC/UNCTAD Rules as ‘any person’. This statements obviously 
point to a single carrier option in the case of multimodal transport.
The single carrier option in multimodal transport was imperative in the development 
of multimodal transport as it solved the long standing problem of the claimant’s 
non-recovery in case of unlocalised damage. Under the through bill o f lading for the 
carriage of goods, recovery for loss or damage was dependent on the claimant 
localising loss and bringing an action against the carrier responsible. In cases of 
non-localised loss or damage, the whole loss was borne by the claimant who had no 
recourse.181
Multimodal transport, by offering the claimant the possibility of claiming against 
someone in case of loss or damage irrespective of localisation was one of the 
advantages of multimodal transport which led to its popularity.
By the very nature o f multimodal transport, the multimodal transport operator is 
given the option to choose how to effect the contract. He can choose to carry or sub­
contract the carriage to other carriers. In instances where he also carries he assumes 
the dual capacity of both the MTO and the carrier, in the instances where he does 
not carry, he keeps the position of contracting carrier and the status of actual carrier 
resides in who ever performs the physical carriage. The question here is what the 
status of both carriers is; can action be brought against both?
This brings into play the concept of the “actual carrier” in multimodal transport. Can 
the claimant bring an action against the actual carrier or the contracting carrier or 
both?
2.2.2.1 The “‘Actual Carrier’ Performing Carrier”.
The Multimodal transport convention does not define who the “actual” carrier is, 
although it is obvious that the nature of multimodal transport dictates that he is 
identified and defines in order to determine his status. The identities o f the “Actual
181 Through carriage which preceded multimodal carriage dictated that each carrier bear responsibility 
for his own part o f  the transport
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carrier” or performing parties are unclear, who are these persons and what is their 
role in multimodal transport?
The actual carrier is usually a party to whom the MTO has contracted with to 
perform all or part o f the contract. The nature o f the multimodal transport does not 
restrict this to one actual or performing carrier as the MTO might contract with 
different carriers within different modes to perform parts of the contract.
The issue here is how many counterparties will the claimant have? The answer to 
this remains one. The actual carrier is not usually a part of the contract and should 
not be sued.182 The performing carrier in this case is acting as the carriers’ servant 
and his fault does not exonerate the MTO who remains liable for any loss or damage 
caused by him.
Normally, in case o f loss or damage to the goods the claimant should claim against 
the contracting carrier. In the case o f multimodal transport, the MTO would like to 
simplify the claims process by ensuring that all action is brought against him rather 
than the other contracting parties.183 However, when loss or damage is identified, 
the claimant can also claim against the party who caused the loss or damage. The 
claimant might bring such an action to avoid the obligations under the contract of 
carriage by suing the actual carrier who is usually not a party to the contract.
The reality in multimodal transport therefore is that once loss is localised, the 
claimant has the option of suing more than one person in the sense that the actual 
carrier can also be sued. Predictability of suit therefore exists only when the loss is 
unlocalised, when the only person liable is the contractual carrier.
Suit against the actual carrier in this context is usually an action in tort as the actual 
carrier is not a party to the contract. This brings about unpredictability as to the law 
which will be applicable to the contract as the claimant possesses the option of suing 
one other than the contracting carrier the MTO, and thereby avoids the contractual 
provisions under the contract.
The question is if the actual carrier can be brought under the contract o f carriage to 
avoid such suit in tort in that he is made a carrier under the contract.
182 C.W.H Goldie, “The Carrier and the Parties to the Contract o f  Carriage”, 81 Dir. Mar. 616 p.620
183 The reason for this might be to save administrative cost or simply to prevent the claimant from 
bringing an action against the sub-contractors.
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The ICC/UNCTAD Rules sought to solve this problem, in Art. 2(3) which by 
including the actual carrier in the definition of carrier. It defines the actual carrier;
"... means any person who actually performs or undertakes to perform the 
carriage, or part thereof whether identical with the multimodal transport operator 
or n o t”
The ICC/UNCTAD Rules, by defining the actual carrier in terms of physical and 
non-physical carriage broadens the definition of actual carriers to also include non­
carrying parties. This definition of actual carrier therefore brings him within the 
confines of the contract. He is therefore a party to the contract who can be sued 
under the contract terms and claim benefits under the contract. It must be noted 
however, that the rules are private and voluntary and would not have the same 
impact as mandatory law.
2.3 The concept of the Joint Carrier
In the light of The Starsin,184 it is doubtful if the concept of joint or several carrier 
will be accepted in multimodal transport. The reality o f multimodal transport 
dictates that more than one carrier is involved in the carriage. The definition of 
actual carrier in the ICC/UNCTAD rules tries to address this reality by making the 
actual carrier a party under the contract and subjecting them to the contract. By 
making the actual carrier a party, both become jointly liable for the contract. This 
joint responsibility for the carriage is the essence o f Tetley’s ‘third alternative’, 185 
which is to the effect that both the contractual carrier and the shipowner are carriers 
as each carries out the responsibility under the HVR, making them jointly 
responsible for the loading, carrying, caring for and discharging o f the cargo. They 
should both be responsible in respect of the third party.
To remedy this situation, Art 7(2) of the Hamburg Rules includes independent 
contractors within this provision and entitles them to benefit from the contractual 
provisions.
184 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep,. 571
185 Tetley, W. “Case note; The Starsin” (2004) 35 JMLC 121
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However, the rejection of the concept joint carrier and the acceptance of the concept 
of the single carrier in The Starsin,'86 is likely to be used in the interpretation of 
multimodal transport and thus enforce the notion that single carrier liability should 
be encouraged.
The enforcement of this single carrier responsibility in carriage cases also has the 
implication of allowing-in attempts to protect the ‘performing’ carrier from action 
by the claimant who seeks to avoid the contractual obligations.
2.4 Protection of the “Third Party Carrier” under the Contract of Carriage
As noted, the third parties and sub-contractors used by the MTO are usually open to 
suit from the claimants, once loss is localised to the potion o f carriage for which 
they were responsible. In this light MTO’s usually seeks to protect the sub­
contractor from suit by the claimant for cargo loss or damage by inserting into the 
contract, terms meant for their protection. The doctrine of Privity of contract in 
English law usually poses a problem for sub-contractors who seek to rely on these 
contractual provisions in the contract. These are mostly in the form of the 
“Himalaya Clause’, the “Circular Indemnity Clause” and the doctrine of “Sub­
bailment on Terms’.187
2.4.1 The Protection Clauses
These clauses are included in the M ultimodal transport contract to protect the 
sub-contractor or anyone whose services the MTO uses in the perform ance o f 
the contract. These clauses are a logical follow up o f the liberty to sub­
contract clause; after exercising that liberty, the MTO has to m aintain the 
ideals o f M ultim odal transport, that he is the only one against who suit 
should be brought, by including clauses which protect the sub-contractor and 
deter the consignee or cargo interest from bringing suit against him. In this
186 The concept o f  the joint carrier had also been rejected in cases like Scruttons Ltd. v. M idland  
Silicones L td.[1962] A.C. 446
187 The doctrine o f  privity o f  contract, allows only a party to a contract to seek its benefits. See Also, 
Gaskell et al: N Gaskell, Regina Asariotis, and Y Baatz, Bills o f  Ladings: Law and Contracts (2000)
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respect the two popular clauses are the Himalaya and the Circular Indemnity 
Clauses.
2.4.1.1 The Himalaya Clause
A typical Himalaya clause can be found in the P& O Nedlloyd Bill cl.4(2) and 
reads as follows;
“ The Merchant undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be made 
against any person whomsoever by whom the carriage is performed or undertaken 
(including all sub-contractors o f the carrier), other than the carrier, which imposes 
upon any such Person, or any vessel owned by such Person, any liability whatsoever 
in connection with the Goods or the Carriage o f  the Goods, whether or not arising 
out o f  negligence on the part o f  such Person and, i f  any such claim or allegation 
should nevertheless be made, the Merchant will indemnify the carrier against the 
consequences thereof Without prejudice to the foregoing every such Person or 
vessel shall have the benefit o f  every right, defence, limitation and liberty o f  
whatsoever nature herein contained or otherwise available to the carrier ( including 
but not limited to clause 24 hereof) as i f  such provision were fo r  his benefit; and in 
entering into this contract, the carrier, to the extent o f  these provisions, does so not 
only on his own behalf but also as agent and trustee fo r  such person or vessel. ”
As seen from the clause, the clause is used to extend the benefit o f the contract to 
third parties.
The Himalayan Clause which was made famous by New Zealand Shipping Co. 
Ltd. v. A.M. Satterwaite & Co. L td188 (The Eurymedon) is to the effect that, 
the sub-contractor if  sued benefits from the same defences as the carrier. The 
Himalayan Clause in The Eurymedon, stated that;
"It is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or agent o f  the 
carrier (including every independent contractor from  time to 
time employed by the carrier) shall in any circumstances
188 The E u r y m e d o n , (1 9  74) I L loyd's Rep 534 . See a lso  K. C hatterjee 'T he UN C onvention  
on the L iab ility  o f  Transport term inals in International trade. The end o f  the H im alaya  
c la u se? ’ (19 9 4 ] JBL 109
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whatsoever, be under any liability whatsoever to the shipper, 
consignee, or owner o f  the goods or to any holder o f  the bill 
o f  lading, fo r  any loss or damage or delay o f  whatsoever kind  
arising or resulting directly or indirectly
from  any neglect or default on his part, while acting in the 
course o f  or in connection with his employment, ... every 
exemption, limitation (etc. to which the carrier is entitled) 
shall also be available and shall extend to protect every such 
servant or agent o f  the carrier as aforesaid... ",89
In the case, during unloading, the stevedore’s negligence caused the drill to slip 
and was damaged, three years later the consignees sued the stevedores for the 
price o f repairing the drill. At first instance Beattie LJ found for the stevedores 
which decision was affirmed by the Privy Council?
Thus by relying on the
"Commercial character, involving service on one side and  
rates o f  paym ent on the other and qualifying stipulations. "I9°
The Stevedores who were third parties and thus not privy to the contract were 
allowed the benefits o f the contract.
This clause was thus used to circumvent the popular legal theory o f privity of 
contract by allowing a third party to benefit from some o f the terms of the 
contract. This clause however does not demand anything from the stevedore, 
although it inures for his benefits.
This clause has been criticised as allowing the negligent stevedores to escape 
liability for their act, at a time when the carrier assumes no responsibility for 
the goods, after discharge which is when the stevedores or term inal operator 
benefits, meaning that the cargo owners in all such cases bears the loss.
189 This clause derived its name from A d le r  v D ic k so n  [ 1 9 5 4 /  2 L loyd's Rep 267 .
190 Ibid at p 548
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These and the many other criticisms thrown at the clause, cease to become 
effective in case o f multimodal transport. Under a M ultimodal transport 
contract, the fact that only the MTO can be sued does not mean that the other 
parties can cause loss or damage negligently. It does not mean that the claim o f 
the consignee is negated, but that the sub-contractor will enjoy the same 
benefits enjoyed by the carrier. The stevedores will not be able to benefit from 
the clauses in the bill o f lading, if  he has been negligent. Clause 1 b (2) states 
that
"... i f  it is proved that the loss or damage resulted from  an act 
or omission o f  this person, done with intent to cause damage 
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably  
result, such person shall not be entitled to the benefit o f  
limitation o f  liability provided fo r  ”191
Since the carrier cannot escape liability if  negligent, so Stevedores cannot also 
escape liability or limit it in case o f negligence. The carrier cannot give to the 
stevedore that which he does not have. The second criticism  o f the clause that 
the stevedores is exempted from liability when the carrier has also ceased to be 
liable, because loss or damage to the goods occurs after the contract has come 
to an end, is not relevant in Multimodal transport because responsibility for the 
goods extends and transcends the different modal boundaries so much, so that 
the MTO stays responsible for the goods until the goods are delivered. This fact 
however was clarified in the Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd. v Salmond and
/ Q?Spraggon (New York Star).
In the case Razor Blades which were discharged by the Stevedores, were 
negligently delivered to the wrong person. One year after, the consignees 
sought to sue the stevedores for negligent handling o f the goods, and contended 
that the stevedores could not rely on a contract that had ended on discharge as 
per clause 5 which stated that the responsibility for the goods terminate on the
191 The C om bicom  bill for com bined transport contains such a clause.
192 The N ew  York S ta r  [1 9 8 1 ]  3 A ll ER 252.
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goods leaving the ship tackle. This point was quashed by Lord W ilberforce, 
who held that since the carrier did not insist on the consignees taking delivery 
at the ships rail, they were liable for the goods themselves, thus the contract did 
not end on discharge, but on actual delivery. This case was sought to be 
differentiated from The Eurymedon on the ground, that while in the latter the 
damage had occurred on boarding, which is within the contract period, in the 
New York Star, it occurred on the w harf after the contract had ended.
This decision was followed in Godina v Patrick Operations, where it was 
affirmed that delivery to the w harf did not suffice to extinguish the contract, it 
has to be delivery to the consignees. The obstacle placed on the path of the 
third party by the Privity doctrine, and cases such as Alder v D icksonm  and 
Scrutton v M idland Silicones L td .195 (where the House o f Lords denied 
Stevedores the protection o f the limitation in the Hague Rules) has been eroded 
bit by bit. Firstly by Art IV bis 2 o f The Hague Visby Rules, which states that 
an agent or servant not being an independent contractor can rely on the 
defences o f the rules if  sued. With the coming into force o f The Contracts 
(Rights o f third Parties) Act 1999 third parties are increasingly allowed the 
benefit o f clauses made for their benefit.
By an Act o f Parliament, the 1999 Act made the principle o f ius quessitium  
tertio a part o f English law, allowing an identifiable third party the right to 
enforce the terms o f  contracts purportedly made for i t ’s benefit.196 Although 
this Act was o f general application, it is increasingly being used within the 
transport industry, in cases o f charterparties, and towage contracts.
In the context of multimodal transport, the Himalaya clause will continue to be used 
so long as unimodal solutions are used in solving multimodal transport problems.
Here there is the added problem of the applicability of this clause extending the 
protection usually found in the carriage by sea to carriage which is not sea carriage. In 
the USA, the courts were prepared to extent the benefits o f the Himalaya clause to rail
193 [1984], 1 Lloyd’s Rep 333.
194 [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep 267.
195 [1962] AC 446.
196 Art 1 o f  The Contract (Rights Third Parties) Act 1999
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/ 97carriage. In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James Kirby, Pty Ltd, the rail carrier 
sought to rely on a Himalaya clause when the train de-railed causing USD 1.5 million 
worth of damage goods. The Supreme Court in their decision allowed the rail carrier 
to claim the protection of the Himalaya clause, basing this decision on the customs 
and practices worldwide where third parties are allowed to benefit from this clause if 
it was intended for their benefit.
In The Starsin,198 the status of the clause was examined by the House of Lord. The 
issue before their Lordships was the determination of the legitimacy of the clause in 
protecting shipowners against liability to cargo owners. The shipowners were held to 
be able to benefit from the clause as they had performed part o f the carriage. The 
majority of their Lordships signal their reluctance in applying Himalayan clauses. 
Basing their arguments on a legal technicality, they held that the clause was 
ineffective. Lord Bingham whilst holding that decisions in The Eurymedon and The 
New York Star were a commercially inspired response to the technical rules of 
English law governing consideration and privity of contract criticized it for its 
artificiality.199 Lord Hobhouse on his part based his rejection on policy, stating that 
the acceptance of this clause will place English law at odds with other jurisdictions 
were privity of contract is not applied.200 Lord Millet relied on the “contra 
preferentem rule ”, that the clause as it stood did not make sense, holding that it was 
obvious that some words had been omitted.201 If The Starsin signals the current 
judicial attitude towards Himalaya clauses, then carriers will have to pay particular 
attention to the drafting of these clauses.
2.4.1.2 The Circular Indemnity Clause
The uncertainty as to the Himalayan clause has led carriers to insert into their 
contracts circular indemnity clauses, which are clauses stating that the cargo
197 125 S. Ct. 385 [2004] A.M.C 2705. This decision was indeed a landmark case as in the earlier case 
o f  CaterpillarO verseas S.A.v. Maritime Inc,900 F. 2d 714; [1991]AM C 75 it was held that a Himalaya 
clause could not extend to inland carriage.
198 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571
199 Ibid Para 34
200 Ibid Para 140
201 Ibid Para 192-193
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interests will not bring an action against the sub-contractors, and in the event o f 
such a claim being brought to indemnify the carrier against any loss likely to be 
incurred by him. This clause is o f particular importance to Multimodal 
transport, for unlike the Himalayan clause, which grants to the sub-contractor 
the same rights as the carrier, this clause seeks to ensure that the sub-contractor 
is not sued and if  sued, the cargo owner will indemnify the MTO as a deterrent 
against suit.
202A typical clause can be found in The Elbe Maru
"The merchant undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be 
made against any servant, agent o f  the sub-contractor o f  the 
carrier,
In the case the carrier sought to bring proceedings under Sect. 41 o f the 
Judicature Act 1925, to prevent the cargo owners from continuing a claim 
against the sub-contractors. Ackner, J held that the carrier was entitled to an 
indemnity against cost incurred in dealing with the claims against the sub­
contractor by cargo owners.
This case was followed in Australia, in Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft.203 
Here, like the Elbe Maru, the carrier sought to bring proceedings on the 
grounds o f a circular indemnity clause. Yeldham, J. held that commercial 
considerations, like the freight rate, were influenced by the knowledge of an 
indemnity clause. The consignee should be held to his part o f the bargain not to 
sue. Yeldham then went on to hold that, such cases were necessary to prevent 
protracted litigation: (The consignee first sues the stevedores, then the carrier 
seeks to sue the consignee to prevent his suit, and the stevedores if  there is 
such a clause, sues the carrier for breach o f promise)
In another case in New South Wales, Sidney Cook Ltd. v Hapag-Lloyd  
Aktiengesellschaft,204 on similar facts as the foregoing case, the consignee 
contended that the clause was a contravention o f Article 3, Rule 8 o f the Hague
202 Nippon Yuson Kaisha v International Import and Export Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 206.
203 (1980) 2 N S W R  p  572, and Sidney C ooke L td  v H apag-L loyd
204 (1980) 2 N S W L R  587.
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Visby Rules. This contention was quashed by Feldham LJ on the grounds that 
the carrier o f the sea leg o f the combined transport operation was not a party to 
the contract covered by the bill of lading, and therefore not a carrier under the 
rules for the application o f Article3 Rule 8 to affect him.
The above criticism together with the criticism, that by the clause the carrier 
seeks to do
"...indirectly what by the rules mandate cannot be done 
d irectly”205
This does not directly apply to multimodal transport. This criticism o f the 
clause is predicated on the fact that they tend to contravene Art 3 rule 8, which 
renders void
"Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract o f  carriage 
relieving the carrier or the ship from  liability fo r  loss or 
damage to or in connection with goods arising from
negligence, fa u lt or fa ilure in the duties and obligation
provided in the article or lessening such liability than as 
provided. ”206
The operative part o f the article is "relieving the carrier or the sh ip", the 
carrier in multimodal carriage is the MTO and he is the only one that can be 
stated as being liable especially in the light o f The Starsin, the focus is on the 
front o f the document as opposed to examining the back o f the document.
By this it becomes clear that the so long as the carrier in M ultimodal transport 
is stated on the face o f the document, the problem o f  the "identity" o f the 
carrier should not exist following on the Starsin. If  this be the case, there can
be no lessening o f his liability under Art 111 rule 8, because he does not by the
205 T etley , M arine Cargo C laim s, (B la is 3rd Ed, 1988) p. 760.
206 The Hague V isby R ules 1968.
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clause seek to deprive the consignee o f any remedy but to say, he alone should 
be sued for that loss.
As a matter o f interest, most o f the multimodal transport documents contain 
liability clauses which state that although only the MTO is liable, his liability 
is based on the extent or criteria under which the party at fault would have been 
liable. Thus as in the Sydney Cooke case, if  it could be determinable that the 
loss had occurred at the sea stage, then the MTO's liability will be liability 
found in sea carriage, as if  it was originally one for the carriage by sea. In this 
case it is hard to see a contravention o f Art 3 Rule 8; instead it seems to be 
more in line with the "giving effect to the clear intention o f  a commercial 
document".
2.4.1.3 Sub-Bailment on Terms Clause
Another way in which the performing party or the sub-contractor can benefit from 
the terms of the contract is through the doctrine of Sub-bailment on terms. Under 
this doctrine, the bailee who has possession o f goods passes that possession to a 
third person who then becomes the sub-bailee. The question is if  the bailee will be 
bound by the terms o f the sub-bailment. In The Pioneer Container,207 It was held 
that a performing carrier could be liable as sub-bailee and that the cargo owner 
could also be subject to the sub-bailment, if it consented to them. Consent in this 
case can be seen from authorisation which can be expressed or implied. The liberty 
to sub-contract clause is usually taken to be enough. This clause is very attractive to 
the third party as it allows him to rely on its terms; it is not reliant on the contractual 
carrier.
This fact was confirmed in Singer Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Rees and Hartleport 
Authority 208 where it was shown that, the local authority was able to establish that 
they could create a sub-bailment on terms which included that authority’s standard 
trading conditions.
207 [1994] 2 A. C. 324
208 [1988]2 Lloyd’s Rep. 164
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2.4.1.4The Contracts ( Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, recognised the right of third 
parties to rely on terms expressed to be for their benefit in contract to which they are 
not parties. The Act gives third parties the rights in circumstances set out under 
section. 1 to enforce the terms of such contracts. In the case o f carriage o f goods, 
section 6(5) and (7) states that, these rights are not available in the case of carriage 
of goods, the main reason for this is to ensure that this does not conflict or overlap 
with the Carriage o f Goods by Sea Act 1992. This therefore excludes the cases of 
the rights of suit against the carrier by the cargo concerns in the case of holders of 
bills of lading or other transport documents.
However, there is an exception to this exclusion which will permit third parties on 
the carrying side to benefit from this Act. This is found under the proviso to section 
6(5) which is expressly designed to cater for the Himalaya clauses. Third parties are 
thus able to rely on this Act to enforce a Himalaya clause; in such cases the 
operation of the privity doctrine will be inapplicable. For the third parties to benefit 
from this Act, they must show that the particular clause in the contract was meant to 
“confer a benefit” on them. In The Starsin,209, it was held that the first part of the 
clause was not for the benefit of the third party and they could not therefore rely on 
it
Although the 1999 Act overcame to a great extent, the limitation of third party 
rights in contracts for the carriage of goods by sea covered by the COGSA 1992, the 
current accommodation of third party rights in the two acts might give rise to 
inconsistencies, potential gaps and unnecessary confusion for third parties.
2.5 Conclusion
The very nature of multimodal transport dictates that more than one party is usually 
involved in the carriage of the goods. As seen from the above, the parties include 
the contracting carrier, the MTO, the performing carriers, transport sub-contractors 
and the agents and servants of the carrier.
209 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 437
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This scenario obviously calls for the identification of the MTO, who has assumed 
the responsibility of the transport and is the party to be sued. This identification is 
important as it allows cargo claimants to sue the appropriate party without the risk 
of being time barred in their quest for identifying the right claimant.
At the moment we see that the status of MTO is fluid and includes within its ranks 
all who chose to carry and assume the obligations of multimodal transport. Carriers 
previously within unimodal transport and freight forwarders are thus the main group 
of persons carrying out multimodal transport.
However, other third parties who are considered as ancillary to the transport are also 
at times regarded as the carrier for purposes of suing them. This highlights the 
problems of other protection clauses within the contracts to prevent suit against 
these parties.
However, the absence of a mandatory international convention within Multimodal 
transport ushers in the applicability of all potentially international and national 
mandatory laws which means that unpredictability exists.
A uniform convention would have been able to secure the fact that only the MTO 
could be sued, however, with the nature of the transport, once loss or damage is 
identified, we find the possibility of suit against the different parties or performing 
carriers under whose charge goods were when the loss or damage occurred.
The position taken by The Starsin goes a long way to support the present concept 
within multimodal transport, that only the carrier identified on the face of the 
document should be considered to be the carrier. This is o f particular importance as 
the realities o f multimodal transport shows a strong tendency to “pierce the veil” to 
reveal the performing party responsible, thereby bringing action not based on the 
contract against him. This makes for uncertainty and unpredictability as to the 
applicable law.
This fact ushers in the problem of protection clauses within the contract and their 
interpretations.
The way forward within multimodal transport might be to make it obligatory that 
the carrier be identified in the contract by a specific notation, failing such
identification it should be presumed that the last carrier is the carrier. This clause it 
should be made clear will be for the purpose of leading to the identification of the 
MTO, as it would be assumed that the last carrier would know the identity of the 
MTO.
Multimodal transport, by offering the claimant the possibility of claiming against 
one party in case of loss or damage irrespective of localisation was one of the 
advantages of multimodal transport which led to its popularity. This advantage can 
only be preserved if  the practice is encouraged of suing only the MTO.
In the absence o f a mandatory liability regime in multimodal transport it will be 
difficult to enforce such a rule. The hope in this instance is that when such a regime 
becomes applicable it should lay down clear rules for the identification of the MTO 
and strict rules to deter suit against the other performing parties involved in 
multimodal carriage.
In continuation of this theme, the next chapter looks at the liability regime 
applicable in Multimodal transport.
CHAPTER 3
3.1 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF LIABILITY IN
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The Hague Visby Rules governs liability for the international carriage o f goods 
by Sea, The Warsaw Convention, The CMR, CIM/COTIF and The CMNI all 
govern liability for the international carriage of goods by air, road, rail and 
inland waterways respectively. In multimodal carriage, there is no such liability 
regime governing liability. Following on from chapter one in which the regime 
is interpreted in terms o f the ‘chained contract,’ the liability regime in 
multimodal transport is made up o f the potential liability regimes used to effect 
the multimodal transport contract.
This leads to uncertainty and unpredictability as to the liability regime applicable 
in any given case. Attempts have been made within unimodal transport to extend 
their applicability beyond their respective regimes to accommodate certain 
aspects o f multimodal transport within their different modes. Nevertheless, none 
o f these attempts could logically provide a full and adequate liability regime in 
multimodal transport. The United Nations Multimodal Transport Convention 
1980 failed to obtain the requisite signatories to bring it into force.
In view of the absence o f a mandatory regime in multimodal transport, a 
proliferation o f potentially liability regimes apply to multimodal transport 
leading to uncertainty and unpredictability as to the applicable laws at any given 
time. This chapter seeks to discuss the multimodal transport problem through the 
illustration o f a consignment of goods carried under a multimodal transport 
contract from Texas to Frondenburg in Germany. Under the contract, Flour Co a 
bakery chain contracts with Multico, carriers for the carriage of 1000 kgs, of flour in 
10 packages of 100 kgs, to be carried in a container, evidenced by a multimodal 
transport document. Multico using its liberty to choose modes decides to use the 
following modes:
(1) From Exporter's premises to rail depot - local road firm.
(2) From Texas rail depot to Quebec in Canada - Canada Rail.
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(3)
4)
From Canada to Paris - B.K.O. Ltd- Sea carriers.
From Paris to Germany - Road Runner Road carriers
On delivery inGermany, 8 packages are delivered to the consignee.
Through this hypothetical case, we will examine the Multimodal transport 
problem o f the proliferation o f liability regimes depending on the loss or damage 
history. Specifically, to show that the liability regime in Multimodal transport is 
uncertain and unpredictable, and has led to a confusing legal situation especially 
when two or more mandatory regimes become applicable to the same loss or 
damage.
This chapter seeks to examine the problem of the liability regime available in 
multimodal transport for compensating cargo owners for loss, damage or delay to 
goods. The present legal framework in multimodal transport is complex and 
modally based, consisting of numerous international unimodal transport 
conventions, regional and sub-regional agreements, and national laws. The legal 
regime applicable varies from case to case depending on the particular facts of 
each case leading to uncertainty and unpredictability.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine and analyse in detail the 
multimodal liability problem of an unpredictable and uncertain liability regime 
which obtains as a result o f the diversity and gaps in the laws governing 
multimodal transport. This problem viewed in doctrinal terms, presents
extraordinary problems which have troubled legal scholars and constituted the
210work of many international bodies.
The thesis will then discuss the different liability provisions in the main 
mandatory transport conventions especially their basis o f liability and their 
exceptions. It will be argued that although the different basis o f liability within 
the different conventions are couched in varying legal terms their interpretations
210
Diam ond, A, "The UN Convention on M ultimodal Transport, Legal A spects o f  the 
Convention", Southampton Seminar on M ultimodal Transport, U niversity o f  Southampton 12 
Septem ber 1980. Faber, D, "The Problem arising from M ultimodal Transport" (1996) LMCLQ  
503. D riscol, W J, "The Convention on International M ultimodal Transport: A Status Report" 
(1978) 4 JMLC 441.
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are quite similar, their basic differences lie in their exceptions and limits of 
liability.
This chapter concludes that given the unpredictability found within multimodal 
transport liability, there is necessity for international rules to govern liability in 
multimodal transport.
3.2 THEORITICAL LIABILITY FOR LOSS, DAMAGE, OR DELAY
The absence o f an international liability convention governing liability in 
multimodal transport means that, when ever loss or damage occurs, the 
determination o f what specific law applies is problematic, because o f the 
possibility that different modes are used. When loss is localised to a particular 
mode, the common practice has been to apply the mandatory international or 
national law that would have applied to that particular mode o f transport. 
However, even in cases in which loss has been localised to a particular mode, it 
is not always obvious which liability regime will be applicable, because the 
chosen liability regime might point to another regime on the facts o f the case .211 
Another problem that arises is that of loss or damage occurring during interface 
areas between modes where no liability regime, international or national applies, 
here the applicable regime has to be that o f the contract. This lack o f a liability 
regime is also exacerbated in the case of unlocalised loss or damage, especially 
when the goods have been carried in a container. In this case it is difficult to 
ascertain what liability regime will apply, in which case the liability regime of 
the contract will be applicable? This means that there will always be a lack of 
certainty as to the applicable terms as the absence of a liability regime regulating 
this mode means that each contract might be different.
The lack of an applicable international convention within Multimodal transport 
has however, seen the rise of standard contracts in this area. Fortunately, most of 
these standard contracts are similar as there are based on model rules formulated 
within the industry, notable the ICC rules for a combined transport document
211 See Art 2 o f  the CMR which under which the CMR will abdicate in favour o f  a mode in which loss 
or damage can be exclusively attributed to in cases o f  ‘mode -on-m ode transport within the CMR
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1975 and the UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal transport documents 1992.212 
The contractual nature o f the rules by definition subjects them to the different 
applicable mandatory conventions and laws applicable in unimodal transport. 
Thus the different transport regimes currently govern liability for cargo damage, 
loss or delay in multimodal transport once loss or damage is localised or as a 
matter of contract.213 A difficulty here is the unpredictability and uncertainty that 
exists in a system which is inclusive o f all unimodal mandatory conventions and 
mandatory national laws.214
3.2.1 International Conventions Potentially Applicable to Multimodal 
Transport
A true picture of the problem of unpredictable liability in multimodal liability 
can be seen from the variety o f applicable regimes in multimodal transport once 
loss, damage or delay occurs. The result is that the parties cannot contract on any 
predictable terms as it is impossible to predict where loss or damage will occur. 
Even in cases where loss or damage can be localised, there is always the added 
problem of the applicability of the unimodal transport convention or national law 
to the multimodal transport contract. In the case o f unlocalised loss the terms o f 
the contract will dictate the liability regime applicable; the liability regime can 
thus only be determined ex post facto.
At this point we need to identify the International Unimodal Conventions 
potentially applicable in multimodal transport.
212 The Fiata Bill o f  Lading for Combined transport, ‘9 2 ’, Multidoc ‘95’, Combicombill etc.
213 Princes Buitoni Ltd v. Hapag [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 383, where under the contract CMR was to 
govern road liability in Europe.
- l4This absence encourages different national, regional and intergovernm ental bodies to enact 
solutions to regulate this m ode, this has led to a further proliferation o f  liability regim es with 
potential applicability in this area;
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3.2.2 TABLE OF IN TERN ATION AL TRANSPORT CONVENTIONS
3.2.2.1 CARRIAGE BY SEA
Hague/Visby Rules Hamburg Rules
Date 1924 Amended by Brussels 
Protocol 1968
1978
Period of application From loading of goods until 
discharge from vessel. 
Special responsibilities 
before the start of the voyage
From period when carrier is in 
charge of goods at loading port to 
port of discharge
Contract of carriage Evidence a by a bill of 
loading or other similar 
document
Bill of loading serves only as 
evidence o f contract
Basis of liability For loss or damage Liability for presumed fault or 
neglect for loss or damage and delay 
in delivery
Limitation of liability 1. SDR/Kg 
666.67 SDR/Package
2.5 SDR/Kg 
835 SDR/Package
2.54. the freight 
Payable for delay
High limits of liability By agreement increase or 
reduction shall be include in 
the bill of loading
Carrier may assume a greater 
liability
Notice of claim Before or at the time of 
renewal of guide writing 
non-apparent loss : 3 days
Apparent loss or damage : 1 day 
Non apparent loss or damage : 15 
days
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3.2.2.2 CARRIAGE BY AIR
Warsaw Montreal
Date 1929 1999
Period of application From acceptance through 
delivery
Period when cargo is in the charge 
of the carrier
Contract of carriage Air waybill -  12 minimum 
particulars
Air waybill -  3 essential particulars
Basis of liability Presumed fault of carrier for 
loss, damage, delay
Presumed fault for damage to or loss 
of cargo, for claims over 
100.000SDR,and Strict liability for 
claims under lOO.OOOSDRs
Delay - -
Consequential or 
economic loss
No restriction on damage 
caused by delay
No restriction on damage caused by 
delay
Limitation of liability 17 SDR/Kg
High limits of liability Specific declaration of value 
by shipper + payment of 
supplement
Special declaration of interest, 
subject to the payment of 
supplementary sum
Notice of claim Damage -  7 days from 
reception of goods
Delay within 14 days
Damage : 14 days 
Delay : 21 days
3.2.2.3 CARRIAGE BY ROAD
CMR
Date 1956
Period of application From taking over to delivery
Contract o f carriage Confirmation by consignment note
Basis of liability Presumed fault of the carrier for loss, damage, delay
Liability for indirect and 
consequential loss
Carriage charges custom duties
Limits of liability 8.33 SDR/Kg
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for delay 1 x value of freight
Higher limits Against payment of surcharge
Notice of claim Damage -  7 days
Delay -  21 days after good placed at carrier disposal
3.2.2.4 CARRIAGE BY INLAND W ATER WAYS
CMNI
Date 1999
Period of application From taking to delivery
Contract of carriage Consignment not required if requested
Basis of liability Liability fir loss, damage and delay
Limitation for 
consequential loss
Cost of preventing damage
Limit of liability 8.33 SDR/Kg 
Delay 3 x value of freight
High limits by liability -
Notice of claim Apparent loss, damage or delivery 
Non apparent loss -  7 days after delivery 
Delay -  21 days after delivery
3.2.2.5 RAIL CARRIAGE
CIM /COT IF Protocol
Date 1980 1999
Period of application From time of acceptance for 
carriage over entire route up 
to delivery
The cargo is in the charge o f the 
carrier
Contract o f carriage Consignment note Consignment note
Basis of liability Strict liabilitv for loss or 
damage resulting from transit 
period
Strict liability for loss or damage 
resulting from total or partial loss or 
damage to goods 
Presumed liability for loss or
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damage to the vehicle or to its 
removable parts and for delay. 
Restricted liability : for wastage in 
transit only if  wastage exceeds 
specific allowance
Delay Not within transit time agree Not within agreed transit time
Liability of 
inconsequential loss
Absence, insufficiency if 
irregularity in documents
In case of interest in delivery
Limitation of liability 17 SDR/Kg
4 x the carriage charges for 
delay
17 SDR/Kg
4 x carriage charges for delay
High limits by liability Carrier may assume a greater 
liability in case of declaration of 
interest
Notice of claim Non-apparent loss : 7 days Non apparent loss or damage : 7 
days
3.2.2.6 M ULTIMODAL TRANSPORT MODELS RULES
FIATA Model Rules UNCTAD/IH Rules
Date 1996 1992
Period of application From taking the goods in 
charge until delivery
From taking the goods until delivery
Contract of carriage Bill of loading MT document
Basis of liability Presumed liability for loss or 
damage
Presumed liability for loss, damage 
and delay
Liability for 
consequential loss
Consequential loss or damage other 
than loss of or damage to goods
Limitation of liability 2 SDR/Kg
Delay - remuneration 
relating to the service giving
2 SDR/Kg
666.67 SDR/Package
8.33 SDR/Kg if no carriage by sea
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use to delay Delay and consequential loss -  1 x 
amount of freight limit of unimodal 
convention of loss/damage localised
Higher limits By agreement fixed in MT 
document
Notice of claim Non-apparent loss : 6 days Non apparent loss or damage : 6 
days after 90 days treatment of 
goods as loss
Diversity o f approach within these Conventions on key issues, such as the basis 
of liability, time bar, delay and limitation of liability means that the applicable 
law will be different in each case depending on the determination of;
-The applicable regime 
-Localised loss 
-Unlocalised loss, and 
-Cause o f loss or damage
The problem can be further complicated if  loss occurs gradually all through 
carriage thereby transcending modes and bringing into play different liability 
regimes.
The question of the applicable liability regime in multimodal transport is of 
tremendous importance because o f the increasing importance of this mode. 
However, given the plurality o f legal regimes and the variation in their treatment 
in different jurisdictions, multimodal liability often changes 
" ...like the colour o f  a chameleon as the transport progresses by various means
o f  conveyance".2'*
This fact clearly limits the ease with which the outcome o f any claim is 
determined before the actual loss or damage. On a close scrutiny o f the
215 Ramberg, J, "Harmonisation o f  the Law o f  Carriage o f  Goods" [1973] S ca n d in a v ia n  
L aw  R ev ie w  245.
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practicalities, however, the choice usually leads to the application o f one of the 
international unimodal transport conventions, either because they are mandatory 
or because they are the ‘choice o f law’ o f the contract. The unpredictability in 
this case also lies in the fact that these different forums vary especially in their 
interpretation o f legal rules.216
3.3 THE PRACTICAL BASIS OF LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL
TRANSPORT
The absence o f a mandatory international convention applicable to multimodal 
transport means that the legal liability is purely contractual, with the 
implication that any number o f regimes can be applicable depending on the 
contract entered into between the parties. This has obvious implications for 
multimodal transport as the absence of statutory cover implies that the contract 
is often overridden by mandatory transport conventions and laws. Further, 
these laws are given varied interpretations in the different jurisdictions leading 
to a situation in which the parties cannot predict what rules will obtain until 
after loss or damage has occurred.
So far the two main ones are the ICC “Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport 
Document”217, and the UNCTAD/ICC Rules for multimodal transport.218 
These rules are important as they attempt to unify the multimodal transport 
contract; however, as private contracts they have no mandatory force and cannot 
establish a mandatory regime.
Before model rules were adopted, the prevailing situation involved the use of 
through contracts of carriage. The main purpose of these through contracts of 
carriage was the provision of continuous documentary cover for goods, without 
necessarily a concomitant liability cover for the goods during carriage. Thus,
216 Haak, “The Harmonisation o f  intermodal liability arrangements” 5th IVR Colloquim-Vienna-27 and 
28 January 2005
217 The ICC Rules were first issued in 1973; Publication No. 273 and in 1975 issued ICC Publication 
No 298
218 Also Found in ICC Publication 481
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under through contracts several carriers could be liable to the cargo owner for the
219portion of the carriage performed by each.
This type of contract did not relieve the shipper of the anxieties suffered prior to
the introduction of the through contract, because in case of loss or damage, he still
had to sue the individual carrier who effectively caused the loss or damage. In
some instances he would not have known about the particular carrier's terms and
conditions.220 The through carriage contract differentiated between the period of
liability and documentary cover, as the carrier issued a document which covered
221the whole transit, but accepted responsibility only for a limited period. This led 
to the demand for a document to be issued which covered both the period of 
responsibility and documentary cover. On this basis model rules were formulated 
by the different international organisations. At present the main model rules being 
used are the ICC Rules of 1975 and the UNCTAD/ICC Rules o f 1992.
3.3.1 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); Uniform Rules for a
222Combined Transport Document.
These rules consisting o f 19 rules were first published in 1973 as the International 
Chamber of Commerce rules for a combined transport document; and amended in 
1975. These rules were for incorporation into the multimodal transport contract 
and mostly concerned the documentation and liability problems o f multimodal 
transport, leaving issues such as freight, liens, general average and jurisdiction to 
be determined by the individual parties. 224
The ICC Rules become applicable by the issue of a combined transport document 
which incorporates these rules, and by the issue of these documents, the carrier 
accepts responsibility for the performance of multimodal transport and liability
219 Ramberg, J, "Harmonisation o f  the Law o f  Carriage o f  Goods" [1973] S ca n d in a v ia n
Law Review 2 4 5 .Stafford A llen & Sons Ltd v Pacific Steam Navigation Comp [1956] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 495 A lso Crawford and Ano v A llen Line [1912] AC 130.
220 Stafford Allen, ibid pp 499
221 Evling Selvig, "Through Carriage o f  Goods by Sea" (1979) 27 AJCL, p 369
222 These Rules where first published in 1973, ICC Pub. 273, and modified in 1975 to cater for the 
problems o f  liability in delay.
223 1 975 ICC Uniform Rules for a combined transport document .Publication No 298. These rules 
where based on the Tokyo Rules and the TCM draft.
224 F D D Cadwallader, "Uniformity: the Regulation o f  Combined Transport" (1974) J BL 193. 
W heble, B S, "The International Chamber o f  Commerce Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport 
Document" [ 1976] LMCLQ 145.
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throughout the entire transport. The rules however differentiate between liability 
rules when loss is localised and when it is concealed. The ICC Rules have adopted 
the network system o f liability, making the carrier liable as per the mandatory 
applicable regime when loss is localised and lays down its own rules when loss is 
concealed. The first generation Multimodal transport documents like the 
COMBIDOC, Multimodal transport Document and the FIATA Bill of Lading for 
Combined Transport bills o f lading were all based on these rules.
3.3.1.1 Liability for unlocalised loss
In our hypothetical case if the contract was on one of the ICC formats and the loss 
is unlocalised, then as per Rule 11 o f the Rules the compensation would be 
provided for. Once the claimant can prove that the bags o f flour were delivered 
short as in our hypothetical case, the MTO’s liability is engaged. This is because 
liability for concealed loss is not based on any fault or lack o f fault on his part or 
those for whom he is responsible; i.e. his servants and agents, it is based on a 
general rule in transportation law which makes him liable for any loss or damage to
225the goods under his care for which he can offer no explanation.
Under the rules, the MTO will be liable for unlocalised loss to the consignee, 
because these rules invoke a presumption of fault as the basis of liability, although 
with slight variations as to the basis of exoneration.
By Rule 5(3) of the ICC Rules, the carrier is liable on a presumed fault basis, if loss 
is concealed, meaning that he benefits from certain exceptions to liability, which are 
stated in Rule 12. The grounds for exoneration, which the MTO has to show to 
escape liability, are:
(1) The fault o f the shipper
(2) Defective packing or marking
(3) Inherent vice of the goods
(4) An unavoidable work stoppage
(5) A nuclear incident
225 The general rule is that he is liable in case o f  unexplained loss or damage. Transatlantic Marine 
Claims_Agency Inc V. OOCL Inspiration(The OOCL Inspiration)_ 1998 AMC 1327 1327 (USCA 2nd 
Cir),1330. Where it was stated poignantly and with respect to the US Carriage o f  Goods by Sea Act 
1936 the “COGSA’s framework thus places the risk o f  non-explanation o f  mysterious maritime 
damage squarely on the [carrier]” see also The Torennia [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep. 210, The Rhesa 
Shipping Company Co; SA V. Edmund ( The Popi M) [1985] 1 WLR 948
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(6) Any other cause which could not be avoided and whose consequences could not 
be prevented by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
These exceptions are normal exceptions found within the different transport 
conventions and would be interpreted in the same way.
While the basis o f liability is similar and likely to result in similar results, the 
limits of liability vary to a considerable extent.
ICC Rules: Rule 11(c)
Under the ICC Rules, the Limit of liability for lost cargo is 30 Poincarre gold 
francs per kilogram (one Poincarre gold franc as set at 65.5 milligrams of gold of 
millesimal fineness 900 in 1928). Largely this standard has now being replaced by 
the (SDR) Special Drawing Rights o f the International Monetary Fund, and 30 
Poincarre is equivalent to 2 S.D.R. per kilogram.
3.3.1.2 Liability for localised loss
As seen in the preceding section, the outcome of any multimodal transport contract 
in which loss or damage is concealed is dependent on the particular choice o f law 
chosen by the parties. However, the practice has led invariably to a situation in 
which the standard o f liability is presumed fault in imitation o f the standard 
applicable in unimodal transport, with a variation only in the limitation of liability.
In the case of localised loss or damage, the liability regime applicable is that 
applicable where loss or damage took place. This means that there is the 
possibility of two or more regimes applying if loss or damage is gradual 
throughout several modes or if it can be proven that different types o f loss 
occurred during different modes. This intermix of different mandatory 
international and national liability regimes leads invariably to different results, 
even on the same facts.
If hypothetically, it was discovered that the loss actually occurred during the 
carriage by sea, or by road or even by rail, then the different rules applicable under 
the conventions sited above will become applicable.
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By Rule 13
"The [CTO] is liable to pay compensation in respect o f  loss or damage to the 
goods; and the stage o f  transport where the loss or damage occurred is 
known, the liability o f  the CTO in respect o f  such loss or damage shall be 
determined:
(a) By the provisions contained in any international convention or national law 
which provisions
(i) cannot be departed from  by private contract, to the detriment o f  the 
claimant, and
(ii) would have applied i f  the claimant had made a separate and direct 
contract with the [CTO] in respect o f the particular stage o f  transport 
where the loss or damage occurred and received as evidence thereof 
any particular document which must be issued in order to make such 
international convention or national law applicable; or
(b) By the provisions contained in any international convention relating to the 
carriage o f  goods by the mode o f  transport used to carry the goods at the time 
when loss or damage occurred...."
Under this Rules, all unimodal conventions and national legislations are 
potentially applicable to the carriage, to be triggered by localisation of loss or 
damage. In this case our hypothetical case may be subject to at least 2 different 
international conventions.
The Hague Visby Rules will apply to the sea leg, by virtue of the Canadian 
Carriage o f Goods by Order Act SC 1993. Although Canada is not party to either 
the 1924 convention or its protocol in 1968, it adopted both by statute, and the 
Road section from Paris to Germany will be subject to the CMR. And in the case 
of rail carriage from Texas to Canada, the US Federal law will be applicable; the 
carriage inside the USA is strictly subject to national or federal law.
The above states the reality when the ICC rules are used, that many different legal 
regimes are potentially applicable even to such a simple MT contract.
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3.3.1.3 Liability for delay
The issue of liability for delay in multimodal transport is not as easy as in 
unimodal transport.226 The question here is what law will be applicable in case of 
delay in a container or in case of delays under different modes during the same 
contract. In the case of the ICC rules liability is triggered in case o f delay only 
when loss or damage is localised, and to the extent that it is actionable under the 
appropriate liability regime applicable. The rule then follows the concept of the 
fictitious contract. The amount payable is in this case shall not exceed the freight 
for the stage to which the loss or damage occurred, provided that the limitation is 
not contrary to any applicable international convention or national law. Rule 14.
3.3.1.4 THE LEGAL FICTION
The main purpose of this clause is to provide back-to-back liability, so that the 
[carrier] MTO is liable to the extent of the actual carriers or sub-carrier’s liability to 
him. The MTO thereby ensures that he does not suffer more loss than that occasioned 
during carriage by a performing party. The purport of this provision is thus all- 
encompassing as it extends the liability of the MTO to cover all liability regimes 
under which the MTO may be sued. The clause thus includes all national and 
international law.
(1) Clauses
Clause 11(a) (i):
"... Which provisions cannot be departed from by private contract to the 
detriment of the claimant?"
226 Gronfors K., “ Liability for Delay in Combined Transport” (1974) ( JMLC 483 at p.485
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This provision reflects the non-derogatory provisions in unimodal transport 
convention and prevents the carrier from derogating from the convention, thereby 
granting to the claimant the same level of protection.
The problem with this provision is that it is essentially based on transport conventions 
which are modally subjective, and automatically falls within the ambit of mandatory 
unimodal conventions. Therefore there is no marked clarity in ascertaining any 
provisions that seek to derogate from the convention to the detriment o f the claimant, 
i.e. in The Morviken;227 the contract was for the shipment of machinery from Leith to 
the Dutch Antilles, under a bill of lading which included a Dutch choice of law 
clause. The machinery was damaged, and the shippers commenced proceedings in 
rem in the Admiralty Courts. The carrier sought to stay proceedings on the basis of 
the exclusive jurisdiction clause.
Under Dutch law the applicable law was the Hague Rules with limits amounting to 
£250, while under The Hague Visby Rules as applicable in the UK the shipper could 
have claimed £11,000.
Their Lordships were of the opinion that the "clause paramount" of the Hague rules 
had been displaced by the Hague Visby Rules, which had the force o f law, so that it 
must be treated as if "they were part o f  directly enacted legislation". The Hague 
Visby Rules were therefore applicable to the bill of lading since it fell within Art X
(a) (b), having been issued in a contracting state, for carriage to a contracting state. 
The opinion thus was that to give effect to the choice of law would have amounted 
to derogating from the provisions, contrary to Art 111 rule 8.
In such unimodal transport it is indeed easy to state as their Lordships did, that one 
cannot derogate from the provision by inserting in the bill o f lading, a jurisdiction 
clause which is detrimental to the claimant.
In multimodal transport, ascertaining such a device is not so easy. First of all there 
is no requirement that the MTO undertake to carry the goods using particular
227 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep l.
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mode(s). Thus the fact that a provision might be taken to be derogatory, does not 
necessarily mean that it was intended to be. Will the fact that the ‘Combidoc’ bill 
states that only the Hague Rules are applicable to sea carriage derogatory, in a case 
in which the Hague Visby Rules would have been applicable?
The contention here is that it is not, because the Hague Rules in this case are applied 
only by contract and not ex proprio vigore. The effect o f the clause in the context of 
multimodal transport is that it places the claimant in the same situation in which 
other claimants under the mode to which loss is localised would find themselves. 
And whether a clause would be construed as non-derogatory or not will at the final 
analysis be seen only after localisation.
(b) Clause 11 a (ii)
"which provision would have applied i f  the claimant had made a separate and 
direct contract with the [CTO] in respect o f  the particular stage o f transport 
where loss or damage occurred".
This brings into play a "hypothetical contract", asking the parties to determine 
liability on a hypothetical contract which might have existed, between the cargo 
claimant and the sub-carrier. The question that suggests itself here is the accuracy 
of the determination o f such a hypothetical contract. How can we predict the 
particular contract that would have been concluded?
The answer to such a question in French and Belgian law was that the hypothetical 
contract between the carrier and the sub-contractor would be similar to that before 
them so that if  that contract is subject to mandatory rules, it will be assumed that 
the "hypothetical contract" that would have been made between the claimant and 
the sub-carrier would also be subject to such mandatory rules.228 
What then is the hypothetical contract?
(i) Is it the contract that would have applied to the relationship between the MTO 
and the carrier or
(ii) That which would have applied had a direct contract been made?
228 See Chapter 2. See also Jan Theunis, International Carriage o f  G oods by Road CMR (1987).
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Alternatively, the contract concluded between the MTO and the performing carrier 
could be taken as the "hypothetical contract" because
(i) On the doctrine o f agency ratification, the cargo claimant can be said to 
have ratified that contract. For the multimodal transport contract which 
contains a liberty to sub-contract can be taken to be the authority given to
229the MTO to contract on terms suitable to the claimant.
(ii) The MTO is a specialist in this field, and it can be assumed that any 
contract into which he enters with any such performing carriers would be 
on terms that are beneficial to him, thus also the cargo claimant. It is 
unlikely that the claimant would have entered into a contract with more 
beneficial terms.230
Unfortunately, the above can only be an assumption as there is as yet no judicial 
certainty to throw light on the interpretation o f this clause in multimodal transport.
231The decision in The Princes Buitoni Ltd v Hapag Lloyd, although containing 
such a contract was decided on the grounds that there was a clause paramount 
effective to trigger the CMR.
The contract had a clause applying the CMR to road carriage in Europe and a 
catch-all provision which contained the "hypothetical contract" when no legal 
provision was applicable. The loss occurred during carriage within England, and 
the defendant carrier contended that the CMR was inapplicable because it failed to 
meet the substantive requirements of the CMR, and was thus within the catch all 
provision.
229 Spectra International PLC v Hayesock Ltd [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 153
230 Glass and Cashmore, Introduction to the law o f  Carriage o f  Goods (1989) para 3.13 contend 
that the ability to negotiate better terms w ill vary from contract to contract. See also Glass, 
Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts,(2005), 254
231 (1991) 2 Lloyd's Rep 383
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The courts holding that the words were plain to warrant the application of the 
CMR, held that, if no such incorporation was present, the hypothetical contract 
would have been triggered and the outcome different, although their lordships did 
not touch on this issue.
Lord Justice Leggatt's advice was that if the parties intend a particular result they 
should use words to that effect, as courts can only go by the language chosen by 
the parties.
In contrast, in a Belgian case,232 the bill of lading for combined transport had a 
choice of law clause which was rejected in favour of the reality o f the transport; 
Holding that the CMR had “d e ju re” application since the place o f taking over and 
the place of delivery were in contracting states.
Thus while in The Buitoni, the particular clause was construed to give it effect, in 
the Belgian case, the important question was the reality of the contract, showing a 
marked uncertainty as to the basis on which such contracts are construed.
The hypothetical problem might however be more profound if there is a clear 
advantage to be gained by using one law over the other.
If in our hypothetical case o f carriage between Canada and Paris, goods were lost 
at sea, the French courts would apply the Hague Visby Rules, so would the courts 
in Canada. However, if one of the countries had to apply the Hamburg Rules, for 
example Cameroon: a tempting situation for forum shopping would arise. The 
cargo owner would have a choice of either the Hague Visby Rules or the Hamburg 
Rules, depending on the desired results; does he seek the higher limits of the 
Hamburg Rules,233 or the unlimited liability for unauthorised deck cargo under the 
Hague Visby Rules?234 The claimant clearly has a choice, so it is difficult to predict
232 (1976) 1 1 ETL 276 (District Court o f  Antwerp)
233 Art 6. 2.5 SDR per kg as opposed to 2 SDR o f  the Hague Visby Rules Art IV(5)
234 Art 1(c) o f  the Hague Visby Rules. See The Chanda [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 494 (Wibau 
Maschinenfabrik Hartman S.A. v. Mackinnon Mackenzie)
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which contract would have been concluded, subject however to the assumption that
2^ 5with hindsight he is likely to choose the contract that would benefit him most.
There is however a plethora of academic opinion and limited judicial precedence in 
cases which contains a similar clause. Within the CMR, leading commentators 
allude to this hypothetical contract as a "fiction".236 Such a clause is also found in 
Art 2(i) where it states that the liability of the road carrier in a situation where 
combined transport is involved would be determined by the
" ...conditions prescribed by law fo r  the carriage"
as if the contract of carriage had been concluded between the cargo owner and the 
carrier by that other means of transport.
It is in the elucidation of this provision that commentators have held that it is 
"fictitious". Ramberg237 is o f the opinion that this can only mean mandatory 
provisions applicable to the other mode. This was not followed in Thermo Engineers 
Ltd. v Ferry master,238 where Neill, J. held that conditions prescribed by law are 
those that permit no variation. And The Hague Rules were thus rejected based on 
Art 5 under which the parties are permitted to increase their liability. Neill, J. held 
that since the contract could have been entered on terms different from those 
contained in the Rules, the rules could not be taken to be prescribed by law. Such an 
interpretation would render the section meaningless as most conventions allow slight 
variations depending on the wishes of the parties for example, ad valorem 
declarations.239 The only way this would make sense is if  the question refers to
235 The Captain Gregos [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 310, here i f  the claimant had such a clause he would 
have opted for the Hamburg Rules to Circumvent Art 111 (6) o f  the Hague Visby Rules, and 
benefiting from the 2 years limitation period under the Hamburg Rules.
236 Hill, CMR, Contracts for the International Carriage o f  Goods by Road, (Lloyd's o f  London Press, 
1995) at 50. Haak, Liability o f  the Carrier under the CMR , The Hague, Stiching Verweradres, 
(1986) pg 98.
237 Ramberg, J, Harmonisation o f  New transport Technologies (1980) 15 ETL p i 19
238 [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 200.
239 The Warsaw System Conventions allow this Article 22 allows the shipper to make a special 
declaration , although the CMR does not allow such a variation
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conditions which would ordinarily cover that particular mode of transport. If the 
answer is yes, then they should apply without need to construe a factual hypothetical 
contract.
3.3.2 UNCTAD/ICC Rules (1992)240
The UNCTAD/ICC Rules was the result of a joint effort between UNCTAD and ICC 
to produce a commercially acceptable document based on current realities. These 
rules like the ICC rules are meant only as a model contract, dealing mostly with 
documentary and liability issues. They are standard contractual terms for 
incorporation into private contracts. By virtue of the fact that these rules are 
contractual, they are subject to applicable mandatory laws. These rules have been 
incorporated in widely used multimodal transport documents such as the FIATA 
Multimodal transport bill of lading and the “MULTIDOC 95” of the Baltic and 
Maritime Council (BIMCO), and the FIATA Bill of lading for combined transport.
Rule 5 lays down its liability provision.
These rules do not differentiate between liability for localised and concealed damage, 
and therefore can be said to be based on the uniform basis of liability, although they 
have special provision for localised loss in the case of limitation of liability; Rule 6.4. 
In the case of delay, the rules become applicable only if there was a declaration of 
interest in timely delivery. Thus in cases in which the shipper fails to signal timely 
delivery recovery for delay will be compromised and he might not be able to recover 
for any such loss or damage.
Since the rules are private, they are still subject to international conventions.241 This 
results in continuing uncertainty as to the liability regime applicable, as their
240 ICC Publication No 481 This replaces the previous ICC rules 1973 as modified in 1975.
241 Incorporation o f  The Rules into the contract o f  carriage can be made in writing, orally or otherwise, 
by reference to the ‘UNCTAD/ICC Rules for multimodal transport Document’. It must be noted that 
these rules only cover some parts o f  the traditional carriage contract, mostly liability and documentary 
issues. It is therefore imperative for MTO’s using this Rules to add clauses dealing with matters such as 
Jurisdiction, arbitration etc.
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application like that of the ICC Rules leads invariably to the implementation of the 
network system of liability.
Rule 5(1) of the UNCTAD/ICC Rules will only exonerate the carrier if he can prove 
that loss occurred with
"...no fault or neg lect... was caused or contributed"
By his acts or those o f his servants or agents
Although the different rules, provide different exoneration grounds, the spirit o f the 
rules are all similar. The carriers are exonerated once they can proof that the loss 
was not their fault; Exercising "reasonable diligence" of the ICC rules and “no fault 
or neglect” o f the UNCTAD/ICC Rules may lead to dissimilar results depending on 
the interpretation they receive from different jurisdictions. It is however arguable if 
acting without
"...fault or neglect" used by the UNCTAD/ICC rules is more onerous.
This is because under the ICC rules the carrier can still escape liability even if he is 
at fault if he could show that he acted reasonably or with reasonable diligence, while 
under the UNCTAD/ICC once damage cannot be localised to any particular mode 
of transport, the rebuttable presumption of Liability becomes irrebuttable and the 
MTO finds him self strictly liable for the loss irrespective o f a lack o f negligence 
on his part or that o f those for whom he is vicariously liable.
Once the carrier cannot state the cause of the loss, it will be extremely difficult for 
him to establish that he either took "reasonable" care, or took "all measures that 
could reasonably be required. In the case of our hypothetical case the carrier will 
be liable for the loss of 2 containers if he cannot establish how loss or damage 
occurred.
The Limit is set at 666.67 SDR per package or 2 SDR per kilo, unless there is no 
sea carriage in which case the limit is 8.33 SDR per kilo.
Il l
3.4 THE NETW ORK SYSTEM OF LIABILITY
The system o f liability used by the model rules is what has been referred to as a 
network liability system, under which when loss is localised, liability is 
determined by the mandatory rules which would have otherwise applied to the 
contract, and when loss is unlocalised the rules themselves lay down the liability 
regime which will become applicable.
Under a pure network system, the laws applicable are those that would apply to 
the different stages o f the transport just as in unimodal transport. This creates a 
network o f existing rules for whenever, loss or damage is localised. If an 
international convention is applicable it will apply to the loss or damage, when 
none is available, national laws will apply to determine liability.
The rules are to the effect that, the respective conventions relating to the specific 
mode o f transport are incorporated into the multimodal transport contract 
whenever loss or damage can be localised to that particular mode. By so doing, 
the claimant is placed in the same position he would have been in, had he 
contracted for carriage in the mode to which loss or damage is localised. The 
multimodal transport contract in this case relies on the network o f rules 
governing the different modes of transport. This means that when there is an 
applicable mandatory international or national liability regime, it will be applicable 
to that part of the multimodal transport contract. Thus a typical multimodal contract 
in which sea, rail, road, air, or island waterways are use is potentially governed 
successively by the Hague Rules, the Hague Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, the 
CMR, the COTIF/CIM, and the Warsaw Conventions together with a ll necessary 
amendments and protocols thereto. This proliferation o f liability rules in the sphere 
of multimodalism is what has been its most unattractive feature.
The pure network system must be differentiated from the modified network system. 
Under the modified system, the liability is still based on the different international 
conventions or national laws applicable to the different parts o f the contract. But the 
parties are allowed by statute or contract to modify the provisions o f the applicable 
laws.
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This modified system cures some o f the defects of the pure network system such as 
applying a liability regime in the gaps left by the pure network system where no 
liability regime would have otherwise applied.
This system of liability was first given legal sanction by the draft convention for the 
combined transport o f goods [TCM],242 a draft drawn by the CMI [Comite Maritime 
International] the UNIDROIT [International Institute for the unification of private 
law] and ECE, [the Economic Commission for Europe]. After necessary 
amendments this draft was submitted to the preparatory Committee of the 
UN/IMCO Container Conference in 1972, where it failed to gain approval. The ICC 
Rules for a combined transport document 1973 and 1975 incorporated much of the 
TCM, with its liability system which was the Network system. Most o f the MT 
contracts in existence today incorporate the rules or imitates its form; The 
COMBIDOC, the COMBICONBILL, the FIATA combined transport Bill o f lading 
for multimodal transport, the P&O Containers Negotiable Transport bill o f lading 
for multimodal transport etc.
The application o f this system is based on easy localisation o f loss or damage to a 
particular mode o f the transport to which a mandatory applicable International or 
National law applies. There are instances in which the loss or damage is so obvious 
that it is self explanatory, and leaves no room for doubt i.e., loss by salt water. The 
difficulty arises when the loss or damage is one that could have occurred anywhere 
i.e., theft or damage in a sealed container.
3.4.1 DEFECTS OF THE NETWORK SYSTEM
One defect o f this system as seen above is the problem of localisation o f damage 
or loss, especially when the damage or loss is one common to the different modes 
to the extent that it could have occurred in any o f them. The prevalence of the 
container in this mode also exacerbates this problem as it makes it difficult to 
determine where damage or loss occurred.
242 Transport Combine International de Merchandises, draft Convention by ECE/IMCO, EVR 1972, p. 
680
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3.4.1.1 Gradual Loss:
Another defect of the system also involves situations in which goods carried are 
susceptible to gradual loss e.g. perishable goods that depreciate, or goods which due
to spillage are delivered at out turn in a quantity which is greatly less than that
originally carried.
Here the difficulty is ascertaining what portion of loss occurred at what stage of the 
transport. This again brings into play the applicability of the various conventions 
and legal gymnastics as to the regime applicable to the loss; it is the one in which 
greatest loss occurred, or the one which would ordinarily govern the MTO’s liability 
if he performed part o f the contract. A more appropriate solution in this case may be 
one in which this loss is regarded as unlocalised and the appropriate contract rule 
made applicable.
3.4.1.2 Recourse Action:
An off-spin of the above defect is that, the absence of localisation means that, the 
MTO might lose his right to a recourse action against the person who caused the 
loss or damage. For example a container develops a gash at an indeterminate point, 
and the goods were carried over, sea, land and rail, where will the loss be localised 
to? In such a case the MTO will be liable as per the rules laid down for unlocalised 
loss or damage in the contract.
3.4.1.3 Applicable Law:
Whether or not the loss can be localised or not, the most frustrating problem is the 
unpredictability of the applicable law; A typical network clause, normally states that 
the applicable law is one that
"Would have applied i f  the claimant had made a direct contract with the 
[CTO] in respect o f  the particular mode"
ICC Rule 13 (a)(ii)
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When more than one law could be made applicable, this provision ceases to be 
easily applicable, i.e. if loss can be traced to the sea leg of the journey, which of the 
Rules on carriage by sea would be applicable? The Hague Rules, The Hague Visby 
Rule, or the Hamburg Rules, if the loss falls under Art 2 o f the CMR a third mode 
might be made applicable. In such a case we find ourselves faced with the 
interpretation and application o f three different laws. The Network contract localises 
loss to the road carriage, on application o f the road carriage, Art 2 o f the CMR, 
might point to a third liability regime which should be applicable.
3.4.2 ADVANTAGES OF THE NETW ORK SYSTEM
Conflict avoidance with other liability regimes seems to be the most voiced 
praise o f the network system. The co-existence o f different liability systems in 
one contract, while attractive in that it ensures that loss or damage under the 
same mode is com pensated on the same basis, m inimises the im portance o f 
multimodal transport, as a contract o f carriage independent o f  unimodal 
transport, by allowing a proliferation o f an indeterm inate num ber o f  laws for 
the purpose o f conflict avoidance. This view o f multimodal transport as a chain 
contract made up o f different modes seeks to benefit from established rules in 
unimodal transport. But in practice these established Rules which are 
responsible for the certainty and predictability in unimodal transport, turns into 
a series o f alternatives which exacerbates the difficulties and leads to 
unpredictably and uncertainty in multimodal transport.
3.4.2.1 Fairness:
Fairness has been advanced as one o f the advantages o f  the system, as it allows 
all claim ants suffering from loss or damage in the same mode to benefit from 
the same basis o f  liability. This, it is argued here should not be taken as a 
motivation to prom ote this system o f liability. The contracts are basically 
different, one party enters into a unimodal contract and expects to reap benefits 
due him under that contract, while the other enters into multim odal contract 
and instead o f  reaping the benefits that would accrued to him under that 
contract, reaps those under the unimodal contract.
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3.4.2.2 R ecourse Action
Carriers regard the system to be fair, because by equating liability to unimodal 
liability, they are assured that what they pay out in exactly what they can 
recover from other perform ing carriers or contractors responsible for the 
damage or loss for which they were sued.
As seen above, the regim e o f liability under the network system is fragmentary, 
because it is the sum total o f all potential regimes o f  liability in transportation. 
This system is unnatural in the sphere o f transport, because while liability in 
unimodal transport is usually specified, the regime o f liability in multimodal 
transport is only specified in the contract when loss is unlocalised. Once the loss, 
is localised the regime o f liability then follows the localisation.
3.5 THE BASIS OF THE CARRIERS LIABILITY IN
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The network system used by the current multimodal transport documents states 
the liability regime as being that which will obtain in mandatory transport 
conventions when loss is localised and the regime stated in the multimodal 
transport document when loss is not localised.
This means that the MTO’s basis o f liability is found in all the international 
transport conventions and the particular standard contract used. These provisions 
determine the carrier’s liability not only for himself but also for his servants and 
agents, and the exceptions available to them.
This section seeks to examine the basis o f liability of the MTO, the exceptions 
available to him, and his burden of proof to adduce evidence, and concludes that 
this basis o f liability is at the heart of the unpredictability and uncertainty in the 
liability regime in multimodal transport.
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3.5.1 THE OBLIGATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF THE CARRIER
One of the findings o f the previous section was that the different conventions 
that potentially apply to multimodal transport portray a diversity o f approach on 
some o f the key issues such as the basis of liability, limits o f liability, exceptions 
and time bar. The outcome of this fact is that liability then depends on the 
applicable regime which becomes applicable when loss is localised, since these 
regimes have different principles, liability is bound to change according to 
regime even on similar facts. In this section, we will examine the provisions of 
the carrier’s obligations and the liability for breach o f these provisions in the 
different conventions, the contention here is that the MTO is by default also 
subject to each o f these conventions and their interpretations. While this is 
within normality in unimodal transport, in multimodal transport it obviously is a 
daunting responsibility for any Carrier to assume.
3.5.1.1 CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
The liability o f the carrier under the carriage o f goods by sea is covered by 3 
main conventions,243 however this work will concentrate on the provisions of 
The Hague Rules as amended by the Brussels protocol 1968; the carrier’s 
liability under this convention will be identified and compared and the 
conditions o f exemption for liability assessed.
1. The Relevant Provisions; The Hague Visby Rules
Article 111, (1) and (2) of the Hague Visby Rules sets out the carriers main 
obligations under the rules as being one to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel at the beginning of the voyage and subject to Article IV, to 
take care of the cargo during the transportation from loading to discharge.
243 The Hague rules o f  1929, The Hague-Visby Rules o f  1968 and The Hamburg Rules o f  1978
Article 111 (1) and (2) lays down the obligations of the carrier; his duty to 
provide a seaworthy vessel at the beginning and throughout voyage (1) and the 
duty to carry out the loading, stowing and discharging o f the cargo (2). When 
ever loss, damage or delay results from the above, it is for the carrier to show 
that he has exercised due diligence. The carrier thus bears the burden o f proving 
that due diligence was exercised in making the vessel seaworthy.
This provision had been taken to mean that the carrier had a duty to perform all 
these tasks properly and carefully.244 The question which arose in under this 
Article is if  reliance on the exceptions depends on him meeting fully the 
obligations imposed by Art III (1) and (2). One view was that failure to meet the 
obligations o f seaworthiness deprived the carrier o f the contractual exceptions 
while failure to meet the obligations to provide a cargoworthy ship will not so 
deprive the carrier form the defences. This was based on the fact seaworthiness 
was regarded as an “overriding obligation”.245 In The Maxine Footwear case, 246 
Lord Somervell explained the relationship between Articles. Ill and IV as 
follows;
Art III rule 1 is an overriding obligation. I f  it is not fu lfilled  and the non- 
fulfilm ent causes the damage, the immunities o f  Art IV  cannot be relied on. This 
is the natural construction apart from  the opening words o f  Art III r.2. The fac t 
that the rule is made subject to the provisions o f  Article .IV  and Rule 1 is not so 
conditioned makes the point clear without argument ”
This case has been authority for the fact that once unseaworthiness is the cause 
o f the loss the carrier could no longer rely on any o f the exceptions.247
7 4RHowever in Pyrene v. Scindia , Devlin J proposed an alternative interpretation 
o f this provision; stating,
244 Scrutton: S.C.Boyd, A .S. Burrows, and D.Foxton, Scrutton on C harterparties and B ills o f  Lading,(  
20th ed„ 1996)
245 Maxime Footwear, [195 9 ] 2 L loyd's Report 105
246 ibid
247 The A postolis (A. M eredith Jones v. Vangemar Shipping Co) [1996] 1 L loyd's R ep.475 a t p .483. 
Carver 2001 p .478
248 Pyrene Co L td  v. Scindia N avigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 402, a t p. 418
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“It is difficult to believe that the rules were intended to impose a universal 
rigidity in this respect, or to deny freedom o f contract to the carrier. The carrier 
is practically bound to play some part in the loading and discharging, so that 
both operations are naturally included in those covered by the contract o f  
carriage. But I see no reason why the rules should not leave the p a r ty ’s free  to 
determine by their own contract the part which each has to play. On this view 
the whole contract o f  carriage is subject to the rules, but the extent to which 
loading and discharging are brought within the carriers obligations is left to the 
parties themselves to decide ”
The above reasoning formed part of the decision in The Renton249 holding that 
the parties can modify the duty of cargo worthiness under Art, 111. r.2, by 
agreeing that the duty o f loading and unloading would be on the shipper. The 
issue here involved a clause in the bill of lading permitting goods to be 
discharged at an alternative port in case o f strike. The bill o f lading had 
specified London as the port o f discharge, but due to strike action, the goods 
were discharged in Hamburg. It was held by their lordships that the shipowners 
could rely on this clause and were not liable for the cost o f transhipping goods to 
London. It was held that this clause was not contrary to Art 111 r. 8, since the 
clause operated to define the scope o f the carrier’s liability and could not 
therefore amount to
“a clause, covenant or agreement in the contract relieving the carrier or the 
ship from  liability fo r  loss or damage to, or in connection with the goods from  
negligence, fau lt or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article 
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in the Rules ”
In a recent case, the above interpretation was used in determining the correct 
interpretation of Article 111, r.2. In Iron and Steel Co Ltd v. Islamic Solidarity
1CA
Shipping Company Inc (The Jordan 11), Lord Steyn following the reasoning 
in the Renton case concluded that the duty of care under Article 111, r.2 was less
249 G.H. Renton & Co Ltd v.Palmyra Trading Corporation o f  Panama (The Caspiana) [1957] AC 149
250 [2005] 1 Lloyds Rep 57 (HL), See also Simon Baughen, “Defining the Limits o f  the Carrier’s
R esponsibilities” (2006) LMCLQ 153
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fundamental than that under Article 111, r. 1 which comprises the carriers duty 
to provide a seaworthy vessel. This case concerned carriage o f coiled steel from 
Mumbai in India to Motril in Spain, the contract contained a FIOST clause (free 
in, out, stowed and trimmed). The point at issue was damage due to stowage and 
the manner in which the goods were discharged. The Bill of lading incorporate 
the terms o f the charter party Clauses 3 and 17 which provided that stowage 
would be undertaken by the shipper and discharge by the receiver. At first 
instance, Nigel Teare Q.C. held that as the clause contained an undertaking for 
cargo both at the port o f loading and discharge they were not null under Artl 11 
r.8. If the claim was brought by the receiver, the carriers defence will be based 
on Art IV r.2 (i) ‘'act or omission o f  the shipper... ” to exonerate himself. And if 
it was shipper, his defence will be under Art IV r. 2 (q) “...any other clause 
arising without the actual fau lt or privity o f  the carrier, or without the actual 
fau lt or neglect o f  the agents or servants o f  the carrier”. On appeal, the carriers 
raised a new argument, that the clauses had the effect o f transferring the 
responsibility o f loading and discharge away from them to the cargo concern. 
Consequently, when the receiver claimed for defective stowage, there was no 
need to rely on any defence, as there was no breach o f the obligations under Art
251III, r. 2. The Court o f Appeal accepted this argument.
In the House o f Lords, their Lordships dismissed the appeal o f the cargo 
concern.
However in another case, Mitsubishi Corporation v Eastwind Transport Ltd and 
Ors the cargo owners alleged breach o f duty to provide a cargo worthy vessel 
leading to loss o f chicken parts shipped. The contract which was not under The 
Hague Visby Rules contained a clause that excluded all loss or damage to or in 
connection with the goods, including deterioration, delay or loss o f market 
whether caused by unseaworthiness or uncargoworthiness, or by faults or error 
in navigation. The court held that the carriers were within their contractual rights 
to so limit. As the contract was not under The Hague rules it was construed 
according to the principles of the common law. This case illustrates the
251 [2004] EWCA Civ 144, [2003] L loyd’s Rep.87, Tuckey L.J. expressed doubt as to whether the
carrier would have been able to rely on these defences if  he had been in breach o f  Art III r.2
252 (The Irbenkiy Proliv) English Commercial Court Judgement 15 Decem ber 2004 cited in [2005 11
JIML 8)
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importance o f harmony and mandatory conventions which apply 
notwithstanding. Although the claimants’ contention was that the clause was so 
wide as to be repugnant, I believe they had hoped that the same standard as 
applied to cases under The Hague rules will be made applicable to the case.
The parties were in this regard allowed to re-allocate these duties to the shipper. 
Lord Steyn supporting the position of Devlin J in the Renton case stressed the 
need to take into account different contractual arrangements. This brings the 
reasoning in carriage o f goods by sea in line with that under road carriage in
253which loading is done by the shipper or his agents.
The claimants in the case however sought to rely not only on Article 111, r.8 of 
the Rules to defeat the reversal of the duty but also on cases from both 
America254 and South Africa,255 to show that the position there is different. 
This contention was dismissed as His Lordship could find no authority or 
academic objection to the stance under the Renton case, if anything he found 
support amongst academia as to the position of the reversibility o f Article 111, 
r.2.256
Article IV states instances in which the carrier will not be liable. Article IV, 1 
states that the carrier shall be exempted from liability for the loss or damage 
arising from unseaworthiness and cargoworthiness provided he can show that 
he exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy and cargoworthy.257 
Article IV further provides a list o f exempted clauses modelled after bills of 
lading clauses. These exception clauses exonerate the carrier from the 
responsibility for loss or damage arising or resulting from the list.
253 The Jordan II [2003] EW CA Civ 144; [2003] 2 L loyd’s Rep.87
254 A ssociated M etals and minerals Corp v. M /V The Artis Sky 978 F 2d 47 (2n Cir, 1992) and 
Tubacex Inc. v. M /V Risan 45 F 3d 951 (5 lh Cir,1995)where the US second Circuit and Fifth Court 
o f  Appeal held that cargo, loading, stowing and discharging constitute ‘non-delegable duties o f  the 
carrier.
255 The Sea Joy (1998) (1) SA 487, 504)
256 See also Simon Baughen, “Defining the Limits o f  the Carrier’s R esponsibilities” [2006] LMCLQ 
153 at p. 155
257 The question that arises here is if  the carrier can successfully invoke any o f  the exceptions if  he has 
not fulfilled his obligations. The prevailing view  is that failure to meet the obligations set out in Art III 
r. I will deprive the carrier from the exceptions as this Article contains an overriding obligation. On the 
contrary, failure to meet the obligations o f  Art III r.2 does not deprive him o f  the exceptions as the 
latter art cannot be considered as an ‘over-riding obligation.
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This list shows an interesting split and can be divided into 3;
1 Exemption from liability for negligence; Article IV (a) and (b), under 
these two sections, the carrier is exempt from liability where 
negligence in the navigation or management o f the ship or fire gives 
rise to the loss or damage, unless such loss or damage was caused by 
the carriers ‘Actual fault or privity’.
2 The Carrier is also exempt from liability where the loss results from 
one o f a number o f events listed in Articles IV, r.2 (c) -(p )
3 The final exemption is found in Article IV, r. 2 (q), exempting the 
carrier from liability due to loss or damage from any other cause 
arising “without the actual fault or neglect” on the part o f the carrier 
or his servants or agents and expressly states that the burden of 
disproving such fault shall be on the carrier.
In the first exemption, negligence is what is been exempted, (a) exempts negligence 
in the navigation or management o f the ship and (b) exempts damage caused by fire 
, irrespective o f negligence (other than the actual privity o f the carrier). At the other 
extreme is Article IV, r.2 (q) which has been variously referred to as the ‘Catch all 
exception’, placing the burden of disproving negligence on the carrier. Who has the 
duty o f showing that the loss or damage occurred without his actual fault or privity 
or that o f his agents and servants. Therefore for any cause o f damage that falls 
within (q), the carrier is presumed to be liable and has the burden o f proving that no 
negligence on his part or that o f his agents is responsible for the loss, or contributed 
to the damage.
The carrier undoubtedly has the burden o f proof as to negligence under (q), and 
complete exoneration even in the presence of negligence under (a) and (b), what is 
still unclear is the allocation of the burden of proof for exceptions (C-P). The 
travaux Preparatoires to the Hague Rules indicates that there was debate on this 
issue at the time o f the drafting. The question as to if the carrier needs to proof lack 
o f negligence to benefit from these exceptions remains a controversial one, with 2 
main schools o f thoughts emerging. One school of thought believes that the items C-
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P are nothing other than examples of what might constitute negligence. This view 
requires the carrier to establish that he used due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy to be able to rely on any exemption under C-P; While the other school of 
thought goes a contrario, and takes the view that once the carrier has established a 
defence the onus of proof shifts to the cargo claimant to defeat that plea by proving 
his negligence. This view seems to represent the prevailing English view which is 
still viewed as controversial in other jurisdictions.258 Within this view, if  the cargo 
claimant wishes to rely on the seaworthiness o f the vessel as a contributing factor to 
the damage, he needs to proof both unseaworthiness and causality. When these 
matters have been established, the carrier is then required to prove the exercise of 
due diligence.
The burden o f the carrier in this section seems to be light, all he needs to do is 
adduce evidence to show that an excepted peril was responsible for the loss and it is 
presumed to be so; as this raises the presumption that the loss was so caused and the 
carrier is relieved from liability.
A close examination of the specific exemptions shows a close resemblance to the 
classical theory of force majeure which allows for exceptions for unexpected and 
insurmountable events. This classical theory has been mitigated by a modification 
that does not require absolute impossibility o f performance and that the performance 
must be practical or humanly impossible.259 Beyond this objective theory of force 
majeure, a subjective theory has also developed which has come to be regarded as 
the “negligence theory”. According to this theory, liability does not exist if  the 
carrier has done everything that a diligent person would have done under the 
particular circumstances. This position was summarised by De Wit as “vis maior 
arises where fault or neglect ends”.
All the exemption clauses found under Article IV C-P, will fall easily within both of 
these theories, as they do meet the requirements o f both force majuere theories. 
From perils o f the sea, to strikes to quarantines, we see incidents over which the 
carrier has no control and cannot rationally be blamed for.
258 Chinyere Ezeoke, A llocating onus o f  proof in sea carriage claims: The contest o f  conflicting  
principles [2001JLMCLQ 260 ,274), See also Hendrikse, M.L. and Margetson N.J. “D ivision o f  the 
burden o f  proof under the H ague-Visby Rules”, [2006] 12 JIML
259 Ralph de Wit, Multimodal Transport (1995) para 2.13
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The question is if  these exceptions could not easily be included within Article IV 2
(q).
This exempts the carrier from liability for;
“any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity o f  the carrier, or without 
the fau lt or neglect o f  the agents or servants o f  the carrier, but the burden o f  p roo f 
shall be on the person claiming the benefit o f  this exception to show that neither the 
actual fault or privity o f  the carrier nor the fault or neglect o f  the agents or servants 
o f the carrier contributed to the loss or damage’'’
This Article clearly places the burden of proof on the carrier who needs to prove 
lack o f negligence to be able to benefit. The phrase “...but the burden o f  p ro o f shall 
be on the person claiming such benefit” might be the differentiating element 
between this Article and Articles C-P. As stated earlier the trust o f opinion within 
English law lends in favour of interpreting the latter articles as shifting the burden 
o f proof on to the claimants. But in this case the carrier would have to proof that he 
was not negligent. If this stance is the correct one, then another interpretation of the 
catalogue o f exceptions found in Articles C-P would be that they are but a list of 
circumstances in which the carrier is presumed not to be liable as opposed to one in 
which he is presumed liable and can exonerate himself. A corollary of this will be 
that the list will be interpreted as rules of burden o f proof. In which case it will 
constitute sufficient evidence for the carrier to proof that the weather was 
particularly onerous to be able to benefit from the exception in Article IV, r.2 (c) 
perils o f the sea. This assertion then turns the burden on to the cargo claimant who 
now has the burden o f proving negligence to reverse the burden o f proof back to the 
carrier.
These arguments are quite convincing when interpreted within the spirit o f the 
Rules, however they do impose a stringent burden on the cargo claimant, one which 
he might be unable to discharge. The management of the ship is usually the 
exclusive domain o f the carrier and the crew is his, how then does the cargo 
claimant adduce enough evidence to disprove any of the exception on the list.
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One must however concede that the nature of the exceptions are such that they 
invoke the basic principle o f force majeure; instances in which the carrier could not 
prevent the loss or damage even with all the good intentions in the world. But 
merely proving the existence o f one o f the excepted perils should not suffice to shift 
the burden o f proof to the claimant, the carrier is the only one able to adduce further 
evidence to show that there was no negligence on his part or that o f his servants or 
agents. This particular provision is thus favourable to the carrier but not so great for 
the cargo owner.
What must be noted however is the general acceptance within commercial circles as 
to the working o f this provision, so commercial probity dictates that this is 
acceptable to all and understood by all.
The uncertainty as to who bears what burden of proof does not end there. So far we 
have seen instances in which Article IV, 2 has been interpreted as placing the 
burden o f proof on the claimant, even though the Rules lays down no such rules as 
to where the burden o f proof lies. There are a plethora o f cases which have treated 
the rules as laying down the rules on the burden of proof. These cases are consistent 
with the pre-rule case o f The Gledarroch260, This case lays down the common law 
position on the burden o f proof for carriage o f goods by sea. In the Court of Appeal 
Lord Esher stated that, as the carriers’ exception preceded the liabilities for due care 
and seaworthiness, the proviso must be read as ‘ not caused by negligence” after the 
exception o f perils o f the sea. Thus construed, negligence then becomes an 
“exception upon an exception”.261 His Lordship then stated the order o f proof as 
follows;
The plaintiffs would have to p ro o f the contract and the non-delivery. I f  they leave 
that in doubt, o f  course they fail. The defendant’s answer is, yes; but the case was 
brought within the exception -within its ordinary m eaning”. That lies upon them. 
Then the plaintiffs have a right to say there are exceptional circumstances, viz., that 
the damage was brought about by the negligence o f  the defendants ’ servants, and it 
seems to me that it is fo r  the p laintiff to make out that second exception.
260 [1894]P.226
261 Chinyere Ezeoke, A llocating onus o f  proof in sea carriage claims: The contest o f  conflicting  
principles [2001]LM CLQ 260 ,274), See also Hendrikse, M.L. and Margetson N.J. “D ivision o f  the 
burden o f  proof under the H ague-Visby R ules”, [2006] 12 JIML
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Since then there have been other cases which have followed the line o f reasoning set 
out in The Glendarroch?62
These cases have the effect o f laying at the claimant’s feet the legal burden of proof 
which following the nature o f carriage is difficult to discharge as the carrier has all 
the relevant information. This line of reasoning is obviously at odds with Article IV, 
r.l
Which imposes the legal burden o f due diligence on the carrier, as the same rules 
cannot then purport to impose the legal burden of proving unseaworthiness on the 
cargo owner. Moore- Bick J., in The Fjord Wind263, went the other way, asserting 
that the carrier had a duty to proof due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, which 
they did not discharge as they could not identify the particular latent defect that 
caused the engine failure.
The carrier thus has the legal burden of proof to proof due diligence under Article 
IV, but that burden is only triggered when the claimant puts it in issue. In Dunlop 
Holdings L td ’s Application264, the Court o f Appeal held that it was incumbent on the 
claimant to trigger the imposition of the legal burden on the carrier by first putting 
the relevant facts in issue. Buckley, L.J., observed;
I f  the secrecy o f  the prior use is not put in issue either in the pleadings ( I f  I  may call 
the opponent’s statement and the applicant’s counter statement in opposition 
proceedings) or in the written evidence placed before the co u rt, it is not in my 
judgement incumbent upon the opponents to come armed with evidence directed to 
establish an aspect o f  the case which has not been put in issue; in other words, i f  
prior use is established, but secrecy o f  that prior use is not raised in issue the 
opponent should be taken to have discharged the burden resting upon them without 
having to prove that the prior use was non-secret.
262 In M inister o f  F ood  v. Reardon Smith L in e([1951] 2 L lo y d ’s Rep. 265,272) M cNair, J held that 
the case was covered by the comm on law exceptions under the Glendarroch, accepting the 
shipowners’ argument that, once exemption is asserted, the onus is shifted to the charterer to 
establish that unseawothiness was the cause o f  the lost. Similarly in The Kriti Rex [1996] 2 L loyd’s 
Rep. 171) M oore-Bick J., decided that the cargo claimant must satisfy on a balance o f  probabilities 
that the damage was caused by unseaworthiness, stressing that they had to point to the specific  
defect which caused the damage.
263 [1999] 1 lloyd’s Rep. 307
264 [1979] R.P.C 523)
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The above line o f reasoning has been followed in many other cases, in Gosse 
Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd265, the carrier sought to 
claim the benefit o f the exception of negligent management under Article IV, r.2 (a) 
of the Hague Rules. The cargo owner claimed that Article 111, r.2 had been 
breached, that the loss was caused by the negligence in the care o f the cargo. 
Wright, J., at first instance held:
...the carrier’s fa ilure to so deliver must constitute a prima facie  breach o f  his 
obligations, casting on him the onus to excuse that breach. That this is so, I think, is 
confirmed by the language o f  the Art. I, r.l, which deals with unseawothiness and 
provides that, in case o f  loss or damage resulting from  unseaworthiness, the carrier 
must prove the exercise o f  due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and... I think 
that by implication, as regards each o f  the other exceptions, the same onus is on the 
carrier. He must claim the benefit o f  the exception, and that is because he has to 
relieve him self o f  the prima facie breach o f  contract in not delivering from  the ship 
the goods in condition as received. I do not think that the terms o f  Art. I l l  put the 
preliminary onus on the owner o f  goods to give affirmative evidence that the carrier 
has been negligent. It is enough i f  the owner o f  goods proves either that the goods 
have not been delivered, or have been delivered damaged. The carrier is a bailee 
and it is fo r  him to show that he has taken reasonable care o f  the goods while they 
have been in his custody (which includes the custody o f  his servants or agents on his 
behalf) and to bring himself, i f  there be loss or damage, within the specified 
immunities.
The above two cases are based on the principle o f bailment, equating the sea carrier 
to other bailees, requiring them to prove due diligence and care in respect of 
seaworthiness.
In Canada, the trust o f legal opinion leans towards the bailment principle. This 
approach is exemplified by Blair’s J., decision in The Federal St Clair266, similarly, 
Cargill Grain Co. v. N.M. Paterson § Sons,267 In this case the cargo owner adduced
205 [1927] 2 K.B 432 , [1929] A .C .223 (H.L)
266 V oest-A lpine Stahl Linz GmbH v. Federal Pacific Ltd (1999) 174 F.T.R.69
267 [1966] Ex. C.R. 22; Kaufman Ltd. v.Cunard SS. Co. Ltd. [1965] 2 L loyd’s Rep. 564,566)
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sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case against the carrier. The carriers 
contended, stating that the loss could have occurred at a point during which they 
were not in charge o f the goods. Blair J. held that the carrier’s contention failed as 
they had failed to show how and under what conditions the cargo might have been 
damaged. Professor Tetley in Marine Cargo Claims268 states that three principles of 
proof can be found under the Hague Rules;
1 - the claimant must first proof the loss
2- the carrier must then prove a) the cause o f the loss ,b) that due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy in respect of the loss was taken and c) that he is 
not responsible by virtue of at least one of the exculpatory exceptions o f the 
rules;
3- then various arguments are available to the claimant and
4- Finally, there is a middle ground where both parties may make various 
additional proofs.269
Unlike The Hague Visby Rules, the Hamburg rules contain a clear and concise 
provision for the burden of proof and allocation of liability. Art 5.1 lays down a 
broad presumption o f fault on the carrier. The carrier is liable for loss, damage or 
delay, unless he can disprove negligence. This generally is complemented by Article 
5.7 which deals with loss or damage caused by a combination o f causes. In this 
event the carrier while presumed to be at fault has the possibility o f adducing 
evidence to show absence o f fault. The carrier thus has a legal burden to disprove 
fault. Failure to discharge this burden for whatever reason renders him liable for the 
whole loss.
While The Hague and the Hamburg rules are based on the principle o f presumed 
fault o f the carrier, there are inherently different in terms o f drafting. The Hamburg 
rules provide a clear and concise provision for allocating liability, The Hague rules
268 3rd ed., (Montreal, 1988),133-147) See also at http:/tetley.law.m cgill.ca/)
269 This view  has also been follow ed in Australia( Shipping Corp. o f  India Ltd. V. Gamlen Chemical 
Co Pty. Ltd, (1980) 147 C.L.R. 142,153)
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do not, instead there are “organised in the form o f a 'ping-pong’ match between two 
parties with conflicting interest ”270
The draft instrument on transport law which is expected to replace the 3 main 
conventions on carriage o f goods by sea is also not as clear as one would have hope 
for. It states in Art.5.4 that;
“ the carrier shall be bound, before, at the beginning o f  (and during) the voyage by 
sea, to exercise due diligence to (a) make (and) keep the ship seaworthy, (b) 
properly man, equip and supply the ship, ( c) make (and) keep the holds and all 
other parts o f  the ship in which the goods are carried, including containers where 
supplied by the carrier, or upon which the goods are carried f i t  and safe fo r  the 
reception, carriage and preservation ”
This Article mirrors Article 111 r. 1 of the Hague Visby Rules, with a slight 
difference. One wonders the impact o f the addition ‘during’ the voyage by sea to 
exercise due diligence. Under the HVR’s the duty is one which ends at the 
beginning o f the voyage. Read literally, this addition might mean that the carrier has 
a duty to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy during the whole voyage. Thus, 
occurrences during the voyage which might render the vessel unseaworthy would 
trigger this obligation. This might be regarded among shipping circles as too 
stringent a duty.
Art 6.1.1 lays down the general liability rule that the carrier shall be liable fo r  
Loss resulting from  loss o f  or damage to the goods, as well as from  delay in 
delivery, i f  the occurrence that caused the loss ...took place during the period o f the 
carriers responsibility as defined in Art 4, unless the carrier proves that neither its 
fau lt nor that o f  any person referred to in Art 6.3.2(a) caused or contributed to the 
loss
This provision seems to represent a hybrid between the Hamburg Rules and the 
Hague Visby Rules. Overall its effects seems to be quite similar to the Hamburg 
rules, however, the last part is quite similar to the catch all provision o f Art IV, r. 2 
(q). The Hamburg Rules require the carrier to prove that he, his servant or agents
270 Regina Asariotis, A llocation o f  liability and the burden o f  proof in the draft instrument on 
transport law. 2002 LMCLQ 382, p.388
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took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and the 
loss, while the Hague Rules requires the carrier to show that neither he nor his 
servants contributed to the loss.
As a logical first step, the claimant will have to prove loss or damage occurring 
during the carrier’s period o f carriage. Once the claimant has established such a 
claim the burden passes on to the carrier to disprove negligence as a factor in the 
loss. And like the Hague Visby Rules Art.6.1.2( a) and Art.6.1.2 (b) contain 
exceptions from liability for loss, damage or delay due to (a) negligence of the 
master, pilot o f crew in the navigation or management o f the ship and (b) fire, 
unless caused by the fault or privity of the carrier. These correspond to The Hague 
Visby Rules exception and truly portray a veritable exception to the rule in Art 
6.1.1. This allows the carrier to rely on exceptions even in case o f negligence in the 
cases o f navigation, management and fire.
Equally, Article 6.1.3 sets out further exceptions, it states,
Notwithstanding the provisions o f Art 6.1.1, if the carrier proves that loss has been 
caused by one o f the following events it shall be presumed, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary, that neither its fault nor that o f a performing party has caused or 
contributed to cause that loss. By and large the list is similar to that found in Art. 
IV. r.2 c-p, although it also contains new phrases meant to cover other aspects of the 
carriage. The 2 exceptions found in 6.1.3 (ix) and (x) however concerns the right of 
the carrier to sacrifice goods when they have become a danger to the voyage.
Art 6.1.3 acts as a further exception to Art 6.1.1 it allows the carrier escape liability 
by proving one o f the listed events. “Notwithstanding” at the beginning o f the article 
is proof that the carrier need not disprove negligence as causing or contributing to 
the loss or damage. To rebut this presumption the cargo claimant bears the burden of 
proving negligence. This Article if  adopted will go a long way in bringing certainty 
as to the burden of proof, as there is no doubt as exists in the Hague Rules that once 
the carrier raises a causative event, the burden of proof is shifted. This is because 
the drafting style is unequivocal and does not allow contracting viewpoints. Most 
cases under English law have this position as the position under the Hague rules, 
this is not so in all jurisdictions notably Canada in which this is disputed. More 
importantly the broad scope of the Draft Rules means that its provisions will be 
applicable to multimodal transport. In this sphere however, the carrier might find it
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difficult to rely on Art.6.1.2 or 6.1.3, especially in cases where the loss is not 
localised. Where there is no clear reason for the loss or damage, it is assumed that 
the carrier is liable, and there is a presumption that the loss was due to a breach of 
one o f the carriers obligations, either of care of the cargo or lack o f due diligence in 
providing a seaworthy vessel. If the carrier cannot show due diligence o f those he 
uses to undertake the carriage, he may need to prove that the defect was one that 
could not be discovered even if due diligence was used. Failing this as well triggers 
Art. 6.1.1 Which demands that the carrier disprove negligence, including that of his 
crew and the cargo worthiness of his vessel? This burden is a particular hard one to 
bear in multimodal transport due to the concept of performing carriers. The position 
under the draft as seen is similar to The Hague and Hamburg Rules positions.
3.5.1.2 CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD
In the sphere o f the carriage o f goods by road, we will examine the CMR which is a 
regional convention covering Europe and some of the North African states. The 
nature of road carriage does not lend itself to the type o f international conventions 
found in the carriage o f goods by sea which is of a global nature. The CMR has 
been chosen as it obtains in Europe; in The Americas they have national and 
regional conventions applicable to road carriage notably in South America.
The basis of the carrier’s liability is set out in article 17 (1) under which he is liable 
for damage to or loss o f the goods during the time he has them in his charge for 
transportation. However, there are certain exceptions to this liability set out in article 
17 (2). The carrier shall not be liable for damage to or loss o f the goods arising from;
1) The wrongful act or neglect of the claimant;
2) The instructions given by the claimant otherwise than as a result of a 
wrongful act or neglect on the part of the carrier;
3) The inherent vice o f the goods; or
4) Circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences of 
which he was unable to prevent.
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Under article 18 (1), the carrier has the burden of proving that in the particular case 
the loss or damage was due to one of these specified causes.
Article 17 (3), contains the provision that the carrier can never be exculpated 
for having used a defective vehicle or for the mistakes of one from whom he hired the 
vehicle.
Article 17 (4) and article 18 (2) to (5) are of special interest. In article 17 (4), there are 
a number o f “special risks” enumerated which provide an exculpation for the carrier 
in case of loss or damage to the cargo. Some of these exceptions to the carrier’s 
liability are modified by article 18 (3) to (5). In article 18 (2), it is provided that when 
the carrier can show that the loss or damage could be attributable to one of the special 
risks in article 17 (4), it shall be presumed that it was so caused, unless the claimant 
can show that this presumption is not applicable.
The special risks enumerated in article 17 (4), as modified by article 18 (3) to 
(5), are as follows:
(a) Use of open unsheeted vehicles, if this use has been expressly agreed and specified 
in the consignment note. As per article 18 (3), this shall not be regarded as a special 
risk entitled to the benefit o f article 18 (2), if there has been an abnormal shortage or 
loss o f any package.
(b) The lack or defective condition of packing concerning goods that needs to be 
packed.
(c) Handling, loading, stowage or unloading done by the sender or consignee or 
persons acting on their behalf.
(d) The sensitive nature o f the goods. As per article 18 (4), the carrier shall not benefit 
from the provision o f article 18 (2), if equipment especially designed to protect the 
goods from certain outside effects was used and the carrier cannot show that he did all 
that was incumbent on him with respect to the choice, maintenance and use of such 
equipment and that he followed all instructions he received.
(e) The carriage o f livestock. This provision is of benefit to the carrier only if he can 
show that he did everything normally incumbent on him and that he followed all 
instructions he received.
Article 17 and article 18 lay down the basis of liability and allocate the burden 
of proof;
a) The carrier is strictly liable for condition of the vehicle he uses.
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b) He is presumed liable when the goods have been damaged; with the possibility of 
pleading one o f the exception clauses to show that the loss or damage was due to 
certain circumstances.
c) Yet in other cases he does not need to prove fully the cause of the loss or damage, 
but it suffices that he shows that they could have been the cause o f the loss or damage. 
In such a situation, the carrier will avoid liability, unless the claimant disproves the 
carrier’s contention o f possible cause.
The basis of liability as set out in article 17 (1) is quite similar to strict. Between the 
time of taking over the goods and the time of delivery, the carrier is liable for every 
loss of or damage to the cargo. He can only avoid liability by showing that the 
occurrence of the loss or damage was due to one of the circumstances enumerated in 
article 17 (2). That it is indeed the carrier who has to prove this is provided in article 
18(1). The result o f these provisions is not easy to label, and the courts of the various
271Member States o f the CMR have termed this kind of liability differently. The sum 
of it is obviously not a strict liability, as in certain circumstances the carrier may be 
able to exonerate himself. Neither is it a liability excluding only force majeure in the 
classical sense, since there are exceptions that fall outside the class o f insurmountable 
obstacles excluded under the classical doctrine of force majeure.
It seems inevitable to define the basis of liability in the light o f the exceptions 
to the carrier’s liability, as the basis of liability in itself does not say much about the 
extent to which the carrier is liable.272 The label must be set according to the most 
important defence found in article 17 para 2: “ ... through circumstances which the
}}273carrier could not avoid and the consequences o f  which he was unable to prevent.‘’,> 
Legal writers now agree that this exception to the carrier’s liability is not limited to 
external causes, as would otherwise follow from the continental doctrine of  force  
majeure?1A There are many fine theoretical distinctions between the various national
271 D.J. H ill & A ndrew M essent, CMR: Contracts for the International Carriage o f  Goods by Road 
[hereinafter H ill & M essent, CMR], 2nd edition, Lloyd’s o f  London Press, 1995, pp. 102 et seq. Also 
M alcolm A. C larke , International Carriage o f  Goods by Road: CMR [hereinafter M alcolm  A. Clarke, 
International carriage], 3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997, pp. 214 et seq.
272 Malcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, p. 216.
273 K.F. Haak, The Liability o f  the Carrier under the CMR [hereinafter Haak, Carrier Liability], 
Stichting Vervoeradres, Den Haag, 1986, p. 143.
274 Haak, Carrier Liability, § 5.2.3.1.; H ill & Messent, CMR, p. 113. This im plies that the carrier is 
liable for culpa, not, as may be thought, for every chain o f  events within his sphere o f  control (the latter 
standard is the standard o f  the Swedish Sale o f  Goods Act). The question, which will presently be 
answered, is how strict the standard o f  care according to which the carrier’s negligence is judged shall 
be.
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concepts of this negligent liability. But it appears that the factual difference between 
these national concepts is minimal.275 J.J. Silber Ltd. and others v. Islander Trucking 
L td 216 is authority for the proposition that the standard of liability is presumed. In this 
case, a lorry driver was robbed, in the subsequent action the carrier relied on the 
defence. Mustill J. concluded that, the concept is best expressed by treating the
277words”could not avoid” as comprising the rider”even with the utmost care”.
As per Mustill J .’s opinion, the carrier has a duty to exercise utmost care in order to 
avoid damage during transport. If he does not do so, he will be liable for any damage 
or loss that may ensue.
Added to this basis o f liability, expressed by article 17 (1) is article 17 (2) "... 
circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences o f  which he 
was unable to preven t”, there are a number of general exceptions also contained in 
article 17 (2). These are 1) the wrongful act or neglect o f the claimant, 2) the 
instructions o f the claimant given otherwise than as a result of a wrongful act or 
neglect on the part of the carrier; and 3) the inherent vice of the goods.
Under the first exceptions (”the wrongful act or neglect o f the claimant”), it 
should be realised that it is easier for the carrier to exonerate himself by claiming the 
specific exceptions in article 17 (4), as many o f the latter are due to the “wrongful act
278 279or neglect o f the claimant”. This general exception is therefore rarely pleaded. 
The term “wrongful” is usually interpreted as meaning that the claimant must have 
been at fault in some way or another. This exception thus concerns fault on the part 
o f either the sender or the consignee, and if and when it applies, the carrier will be 
relieved from liability.
The term “instruction” in the second of the exceptions discussed here is very 
wide. It comprises virtually every instruction concerning goods.281 The carrier, in 
other words, must follow this instructions to the letter; if the carrier’s fault has cause 
the goods to get into a dangerous situation and the carrier then asks for instructions 
how to react he can not rely on this exception. However, this defence is not available 
when the instructions are the result of a wrongful act or neglect on the part of the
275 Haak, Carrier Liability, supra note — p. 127.
276 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s law Reports, 243.
277 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s law Reports, 243, 245.
278 Cf. H aak, Carrier Liability, p. 140; M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, pp. 259 and 260
279 Haak, Carrier Liability, p. 140.
280 M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, p. 261
281 M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage o f  Goods by Road: CMR (4th ed., 2003), p. 261 and 262.
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carrier. Since “wrongful” above has been interpreted as meaning fault, the carrier will 
not be able to rely on this exception in cases where he has already been guilty of fault 
(e.g. has been involved in an accident as a consequence of his own fault) and then 
receives instructions from the cargo owner. If the instructions given in such a situation 
lead to new damage, the carrier, according to the clear wording o f article 17 (2), will 
not be able to exonerate himself.282 However, in certain cases, it may be argued that 
liability should be divided between the carrier and the claimant
’’Inherent vice” is a rather difficult concept and has often been confused with 
the concept o f “sensitive goods” in article 17 (4) (d).283 The difference basically lies 
in the fact that sensitivity is a quality in all samples of the goods in question, whereas 
inherent vice only affects certain items o f a particular kind of goods.
In summary, the carrier’s liability is based on “utmost care” for the goods 
during transport. He can exonerate himself by showing that the damage was due to a 
wrongful act or neglect o f the claimant, to the instructions given by the claimant or to 
the inherent vice o f the goods. The carrier’s liability is heavier in respect of the 
vehicle he uses. According to article 17 (3), the carrier is never excused for defects in 
the vehicle or for the wrongful act or neglect of any person from whom he hires the 
vehicle.
Article 18 (2) provides that, if the carrier can establish that in the particular case the 
damage could be attributed to one or more of the risks enumerated in article 17 (4), it 
shall be presumed that that risk did in fact cause the damage, thereby relieving the 
carrier from liability. However, the claimant is free to introduce counterproof to the 
effect that the damage was not, in fact, so caused.
This provision, as can be readily perceived, concerns the burden of proof.284 
First, the carrier has to show that the special risk materially existed, e.g. that the 
loading was indeed done by the sender. Then he benefits from the relief o f a burden of 
proof: he does not need to show that the risk actually did cause the damage, for it 
suffices that he shows that the damage could have been caused by the special risk.
282 M alcolm A. C larke, International Carriage, ibid p. 262
283 M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, ibid p.332
284 M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, ibid p. 296.
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If he succeeds in doing so, the claimant has the possibility o f showing that the damage 
was, in fact, not caused by the special risk, i.e. he may show that there is no chain of 
causation between the special risk and the damage. If he is successful in this respect, 
he once again turns the burden o f proof on the carrier.
3.5.1.3 CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY RAIL
The CIM convention which governs the carriage of goods by rail like the CMR is a 
regional convention, applicable mostly in Europe and some North African countries.
As will be perceived, the basis o f liability in the CIM is very similar indeed to the 
basis of liability in the CMR,285 this is based on the fact that the CMR derives from 
the CIM286, so the similarities between the two conventions is no coincidence. I will 
therefore not delve in all aspects of the CIM’s liability system but concentrate on the 
aspects that differ from the CMR. This stance is dictated by the limited case law and 
doctrinal stance found in the CIM.
The basis of liability o f the CIM is like the system in the CMR. Article 36, § 1, 
lays down the general basis o f liability. It is then modified in a general way in Art.36 
§ 2; by stating the exceptions for the fault o f the person entitled, for instructions given 
to the railway, for inherent vice and for unavoidable circumstances. This exception is 
quite similar to that found under the CMR and should be treated as such, rendering the 
Carrier not liable for force majeure type occurrences in which no fault can be found 
on his part or that o f his servants, agents and those he makes use of in the 
transportation of goods.
According to article 37, § 1, the carrier has the burden of proof for any exception 
which he wishes to rely on under Art.36. However under the CIM there is no strict 
liability for the condition of the trains used as found under the CMR, which makes the 
carrier strictly liable for any damage or loss caused by the condition o f the vehicle?
285 D avid  A. G lass & Chris Cashmore, Introduction to the Law o f  Carriage o f  Goods, Sweet and 
Maxwell London 1989 [hereinafter G lass & Cashmore, Introduction], p. 147
286 M alcolm A. Clarke, International Carriage, p. 346.
136
In article 36, § 3, special risks are enumerated which, according to article 37, § 2, 
lighten the railway’s burden o f proof for non-negligence; For one o f the special risks 
enumerated in article 36, § 3, namely, the carriage of goods in open unsheeted 
wagons, there is a modification in article 37, § 2, which provides that the railway is 
not entitled to a lowered level o f proof when there has been an abnormal wastage or 
any package has been lost, this exception is the same as that found under the CMR.
Although the CIM is quite similar to the CMR, there are some 
differences worth examining. The main difference between the CMR and the CIM 
seems to be the fact that article 37, §2 CIM makes fewer counter-exceptions to the 
special risks than its corresponding article 18 of the CMR. The only exception 
contained in article 37, § 2 CIM is exactly parallel to article 18 (3) o f the CMR, and it 
has already been shown during the discussion o f the CMR, especially that o f carriage 
in an open wagon. But as there are no exceptions or modifications to the other special 
risks, it is not possible to reduce the catalogue in any decisive way, and therefore, the 
railway benefits from a lighter burden of proof in many respects than the road carrier.
There are basically eight exceptions left that also entitle the railway to benefit from 
the lowering o f the required standard of evidence;
b) absence or inadequacy of packing,
c) loading by the consignor or unloading by the consignee,
d) defective loading by the consignor,
e) completion by the consignor or the consignee of customs formalities,
f) sensitive goods,
g) irregular, incorrect or incomplete description of goods,
h) carriage o f livestock,
i) Carriage accompanied by an attendant, if the damage is such as the attendant was 
intended to prevent.
These exceptions are quite identical to the exceptions found under Article 17, (4) of 
the CMR. This is an interesting point in that the CIM - contrary to the CMR - does 
not grant the railway an exception for the consignor’s or consignee’s handling of the 
goods. Handling o f the goods may occur during various stages of the transport, such 
as loading, re-stowing during the transport or unloading. As handling during loading
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and unloading are covered by the exceptions for loading and unloading (art. 36, § 3, 
items (c) and (d)), such an exception could only refer to handling during the 
transport. The reason for such an exception not being granted may once again lie in 
the fact that railways in Europe are traditionally state owned and that it is therefore 
improbable - not to say unthinkable - that the cargo during the transport is handled 
by one of the parties to the contract of sale. Railway stations and railway 
warehouses are usually not accessible to the public - the risk that one of the parties 
gets its hands on the cargo during the transport is therefore almost non-existent.
Thus, the railway has to show three things: 1) that the cargo was loaded and 
stowed by the sender or unloaded by the consignee; 2) that this was agreed upon 
between the relevant party and the railway and, in the case of the sender, referred to in 
the consignment note, or alternatively that this was done under the relevant 
provisions; and 3) that the damage could have arisen from these circumstances.
In summary, o f the special risks of the CIM, the striking feature in the 
catalogue is that most o f the special risks concern circumstances under the exclusive 
or partial control of the consignor or consignee. This applies to the exceptions 
contained in article 36, § 3. (b), (c), (e) and (g). All these exceptions concern risks that 
lie outside the actual contract o f carriage, and it is therefore not surprising that the 
railway benefits from a lighter burden of proof in such circumstances.
Exception (f) and (h) concern goods that are inherently subject to 
damage, which must be seen as a concession to the railway that it does not have to 
assume responsibility for goods that, are particularly difficult to transport. These 
exceptions are not really surprising either.
The only exceptions that concern the transport as such are exceptions (a) 
and (h). However, the carriage in open wagons is a particularly dangerous way to 
transport goods. Exception (h) concerns goods that need an attendant - otherwise, an 
attendant would not be required
Thus there remain two general types of special risks o f the catalogue of 
special risks in the CIM: the special risks concern either duties o f the consignor or the 
consignee or the special risks that the goods are particularly difficult to transport.
The general system of liability is thus the following: The railway is 
presumed liable for damage (article 36, § 1, and article 37, § 1). It may, however,
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exculpate itself by showing it has exercised utmost care (article 36, § 2) during the 
transport. In a number o f specified cases, the railway is relieved from the normally 
required standard o f proof (article 36, § 3, and article 37, § 2). These specified cases 
may be summarised as being cases in which the consignor/consignee has to retain 
some responsibility for his own sphere of control, alternatively as cases in which the 
goods are particularly difficult to transport. It is this system of liability which will be 
compared to the other relevant systems.
3.5.1.4 CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY AIR
The Warsaw Convention and all its relevant amendments and supplements represent 
the International Air Conventions which apply mandatorily in air carriage and cannot 
be modified for the benefit of the carrier.
Under the Warsaw convention, the carrier is liable for damage caused during the 
carriage by air, unless he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary steps 
to avoid the damage, or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures. 
This is prima facie  a liability for negligence with a reversed burden of proof, i.e. a
987presumed liability. Thus the claimant whose goods are lost or damaged needs to 
prove only the extent o f the loss or damage during air carriage; he does not need to 
prove that the carrier was at fault.
There is, however, an immediate problem in the interpretation of Art 20, that 
the carrier must prove that he and his agents have taken all measures ’’necessary” to 
avoid the damage. The operative word here is taken “all necessary measures”. The 
phrase “all necessary measures have been interpreted by the courts to mean “all 
reasonably necessary measures”288 This interpretation is similar to the wordings of 
the Montreal Convention 1999,which replaces the words “all necessary measures” 
with the words “all measures that can reasonably be required to avoid damage”
The word “necessary” is, however, not to be taken literally.289Basically, 
this is liability for negligence. In Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.290, Lord Justice
287 I.H.Ph. D iederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air law, Fourth revised edition, Kluver law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer-Boston 1991 [hereinafter Diederiks-Verschoor, Introduction], p. 64.
288 Sw iss Bank Corp, and others v. Brink’s-Mat Ltd and Others, [1986]2 Lloyds Rep. 79, 97-97)
289 Lord M cN air, The law o f  the Air, Third edition, Edited by Michael R.E. Kerr and Anthony H.M. 
Evans, Stevens & Sons, London 1964 [hereinafter M cNair, law o f  the Air], pp. 184 and 185.
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Greer held that, the effect of this clause was to put on the carrier, the obligation of
291disproving negligence, leaving them liable for negligence if they fail to disprove it.
The same argument holds well in American law.292 The carrier has thus to disprove 
negligence; otherwise he is presumed liable. The carrier in the event that he cannot 
prove “a// necessary measures” is allowed to prove that it was impossible for him to 
take such measures. This can be used in cases of natural disasters where the carrier
293can prove that it was impossible for him to take any measures to prevent the event. 
Carriage by air is further complicated by the fact that the Warsaw Convention and the 
Warsaw- Hague Conventions allow the carrier to use the defence of “all necessary 
measures in case o f loss or damage to cargo, while the Montreal Protocol No 4 and 
the Montreal Convention 1999, allows this defence only in cases o f damage caused by 
delay.294 To compensate for this exclusion, the above cited conventions provide 4 
exceptions in respect to cargo loss:
“-inherent defect, quality or vice of that cargo;
-defective packing of that cargo performed by a person other than the carrier 
or [his] servants or agents;
-act o f war or an armed conflict;
-act of public authority carried out in connection with the entry, exit, or transit 
of the cargo”.
Under the new convention, the defence of all necessary measures has been replaced 
by the above 4 exceptions. The defences are standard defences found in most 
transport conventions, thus one would expect their interpretation to follow the set 
pattern in carriage cases.295 This liability system clearly mirrors a civil law drafting 
style allowing courts to interpret it according to the particular needs at the time. It 
therefore rests heavily on case law after a certain period of time. In many aspects,
290 Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd., L loyd’s law Reports (1936) Vol. 55, 318.
291 Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd., Lloyd’s law Reports (1936) Vol. 55, 318, at p. 332. Lord Justice 
Greer was analysing and interpreting liability for personal injuries sustained by passengers, but due to 
the structure o f  the Warsaw Convention, the argument is valid for damage to goods as well.
292 D iederiks-Verschoor, Introduction, pp. 64 and 65; M cN air, law o f  the Air, p. 185.
293 DE Vera v. Japan Airlines, 24 Avi 18, 317 (SDNY, 1994))
294 Art. 20 Montreal Protocol no 4, Art. 19 Montreal convention 1999)
295 Clarke & Yates, Contracts o f  Carriage by Land and Air, (LLP, 2004) para. 3.250)
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case law will not be less complicated than an explicit catalogue on what is to be 
accepted as exception and what is not. On the other hand, case law is flexible, and it is 
easier for the courts to answer new questions than it is for international convention 
drafters to agree on answers to the same questions. A system for presumed negligence 
is thus judicially and technically easier to handle than a system with detailed 
exceptions and counter exceptions - the answer to the question what is negligence and 
what is not depends on the individual case and the particular interpretation the judge 
will put on it.
It would be interesting to delve in the distinctions made by case law and to 
analyse the rules and exceptions provided by the courts within the Warsaw system.
3.6 A Comparison of the Transport Conventions
As stated above the need for the examination of the different liability regimes was 
meant to give us a good idea of what the different liability regimes are to better 
understand the difficulties potentially applicable in the field o f multimodal 
transport.
In summary, the Hague Rules, The CMR, the CIM and The Warsaw Conventions 
provide a presumption o f liability for either negligence of the carrier or utmost care 
for the goods. With respect to the general system of liability, all the modes base their 
liability system on presumed fault, the difference lies more in the exceptions afforded 
the carrier under each convention and the interpretation o f the different jurisdictions. 
Within the different modes, this operate well, the problem arises when all of them 
become potentially applicable to multimodal carriage, where the MTO finding 
himself excluding his liability for the perils of the sea and also for a defective vehicle. 
However, it is interesting to see the differences between a liability for negligence in 
most of the conventions and the CMR’s liability for having exercised utmost care. 
Let’s assume that in our Hypothetical case the goods where lost through theft. When 
goods are stolen while in transit, no carrier can excuse himself by showing that the 
goods were stolen due to circumstances beyond his control, if he cannot adduce 
evidence of lack o f fault, he will be held liable.
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In the carriage o f goods by sea, the carrier is liable unless he can show that the 
theft occurred without the fault or privity of the carrier or his agents or servants. This 
is a straightforward liability for negligence. This is the same standard o f liability that 
occurs in the other modes.
In road transport, theft is seldom accepted as exoneration.296 The carrier has to 
show that he has done all he possibly can to safeguard the goods, such as parking the 
vehicle in guarded areas and equipping the vehicle with security devices.2)7 The 
requirement of utmost care in this case is therefore very much alike to a requirement 
of being duly diligent; it is reasonable to park the lorry in a guarded area, but is not 
reasonable - and rather absurd - to arm the driver. Legally speaking, it is difficult to 
see the real difference between ’’reasonable care” and ’’utmost care”, when ’’utmost 
care” is defined as being an obligation to take all reasonable measures short of the 
absurd. In reality, it seems, the difference between reasonable and utmost care is not 
necessarily mirrored by a difference in the kind of measures the carrier has to take to 
prevent theft.
In air transport, the system is straightforward. The carrier is liable for 
negligence. The content of this rule is the same as in other kinds of transport 
conventions.
In the case of multimodal transport, the carrier is also liable for his negligence. When 
taking a closer look at the factual requirements on the carrier, we find that there is not 
much difference between the modes.
If so, it seems as if there may be a common general basis of liability in 
transport law. Carriers in all kinds of transport are liable for negligence, being the 
exercise of all reasonable measures required to prevent damage.
The different liability systems of the various laws of transport diverge when it comes 
to the exclusion of liability. In sea transport, the carrier has two specific excuses: He 
is excused for faults in the navigation or in the management o f the ship, and he is 
excused for fire, unless caused by his own actual fault or privity. In road transport, the 
carrier benefits from a reduction in the required standard o f evidence when the
2% Haak , Carrier Liability, supra note 272 p. 144 et seq.
297 Levi Strauss & Co v. Tropical Shipping Constriction Ltd, [2003] A.M.C. 283, (S.D . Fla. ( West 
Palm Beach) 2002), where the court had to consider the application o f  the Q clause in the case o f  loss 
during an Inland leg o f  a multimodal transport contract.
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damage was due to the lack or defectiveness of packing, the handling o f the goods by 
the sender/consignee and the insufficiency or inadequacy o f marks or numbers. In 
railway transport, the relief from liability to the carrier’s benefit is the most extensive 
of the systems here discussed. The railway carrier is exempted from liability for a 
large number of circumstances in which the risk for the goods either pertains to the 
sphere of control o f the consignor/consignee or is due to the nature o f the goods 
making them particularly difficult to transport. The air carrier, on the other hand, 
works under a system in which there are no specific exceptions to his liability for 
negligence.
We see a wide variety o f solutions, stretching from absolute exemptions for certain 
kinds of causes of damage, to no specific exceptions at all. It is here that the 
difference between the different conventions lies. In the case of multimodal transport 
it shows the extent to which each case is exposed.
Additionally, in sea transport, the carrier has to exercise due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy and a duty to care for the cargo; he is liable for negligence in this 
respect. The concept o f due diligence has at times been given a very rigid
298interpretation. In the Muncaster Castle case , the shipowner was held liable for 
water damage due to the insufficient tightening of nuts on inspection covers. The 
mistake had been made by a worker at the yard where the ship had been repaired, but 
nevertheless the fault was attributed to the shipowner with the argument that he had 
failed to make the ship seaworthy. The duty of making the ship seaworthy is said to 
be non-delegable, which means that the shipowner cannot blame the unseaworthiness 
of the ship on a yard or a classification society - he is himself responsible for making 
the ship seaworthy. In case the UNCITRAL draft transport law is adopted in its 
present form, the Art.5.4 will place on the carrier an even heavier burden as the duty 
is extended to cover the whole voyage.
In road transport, the carrier is strictly liable for the roadworthiness and 
cargoworthiness o f the vehicle. There is no excuse at all available to him, should the 
vehicle prove not to be road- and cargoworthy. This duty is perceivably even heavier 
than in sea transport, as in the sea mode the carrier may at least be excused when he 
has been duly diligent.
298 Riverstone M eat Co. Pty. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd. [1961] 1 Lloyd’s law Reports 57
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In railway and air transport, there is no specific provision on the strict liability 
for the means of transport. Therefore, one must assume that in this respect the 
carrier’s liability is governed by the general basis of liability, i.e. presumed liability 
for negligence. As negligence can be rephrased as the absence o f due diligence, the 
liability of the railway and air carrier for their respective means o f transport is the 
same as in sea carriage, that is, a liability for negligence.
It might be thought that in railway and air transport the courts would take a 
similar strict attitude towards the carrier’s negligence concerning the means of 
transport as they do in sea transport; after all, it is the carrier who has exclusive 
control of the state o f his means of transport. If that should prove to be true, the level 
of duty required o f the carrier would be very high indeed, and it may happen to be 
nearly as high as in road transport. In the light of The Muncaster Castle case, it is very 
difficult for the carrier to get away from liability, should his means o f transport prove 
to be defective. It may therefore be said that the carrier’s duty of exercising due 
diligence in providing a suitable means of transport employed is rather heavy. This 
can be stated to be a general principle of transport law, with the modification that the 
road carrier can never be excused for having used a defective vehicle.
3.7 THE BASIS OF LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The basis o f liability in transportation law generally is presumed fault. In all the 
modes of carriage, once goods are delivered either short or damaged the carrier is 
prima facie liable to the cargo owner for that loss.299 It is clear now that the carrier 
has the duty to adduce evidence once a claim has been made for short or damaged 
delivery to show that the loss or damaged is covered by an exception clause.300 It is 
this system of liability that also applies to multimodal transport either by default or 
by incorporation.
Generally, the burden o f proof of this basis is on the carrier, this principle however 
is not without problems; in certain instances this burden o f proof reverts to the
2W This principle applies to all modes o f  transport with slight variations which reflects the particular 
mode o f  transport. These variations are usually in the form o f  exclusion clauses.
300 Tetley, W. The Burden o f  proof, Chap 6. http/Tetley.law.M cgill.ca.maritime/chap6.pdf.
144
cargo owner who has to prove that the carrier was negligent.301 Thus when the 
cargo interest adduces evidence to show that goods are lost or damaged under a 
contract of carriage, and the carrier pleads an excepted peril, the allocation o f proof 
might still be uncertain. This then raises the question o f the burden o f proof in 
transportation, where does it lie? Normally, the substantive law dictates the legal 
burden although the courts must decide which issues attract an evidential burden 
and who bears it.302
In the carriage o f goods by sea, two main principles are predominant. Some cases 
are based on bailment under which the carrier as bailee bears the burden o f proof, 
while in other cases the cargo owner has the legal burden of proving that the carrier 
is at fault.303
In the other modes o f carriage, notably, carriage by air and road, this is not the case. 
Once the cargo owner adduces evidence o f loss or damage, the burden of proof is on 
the carrier and does not at any time revert to the cargo owner. In these cases the 
burden of proof is based on bailment in which case the carrier bears the burden of 
proof exclusively.
This raises the question under which circumstances these principles also apply to 
multimodal transport.304 Because the liability in multimodal transport depends on 
the law applicable to where loss is localised, the burden of prove will also depend 
on the particular regime that would apply to that mode. The implication o f which is 
that the burden of proof in multimodal transport is always uncertain which is 
disadvantageous to the shipper.
Another problem with presumed fault as a basis o f liability in multimodal transport 
lies in the nature of the mode. The principle of presumed fault demands that the 
carrier adduces evidence to show either that he is not at fault or that the damage is
305covered by an excepted peril. The burden is thus a personal one. In multimodal
301 This is the case in the carriage o f  good s by sea under The Hague Visby Rules
302 Tapper, Colin (ed.), Cross & Tapper on Evidence, 9th ed. (London, 1999)
303 Chinyere Ezeoke, ‘Allocating onus o f  proof in sea cargo claims: the contest o f  conflicting  
principles.’ [2001] LMCLQ p. 261, what she refers to as the bills o f  lading position.
304 All the contracts on Multimodal transport and Art. 16 o f  the 1980 Multimodal transport convention  
all state that the basis o f  liability is presumed fault.
305 The Theodegmon [1990] 1 L loyd’s Rep.52, The Antigoni [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 636
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transport, the MTO as carrier assumes all liability for loss or damage irrespective of 
where loss occurred. By so doing he assumes the duty of adducing evidence to show 
that a particular carrier under whom damage or loss occurred was not negligent.
This means that the carrier as MTO has a wider burden than envisaged in unimodal 
transport cases. The Carriers contractual liability for his servants is liability without 
fault. In this case liability does not lie with the fact of negligence, but vicarious.
This vicarious liability for the acts o f servants is again exacerbated in multimodal 
transport as in involves not only the servants and agents of the MTO, but also those 
of the performing parties.
This section seeks to argue that this basis of liability in multimodal transport 
exacerbates the problem. It will also be contended that this principle when it was 
propounded could not envisage the pleadings involved in a multimodal transport 
liability case for two main reasons;
(1) First, this concept presumes localisation o f loss not when loss is concealed,306 
and the majority o f loss or damage in multimodal transport is carried in containers 
thus concealed. Thus, although it is used as a basis of liability its incidence o f use is 
very limited.
(2) Secondly, the implementation o f this concept to multimodal transport is 
allegedly based on its use in unimodal transport, as a medium o f conflict avoidance 
with the already existing mandatory conventions.
The stance taken in this section is that the assimilation o f the presumed fault concept 
into multimodal transport as found in unimodal transport was inevitable; in the 
absence o f a mandatory applicable convention on multimodal transport, carriers 
adopted a basis o f liability familiar to them and further clarified by judicial 
pronouncements. Thus, when looked at from the viewpoint o f the carrier, it is 
theoretically possible to state that this concept represents by far the most cogent 
basis for multimodal liability, but such an approach has its flaws. Firstly, 
multimodal transport is not the same as unimodal transport, and although it can be
306 Once loss or damage is concealed the carrier cannot adduce evidence to support a claim that an 
excepted peril is the cause o f  loss.
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regarded as embodying normal transport tendencies, it embodies a wider scope than 
is usual in unimodal transport.307
These two factors explain why the concept of presumed fault might not do for 
multimodal transport what it does for unimodal transport; ensuring a certain and 
predictable liability regime.
Diamond QC cautioned that an application of unimodally structured liability to 
multimodal transport would at best
"...introduce an irrelevant anomaly into what without statute is at best an 
unpredictable aspect o f  legal liability and at worst a muddle".308
Any new law on multimodal transport which hopes to eradicate the problem of the 
proliferation o f liability regimes must then depart from concepts that were 
introduced into multimodal transport by default; because there was no mandatory 
liability regime applicable per se to it.
3.7.1 PRINCIPLE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF LIABILTY IN 
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The legal status of this principle in international transport law comprises o f the 
different unimodal conventions operational which govern the carrier's liability. As 
noted above the main liability regimes, The Hague Rules, the CMR, CMNI, the 
CIM and the Warsaw Conventions together with their different amendments exhibit 
the traits o f a fault based liability standard in varying degrees. Their differences lie 
more in the fact that they reflect different problems associated with each individual 
mode than any real substantive difference, although in some instances the burden of
307 The implications o f  the com ing into force o f  the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal transport 
Conventions TD/M T/CONF- p 15 See also Hans Carl., “The spread o f  multimodal transport 
legislation.” IMMTA Bullentin, December 199 p.6 Where it is stated that the majority o f  goods carried 
in containers suffer from concealed loss with little proof as to where loss or damage occurred.
308 Schmitthoff and Goode, International carriage o f  goods; Some legal problems and possible 
solutions, 1988 London
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proof is more onerous.309 The shifting of the burden of proof is particularly 
important in carriage cases especially when loss or damage occurs because of the 
heavy burden on the plaintiff to establish the cause of such loss or damage. If the 
law did not impose such a shifting o f the burden of proof, plaintiffs will often be 
compromised in pursuing their claims.310The imposition o f the legal burden on 
bailees has also been done to protect bailors when loss or damage has occurred. 
Sachs L.J. clearing stated this rationale in B.R.S. Ltd. v. Arthur Crutchley,311 that, 
The common law has always been vigilant in the interest o f  bailors 
whose goods are not returned fo r  a number o f  reasons: in so 
fa r  as that negligence relates to the onus o f  p ro o f one o f  
the reasons stems from  the fact that normally it is only 
the bailee who knows what care was being taken o f  the goods, 
and an another from  the number o f  temptations to 
which the bailee may succumb. Those temptations may vary in each 
generation according to the nature o f  the transactions and in these 
days o f  rising cost include that o f  the bailee wishing to pay as 
little fo r  security as he can get away with, and the complacency 
that can arise from  the feeling that after all, we are insured.
This is the general rule fo r  the liability o f  the carrier.312
Presumption o f liability here presupposes a set of facts recognised in law as peculiar
l O
to carriage cases, by which the burden of proof is shifted from the plaintiff to the 
defendant who is considered to be in a better position to ascertain the facts leading 
to the cause o f suit in our case loss or damage.314
309 See the liability Regime introduced into the carriage o f  goods by Air, by the Montreal Protocol o f  
1999.
310 The clearest cases o f  presumption o f  liability are found in the four main TransportConventions/1) 
The Hague /V isby and the Hamburg rules 2) Thee Warsaw Convention3) The CMR,4) The 
CIM/COTIF.
3,1 [1968] 1 All. E. R. 81, 822.
312 In this regard see also the Comments o f  Hakan Karan. Supra note 125 at p.82
313 Contrary to the common law principle that he who alleges must proof, see Aktieselskabet de Danske 
Sukkerrfabriker v. Bajamar Compania Naviera SA (The Torenia) [ 1983] 2 L lyods’s Rep. 120, 215. per 
Hobhouse J “The legal burden o f  proof arises from the principle: He who alleges must prove. The 
incidence o f  the legal burden o f  proof can therefore be tested by answering the question: What does 
each party need to allege?”
314 This principle is considered to be a matter o f  public policy which prevents the parties to derogate 
from, in this regard see, The Hong kong Producer, [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 536
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As already stated, the carrier is liable for loss or damage to goods received by him 
in good order and condition and delivered in a damaged state or short. The Carrier is 
Prima facie liable for loss which is presumed to have occurred when the goods were 
under his custody for carriage.315 Prima facie; so the carrier has the opportunity to 
adduce evidence to overturn the claimant’s proof of loss, which he discharges by 
proving that the damage was caused by one of the excepted perils laid down in the 
contract.316 The burden o f proof on the carrier is based on the principles that he who 
alleges must proof,317 and ‘he who seeks to rely upon an exception in his contract 
must first bring himself within it’318
When the loss is concealed especially in multimodal transport, the carrier cannot 
rebut this presumption by showing that he took reasonable care o f the goods, he 
must explain the cause o f the loss. This principle was forcefully stated in Quaker 
Oats Co. v. M /V Tovanger,319 that
“to rebut the presumption o f  fault when relying upon 
its own reasonable care, the carrier must further prove 
that the damage was caused by something other than 
his negligence . Once the shipper establishes a prima facie  
case, under the 'policy o f  the law ’ the carrier must explain 
what took place or suffer the consequences. ... [T]he law casts 
upon [the carrier] the burden o f  loss which it cannot 
explain or, explaining bring within the exception ”
Wright J, in The Gosse Millerd case, affirmed this by stating that, the prima facie 
case which is established once goods are loss or damaged can only be rebutted by 
actually showing how the loss or damage actually occurred.
315 Based on Article 3 (4) o f  the Hague Visby Rules, that the bill o f  lading acts as evidence o f  receipt 
o f  goods by the carrier. See also in this regard The Tolmidis [1983] I Lloyds Rep; 530 at p. 534
316 Article 4(2) (a)-(q) o f  the Hague Visby Rules.See also The Theodegmon [1990] 1 Llloyd’s 
Report.52, The TNT [191] 2 L loyd’s Rep. 636 at p 642 (NSW SC)
317 See The Torenia (1983] 1 L loyd’s Rep.
318 Per Staughton L.J. (CA) in The Antigoni [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 209 at p. 212. For the earlier cases 
on this see The Glendarock,[1894] p. 228 at 231(CA) Gosse Millerd , Ltd. v. Canadian Government 
Marine Ltd. [1929] AC 223 at p. 234, (1928) 32 Li.l. Rep. 91 at p.95 (H.L)
319 743 F 2d. 238 at p. 243, 1984 AMC at p. 2943 ( 5th Cir. 19cert. denied 469 U.S. 1189, 1985 AMC  
2398.
320 [1929] A.C. 223.
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3.7.2 THE ORDER OF PROOF321
The order of proof is generally the sequence used by both parties in a cargo claim. 
The cargo claimant must first prove his loss, by proving that the loss or damage 
occurred to the goods while in the custody of the carrier. This he can do by proving 
the condition o f the goods on receipt and on delivery with the aid o f the transport 
document.
The Carrier must then prove the cause of the loss or damage, and that the loss or 
damage falls within one o f the excepted perils, or that he used due diligence to make 
the vessel [sea] worthy at the beginning and during the carriage.322 
Once the carrier has proven that the loss is covered by an excepted peril, the onus 
shifts back to the claimant to proof that the actual loss was caused by the negligence
323of the carrier, either in the loading, stowing, or during discharge o f the cargo 
The above shows two distinct positions, one in which the bailee is held to disprove 
fault and one in which the bailor is held to disprove fault once an excepted peril is 
adduced.324
3.7.3 THE PRESUMPTIONS OF PRESUMED FAULT
The effective working o f the presumed fault system is grounded on the existence o f 
certain facts. The fact that loss or damage occurred is localised, and the existence or 
possibility to adduce adequate proof to rebut the presumption.
3.7.3.1 Localisation
The effective working of presumed fault is closely linked to the possibility of 
localisation. In unimodal transport this problem does not exist, once the cargo
321 This has been treated in pp
322 F.C.Bradley & Sons, Ltd v. Federal Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. (1927) Li L. Rep. 395 at 396 
(H.L.), Phillips v.Clan Line ( 1943) 76 Li. L. Rep. 58 at p.61, Svenska Tractor Aktiebolaget v. 
Maritime A gencies (Southham pton), Ltd. [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 123 at p. 133, see also Albacora 
S.R.L. v. Westcott & Lawrence Lines Ltd. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 53
323 In this regard see the Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v. Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation Berhad ( The Bunga Seroja). [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512, and the earlier case o f  Finucane 
v. Small (1795) 1 Esp. 315
324 Both positions have been treated in pp - above
150
claimant adduces sufficient evidence of loss or damage, it is presumed that the loss 
occurred during carriage by that particular mode o f carriage. There is no question of 
where the loss or damage could have occurred; the carrier then goes on to rebut the 
presumption of fault triggered by that proof.
In multimodal transport, adducing sufficient evidence of loss or damage having 
occurred during carriage, triggers the presumption that loss occurred during the 
carriage period, what it can not do is pinpoint where lost or damage occurred, 
because the goods would have been carried using different modes o f carriage.
It is down to the carrier apart from the obvious cases to adduce evidence to show 
where loss occurred to enable him to rebut that presumption, if  he cannot localise 
the loss or damage, the rebuttable presumption of fault becomes irrebuttable. This is 
based on the fact that the carrier needs to prove specific events to be able to rely on 
any o f the exemption clauses, he must positively prove the particular event that he 
seeks to rely on.
3.7.3.2 Exoneration
The principle o f presumed fault presupposed that the carrier can exonerate himself 
by negating fault. In cases in which the carrier cannot adduce evidence to negate 
such loss or damage, he is held liable because he should be in control o f the goods 
and should know of any causes of loss or damage to the goods. On these bases he is 
liable for unknown causes of loss or damage. In general, the carrier is usually able 
to show how loss or damage occurred and therefore can adduce adequate evidence 
to show that he was not negligent. In multimodal transport however, exoneration is 
only possible when loss is localised. In this case the carrier can adduce evidence to 
show where such loss or damage occurred.
Once loss is concealed, the principle loses its importance in multimodal transport. In 
such cases the carrier cannot adduce evidence to rebut the presumption o f fault, and 
is therefore held liable with only the benefit o f limitation clauses where appropriate. 
Unlike unimodal transport in which inability to explain loss can be taken to be 
negligence, in multimodal transport inability to adduce evidence to rebut the
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presumption o f fault is due to the nature of the transport, and not in any way linked 
to negligence.
The presumption o f fault principle in the context of multimodal transport is likely to 
lead to a situation o f multiple liabilities. As seen above the carrier is liable to a fault 
basis when loss is localised and a strict basis where loss is concealed. However, 
even when loss or damage is localised, the carrier might find him self subject to 
different liability regimes than that to which his loss was originally located to.
The major criticism o f the presumed fault in the sphere o f multimodalism is the fact 
that the calibre of proof necessary to rebut this presumption is higher than in 
unimodal transport and leads to a 2 tier liability system.
Additionally the increasing use of containers in multimodal transport also 
exacerbates the problems of concealed loss; because o f the difficulty o f adducing 
evidence o f loss in goods carried in container, this poses a particular problem 
because o f the fact that multiple carriers might be involved.
Another problem that has come to the fore is the problem of gaps and loopholes 
especially those caused by loss or damage occurring at terminal interfaces especially 
in the wake o f the failed International Convention on the liability o f terminal 
operators.
A fact which is not obvious is the cost of adducing evidence in multimodal transport 
in case o f loss or damage. The carrier will incur cost in trying to adduce evidence 
from the different carriers and possibly their servants to show lack o f negligence or 
that one of the exception clauses apply.
These criticisms have not gone unchallenged, although its basic challenge has been 
based on the cost o f administering this system in MT. Critics have maintained that 
the fault is inherently expensive to operate due to the legal intricacies involved in 
adducing evidence to maintain or rebut such a presumption.
The MTO within the realms of containerised Multimodal Transport finds himself 
held to a fault liability standard, with often no means o f exoneration, which is 
tantamount to strict liability. There is however the problem of trying to adduce
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evidence especially if it will lead to benefit for the party claiming a higher limit of 
liability.
The different legal commentators, i.e. De Wit,325 while agreeing that more needs to 
be done, offer solutions which reflect the dogmatic attachment to unimodal 
transport, in that he proposes that the carrier be held to a negligent and vicarious 
liability standard to alleviate this unpredictability.
3.7.4 Rebutting the Presumption of liability in multimodal transport
The exceptions vary according to the type of contract used; as a consequence we 
will concentrate on those found in ICC document as representative o f the type of 
perils likely to be excepted. The UN MT convention 1980, does not lay down any 
specific exceptions, this it leaves to the individual parties, this same stance is 
followed by the UNCTAD/ICC rules with the exception o f the excepted perils found 
in the Hague/Visby Rules Art IV rule 2 (a) and (b) of Negligence in Navigation or 
Management and fire.
By rule 12 of the ICC rules, the carrier shall not be liable for loss, damage or delay 
in delivery in the goods, i f  the loss or damage was caused by;
An act or omission o f the consignor or consignee, or person other than the CTO 
acting on behalf o f the consignor or consignee or from whom the CTO took the 
goods in charge
This defence does not mean wrongful act, all it means is that an act or omission of 
the consignor or those acting under him is responsible for the loss or damage and as 
such the carrier is not liable for the loss. In Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines,326 potatoes 
were stored in a particular mariner following the instructions o f  the claimant, as a 
result they were damaged and it was held that he could not claim as the loss was as a 
result of his instruction. Insufficiency or defective condition o f the packing or 
marks; this defence would only work, if by the contract, it is the consignors duty to
325 De Wit, supra pg 314.
326 [1977] 2 L lo y d s  Rep, 134.
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pack the goods and state the appropriate marks. Failure to do so would exonerate the 
ship-owner from loss or damage attributable to such defective conditions, and when 
such defective parking damages other goods, the carrier would still be exculpated 
from liability.
Strike, lockout, stoppage or restraint of labour; the consequences o f which the CTO 
could not avoid by the exercise o f reasonable diligence. The MTO is not liable and 
can plead this exception, if  he can show that the strike or lock out was not his fault.
Inherent vice o f the goods;
Inherent vice is a defect in the goods that make them unfit to withstand the rigours 
of the carriage. The carrier however has a duty to use care proportionate to the state, 
condition and type o f goods involved. If a reasonable examination has been 
conducted and the goods are discovered to have a defect, any carrier who fails to use 
diligent care equal to the defect, might be held liable.
Any cause or event which the CTO could not avoid and the consequences of which 
he could not prevent by the exercise of reasonable diligence
The exception is quite similar to Art 17(2) of the CMR, taken from Art 27(2) of the 
early CIM convention before the 1952 convention eliminated “reasonable” in favour 
of "unavoidable circumstances". The defence as it stands resembles the defence of 
"force majeure", which is an event which cannot be avoided by the use o f care and 
which by its very nature makes it difficult for preventive measures to be taken to 
avoid damage, must be differentiated from the defence o f "unavoidable 
circumstances". Unforeseeability is a requirement o f the former but not o f the 
latter, making the former a stricter standard to attain. The standard required by the 
defence of "unavoidable circumstances" is that laid down by Mustill J, in Silber v 
Islander Trucking327 as
"a standard which is somewhere between, on the one hand a requirement to take 
every conceivable precaution, however extreme, within the limits o f the law, and on
69 [1985] 2 L loyd’s Rep. 348
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the other hand a duty to do no more than act reasonably in accordance with current 
practice."
The duty thus can be said to be one to use all available means to avoid incidents 
leading to loss or damage coupled with mitigating the effects of such loss or 
damage. This defence is so wide and can be compared to Art IV 2(q) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules, exculpating the carrier for loss or damage when it can be 
proved that it was caused without
"...actual fau lt or privity o f  the carrier".
The factor common to the road carrier under Art 17(2) of the CMR, rule 12(e) for 
the MTO and Art IV 2(q) o f the Hague Visby Rules is the fact that, all o f them must 
prove that no negligence was involved, or put another way, there was no fault or 
privity.
Failure to show how the loss or damage might have occurred means that the carrier 
cannot rely on this exception as he will be unable to discharge the burden of proof 
required under the various Articles.
The road and sea carrier can rely on this exception with relatively more ease than 
the MTO as they have all the facts available to them to explain the cause of the loss 
or damage. In MT or as per the ICC Rule 12, this defence operates only when the 
loss cannot be localised, how then will the MTO be able to adduce enough evidence 
to show how the loss or damage occurred to benefit from this rule? Atkinson J, 
stated in Phillip & Co v Clan Shine Steams Ltd,m  that
"...it is necessary fo r  the defendant to establish exactly why and how damage 
occurred, provided that they can disprove negligence, but o f  course, it is not easy to 
do that unless they can establish some reasonable possible alternative explanation. 
I f  the damage is entirely unexplained, it is difficult to see how the onus can be 
discharged."
328 (1943) 76 LiL Rep. 58
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Would it suffice to prove that "due diligence" was used or that the MTO did all he 
could by employing reputable firms for the defence to be triggered?
Short of such a standard it is difficult to see how often this defence will be 
successfully relied on. For if the MTO can explain how the loss occurred, he would 
at the same time be either localising it which makes the network system operate to 
deal with the loss or be bringing it under one of the already seen exception e.g. 
inherent vice o f the goods. But so long as the MTO cannot explain how the loss or 
damage occurred to prove that he was not in any way negligent he cannot rely on a 
defence which demands of him to show that which he
" ...could not avoid and the consequences o f  which he could not prevent by the 
exercise o f  reasonable diligence".
In the event that the 1980 UN Convention comes into force the MTO would be 
exculpated from liability if he can show that he
"...took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and 
its consequences".
The above exception o f "all measures" is quite similar to both Art 5 o f the Hamburg 
Rules and Art 20 of the Warsaw Convention. "All" necessary measures was held in 
Goldman v Thai Airways.International Ltd329 to mean
"...all measures necessary in the eyes o f  a reasonable man".
There is as yet no judicial pronouncement on "all necessary measures" under the 
Hamburg Rules, but one feels that the deliberate ignoring of the words as found in 
the Hague-Visby Rules in preference to "reasonable" as found in the Warsaw 
Convention seems to be a clear indication that the drafters intended that the Article 
should have the same effect as Art 20 of the Warsaw Convention.
329 [1983] 3 All E R  693
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The UNCTAD/ICC Rules like the convention does not lay down exceptions apart 
from the exceptions o f Art IV (2) (a) and (b) of the Hague/Visby rules for loss or 
damage caused during carriage by sea or inland water way. The rationale for the 
inclusion o f this exception is to make the rules compatible with the Hague/Visby 
rules, in the event o f the applicable convention being the Hamburg rules, which has 
done away with the exception o f the fire and negligent management and navigation. 
The other exceptions are not included as they would add nothing to the notion of 
presumed fault which is the basis o f liability under the rules. Although the parties 
are free to incorporate whatever exceptions they choose, subject however to the 
rules of construction.
The cargo owner or claimant now has a duty to adduce further evidence showing 
that the loss or damage was not so caused or does not fall under one o f the 
exceptions because o f negligence or unseaworthiness (carriage by sea) of the MTO.
3.8 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
One o f the pivotal elements o f any liability regime is its limits of liability. The 
different international conventions provide different limits o f liability and this has 
implications for the limits in multimodal transport as the current network liability 
system means that the limits will also vary as to the particular law which eventually 
becomes applicable.
The different levels o f limitation o f liability within the international conventions, 
shows the varying levels o f limits that the parties are subjected to. This obviously 
exacerbates the liability issue. What is needed is a liability limit that is predictable. 
The fact is that different interest will advocate for different levels o f liability. At 
present under the UNCTAD/ICC Rules, the Hague Visby Rules apply to non­
localised damage where sea carriage was part o f the carriage contract while the 
CMR limits apply for all other contracts in which a sea leg is not included.. 
Limitation of liability must relate to the particular regime that eventually emerges; 
mandatory or not and uniform or not.
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The reality of multimodal transport which shows that a stricter liability is more 
compatible will also favour a limitation of liability which supports this suggestion.
A system in which claimants are compensated in full will not change the existing 
status-quo between the parties as insurance is usually where the reality o f limits 
exists.
3.9 LIABILITY IN TORT
Most multimodal contracts state that suit in tort is acceptable, alongside 
international and national mandatory laws. While such choice o f law clauses, which 
either incorporate international conventions or other national laws, might lead to the 
conclusion that they would be the sole basis of liability, the acceptance and 
recognition by the law o f a concurrence o f liability in carriage cases points to the 
possibility of other basis o f liability being used.330 This thrust in the law means that 
English pleadings in carriage cases are no longer based only on a breach of the 
particular convention or contract, but a pleading that would invoke bailment and 
negligence in addition to any contractual or statutory breach. The rationale for 
such concurrence o f liabilities was held by Lord Diplock to be based on the fact 
that a contract o f carriage o f goods by sea was a combined contract o f bailment 
and transportation.331
A concurrent action exists if  the tort in the absence of the contract could have been 
actionable, although only one action can be entertained. It was expressed in 
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd that a,332
"A concurrent or alternative liability in tort will not be admitted i f  its effect 
would be to perm it the p la in tiff to circumvent or escape a contractual
330 Most legal system s allow  an action in contract and tort, between contracting parties. Wier, T, 
"Complex liabilities" in In tern a tio n a l E n cyc lopaed ia  o f  C o m p a ra tive  L aw  XII, Torts, Tuna (ed) 
Tubingin, J C B Muhr (1983) Chap 12 (The Eras) EIL Action (Societe Commerciale de Reassurance 
v Eras International Ltd [199211 Lloyd's Rep 570 (CA). Referred to here as parallel liability.
331 B arclays Bank L td  v Custom  an d  E xcise [1 9 6 3 ] I L loyd Rep 81 at 89
332 [1994] 3 All ER 506 at 522
158
exclusion or limitation o f  liability fo r  an act or omission that would 
constitute a tort. Subject to this qualification, where concurrent liability in 
tort exists the p la in tiff has the right to assert the cause o f  action that appears 
to be the most advantageous to him in respect o f  any particular legal 
consequence."
Although earlier English law required that the action in contract be pursued in 
such cases, it allowed such concurrent actions in the common callings, and thus
333recognised it to common carriers.
In Henderson v, M errett Syndicates Ltd ,334 The House o f Lords confirmed 
generally that in English law there may be concurrent liabilities in contract and 
tort, where a duty o f care was owed, even though the defendant owed an identical 
contractual duty to the same plaintiff, expounding the attractiveness of such 
concurrent action and affirming that one does not preclude the other. And in
IK
Sonicare v. EAFT, in an action for loss o f cargo the plaintiffs and defendants 
sought to rely on 5 different causes of action to forge a contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendants ranging from:
(1) Contract
(2) Simple bailment
(3) Bailment by attornment
(4) Brandt v. Liverpool contract
(5) Breach o f a duty o f care.
3.9.1 CONCURRENT ACTIONS
Concurrent actions are important in transportation because a typical English cargo 
claim may be framed in a combination o f contract, bailment, tort, with a number of
333 Jane Swanton and Barbara McDonald; "Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract under the Hedley 
Bryne Principle" (1995) 3 Torts Law Journal 131 at p 135
334 [1995] 2 A.C. 145
335 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 48 at p 52
159
mandatory conventions.336 Such claims are normally predicated on the fact that a 
novel situation might have arisen which does not fit in well with the particular 
contractual framework. To be able to entertain a suit, it is usually imperative that 
such concurrent heads are available.
However a claimant wishing to circumvent the contract o f carriage from applying 
its exceptions and limitation clauses will find that his position does not improve,337 
the existence o f the contract between the parties means that the claimant cannot 
sue the carrier in tort to circumvent the contract, since the parties will both be able 
to rely on a contract between them, thus the carrier will be able to rely on the 
exception clauses. Viscount Finlay dissenting in Elder Dempster Ltd  v. Paterson
339Zochonis, held that where a contract subsisted between parties no action in tort 
may be brought by the injured party as against the other, where the cause o f action 
proceeds from conduct which is in breach o f such a contract, it might be a tort if 
no such contract where in existence, unless the tort so alleged can be considered 
independent o f the contract.
And in Bigot v. Stevens, Scanlan & Co Ltd,340 claims in tort were rejected, when 
there were good reasons to restrict the plaintiff to his contractual remedy against 
the defendant.341
The suit is normally useful when the identity o f the carrier is in doubt, and the 
claimant has thus mistakenly sued the wrong person, and the time limit for suit 
against the proper person has expired.342 This was the case as early as 1949 where 
it was held in Hiram & Sons v. Dover Navigation,343 that
"Both the shipowners and the charterers could be sued as both were 
considered to be actual carriers. The court then considered the tort action
336 Palmer, N , "Sub bailm ent on Terms" [1989] LMCLQ 466
337 Rowlands v Collow (1992) 1 NZLR 178 at p 190
338 Todd, P, M odem  Bills o f  Lading, (Oxford, Blackw ell Law 1990) at 96.
339 [1924] AC 522 at p 548
340 [1966] 1 QB 197
341 Ibid pp 200
342 The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 A ll ER 250. The INES [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 144
343 (1949) 83 LiL Rep 84 at p 91
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against the owners at the same time as a contractual action against the 
charterers."
And in Grace Kennedy & Co v. Canada Jamaica lin e 344 a demise clause was 
upheld to enable the defendant who had no contractual liability responsible in tort 
under the civil law o f the place where the case was tried, while in The Golden 
Lake,345 the carrier though not a party to the bill o f lading contract was found 
liable in tort since the goods were damaged while in his custody.
3.10 CONCLUSION
Despite the rapidity o f  growth in this mode, there is still no predictable liability 
regime in Multimodal transport. There is scant judicial opinion as to what the 
liability regime in multimodal transport ought to be. The unpredictability of the 
liability regime will continue to be a problem until a multimodal convention 
becomes applicable in MT, which lays down the basic liability regime and Limits 
appropriate to it.
Part o f the unpredictability stems from the fact that multimodal transport has for a 
long time and almost universally being viewed as a patchwork o f unimodal modes. 
All the transport regimes examined here are based on the principle o f presumed 
fault. This chapter has tried to show how confusing this principle is to multimodal 
transport.
The concept o f presumed fault is not a concept that is at ease in multimodal 
transport. It was used in multimodal transport as a conflict avoidance tool with 
already existing international mandatory transport conventions. To truly reflect 
multimodal ideals, this basis ought to be changed into one which is more suited to 
the nature o f multimodal transport. The question is if a change in the basis of 
liability in transportation will be accepted by the stakeholders in the transport field. 
Increasingly, higher standards of liability are being introduced in the transport field 
in the cases o f the COTIF and the Montreal Protocol, the trend is now to increase 
the standards of liability and limits of liability. In this light it is most appropriate 
that there are increasing calls for strict liability with limit.
344 [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep 336.
345 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 632 and The President Monroe [1972] 1 L loyd’s Rep 385.
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Chapter 4
THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CONVENTION 1980
For a long time now and on going the debate rages, as to what the liability regime 
should be in multimodal transport, should it be based on the network system of 
liability or on the uniform system, should it be based on the presumed liability of the 
unimodal transport conventions or should it be based on a strict liability?
It is now generally accepted that the liability regime in multimodal transport is 
uncertain and unpredictable because of the potential liability regimes applicable to it. 
The incorporation o f the UNCTAD/ICC rules into the different multimodal transport 
contracts brought about a level of harmonisation and certainty into multimodal 
transport. But such provisions apply only when they are incorporated into the contract 
and are often subject to mandatory laws. The ideal situation would clearly be one in 
which a mandatory regime applies. Given this consensus, the international community 
has still been unable to produce an internationally acceptable set of rules to govern the 
liability of the parties to this mode of transport.
The success o f such a liability regime for multimodal transport has been elusive 
because any attempt must take into consideration the complex landscape of varying 
liability regimes applicable to multimodal transport, especially the different unimodal 
transport regimes applicable when loss or damage is localised.
This chapter seeks to examine the attempts made by UNCTAD to solve the 
multimodal transport problem by drafting an international transport convention on 
multimodal transport. In this respect, the 1980 United Nations Multimodal Transport 
Convention will be examined, and an assessment will be made as to its viability as an 
appropriate convention in this area.
This chapter is preoccupied with the effect this convention would have had on 
multimodal transport if adopted. Would it have solved the problems of an uncertain 
liability regime, and would it have brought certainty into the multimodal liability 
landscape?
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This chapter argues that this convention would not have drastically changed the 
multimodal transport liability landscape. It was doomed to failure from its inception 
because it was based on the flawed premise that unimodal principles can be used 
unmodified to solve multimodal transport problems. It will be argued further that the 
fear of conflict with other regimes and changes as to the applicable regime prevented 
the convention from attaining its goals of a predictable and certain liability regime. 
This chapter constitutes an attempt to analyse the International Multimodal Transport 
Convention o f 1980, the only international convention on multimodal transport, which 
though not in force has helped to shape the landscape o f multimodal transport.
The analyse will focus primarily on the liability regime of the convention while a 
Cursory explanation is given for the reasons of failure o f this regime.
4.1 THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONVENTION
Modelled on the Hamburg Rules 1978, the United Nations Convention on Multimodal 
transport was adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) to regulate all contracts for the International 
multimodal transport of goods, by creating a minimum liability regime for multimodal 
transport. With this adoption came the hope that the gaps which existed between and 
within modes in the case of multimodal transport would be filled, and the hitherto 
piecemeal solutions provided by provisions of national law, standard clauses and 
model rules will be replaced by uniform mandatory rules. Additionally it was hoped 
that the problems faced by courts in ascertaining the liability regime in multimodal 
transport and the 346corresponding basis, extent, limits and defences would be at an 
end.
Sadly, however, after nearly 30 years, the Convention has not yet come into force and 
is unlikely to do so.347
The reality in multimodal transport portrays a situation in which different legal 
regimes apply to different parts of the contract; (the network liability system).348
346 Driscoll, W. and Larsen P.B ‘The Convention on International Multimodal Transport o f  G oods’ 
(1982) Tul. L.R. 193.
347 The requirement o f  30 ratifications before it comes into force is too high a number to achieve. Art 
36(1) states that, [t]he convention shall enter into force 12 months after the governments o f  30 states 
have either signed it not subject to ratification, acceptance or approval or have deposited instruments o f  
ratification, acceptance approval or accession with the depository”
348 See chapter 3 on a discussion o f  the network system o f  liability
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Under this system, the different liability regimes allow the parties to limit and exclude 
their liabilities using different parameters found under the different mandatory 
national laws, international conventions or standard contracts.
For the first time in multimodal transport a uniform liability regime was proposed to 
cover all damage, loss or delay to goods carried by the multimodal transport 
irrespective of where the loss or damage took place.
4.1.1 THE HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION
Prior to the work carried out in preparation of the convention, other attempts had been 
made to solve this problem, but failed because of inadequate support from the 
different interest groups.349 Alternatively, it might be that at the time there was no 
compelling need for a multimodal transport convention. This stance was summarised 
by Diamond QC, when he stated that,
“There can be said to be a need fo r  the general adoption o f  a new sea convention but 
there is no comparable need fo r  a multimodal transport convention. ”35()
This view might have been correct at the time as the 1980 convention failed to secure 
the requisite number of ratifications, however, the message is now clear, there is a 
compelling need for a multimodal transport law.351
4.2 ATTEMPTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONVENTIONS
Technically, multimodal transport is not a 21st century problem. It did not arise prior 
to this time because the volume carried multimodally did not warrant regulation.352 
Technically speaking multimodal transport is as old as transportation using single 
modes, as nothing could stop parties from entering into agreements in which more 
than one mode o f carriage was used. However, the advent o f containerisation,353 
simplified the transference of goods from one mode to another, thereby encouraging
349 De Wit R, Multimodal Transport (1995) Para 2.190
350 Presentation at the University o f  Southampton on Multimodal transport.
351 Indira Carr, “International Multimodal transport - United Kingdom” [19981 4 Int T.L.R. 99-110
352 D iam ond,
353 Seymour Simon, 'Container law: A recent Reappraisal' (1976-77) 8 JMLC 489.
Sean Harrington, 'Legal Problems Arising from Containerisation and Intermodal Transport’ (1982) 
17 ETL p 3. See also Chapter 1 p.
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the widespread use o f multimodal transport. With this use, came problems of the 
appropriate liability regimes applicable.
Multimodal transport contracts were made subject to carrier liability rules already in 
existence. The question was if these rules were appropriate for multimodal transport 
given its nature and focus?354 This question was not as simple as stated, because 
while on the one hand multimodal transport was not a single mode and technically 
could not fall within the scope of the existing unimodal convention, on the other 
hand, any attempt to depart from unimodal rules would conflict with the rules which 
would govern the different elements of the multimodal transport, because no matter
355the way the contract was executed, it would still be by different unimodal modes. 
The decisive issue to be decided within the debate as to the appropriate liability 
regime in multimodal transport was the type of regime and the basis o f liability to 
be used.
4.2.1 The Comite Maritime International (CMI)
The CMI is one o f the bodies that have devoted time, expense and tenacity in trying 
to find a solution for the multimodal transport problem. As far back as 1911 and 
19 1 3,356 in the Paris and Copenhagen Conferences of the CMI, multimodal transport 
was considered albeit in the sphere of the carriage of goods by sea.357 The 
conference was devoted to discussions leading to a code for international carriage 
by sea, thus multimodal transport was not specifically addressed, reference being 
made only to the fact that the last carrier in a multimodal transport contract would 
be liable for the whole carriage.358 This proposal was turned down at the
354 De Wit, 'Multimodal Transport: Carrier liability and Documentation’ (London: LLP: 1995) pg 
138.Nasseri, K 'The Multimodal Transport Convention’ (1988) JMLC p 231.
355 Glass, D A, « Meddling in multimodal muddle ?— a network o f  conflict in the UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on the Carriage o f  Goods [wholly or partly] [by sea] [2006] LMCLQ 307
356 Quoted in De Wit, supra, pg 147. Quoting the work o f  Scheer W, Die Haftung des Befurderes im 
gemischten Uberseevekehr Hamburg, verlag Commerciam, 1969, 90 ref, also. Richter-Hannes, D, Die 
UN-Konvention iiber die Internationale Multimodie Giiterbeforderung, Wien, GOFVerlag 1982, 23.
357 Richter-Hannes, ibid pg 23.
358 Hamburg Draft 1911, Art 20
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Copenhagen and Genoa conferences of the CMI,359 as ineffective in promoting 
through transport, as no carrier would ever consent to be the last carrier.
By 192 7,360 the view had emerged within the CMI that it was too early for a law to 
be created dealing with multimodal transport, because commercial practice was not 
widespread enough to warrant legislative concern.361
At the Antwerp conference in 1948, a draft presented by the Swedish Judge, Algit 
Bagge was discussed.362 The draft proposed that multimodal transport should be 
limited to parties who had registered themselves as multimodal transport 
operators.363
By 1966, the CMI started looking at the multimodal transport problem afresh in the 
light o f the growing use o f containers, and the need to draw a convention on 
multimodal transport was now a necessity. This led to the distribution of 
questionnaires to the different member organisations and states to gauge their 
reactions and opinions as to the developments in containerisation.364
Under the chairmanship o f Kaj Pineus, five drafts were presented to the CMI 
subcommittee in 1966, each containing a different liability system.365
359 Sheer, J, supra note 355, quoted in De Wit pg 91.
36° 19 2 7  Amsterdam Conference o f  the CMI. Sheer, J, op cit, pg 41.
361 De Wit, supra note 353, p. 148, the ICC had also reached a similar conclusion by 1927 in their 
Stockholm Conference.
362 Richner-Hannes, supra note 355, pg 24..
363 This system was then to be used in COTIF (Art 3) for combined transport operation.
364 Bureau Permanent o f  the CMI passed the follow ing resolution on 18th Sept 1965 to "Mettre a 
l'etude la question des containers pour voir, si etude opportune ce que peut etre fait et s'il y a lieu 
d'etendre le sujet". Sec Pineus K, CMI Documentation 1967 Containers 1, DOC CR-1.: Report and 
Questionnaire 3, CMI docum entation 1967. Container 2, DO CR 2, 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
16.
365 D riscoll, W and Larsen, P B, The Convention on International M ultimodal Transport o f  
Goods' (1982) 57 Tul L Rev 193 at 196.
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4.2.1.1 The CMI Drafts
Under Art 5 o f Draft 1, the carrier would be liable according to the maritime 
legislation applicable under the special conditions as would have applied if the 
carrier had made a contract o f carriage with the shipper. This draft was based on 
the fact that the original carriage[s] in multimodal transport invariably involved 
sea carriage and the M TO’s were thereby sea carriers.
The carrier by sea therefore assumed responsibility according to the Hague Rules 
in cases where loss or damage occurred during the sea mode and for unlocalised 
loss, for damage or loss during carriage by other modes, the carrier's liability was 
that which would have applied to the sub carrier.366
The second draft was based on presumed fault. The carrier was liable for loss or 
damage during carriage, unless he proved that the loss or damage arose without his 
fault or the fault o f his agent. This draft went a bit further than the first draft and 
specifically stated that the basis of liability was presumed fault.
In case o f localised loss, subject to certain exceptions as specified in Art 5, the 
carrier's liability was to be dependent on the rules applicable to that particular leg. 
While draft 1 allowed recourse action by the carrier, this draft did not, thus the 
carrier was liable without the benefit o f recourse even in cases where another 
carrier was at fault.367 The part of the Article regulating recourse action was 
removed as it was thought to be superfluous; presuming to regulate the unimodal 
contract under which the performing carrier would have contracted with the MTO 
to carry for part o f the multimodal transport contract.
This draft was based on the uniform liability system, but it was similar to the CIM
368and CMR conventions. This liability was also quite similar to the common 
carrier's liability with exceptions for inherent vice of the goods, fault of the 
shipper and contributory negligence.
366 CMI documentation, 1967, Containers 3, DOC CR-17. International Subcommittee - Report 
October 1966, 24-26. See Comments, 26-29.
367 CMI Documentation, 1967, Containers 3. International Subcommittee, Report 1966, pg 29-31. 
Comments 31-33.
368 CMR 1956, see Pineus, K, Comment to Art 4 and 5 o f the draft in CMI Documentation, op cit at pg 
37-38.
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The fourth draft which was called the Oxford draft was a modified version of the 
third draft, the only difference being that liability for delay was included.36;This 
was based on the different existing unimodal conventions. This draft provided for 
liability in cases o f localised and unlocalised loss or damage. In case of 
unlocalised loss, the carrier would be liable under the Hague Rules unless he 
proved that the loss or damage had arisen in circumstances excluding any wrongful
370act or default on his part or that o f his agents and servants.
4.2.1.2 The Genoa Draft
This draft attempted to strike a compromise that would be adequate, to minimise the 
differences and confusion likely to arise after five drafts.371 The scope of the draft 
was limited to carriage in which an international element was involved. The draft 
was based on the uniform system but with strict liability. Under this draft the 
MTO was liable for the damage, loss or delay to the goods regardless o f the where 
such loss or damage occurred.
4.2.1.3 The Tokyo Rules
Because o f the shortcomings o f the above six drafts, a last one was presented to the 
CMI Conference in Tokyo in 1968.373 The draft introduced the concept of the 
multimodal transport document (MTD), under which the multimodal transport 
operator (MTO) undertook liability for the whole carriage. The rules were based on 
a mixed liability system, as a compromise between absolute uniform liability and 
network liability, with a number o f exception clauses (Art VI(I)). To exonerate 
himself under these rules, the MTO had to adduce enough evidence to prove that
369 CMI D oc [1967], Container 4, DOC CR-18, 1967, 6-7.
370 Ibid. pg 7.
371 ibid, pg 7-8 and 9-14.
372 The draft was criticised by the Germans and Dutch, as introducing a new and unwanted type o f  
liability to co-exist with already existing liability. See Manca, P 'A legal outline o f  containers' (1968) 
ETL 491 at 529.
373 M assey, E A, 'Prospects for a new intermodal legal regime: A look at the TCM' (1972) 3 JMLC 
725, at 727, Moore, J C, 'The Tokyo Convention on Multimodal Transport (Tokyo Rules)’ (1969) 1 
JMLC 85-91.
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damage was due to one o f the exceptions. The problem with the rules was that it 
allowed the parties to choose another rule that could have applied, and in case of 
concealed loss or damage, the rules presumed that it was caused during the sea 
stage, thereby protecting shipping interest and importing sea carriage rules onto land 
carriage.
4.2.2 UNIDROIT: International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
Following the proliferation o f the use of containers, UNIDROIT in 1961, introduced 
a new Draft Multimodal Convention modelled on the CMR rules,374 in the light of 
the interest o f parties to the CMR in creating a multimodal convention in the 
future.375
The main aim o f the draft was to provide uniformity in the liability rules.
The notion o f the "principal carrier" was introduced; as one who was responsible for 
the goods irrespective o f who actually carried the goods and who was at fault. The 
draft was based on a pure network liability principle, and was criticised because it 
did not provide a complete solution to the problems o f the carrier's liability. The 
draft by proposing a network liability regime in which regulation o f loss was 
determined by localisation of loss, left many gaps between regimes when no 
convention would have been applicable.376
4.2.3 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Shortly after, The United Nations ECE convened a Round Table conference to 
reconcile the differences of the two private law organisation's drafts. At this time it 
was thought that governmental involvement would be welcome so that the rules 
could be made mandatory. From the round table conference, the Rome Draft was 
concluded.377
374 De Wit, supra, note 353 pg 149.
375 DOC E/ECE/Trans/480; Richter-Hannes, supra note 355 pp 25 at 27.
376 W ijffels, R, 'Legal A spects o f  Carriage in Containers' [1967] ETL 331 at 341.
377 The Rome Draft [1970] ETL 1321. See Driscoll, W and Larsen, P B, 'The 
Convention on Multimodal Transport o f  Goods' [1982] Tu. L Rev (193) at 196.
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Recommendations were then made for a diplomatic conference to create a binding 
convention.
4.2.4 The TCM Draft Convention378
The IMCO (International Maritime Consultative Organisation) and the ECE, met a 
couple o f times to amend the Tokyo Draft, resulting in the TCM Convention.379 
This convention had two different basis of liability, the network system and an 
alternative one based on a uniform system. This convention was further 
handicapped because it did not contain mandatory provisions: it was purely 
contractual.
4.2.5 The International Preparatory Group Draft
By resolution 1734, ECOSOL requested that the UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Board create an international preparatory group to draft a convention 
on multimodal transport.380
This body started work in 1973 and produced a draft convention in March 19 79.381 
The problem faced by this group was reconciling the different views of the 
different groups:
The Group o f 77 - developing countries 
Group B - developed countries 
Group D - socialist countries.
Wheble, B S, Combined Transport - The 'Rome Draff TCM Convention [ 1970] ETL 1307.
378 Transport C om bines des Marchandises.
379 See M assey, supra at note 372, p.725.
380 Preparation and adoption, UNDOL TD/MT/CONF/6 (1979) 15.
381 C hrispeels, I E, 'The United N ations Convention on International M ultimodal 
Transport o f  Goods: A Background N ote’ [1980] ETL 355.
United Nations C onference on a Convention on International M ultimodal Transport. Report o f  the 
Intergovernmental Preparatory Group, Part one - UN DOC T D /M T/C O N F/1, T D /B/A C  15/56, 
1979 and Part 2 report UN DOC TD/M T/CO NF/A/Add 1, TD/B/AC 15/56 Add 1.
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The main conflict areas were the basis of liability and the question o f a public 
international law convention as opposed to a private international law one.382 
On the 24th of May 1980, the Convention was formally adopted by a resolution 
approving o f the text of the Convention. The Convention would come into force 12
383months after the 30th instrument of signature is deposited.
4.3 THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT CONVENTION384
4.3.1 STATED OBJECTIVES
The multimodal transport convention was meant to regulate multimodal transport, 
by introducing a minimum liability regime. Existing scholarship had noted the 
inadequacies and limitations of the means available o f resolving liability issues in 
multimodal transport.385 This limitation did not encourage the effective utilisation of 
this mode. The need therefore arose for the creation o f a structure to provide 
appropriate and effective rules for its regulation. To ensure that the convention met 
these goals, it set out the objectives of the convention:
(a) That international multimodal transport is one means o f facilitating the 
orderly expansion o f the world trade.
(b) The need to stimulate the development of smooth, economic and efficient 
multimodal transport services adequate to the requirements o f the trade 
concerned.
(c) To ensure the development of multimodal transport in all countries and to 
consider the problem of transit states.
(d) To determine adequate rules for multimodal contracts and the liability of 
MTO’s.
382 See Chrispeel, supra at note 380g 363 and Nasseri, K, supra at note 353 236.
383 Art 36 o f  the Convention, which states that "This Convention shall enter into force 12 months 
after the governments o f  30 states have either signed it not subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval or accession with the depository".
384 UN DOC TD/M T/CO NF/ 17( 1981)
UN DOC TD/M T/CO NF/16 4 o f  10 June 1980. See also W Driscoll & Larsen P "The Convention o f  
International Multimodal Transport o f  Goods" (1982) Tu. L Rev 193.
385 Regina Asariotis, “Towards Improved Intermodal Freight in Europe and the United States: Next 
Steps, Report by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Policy Forum held November 12-20 1998.pg 42
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(e) The desire not to affect other unimodal transport conventions. The right of 
each state to control its multimodal industry.
(f) The need to address the problems of developing countries.
(g) To balance the interest between suppliers and users of multimodal transport 
services.
(h) And the facilitation o f custom procedures.
In this work however, we will limit most of our comments to (d), the determination of 
adequate rules for the Multimodal Transport contract and the liability o f the MTO.
4.3.1.1 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION TO 
MULTIMODAL REALITIES.
The very basic requirement for the success of this convention would be it’s ability to 
solve the problems of unpredictability and uncertainty in multimodal transport. In this 
light this section will examine the basis reasons of unpredictability and analysis the 
adequacy of the convention in dealing with it.
4.3.1.2 LIABILITY REGIME OF THE CONVENTION
The different drafts in multimodal transport like the ICC drafts o f the 1970’s and the 
1992 UNCTAD/ICC draft, proposed measures aimed at regulating this mode and 
safeguarding it from problems likely to arise due to its nature. In the main, the 
measures proposed were substantive, usually in the nature o f private rules to be 
voluntarily adhered to by all parties concerned.
Some o f the rules took the form of proposals for multilateral conventions providing 
different regimes of liability dependent on localisation o f loss or damage what came 
to be known as the network liability solution. Such measures were initiated and 
promoted by the international private sector. The measures taken were attempts to 
codify substantive rules deemed applicable in this area. Such substantive rules and 
principles as already existed were not only incomplete, but also unclear and not
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surprisingly, full of controversy.386 As a result, there was a need to search for rules 
which would effectively deal with these problems.
4.3.2 THE BASIS OF LIABILITY OF THE CONVENTION
The determination of the basis of liability to be used in multimodal transport emerged 
after a protracted debate to determine the nature of the convention. The question was 
if the contract was sui generis. Some nations especially the developing ones regarded 
it as sui generis with the implication thus its legal regime should be completely 
separate from unimodal transport, while others viewed it as not sui generis in that its 
execution invariably involved two or more other modes which were regulated by 
mandatory conventions.387 It was finally resolved in favour of sui generis and it was 
held that the liability regime should be separate.388 In deciding this there was the 
presumption that liability would be uniform throughout carriage. This was in contrast 
to the network system of liability that operated in multimodal transport under the
->OQ
currently used multimodal transport contracts. The liability regime adopted 
therefore in the convention was the uniform system of liability.
4.4 THE UNIFORM SYSTEM OF LIABILITY
The difficulty o f applying different liability regimes to the same contract was one 
o f the reasons why the network system was deemed unacceptable. As far back as 
1972, during the meetings to consider the TCM draft;390 alternatives were being 
suggested. The French proposed a strict liability system for concealed damage to 
co-exist with the network liability system, their reason was conflict avoidance.391
386 See Chapter 2 for a treatment o f  the network system o f  liability
387 UN DOC TD/B/AC 15.14. Part Two
388 Art 1, 30(4) and 38 resolved this issue.
389 See Chapter 2 in which the principle o f  a network liability system is discussed. BIFA has also made 
a major contribution in standardising the terms o f  its standard trading conditions used by its members 
in multimodal transport.
390 Massey, “Prospects for a new Intermodal legal regime: a critical look at the TCM” (1972) JMLC p. 
744-745.
391 Ibid, p.740
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Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden, proposed that the basic network system 
be abolished and in its place, a stricter liability regime be initiated,392 preferably 
an elimination o f the negligence and due diligence standard to be replaced by a 
more stringent standard; "circumstances which the CTO could not avoid and the 
consequences o f  which he was unable to prevent".393
The United States also strongly objected to the network system because it was 
thought to be unpredictable, and proposed a uniform strict liability system in 
[combined] transport.394 All these objections were ignored together with those 
made by some o f the independent395 delegates attending the deliberations 
culminating into the United Nations Convention 1980. And a compromise had to 
be reached on the one hand between advocates of a network system o f liability, 
and those for a uniform system o f liability.396
At the end o f the deliberation the uniform system o f liability was the chosen 
system. By Art 16, the multimodal transport operator is liable for loss or damage 
to a uniform standard, this liability was based on a principle of presumed fault or 
neglect, whereby the MTO could exculpate himself from liability if  he could prove 
that he and his servants and agents did all they could to avoid the occurrence leading 
to the loss or damage.
Article 16 stated,
“ 1 .The multimodal transport operator shall be liable fo r  loss resulting from  the loss 
or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, i f  the occurrence which 
caused the loss, damage or delay in delivery took place while the goods were in his 
charge as defined by article 14, unless the multimodal transport operator proves that 
he, his servants and agents or any other person referred to in article 15 took all
392 Austria, Canada, Norway and Sweden proposed an Alternative System. TD/M T/AC 15 pg 9.
393 M assey, supra note 389 at p 391
394 TD/B/C 4 Supp 7 o f  21 April 1972. Consultation Machinery TD/A/A C/13/28 o f  20th Sept 1977.
395 Driscoll, W. « The Convention on International Multimodal Transport: A Status Report », (1978)
9 JMLC. 441. Report o f  the United Nations/ IMCO Conference on International Container Traffic, UN. 
Doc E/5250 (1973)
396 Group B, plus the group o f  77 and Group D T D /B /315/Rev 1.
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measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences
2 Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered within the time 
expressly agreed upon or, in the absence o f such agreement, within the time which 
would be reasonable to require a diligent multimodal transport operator, having 
regards to the circumstances o f  the case. ”
By the proposed uniform system of liability, the liability o f the MTO was uniform 
throughout the carriage, no matter where loss or damage occurred. This system was a 
marked departure from the network system which was complex and gave no 
indication o f the applicable liability regime. In this uniform system of liability, a 
single set of rules would govern the multimodal transport contract. In academia, it is
-JQ7
agreed that this system is the ideal one for multimodal transport. Under this system, 
the liability of the MTO is certain regardless of the modes used. The cargo concern 
can hold the MTO liable for damage on agreed terms. Unfortunately, the agreed 
terms in this case are as per article 16 based on presumed liability with reversed 
burden of proof as found under unimodal transport conventions. Thus although the 
uniform liability regime allows for clarity and predictability it also bears the failings 
of the presumed liability within multimodal realities.
4.4.1 ADVANTAGES OF THE NETWORK SYSTEM
The main advantage of this system is that it eliminates most o f the criticisms of the 
network system of liability.398 The problem of localisation disappears as liability is 
uniform throughout carriage. The problems of liability gaps and uncertainty as to 
applicable liability regimes are minimised as do the problems o f gradually occurring 
loss or damage, because the MTO is made liable on a uniform basis throughout 
carriage. Of particular note is the fact that the problem of delay in the network system 
is eliminated by the uniform system which also covers delay in multimodal
399transport.
397 De Wit, R. Multimodal transport, Para 2.158 p. 143
398 Glass, D, Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts (LLP London, Singapore 2004)
p.280
399 See Chapter 3
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4.4.2 DISADVANTAGES OF THE NETWORK SYSTEM
The main disadvantage o f the uniform system is the fact that the MTO’s recourse 
action against any carriers who performed under the contract o f carriage will be 
subject to a different liability regime. This action would be governed by the rules of 
the particular mode o f transport not the rules under which he is liable to the 
claimant.400 This shifts the unpredictability on to the MTO, who is left to recover from 
the different performing parties under different carriage or service contracts.
In the case of unlocalised damage or loss, the MTO would have to sue all the different 
carriers leading to additional cost to him. In addition the MTO will not be able to 
claim for damages or loss occurring during gaps in liability.
Another disadvantage o f this system is the likelihood to create discrepancies between 
multimodal and unimodal transport;401 the argument here is the unfairness of applying 
two different liability regimes to the same loss or damage. This argument is not 
limited to multimodal transport because the different unimodal transport conventions 
are faced with the same problem. A convention might have different interpretations 
under different jurisdictions, leading to the same loss or damage under the same mode 
of transport being treated differently under different jurisdictions.402 This is not a 
problem specific to multimodal transport, but one that exists in transportation today. 
Further, the fear o f conflict between conventions has been one of the objections to the 
uniform system o f liability. The argument is that the uniform system o f liability will 
invariably lead to a conflict of conventions between the Multimodal Transport 
Convention and the different Unimodal Conventions. This is obvious in cases in 
which the carriage is performed in such a way that both conventions might be 
applicable to it.
De Wit, supra at Para 2.164
401 Racine, J, "International Multimodal Transport, A Legal Labyrinth" (1982) II Diritto Aereo, p 126.
402 See the problem o f  the Art 2 o f  the CMR which is interpreted differently in Germany and England, 
see additionally The Quantum Case
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4.4.3 The Extent of Liability
The next issue to be resolved was the extent of the liability. It was thought to be a
prerequisite of any convention on multimodal transport, that the MTO should assume
liability throughout the carriage, thereby taking care of any gaps in liability at the 
start, finish and interface points during the transport. (Article 14) The next issue to be 
decided was the appropriate basis of liability to be used to effectively regulate 
multimodal transport. The choice seemed to be between strict or negligence 
liability.403 After lengthy deliberations, it was decided that fault liability would be 
more appropriate, as it was felt that both bases of liability would lead to the same 
interpretation depending on the emphases placed on them. A liberal interpretation of 
strict liability and a rigid interpretation of negligence liability would lead to the 
same result.404 Additionally the fact that the existing unimodal transport convention 
had moved from the strict liability of the common law to negligence liability was a 
big influence with the IPG. Especially in view of the Hamburg Rules which were 
being prepared at the time by UNCITRAL.
As a result Art 16 o f the Convention stated that the MTO
"shall be liable fo r  loss resulting from  loss o f or damage to the goods, as well 
as delay in delivery, i f  the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay 
in delivery took place while the goods were in his charge as defined in article 
14, unless the multimodal transport operator proves that he, his servants or 
agents or any other person referred to in Art 15 took all measures that could 
reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences. "
In spite of the fact that this clause is almost identical to Article 5 of the Hamburg 
Rules, in which the liability of the carrier is based on presumed fault, the convention 
wished to emphasise this aspect, by additionally stating in its preamble (d) that
403 UN DOC TD/B/AC 15/24 at Para 85.
404 UN DOC TD/B/AC 15/14 Para 38.
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"The liability o f  the multimodal transport operator under this convention shall
be based on the principle ofpresumed fault or neglect."405
The basis o f  the M TO's liability is based on negligence and vicarious
liability fo r  acts o f  his servants or agents. The burden o f  rebutting that
presum ption is on him, and he has to prove that he has taken all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences.
4.5 REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF LIABILITY
To rebut the presumption o f liability, the MTO had to prove that he was not 
liable, by showing that no fault actually existed which m ight have lead to the 
loss or damage.406
The problem with the basis o f liability within this regime is the fact that it is 
wider in multimodal transport, than in unimodal transport which it im itates.407 
In case o f loss or damage, the MTO would need to adduce evidence to show 
that neither he nor his agents or servants were negligent. Such a defence is 
easily ascertainable when loss is localised. When loss is not localised, the MTO 
would be liable because he will not be able to adduce enough evidence to rebut 
that presumption. In unimodal transport, it is easy to adduce evidence as the 
journey is usually on one mode with one carrier and a finite number o f agents 
and servants. In multimodal transport, the carrier will find it difficult to trace 
the carriage through the different modes o f transport and layers o f agents to 
adduce specific proof. In this regard the basis in multimodal transport is more 
onerous than it is in unimodal transport. The advantage here is that unlike the 
network system o f liability in which all the possible exceptions o f liability in 
the different potentially applicable conventions apply, there is only one rule: 
prove that he has done all he could to avoid the loss.
405 See Report o f  the IPG on a convention on International Multimodal Transport on the second part 
o f  its third session, January 1977 (TD/13/AC 12/23 Annex 1) on the comm on understanding between  
all Groups as regards the scope o f  the draft Convention.
406 See chapter 2 on presumed liability in which the intricacies o f  this principle are discussed.
407 See chapter 4  on the principles o f  the presumption o f  liability in transportation law
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4.6 LIABILITY LIMITATION
The multimodal convention, contrary to its basis o f liability which is uniform, 
institutes limits which are varied depending on localisation. According to 
Article 18(2), the limit of liability is 920 SDR per package or 2.75 SDR per kilo if 
a sea leg is involved, and 8.33 SDR per kilo if no sea leg is involved. This makes 
the limits higher that the limits that obtain under the Hamburg Rules and the 
Hague-Visby rules. This higher limit it is argued here was inevitable and 
necessary in a case o f multimodal transport where the loss might have taken place 
during a non-sea segment. This higher limit is said to reflect the possibility that 
damage might occur in a stage other than by sea.408
While under Art 19, if  an otherwise applicable mandatory convention would have 
applied and utilised a higher limit, that limit would apply to the contract. This 
Article introduces a modified network solution albeit to limits. This Article has 
been criticised as reintroducing the concept o f network liability in a situation in 
which liability is based on uniformity.409 This means that the parties would spend 
time and money trying to adduce evidence to show that a higher limit would 
otherwise apply to benefit from that limit, while the carrier would then need to 
adduce evidence to rebut it to maintain the limits of the convention.
The effect is that the burden of proof is shifted on to the cargo owner. In 
transportation law, the burden of proof as shown by the predominance of the 
concept o f presumed fault is on the carrier as the one who possesses information 
as to events likely to have happened during carriage. Art 19, by shifting this 
burden, departs from the normal trend of transport law.
It must, however, be noted that this burden is stated to apply to limits and not the 
basis o f liability, but the practical effects of adducing evidence to show that a 
particular convention would have otherwise applied is quite similar to the process 
of localisation and its ramifications. This places a heavy burden on the carrier
408 Glass, D. “ Freight forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts (LLP 2004) p. 282
409 D riscoll, W and Larsen, P B, International Multimodal Transport o f  G oods, supra note , pg 235- 
6, and Diamond, A, Legal A spects o f  the Convention, supra at .24.
179
which is difficult to discharge. The effectiveness of this provision however 
depends on localisation.410The rationale for this Article 19, has been said to be the 
desire to place the cargo owner in the same position in which he would have been 
had he concluded a contract under the appropriate unimodal regime, especially in 
cases in which a sea leg is included in which the limits would have been smaller.411
By doing this, this convention departs from its original stance o f a carriage mode 
which is sui generis. Article 19 reiterates the problem of stages in multimodal 
transport discussed in chapter 1, and requires the court to determine what a stage is, 
and to then ascertain the relevant convention applicable. This means that the 
problem of liability which ought to be resolved by Article 16's uniform liability 
regime is undermined. Additionally it allows a wider scope of liability regimes than 
was originally allowed by the ICC Rules; by allowing all applicable liability 
regimes with no restrictions, while the Rules by allowing only mandatory regimes 
greatly reduced the number of regimes that could apply.
It is argued that the minimum requirements of a convention are not met by the 
multimodal transport convention as it fails to provide a predictable limit of 
liability.412 Art 19 also creates confusion over the system o f law applicable to 
determine whether an international convention or national law will become 
applicable. Is it the law of the contract or the law of the place where loss or damage 
occurred?
There might be difficulties in determining whether an international convention or 
national law applies to the Multimodal transport contract in such circumstances. For 
instance, will the Hague Visby Rules apply to such a case?
410 There is at present no agreement as to the precise place o f  localisation in multim odal transport. 
Som e academ ic writers hold that there is a high degree o f  localisation, notably Pinenz I L, CMI 
D ocum entation 1967, Containers 3 DOC CR-17, pg 17, where he states that localisation is high in 
m ultim odal transport. W hile others contend that localisation is uncommon in cases o f  multimodal 
transport: Lord D iplock 'A  Combined transport Document. The Genoa Seminar’ [1972] JBL 369 at 
273, and S elv ig  E, The Background to the Convention in Multimodal Transport. The 1980 UN  
C onvention Papers - One day seminar, University o f  Southampton, Sept 12 1980 at A 14, a high 
percentage o f  cargo damage is unlocalised.
411 Racine, 'Multimodal Transport, a legal Labyrinth’ [1982] 11 Diritto Aereo. 126.
4,2 Faber et al: “Practical Guide Multimodal transport -  Avoiding Legal Problems
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4.7 THE RESULTS OF THE CONVENTION
The convention which took more than 12 years to deliberate solicited very little 
support from stakeholders, thereby retiring this convention into the archives of 
failed conventions. Many views have been propounded as to the reasons why this 
convention failed, some o f which we will discuss here.
One of the main hindrances to the adoption of this convention is based on the time 
factor; this convention came closely behind the Hamburg Rules o f 1978, imitating it 
in important details. The Hamburg Convention at the time was regarded as too 
drastic and failed to gain the support of most shipping nations. The multimodal 
convention was thus not ratified because;
-The fact that the basis o f liability was modelled after the Hamburg rules as opposed 
to the ever popular Hague/Visby Rules, made the convention unpopular to shipping 
nations.
-The monetary limits o f  liability was considered to be too high, although technically 
speaking it was only 10% higher that the Hamburg Rules and 20%higher than the 
Hague- Visby rules, but that was enough to ensure that it was ignored by shipping 
interest, and thirdly ,
- The principle o f uniform liability which had implications for both the principle of 
recourse action and conflict with other otherwise applicable conventions was not 
easy to accept within the carrying fraternity.
The convention had limits o f liability whose interpretation lead to the same results 
as were achieved under the network liability regime.
However on a wider interpretation the convention failed for a variety of reasons in 
addition to the fact that the convention did not receive the requisite support from the 
different countries to enable it come into force. There is the contention that there 
was insufficient information and awareness among the shippers who would have
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been affected by this convention. 413 Additionally, the nature o f the convention was 
such that the benefits were not obvious.
The maritime community did not lend its support to this convention because of its 
limits which were higher than those offered by the carriage by sea conventions, this 
fact meant that there was adverse lobbying by this group. The influence wielded by 
this group prevented some developed countries from lending support to such a 
convention. This was because these nations did not want to go against the interest of 
such a powerful group.
In summary, the MT convention failed to adequately address problem of 
unpredictability in the liability regime of the mode.
4.7.1 The Applicable Regime
The Convention, while adopting a uniform liability regime as stated in Art 16 of the 
convention, also adopted strains o f the network system of liability in Art 19 which 
had created so much uncertainty into the liability regime in multimodal transport. 
By abdicating in favour o f another convention with a higher limit the convention 
shifted the unpredictability from the cargo concern to the carriers. In addition, this 
article also brings into play the applicability of other conventions. In summary, 
article 18(3) of the convention stated that, if the contract did not include carriage by 
sea or inland waterways, the higher limit of 8.33 SDR as applied under the CMR 
would apply.
The convention however does not sufficiently clarify when this article 18 will be 
triggered. Will it suffice that the contract does not include carriage by sea even if 
the execution involves carriage by sea by the clause ‘according to the contract’? or 
must the contract and the performance exclude carriage by sea? Article 19 further 
makes this convention unacceptable as a convention meant to bring about certainty 
within multimodal transport. By stating that
“When the loss o f  or damage to goods occurred during one particular stage o f  the 
transport, in respect o f  which an applicable international convention or national 
law provides a higher limit o f  liability than the limit that would follow  from  
application o f  paragraphs 1 to 3 o f  article 18, then the limits o f  the multimodal
413 Multimodal transport: The feasibility o f  an international legal instrument. 
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1 p. 12
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transport operator's liability fo r  such loss or damage shall be determined by 
reference to the provisions o f  such convention or national law. ”
Thus there is a uniform limit when loss is unlocalised or when the convention would 
apply a higher limit. Once another convention would apply another limit the 
multimodal transport convention abdicates in its favour. This is basically the same 
approach taken as the network system of liability, thus it is strange that the 
convention would achieve the same results as the network system o f liability.
More distressing is the fact that the article re-introduces the concept o f stages into 
multimodal transport, although it failed to define what constituted a stage. The 
courts will thus have to decide the demarcation line between modes.414 This also 
invokes the problem o f the determination of;
a) The convention or mandatory national law applicable to the contract
b) The convention which would have applied to the contract if the consignee had 
made a separate contract with subcontractor, or
c) Would have applied if the consignee had made a contract with the MTO for that 
stage o f the transport.
This convention thus exhibits the same problems that multimodal transport faced 
under the network system.
4.7.2 The basis of liability
The convention had been modelled after the 1978 Hamburg Rules. This was 
unacceptable to a sector that was conversant with the basis as laid down by the 
Hague and Hague Visby Rules. The basis of liability under the convention of 
presumed fault with a reversed burden of proof, fails in multimodal transport to 
provide the same level o f immunity for lack of negligence. The result o f the working 
of the basis in multimodal transport is likely to lead to a stricter liability for the 
MTO especially hen loss is unlocalised. Therefore the uniformity o f basis sought is 
unachievable.
414 Glass, D , Freight forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts,( LLP London Singapore 2004) 
pg 283
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4.7.3 The Monetary Limits of liability.
Art 18 laid down the liability limits under the convention which become applicable 
when damage or loss is not localised. This article as been described as “difficult, 
unsatisfactory and somewhat complex”415 This is because the calculations for 
limiting liability are based on the inclusion or exclusion of a sea leg in the contract. 
Having laid down such a criteria, the article does not specify how such a difference 
is made. Is it based on the actual contract or the performance of the contract? This 
might open the way for disputes and proof to determine which contract include a sea 
leg and those which do not have.
The monetary limits were considered to be too high. This was not acceptable to 
carriage interest as it meant that the pay more. With the leverage they possess it was 
obvious that such high limits will not be acceptable to them. This matter is further 
complicated because the uniform system is diluted by the network system where 
loss and damage can be identified.
4.7.4 Conflict with other Conventions
The obvious difficulty o f this convention if it came into force would be the potential 
conflict with other international transport conventions. This would be for two main 
reasons:
-Some of the existing transport conventions contain multimodal transport 
provisions, and the compulsory nature of the convention.
The convention however seeks to avoid these problems under its article 38;
Article 38 o f the Convention states;
“ .. . I f  according to Art. 26 or 27, judicial or arbitral proceedings are brought in a 
contracting state in a case relating to international Multimodal transport subject to 
this convention which takes place between two states o f  which only one is a 
contracting state, and i f  both o f  these states are at that time o f  entry into force o f  
this convention equally bound by another International convention, the court or 
arbitral tribunal may, in accordance under such a convention, give effect to the 
provisions thereof”416
415 Faber et al, “Practical Guide Multimodal transport -  Avoiding Legal Problems p. 57
416 See in this regard The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties 1969
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The convention attempts to solve some of the difficulties which might arise where 
two different regimes become applicable to the same contract, by abdicating in 
favour o f the other convention provided both parties are bound by it. This article is 
quite unsatisfactory as it fails to specify the rules to be used to determine why one 
convention will apply over the other. It leaves that determination to the courts or the 
arbitrators with the implication that the criteria will differ depending on the forum 
and background of the case.417 This will destroy uniformity.
Art 30(4) of the convention also abdicates in favour of the CMR, it states;
“Carriage o f  goods such as carriage o f  goods in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention o f  19 May 1956 on the Contract fo r  the International Carriage o f  Goods 
by Road in article 2, or the Berne convention o f  7 February 1970on the carriage o f  
goods by Rail, article 2, shall not fo r  states parties to conventions governing such 
carriage be considered as international multimodal transport within the meaning o f  
article 1, paragraph 1, o f  this convention, in so fa r  as such states are bound to 
apply the provisions o f  such conventions to the carriage o f  goods. ”
The multimodal transport convention will not therefore apply to instances in which 
art 2 o f the CMR and the CIM apply to certain types o f carriage. This creates 
uncertainty as to the applicable regime at the time of contracting.
4.8 CONCLUSION
The multimodal transport convention was meant to regulate multimodal transport 
liability and its documentary problems. The failure of previous attempts had led to 
the belief that an approach based on an international convention with mandatory 
application would go a long way than previous attempts, to avoid the difficulties 
arising from trying to establish substantive rules on the subject.
According to eminent existing scholarship,418 a solution based on a convention 
would be more appropriate than any other approach at eliminating the problems in
417 See Faber et al: “Practical Guide Multimodal transport -  Avoiding Legal Problems. 65
418 Indira Carr, International Multimodal Transport - United Kingdom (1998) 4 Int TL pg 99 at 109.
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multimodal transport. This view was taken, because it was believed to be more 
easily achievable and also due to the precedence in the field o f transport in 
implementing mandatory conventions.
However, the resulting convention is one which has not gained the required
419support.
In the main the Convention is far from satisfactory, as there are too many issues in 
which the interpretation leads to uncertainty. In its quest to emulate other 
international Conventions, it discards its links with sea carriage, which had hitherto 
constituted the mainstay o f multimodal transport. This link was based on the fact 
that the proliferation o f multimodal transport corresponded with the increase use of 
containers which also was originally a sea concept. The problems in multimodal 
transport began as problems with a sea link; this can be seen from the fact that a 
typical multimodal transport document is called a bill o f lading not an airway bill or 
a consignment note, the existing document in operation such as the combidoc and 
the combiconbill adopt the Hague Rules as their choice o f law rules in case o f 
concealed loss or damage.
Shipping interest which performs a large part o f multimodal transport were bound to 
reject this convention, especially through the loss of the defence o f Article iv (2) of 
the Hague Rules will have an impact on the sea carriers liability in multimodal 
transport, as the carrier under the Convention will be liable for loss or damage 
caused by the negligence o f the master, mariner, pilot or servant. This will have 
implications for recourse actions, in that the carrier while being liable under the 
multimodal transport contract will not be able to claim from any on-carrier.
Having taken the bold step o f breaking ranks with the carriage of goods by sea, this 
convention should have gone the whole way and introduced laws reflective o f its
E A M assey, supra, Selvig, supra, and "The influence o f  the Hamburg Rules in the work for a 
Convention on International Multimodal Transport" in Speakers Paper for the bill o f  lading 
Conference: Lloyd's o f  London Press.
419 Indira Carr, supra pg 109, believes that with the com ing into force o f  the Hamburg Rules, more 
states would ratify this convention.
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basic nature. By so doing, this convention failed to find its place within 
transportation conventions; it was neither a unimodal convention nor a truly 
multimodal transport convention. Starting off by defining itself in terms of modes to 
adopting unimodal solutions. If it had started off by sufficiently defining itself as a 
mode not dependent on modes, that freedom would have also allowed it to introduce 
appropriate liability rules.
The Convention failed to adequately address the problems it was mean to address. 
And it was accurately described as lacking in precision and uncertain.420 This was 
due to the fact that its drafting left a lot to be desired where it failed to provide clear 
determinative criteria for establishing the appropriate regimes. This is particularly 
true of Art 38 which although meant as a compromise, has a very wide scope of 
application. In any case in which both parties are not signatories to the multimodal 
transport convention, it would be incumbent on the judge to decide.
In addition it abdicated in favour of other conventions, meaning that it was difficult 
to be able to say with any certainty when and if the convention will apply, under Art 
30 and 38.
This convention was based on the different compromises being made by the 
different groups o f interest. The result was a convention which did not satisfy quite 
fully any group. Thus there is a strong lack of support especially among the 
developed nations, none of which to date has signed this convention. This fact and 
the shortcomings o f the convention, especially its limits of liability and the onerous 
burden imposed on the parties means that this convention is unlikely to come into 
effect any time soon.
At the rate at which it is going, by the time this convention achieves the 
appropriate signatures it would have lagged far behind in taking account of the 
necessary technological advances.421
The time has now come for calls for this convention to come into force to be 
stopped. Calls for innovation in multimodal transport should now take the form
420 Faber et al, Practical Guides-Multimodal Transport: Avoiding Legal Problems (1997) LLP limited.
p 66
421 The Convention requires 30 Ratifications; so far only 6 have been achieved.
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of a new liability theory which reflects the advances in technology and the nature 
o f multimodal transport.
An immediate solution would be for the multimodal industry as a whole to 
improve its procedures and formalise contractual relationships between the 
various parties involved. In this way relationships will be concretised and the 
parties will be aware o f their rights and liabilities, any inadequacies of the 
Convention will be inform ally corrected without the expense in time and money 
required to amend it.
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CHAPTER 5
SOLUTIONS FROM ALTERNATIVE GROUPS
The lack o f a mandatory international legislation in multimodal transport led different 
International Organisations, Regional Associations and National Governments to 
enact different legislations to cater for multimodal transport. This has further 
increased the number of applicable regimes already in existence in this field. It is 
therefore imperative that the experiences and solutions proposed and used by the 
different regional and national legislations are examined and taken into account, in 
any work that proposes to treat the problems of multimodal transport.
This chapter will therefore discuss the different attempts that have been made 
internationally, regionally and nationally to put in place a liability regime in 
multimodal transport. Starting with the attempts made at international level and 
finishing with an examination of some of the national legislative texts, this chapter 
will show that all these attempts have been inadequate because, they have invariably 
been based on unimodal ideals.
At the end, it will conclude that although there is a burning need for a private 
international multimodal transport instrument or convention, the way forward lies in 
further work in which all the ideals of multimodal transport will be taken into 
account.
5.1 ATTEMPTS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
The lack o f uniformity and the proliferation of liability regimes in this area prompted 
International Organisations to carry out work aimed at establishing solutions to these 
problems. The volume of work and committees being convened both at international 
level, regional and national level is enormous, and this work will limit itself to the 
most pertinent ones.
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5.1.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)
The maritime transport committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) had as remit the task of finding a workable solution to 
the multimodal transport problem.422 The main objective of the OECD was to 
examine existing carriage regimes to identify the areas of contention and discord 
and to find a solution acceptable to all parties. It was believed that in so doing the 
basis of a common solution would be found which will act as the base of any 
discussion in this area. In the light of this, a workshop on cargo liability regimes 
was organised to establish the elements that could provide guidance for future 
work.423
5.1.2 UNCTAD/ICC424 Initiative
While awaiting the coming into force of the multimodal transport convention, the 
UNCTAD and ICC working together and in collaboration with different commercial 
parties and international bodies, elaborated model rules for multimodal transport 
based primarily on the Hague/Visby Rules, the FIATA bill of lading and the ICC 
Uniform rules for a combined transport document. After a couple of meetings 
between the two groups, the UNCTAD/ICC Rules for a Multimodal Transport 
Document was drawn up in 1999. The Rules came into force on the 1st o f January 
1992. At the moment these rules are undoubtedly the most used rules on multimodal 
transport, and have been adopted by FIATA,425 and the Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO) MULTIDOC 1995. Although these rules do not have the 
force of law and are private they fill a need for guidance: Their only requirement is 
incorporation, once incorporated into a contract, they become binding to both parties, 
and override all conflicting provisions in the contract. These Rules only take effect to
See DSTI/DOT/MTC (99) 19™ Oct. 1999.
423 Workshop on Cargo Liability Regimes: http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/transpor/sea/index.htm
424 United Nations Commission for trade and Development and the International Chamber o f  
Commerce, See Chap 3 where this instrument is discussed.
425 The Law o f  Freight Forwarding and the 1992 FIATA Multimodal Bill o f  Lading, FIATA 
Publication 1993
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the extent that they are not contrary to any mandatory provision otherwise 
applicable.426
The rules are based on the “network system”,427 and as with the multimodal transport 
convention, the rules are based on presumed fault or neglect. Thus the MTO is liable 
for loss or damage to goods if goods are lost while in his custody unless he can prove 
that there was no fault on his part or on the part of anyone whose services he made 
use of. Unlike the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention, the rules have retained the 
‘error in navigation and management’ exceptions as found under the Hague/Visby 
Rules.428
Other important provisions include;
-Period of responsibility; the MTO under the rules is responsible for the goods 
from when he takes charge of them until he delivers them.
-Limits of liability; the limits of liability under the rules are based on the 1979 
Protocol amending the Hague Visby Rules. Thus the limit of liability is 666.67 SDR 
per package or 2 SDR per kilo of gross weight which ever is higher provided the 
value of the goods has not been declared. The limits of the rules are therefore lower 
than that of the convention.429
However, like the convention limits are also pegged in cases of localisation to the 
particular mode of transport under which loss or damage occurred. The difference 
being that under the convention, the alternative limits apply only if  they are higher, 
while under the rules they apply regardless. (Rule 6.4)
5.1.3 UNCITRAL’S Initiative
The limited success of the Hamburg Rules brought renewed pressure from cargo 
interest to revise The Hague-Visby Rules. This challenge was assumed by 
UNCITRAL who commissioned the CMI to do the initial work on the feasibility of
426 Rule 13, similar to Art 14 o f  the Multimodal Transport Convention
427 Rule 6.4 o f  the UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992
428 These too like the Hague Visby Rules is subject to the overriding requirement o f  using due diligence 
to make the ship seaworthy at the beginning o f  the voyage.
429 The convention puts the Limits at 2.75 SDR in case carriage includes sea Carriage and 8.33 SDR 
when sea carriage is not included. Article 18
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such an instrument. The CMI formed an International subcommittee on Issues of 
Transport Law, which produced a draft o f a proposed Sea Convention.430 
This draft extended the coverage to multimodal transport, albeit multimodal transport 
with a sea leg.431 In 2000 UNCITRAL in collaboration with CMI prepared a report 
identifying the main areas in which future work on multimodal transport should be.432 
A draft text of an on-line document had been previously drafted by the CMI on 
transport law issues notably issues covering liability for loss of, or damage to, cargo
This section seeks to examine the multimodal aspect of the UNCITRAL draft; to 
assess the feasibility of this instrument to apply to multimodal transport. In this light, 
the provisions of the draft purporting to extend its applicability to multimodal 
transport will be examined. Other aspects of the draft, which have significance for 
multimodal transport, will also, be examined such as the provisions on the performing 
carrier and the proposed liability scheme.
5.1.3.1 THE UNCITRAL DRAFT INSTRUMENT ON TRANSPORT LAW 
IMPACT ON MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The desirability of a modem and uniform international liability regime in the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea, led the UNCITRAL to commence work on a project aimed at 
replacing The Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules.
At UNCITRAL’s twenty- ninth session in 1996 in which the UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted, the session considered a proposal to 
include in UNCITRAL’s work programme;
430 The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f  Goods [Wholly or Partly] [by Sea], 
UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN/.9/W G.III/W P.29 January 2003, “Transportation Law: Preparation o f  a draft 
instrument on the carriage o f  goods [by sea]. General remarks on the sphere o f  application o f  the draft 
Instrument”, see also (www.uncitral.org/english/workinggroup/wg_3/W P-29-e.pdf)
431 Official Records o f  the General Assembly, fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No 17 (A /56 /17), 
para.224; Draft Instrument Article 1(a)
432 Report o f  the comm ission at its thirty-third session,2 June -7 June 2000, Supplement No. 
17(A/55/17) During the 37th CMI conference, what were considered as the transport issues needing 
more discussions where noted to include; the period o f  the carrier’s responsibility, the nature and extent 
o f  the carrier’s liability, liability o f  the performing carrier, responsibility o f  the shipper, liability for 
delay and electronic commerce
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“...A review o f  current practices and laws in the area o f  international 
carriage o f  goods by sea, with the view to establishing the need fo r  uniform rules 
where no such rules existed and with a view to achieving uniformity laws ”433 
During the session, it was stated that the “review o f  the liability regim e was not the 
main objective o f  the suggested work, rather what was necessary was to provide some 
modern solutions to issues that were not adequately dealt with or were not dealt with
i • >>414in the treaties '
The commission appointed UNCITRAL’s secretariat to act as the focal point in 
gathering information, ideas and opinions from different groups as to the problems 
that arose in practice and the possible solutions to these problems. These views were 
to be analysed to allow the commission to consider an appropriate course of action for 
a possible new regime to replace the current regimes in the carriage o f  goods by sea; 
The Hague Rule, The Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules.
The International Maritime Committee (CMI) was requested to assist and corporate 
with the secretariat at its thirty- first session in 1998. At the time The CMI had 
already commenced work on the uniformity of legal regimes for the carriage of goods 
by sea.435 The CMI then set up a committee that elaborated a draft convention that 
was transmitted to the UNCITRAL Secretariat.436 This draft was presented as a 
‘Preliminary Draft on the carriage of goods by sea’.437
Contrary to the original terms of reference of the project as one for the carriage of 
goods by Sea, the UNCITRAL Draft contained not only rules covering carriage of 
goods by sea, but also dealt with the liability of a carrier who undertakes to carry only 
partly by sea.
The commission had concluded that,
“ ...Since a great and increasing number o f contracts o f  carriage by sea, in 
particular in the liner trade o f containerized cargo included land carriage before and
433 UNCITRAL Doc. A /C N.9/497 « Possible future work on transport law”, Report o f  the Secretary 
General, para. 1-2
434 Ibid,, para.5
435 Beare, S. “Liability Regimes/ where we are, how we got there and where w e are g o in g ” [2002] 
LMCLQ 307
436 General Assem bly 51st Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/51/17), Para. 210-215
437 A/CN.9/W GIII/W P.21)
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after the sea leg, it was desirable to make provision in the draft instrument governing 
inland transport. ”438
This addition, which concerns multimodal transport was criticised during the 
working group session in April 2002,439 on the grounds that the mandate was for port- 
to-port transport operations. There were calls to remove the multimodal provisions as 
an element likely to compromise the acceptability of the convention, especially in the 
light of the failed attempts to promulgate an instrument to cover multimodal transport. 
Another objection was that it was inappropriate to elaborate multimodal rules in a 
maritime context, thereby extending the regime to land segments prior and subsequent 
to the sea carriage. The Working Group at that session decided that the scope of 
application would have to be considered further before a final decision could be 
taken.440
At its thirty-fifth session in June 2002, UNCITRAL approved the multimodal aspect 
of the instrument, subject again to further considerations, while requesting the 
working group to also consider the problems likely to occur from the extension of 
maritime rules into land transport. The working group was thus requested when 
further developing the draft to take into consideration the specific needs of land 
transport.441 In October 2003, the working group again examined the scope of 
application of the draft based on the revised draft of 2002which was called “Draft 
Instrument on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea].442 On the basis of that 
session, the UNCITRAL Secretariat elaborated a ‘provisional redraft o f the articles of 
the draft instrument.443 It was then stated that for the purpose of the discussions, the 
title of the draft would continue to be the same. 444 (With the square brackets)
438 Draft Instrument on carriage o f  goods [wholly or partly] [by sea], www.comitemaritime 
. org/draft/draft, html.
439 N ew  York 15-26 April 2002, (A/CN.9/510 para 27
440 Ibid,, para 32
441 General Assem bly Fifty-fifth Session Supplement No 17 (A /56 /17), Para 319-345
442 A/CN.9/WGIII/WP 32
443 A/CN.9/544
444 A/CN.9/W G.III/W P.36 ( New-York 3-14 May 2004) This section will deal mostly with the 
provisions o f  the UNCITRAL 2003 and 2004 drafts, to assess the suitability o f  the draft to govern 
Multimodal transport and bring a measure o f  predictability and certainty. It needs to be pointed out that 
discussions within UNCITRAL‘s working groups continue, thus the text o f  the provisions in the 2003 
and 2004 drafts might change.
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5.1.3.2 The Scope of Application
Art. 1(a), o f the draft defined the scope of application o f the instrument to cover 
“ ...A contracts o f  carriage under which a carrier, against the payment offreight, 
undertakes to carry goods [wholly or partly] [by sea] from  one place to 
another 445
The extension o f the scope of the instrument from the tackle-to-tackle provisions 
o f the Hague Rules and the port-to-port provisions of the Hamburg Rules to the 
door-to-door concept reflects the multimodal scope of the instrument. By this 
provision, the UNCITRAL decided that the instrument should not only cover sea 
carriage but should be extended to multimodal transport. This draft instrument is 
thus intended to apply to all international contracts of carriage. This definition 
was modified in October 2003 and now reads;
“ ...Contract o f  carriage means a contract under which the carrier against 
the payment o f  freight undertakes to carry goods by sea from  one place [port] in 
one state to a place [port] in another state; such contract may include an 
undertaking by such carrier to carry goods by other modes prior to or after the 
carriage by sea ”
The second definition was thought to be more in line with an instrument that 
originally started as one for the carriage of goods by sea. Thus emphasis should be 
on the fact that carriage should be by sea; carriage by any other mode is incidental. 
Thus it is necessary that a part of the contract of carriage is performed by sea.446 
Contrary to the scope o f application o f The Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg 
Rules,447 the scope o f the draft convention is two-fold: it is unimodal if the 
contract is limited to sea carriage exclusively and multimodal when a land based 
carriage is included.448 This brings all multimodal transport contracts that are
445 Revised CMI Draft Outline Instrument, Art. 1.1: Provisional redraft o f  Art 1. (a) In UNCITRAL 
Doc. A/CN.9/W .G III. W.P. 36 , March 23 2004, “ Transport Law: Preparation o f  a draft instrument on 
the carriage o f  goods [by sea] -  Provisional redraft o f  the articles o f  the draft considered in the report o f  
the working Group III at its twelve session (A/CN.9/544 (http://www.uncitral.org/eg-index.htm)
446 UNCITRAL Document A/CN.9/W G III/WP 21
447 A similar provision is found in the US Senate Draft COGSA 1999 S. 2 (a) (5) (A)
448 Theodora,Nikika “ The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f  goods [W holly or partly] 
[by sea] : Multimodal at last or still at Sea? [2005] JBL 647 p .651
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partly performed by sea under the instrument. The working group during this 
session stressed the necessity of specifying that the transport needs to be 
performed partly by sea. There was the feeling that it would be inappropriate to 
exclude from the scope o f application contracts that did not imply that sea carriage 
would be performed.449 It was then decided to include into the definition o f a 
contract o f carriage the clause that:
“...A contract that contains an option to carry goods by sea shall be 
deemed to be a contract o f  carriage provided that the goods are actually carried 
by sea. ”
Such a provision reflects the multimodal nature o f the instrument and a desperate 
need to provide a legal regime for such carriage by stipulating that in cases of 
unspecified modes, once carriage is performed by sea, the instrument will apply. 
The result is that most international multimodal carriage contract with a sea leg 
would potentially become subject to the instrument, which is essentially maritime 
based and drawn by maritime specialists without the participation o f the other 
modes. This instrument is essentially maritime, it emphasises the fact that it does 
not cover any other types o f multimodal contracts.
This limitation o f the scope of the draft convention makes it another attempt at 
solving the multimodal transport problem, but this time within sea transport. In 
this sense the instrument can be seen as solving the problems likely to apply when 
a multimodal transport carriage involves sea carriage as opposed to promoting 
uniformity in international multimodal transport.450
This provision would be very unsatisfactory if loss or damage occurred during the 
land segment where part o f the carriage was by sea, as the instrument might 
determine the liability o f the carrier, alternatively if no sea segment was used, the 
liability will be based on another liability regime.451 In this way the carrier might
449 Report o f  the Working Group III A/CN.9/544 Para. 62
450 Theodora Nikika, “ The Uncitral Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f  goods [Wholly or partly] [by 
sea] : Multimodal at last or still at Sea? [2005] JBL 647 p.652
451 There was some discussion as to the importance o f  the other modes o f  transport as compared to the 
sea segment, but it was decided that the instrument « should contain provisions applying to the full 
scope o f  the carriage, irrespective o f  whether or not the movement on land may be deemed to be 
subsidiary to that by sea provided carriage by sea is contemplated at some stage. CMI Document 
“Singapore Door-to-Door Transport” para 3.2 at http//www.comitemaritime.org/Singapore/issue/issue- 
door.html
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be able to determine his liability by the choice of modes he uses while the cargo 
concerns will not be able to determine what regimes will be applicable.
A pivotal part o f the definition is the fact that the carrier undertakes to carry by 
sea; this undertaking usually comprises of a promise made by the carrier that he 
will carry and deliver the goods. This is reflected in Art 10 (2003 draft) that states 
that,
“...The carrier shall subject to this instrument and in accordance with the 
terms o f  the contract [properly and carefully] carry the goods to the place o f  
destination and deliver them to the consignee, ”
Yet by Art 9 the parties may expressly agree in the contract o f carriage that in 
respect o f specific parts or parts of parts of the contract o f carriage, the carrier 
acting as agent will arrange carriage by another carrier. This brings into play the 
mixed contract o f carriage and the forwarding contract. By this provision, the 
instrument includes into its scope o f application not only the carriage contract but 
also the forwarding contract. Art 9 thus allows a carrier merely to promise to 
arrange carriage as opposed to performing it. This will allow the forwarding 
contract to be covered by the instrument. This broadens the scope of the 
instrument to even exceed the confines of the multimodal transport contract, which 
specifically calls for the contract to be one of carriage and not one o f arranging 
carriage. The broadening of the scope was criticised and requested that it be 
deleted.452
This provision is however still open. This article reflects article 11 (1) o f the 
Hamburg Rules which allows a carrier to contract part o f the carriage to other 
carriers, provided such parts are contracted to a named person and included in the 
contract o f carriage.453 Under such an arrangement, the carrier is not liable for 
loss, damage or delay occurring during the contracted-out part o f the contract.454 
The draft instrument is different from the Hamburg rules in that the freight
452 Report o f  the Working Group on Transport Law, Ninth session at 41
453 United Nations Convention on he Carriage o f  goods by Sea, U.N Comm’n o f  Int’l Trade Law, 12th 
Sess, (1978) art 11.1, available at http:/www.uncitral.org/english/texts/transport/hamburg.htm.
454 Theodora Nikika, « The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f  Goods [Wholly or Partly] 
[By Sea]: the Treatment o f  “Through Transport” Contracts”(2004) 31 Transportation Law journal 193 
at p. 200
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forwarder arranged carriage by another carrier and provides for its obligations 
while the Hamburg Rules carrier does not take such a responsibility.455 This article 
has been argued to be a useful addition in such an Instrument as it regulates the 
customary practice o f mixed contracts of carriage and freight forwarding, and 
strikes a fair balance between carriers’ interest and shippers’ interest.456 It is 
however contended that this article within multimodal transport will not further 
the cause o f predictability as it will allow the MTO to contract parts of the 
contract out as agent, obviously the main aim within multimodal transport is the 
liability o f a single party when multiple modes are used.
5.1.3.3 Applicable Law
The main remit o f the UNCITRAL draft was to offer practical solutions to the 
problems arising due to a lack o f uniformity in the liability regime covering the 
carriage o f goods by sea and by extension o f this remit multimodal transport. The 
draft therefore contains substantive rules and the conditions under which these 
rules apply to contracts o f carriage. The scope covered by the draft makes it 
imperative that there are different rules for localised loss and different rules for 
non-localised loss. The liability provision used is therefore the network system of 
liability which presently applies to contractual multim odal transport in cases of 
localised loss, damage or delay. This provision has already given rise to many 
uncertainties in multimodal transport, as its applicability also depends on the 
identification o f the stage where loss or damage occurred and determining if the 
given jurisdiction would apply mandatorily or not to the contract.
i) Localised loss
Art 8 o f the 2003 draft lays down the rules applicable when loss is localised. It 
covers the following situations;
455 Id. 201
456 Id. 203,
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1) The loss, damage or delay in delivery occurred during the maritime 
transport i.e. the part o f the transport which starts at the time of loading 
of the goods on the vessel and ends during the time of the discharge of 
the goods from the vessel.
2) The loss, damage or the delay in delivery occurred during the transport 
period ancillary to maritime transport, i.e. the part o f the transport that 
ends before the time o f loading on the vessel or the part o f the transport 
which starts after the time o f the discharge of the goods from the vessel, 
and non-mandatory law applies to the carriers activities during that 
period.
3) Eventually, if  so decided by the working group, the loss, damage or the 
delay in delivering occurred during the transport period ancillary to the 
maritime transport and a mandatory international and national law 
applies according to its terms to the carrier’s activities during that 
period.
In the above cases loss or damage is localised and the legal regime o f the draft will 
apply to 1 & 2. In the case o f 3 when it is proven that the loss, damage or delay 
occurred during carriage other than by sea, an international or national mandatory 
regime will be applicable. The applicability of these regimes is predicated on the 
fact that according to their own terms they would have applied to the carrier’s 
activities under the contract and for the relevant period. It must however be one of 
the non-derogatory conventions, which cannot be modified to the detriment of the 
cargo concern.
During the 12th session of the working group, it was suggested that the Article 
should be further refined from the phrase “international and national” to 
“international or national” to lessen the proliferation of potentially applicable laws 
under the same contract.457 Another international convention will only apply when 
the loss damage or delay occurs exclusively and undoubtedly during the carriage 
other than by sea.
However, even when another international convention is made applicable by the 
rules, it does not apply in its entirety. It will only apply to certain issues relating to
457 A/CN.9/544 para.46
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the carrier’s liability, limit and the time of suit. In any other respect the draft 
instrument will apply to the contract. By this provision, the mandatory liability 
regime applies only in part and the instrument applies in the instances not covered 
by the mandatory law. This will only serve to bring about unpredictability in the 
sense that different provisions from different laws will be applicable to the same 
loss or damage.
The implication o f the phrase “according to its own terms applies to the carriers 
activities” has not yet been discussed, but it poses the question if this does not 
refer to all the provisions o f the international mandatory convention. For example 
which law will determine the applicable regime when say Rail carriage is part of 
the carriage, under the CIM?458 Would the CIM apply even when the carrier has 
issued no consignment note? By the wordings of the draft, the CIM might not be 
applicable since Art 1 o f the CIM would not have been fulfilled.
This also brings into play the question o f the Hypothetical contract. The 
application o f the hypothetical contract as first illustrated by Art 2 o f the CMR is 
still unsettled in its interpretation. Which is why it is surprising that the draft 
instrument would choose such a provision.
The problems encountered in the interpretation of the clause within the CMR were 
due to the fact that the provision used to interpret the hypothetical contract 
between the carrier and the other mode carrier v/as unclear. Art 2 o f the CMR 
covers what is referred to in road carriage as ro-ro transport or piggy back 
transport in which one mode is carried on to another mode in what might be 
termed “mode on mode”.
Art 2(1) CMR states that;
“Where the vehicle containing the goods is carried over part o f  the journey  
by sea, rail, inland waterways or air, and, except where the provisions o f  Art 14 
are applicable, the goods are not unloaded from  the vehicle, this Convention shall 
nevertheless apply to the whole o f the carriage. Provided that to the extent that it 
is proved that any loss, damage or delay in delivery o f  the goods which occurs 
during the carriage by the other means o f transport was not caused by an act or
458 International Carriage o f  Goods by Rail 1980 (CIM- Appendix B to COTIF)
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omission o f  the carrier by road, but by some event which could only have occurred 
in the course o f  and by reason o f  the carriage by that other means o f  transport, the 
liability o f  the carrier by road shall be determined not by this convention,, but by 
the manner in which the liability o f  the carrier by the other means o f  transport 
would have been determined i f  a contract o f  carriage o f  goods had been made by 
the sender with the carrier by the other means o f  transport in accordance with the( 
conditions prescribed by law fo r  the carriage o f  goods by that other means o f  
transport). If, however, there are no such prescribed conditions, the liability o f  the 
carrier by road shall be determined by this convention ’
The three main elements o f Art 8 o f the draft instrument also apply to this article:
1- The CMR governs the relationship between shipper and the road carrier 
during the non-road segment of the carriage, extending the scope of the 
rules to other modes,
2- The CMR abdicates in favour o f an applicable regime which would have 
governed the hypothetical contract if  it was entered into between the 
shipper and the other modal carrier,
3- When it cannot be proved that damage or loss occurred during non-road 
carriage, or an event that could only have occurred during such non-road 
carriage, or the other regime cannot be regarded as prescribed by law, the 
CMR will apply.
The interpretation o f the hypothetical contract has been very problematic. The 
problem is the interpretation that is given to the hypothetical contract between the 
road carrier and the non-road carrier. In Thermo Engineers Ltd v. Ferry Masters,459 
a case concerning Art 2 (1) of the CMR, Neill J held that conditions prescribe by 
law are conditions which permit no variations thereby excluding the application o f 
the Hague Rules.460 The implication of this decision would be that whenever any 
variation is allowed the law will not apply. Following this decision, the Hague 
Rules will never apply in Art 2 CMR situations.
[1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 200
460 See Chapter 3 on the treatment o f  the hypothetical contract
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However, in three recent decisions in the Netherlands, the Dutch Courts attempted 
to interpret this provision. In The Baltic Ferry,461 goods where transported by road 
under the CMR from Germany to the UK. At Rotterdam, the trailer including the 
pallet where carried on board the vessel The Baltic Ferry. During unloading in 
Felixstowe, the trailer upturned due to a sharp rotation by the lift truck. The 
shipper sued the road carrier under the CMR. The road carrier sought to protect 
himself by invoking the provisions of The Hague Rules as per Art 2 (1). The sea 
carriage had been performed under a sea waybill. The Court had to decide 3 
issues; if the damage was caused exclusively by sea, the liability regime 
applicable; (CMR or Hague) and the regime that governs the period of limitation. 
At first instance, the argument o f the shipper that the event was not exclusive to 
sea carriage was rejected on the grounds that it was a concrete fact that happened. 
On the issue o f the Sea waybill not being a bill o f lading or similar document of 
title, the courts also held that to so confirm would exclude the application of the 
CMR within short sea journeys in which seaway bills are mostly used. However, 
the incorporation o f the rules into the contract was enough. On the basis of the 
above findings, The Hague Rules were allowed to determine the limitation period. 
On appeal, all three positions were overturned, the Court o f Appeal considered 
that the overturning was not an event exclusive to sea carriage, thus the question 
of the alternative legal regime remained unanswered. On these bases, the CMR 
was applied. It was however stressed that even if  the Hague Rules were held to be 
applicable, the CMR should still have been used to determine the limitation 
period.
In a later case The Gabriele Wehr 462 the position o f The Baltic Ferry was not 
followed. In that case, goods were transported under the CMR from Sweden to 
Holland. During the sea segment the goods were shipped on board the Gabriele 
Wehr under non-negotiable bill of ladings incorporating The Hague Visby Rules. 
Damage was pinpointed to the sea leg and the carrier was sued under the CMR. 
The carrier sought to rely on the defence of perils of the sea under The Hague 
Visby Rules. The courts considered the sea waybill insufficient to trigger the 
applicability of the Hague-Visby Rules, as the “conditions prescribed by law”
461 District court o f  Amsterdam (1990)
402 (18 November 1987) District Court Amsterdam [1990] ETL 251
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referred to mandatory law. The incorporation of the rules in the sea waybill was 
held to be voluntary between the road carrier and the non-road carrier and could 
have no effect on the shipper. Thus the CMR was made applicable to the case.
We thus see two different interpretations of the Art. 2 CMR. On appeal to the 
Dutch Supreme Court, two issues had to be decided;
a) The interpretation o f the term “conditions prescribed by law”, and
b) The interpretation o f the hypothetical contract.
It was held that “conditions prescribed by law” should be taken as a reference to 
an objective legal transport system, and the “hypothetical contract” was in line 
with the objectives o f the convention which was to provide uniformity with regard 
to the CMR carrier’s liability. At the time of the realisation o f the CMR, the other 
transport modes already in place were taken into consideration as they too were 
considered to be compulsory law. It was then observed that the Hague Rules 
themselves leave room for escape from the mandatory principle o f the Rules; Art 
1( C) on deck carriage, Rule V on increasing the carrier’s liability, and rule 6 on 
particular goods under a non-negotiable document, in exchange for the freedom of 
contract between the parties. This cannot mean that the Hague Rules will never 
apply to the short sea transport envisaged by the CMR. The opposite of this view 
will mean that the CMR will govern all the relationship between the shipper and 
the carrier even in cases in which the damage occurred by sea, which is not 
reasonable.
Their answer to question one was thus that “conditions prescribed by law” refer in 
principle to other unimodal regimes. But for their applicability one should keep in 
mind how the mode o f the ro-ro carrier relates to the scope rules envisaged by the 
convention. It was remarked that the French wordings “disposition imperatives” 
was in line with the above interpretation in the light of Art 33.4 o f the Vienna 
Convention on the Law o f Treaties 1969, which provides that, if  a comparison of 
the two text discloses a difference in meaning which the application o f Art 31 and 
32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the text, having regard to 
the object and purpose o f the treaty, shall be adopted. It was further added that one 
should ignore the possible arrangements to escape the mandatory character of the 
convention as well as the particularities (e.g. such as the provisions on deck
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carriage and the bill o f  lading) in the contract between the road carrier and the ro- 
ro carrier.
On the second question, it was held that once the applicable liability regime had 
been chosen, the next question to be determined would be if  the contract between 
the ro-ro carrier and the road carrier should also apply to the hypothetical contract 
between the shipper and the ro-ro carrier. It was held that the shipper was not a 
party to the contract between the road and ro-ro carriers and that contract should 
not therefore apply to his contract with the ro-ro carrier.
The decision o f the Supreme Court was that the Hague Rules were applicable to 
the damage, and their applicability did not depend on the actual contract between 
the sea carriers and the road carriers. It was stressed that any particular agreements 
regarding the issue o f the bill of lading could not prevent the applicability of the 
liability provisions o f the Hague Rules applying to the road carrier to safeguard 
the interest o f the shipper and consequently to generate legal security and 
uniformity o f the road carrier.
This solution is quite unique in the area and at odds with the recent French case of 
Anna-Oden463 in which the Cour De Cassation refused to apply The Hague Rules, 
which had been incorporated by means of a paramount clause in the contract.
This is to show the uncertainty that exists in the concept of the hypothetical case. 
It normally leads to enquiries as to the applicable law and the interpretation under 
different conventions.
O f particular concern here is also the fact that the burden o f proof for such 
localisation would fall on the party seeking the application of another convention, 
as the draft instrument does not lay down clear rules for the uniform and general 
application o f the burden of proof.464 The determination o f the burden o f proof is 
thus subject to national laws leading to diverse results, such could lead to forum 
shopping as parties seek out more favourable jurisdictions.
In the case o f localised loss or damage, the instrument has failed to provide a 
predictable law.
46J (5 July 1998) Cour de Cassation [1989] ETL 49
464 Alcantara, J.M “The N ew  Regime and Multimodal Transport” [2002] LMCLQ 399 at p. 404
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ii) Non-Localised loss
Under Art. 8 o f the draft, it is clear that when there is no localisation, the damage, 
loss or delay will be determined by rules of the draft Instrument. Thus in the case 
of non-localised loss the rules will apply to all contracts. The question here is the 
feasibility of rules which are drafted for maritime carriage based on The Hague 
Visby and the Hamburg Rules to govern loss, damage or delay which might have 
taken place by land or air.
The liability o f the carrier is based on Art 14, under which the carrier is liable for 
loss, damage or delay caused during the carrier’s period o f responsibility unless he 
can prove that neither his fault nor the fault of his servants or agents contributed to 
the loss, damage or delay. A list o f exceptions is then provided which is a 
catalogue of exceptions similar to The Hague Visby Rules art. IV 2(c-q).
-The Limits o f Liability for non-localised loss
In the case o f limits o f liability for unlocalised loss, the burden o f proving the 
place of damage might fall on the carrier. Article 18(2) (which is still in brackets) 
states that;
[“2. Notwithstanding paragraph I, i f  the carrier cannot establish whether 
the goods were lost or damaged by sea carriage or during the carriage preceding 
or subsequent to the sea carriage, the highest limit o f  liability in the international 
or national mandatory provisions that govern the different parts o f  the transport 
shall apply] ”465
This provision if  unchanged will place the onus on the carrier to localise loss, as 
non-localisation will also lead to a more onerous limit. This provision is quite 
similar to that o f the Netherlands Civil code dealing with multimodal transport.466
465 A /CN.9/544, para 47 and 50, It was suggested that this article be kept in square brackets until art 
18(1) on the limits o f  liability for localised loss had been decided. See also UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/W GIII/W P.26 p.5
466 Book 8. Title 2, Chapter 2, Section 43 o f  the Dutch Civil Code
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5.1.3.4 Basis of Liability Provisions
The draft instrument has been described as a complex amalgamation of the 
provisions o f The Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules with substantial 
modifications in terms o f substance, text and structure.467 The fact that the draft is 
based on two rules with different styles of drafting creates confusion. The 
Hamburg Rules contain a simple provision allocating the burden o f proof while 
the Hague Visby Rules creates a system where the burden is shifted form one 
party to another together with an elaborate list o f exception clauses. The Hamburg 
Rules when drafted were considered a vast improvement on the Hague Visby 
Rules, making liability within carriage by sea similar to liability provisions found 
in the other unimodal transport conventions.468 The effect o f the combination of 
these two conventions in one instrument is an alteration of the original substance 
and text; thus the certainty associated with the different provisions within the 
different rules will be lost.469
Art. 5 lay’s down the main obligations of the carrier under the contract as one in 
which he promises to carry goods to their destination, setting out the fundamental 
obligation o f seaworthiness and cargo worthiness.
Art 6 contains the liability provision of the carrier; the carrier is liable for loss or 
damage unless he proves that no fault of his or that o f any persons under him is 
responsible or caused the loss.
Art 14 sets down the points concerning the burden o f proof. This consists of 4 
main elements;
-The claimant needs to establish a prima facie case by showing that loss or 
damage was caused while the goods were in the charge o f the carrier
-The carrier then has a chance at rebutting the presumption and showing 
that there was no fault, or that the loss or damage is covered by an exception 
clause
467 « Draft instrument on transport Law: Comments submitted by the UNCTAD Secretariat. 
Http//www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html, see also A/CN.9/W G.III/W .21/add.l.
468 Clarke, M “A Conflict o f  Conventions: The UNCITRAL/CMI Draft Transport Instrument on your 
Doorstep” (2003) 9 The Journal o f  International Maritime Law, 34
469 The UNCTAD comment on the draft, UNCTAD/SDTE/ TLB/4, 13th March 2002
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-The cargo concern may then adduce evidence to show that the excepted 
peril was not the cause o f the loss or damage, and
-In the cause o f concurrent causes the liability must be apportioned.
The first three steps are similar to the steps in the HVR the fourth one on 
concurring causes was only included in the Hamburg Rules.
The instrument also chooses to expressly mention the exception clauses in a more 
intensive manner than the two conventions it derives from.470 It would have been 
easier if the instrument had used the shorter version as found in the Hamburg 
Rules, thereby permitting the courts to interpret and evaluate evidence based on 
the substantive provisions o f the instrument.
The burden o f proof is retained in the carrier, and the claimant has the possibility 
o f rebuttals.471
A problem under Art 14 (4) might be apportioning concurrent causes between the 
carrier and any other person liable. The provision leaves the determination of this 
on the courts or the arbitrator with the result that the determination will differ 
according to the jurisdiction. Also in cases where it is difficult to ascertain, the 
provision allows apportionment at 50/50. This will lead obviously to a disincentive 
for the carrier to adduce evidence to aid this, as it might be advantageous to him to 
be liable only for 50% of the damage or loss. This lack o f clarity covering the 
allocation o f liability for concurrent causes has implications for the burden of 
proof. The cargo concern might bear the burden of proof in such cases. This is a 
departure from the current practice in carriage of goods by sea and reflects an 
unacceptable shift from established principles of risk allocation as between cargo 
and carriers.
In addition, in most international conventions, the liability provisions are 
mandatory and cannot be derogated from. The draft allows opting outs, which 
reduces the carrier’s liability. Art 9, which allows the carrier to act as agent o f the 
shipper in certain instances reduces the carrier’s liability. Additionally Art 7 of the 
draft (Old Art 4.1.2) also allows for a modification of the period o f responsibility
470 The exceptions o f  error in navigation and fire are still unclear under the instrument. While there is 
pressure to delete the error in navigation provision as under the Hamburg Rules, the fire provision will 
probably survive.
471 Art 14 (3) puts the burden o f  proof for unseaworthiness on the cargo claimant.
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472to tackle-to-tackle, thereby also restricting the carriers liability. Art 9 on its part 
allows the carrier to act as an agent for the shipper in contracting parts of the 
contract, which it does not carry.
These provisions are not usually found in transport conventions that normally do 
not allow parties to derogate from its provisions. The carrier under the draft can 
contract out o f functions such as stowage, loading and discharge by the stipulation 
that these activities are carried out by or on behalf of the shipper. This is allowed 
under Art 11 o f the Draft. The result is that the carrier becomes the agent o f the 
shipper who may then be liable for loss or damage arising out o f such activities. 
The above provisions greatly lessen the contractual responsibility under the 
instrument as the carrier by opting out of certain clauses becomes responsible only 
for parts o f the contracts and only for certain functions o f the carrier.
By allowing the carrier to depart from the main tenets o f multimodal transport 
such as responsibility throughout carriage, opting out o f door-to-door carriage in 
favour o f tackle-to tackle carriage and lessening its responsibility for the goods, it 
is doubtful if  this instrument was meant to cover multimodal transport.
The question here is the effect of the above three provisions on Art 84 o f the 
instrument. This provision states that any contractual provision, which directly or 
indirectly, excludes or reduces liability of the carrier, performing shipper, the 
controlling party or the consignee is void. It is submitted here that those three 
provisions if  kept will derogate Art 84. It is hoped that it will eventually be 
modified or better still deleted.
Additionally in the case o f multimodal transport the idea o f one carrier which is 
the mainstay of this mode is compromised by the opting outs bringing into play 
the concept o f the multiple carriers liability for the contract o f carriage.
5.1.3.5 The Limits of Liability
One o f the main tenets of any liability regime is the traditional right to limit 
liability given to the carrier. Art 18 (1) & (3), lays down the provisions for
472 A /CN.9/510, Para 40,
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limitation o f liability o f the carrier. This is based in part on Art 4 (5) of The Hague 
Visby Rules and Art 6.1 (a) o f the Hamburg Rules.473
The limit for the Hague Rules stands at 2 SDR per kilo as opposed to 8.33 SDR 
per kilo under the CMR and 17 SDR per kilo under the Montreal Convention. The 
proposed limits in the instruments will thus fall well below that found in land 
carriage. There seems to be the argument that in this case these limits should not 
apply to the land segment o f a Multimodal transport contract.474
However the final amounts have not yet been determined. Another problem likely 
to be faced by the Instrument as expressed above is the fact that each of the 
unimodal conventions has different limits. The question then is the feasibility of 
applying a maritime convention to non-maritime carriage. A cogent example will 
be the Instruments ‘perils o f the sea’ defence to a truck. Another problem would 
be the basis o f liability used in the different conventions, the draft uses due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy, the CMR uses utmost diligence, while the 
Montreal convention holds the carrier to a strict duty.475 The draft might therefore 
apply a different duty o f care to non-maritime transport. However, the network 
system might not apply here because the article 8 limits the importation of other 
conventions provisions to issues o f liability, limits and time o f suit.476
The wordings of the Article are very peculiar and might lead to diverse 
interpretations within different jurisdictions, i.e. what will be the meaning of 
“liability for loss or damage to or in “connection with goods”, the words “in 
connection to” might be taken to mean damage other than for physical loss or 
damage such as for wrongful delivery or misrepresentation. This might impede the 
acceptability o f this provision as it involves documentary liability, which is 
different from physical liability for the loss or damage.
473 Huybrechts, M. “Limitation o f  liability and o f  Actions” [2002] LMCLQ 377, a contrary view is 
expressed by Tetley W (P rof) who believes that the limits proposed might be inappropriate, Tetley, W. 
“ Reform o f  Carriage o f  Goods- the UNCITRAL draft and the Senate COGSA ‘9 9 ’” (2003) 28 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal 10
474 Clarke M, “Conflict o f  Conventions:The UNCITRAL/CM1 draft transport Instument on your 
doorstep” (2003) JIML 39
475 Preparation o f  the Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f goods [by sea] -Genneral Remarks on the 
sphere o f  Application o f  the Draft Instrument, U. N. comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 11th Sess., para 122, 
U.N. Doc, A/CN.9)W GIII/W P.29) (2003). Available at 
http:/uncitral.org/English/workinggroups/wg_3/WP-29-e.pdf.
476 Article 8 ( l ) ( b )  (ii)
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Normally, limits in transportation law have been known to cause problems, in the 
field o f multimodal transport the problems are even more. The recurring question 
here would be the limits for unlocalised loss, would the limits set for maritime 
transport also be used for land based damage or loss? The inappropriateness of 
applying maritime limits to land based damage is responsible for the proposal in 
Art 18 (2) that the limit for liability for unlocalised loss or damage should be the 
highest possible limit o f liability in the international or national mandatory 
provision that govern the different parts of the transport. This is a clear advantage 
for cargo concerns, while it is a disadvantage for the carrier who will find he pays 
more than he hoped for. It is doubtful if this would be acceptable to carriers. At 
this point it must be pointed out that one of the impediments to accepting the 
multimodal transport convention was the fact that its limits o f liability was thought 
to be too high.477
5.1.3.6 The performing Party
Modern transportation o f goods no longer requires the carrier to perform during all 
aspects o f the carriage, thus he subcontracts different aspects o f the carriage to
478specialists; stevedores, other carriers, loader etc. Taking note o f this trend, the 
instrument has provisions for such third parties.
The preparatory text o f the draft first introduced the concept o f the “performing 
carrier” : Criticisms that it was too narrow led to a change to “performing party”, 
which was thought to include all parties involved in the carriage.479 
Art 1 (e) defines the performing carrier as,
"... a person other than the carrier that physically performs or undertakes to 
physically perform any o f  the carrier’s responsibilities under a contract o f  
carriage including the carriage, handling, custody and storage o f  the goods, to the 
extent that that person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carriers request or 
under the carrier’s supervision or control. The term ‘performing p a r ty ’ does not
477 A.Kiantou-Pampouki, “ The General Report in the XVth International Congress o f  Comparative 
Law, Bristol 1998” published in Multimodal Transport: Carrier Liability and Issues Related to the Bill 
o f  Lading (E.E.B., 2000) Para 1.5.1.1
478 See Chapter 2. on The Parties
479 Sturley, M, “Scope o f  Coverage under the UNCITRAL Draft Instrument” (2004) 10 The Journal o f  
International Maritime Law 148
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include ant person who is retained by the shipper or consignee, or is an employee, 
agent, contractor, or sub-contractor o f  a person (other than the carrier) who is 
retained by a shipper or consignee. ”480
The advantage o f such a wide definition was said to lie in the fact that a uniform
481regime would govern all those involved in the carriage. Yet in certain respects, 
this definition cannot be considered to be the “catch all” provision meant to cover 
all those who are involved in the carriage. The definition covers those involved in 
carriage, handling, custody, or storage but have not been retained by the shipper or 
the consignee. The draft has no provision for the liability o f those performing 
other duties under the contract o f carriage. These persons are therefore not subject 
to the liability rules o f the instrument in any action concerning the goods, but are 
entitled to benefit from the defences and limitations o f liability available to the 
carrier under the instrument. An example given in the explanatory note of the 
instrument482 sited the security firm in charge o f a container yard who is not 
covered. Cargo concern will then have different remedies under different
4o->
arrangements depending on who was responsible for the loss or damage. 
Additionally, intermediate sub-contracting carriers are also excluded, limiting the 
concept o f “performing party” to those who present front line services to the 
carrier, but not those that carry out or procure parts o f the contractual obligations. 
Thus a sub-contracting carrier who also sub-contracts his obligations under the 
contract will not be considered to be a performing party. His status will depend on 
whether the sub-contracted mode was international or if  the regime was 
incorporated into the contract.
Yet, his sub-contractors would be considered a “performing party” under the 
instrument who can be sued by cargo concerns. The cargo concern may however, 
not easily ascertain who such sub-sub-contractors are or what their liability is for 
the loss or damage to the goods. However, such a sub-sub-contractor when sued
480 A /CN.9/544 para 41
481 The FIATA were however concerned that this provision is to wide and would include heir members 
who wanted to act only as agents. See Sturley M, “Scope o f Coverage under the UNCITRAL draft 
Instrument” (2004) 10 The Journal o f  International Maritime Law p. 150
482 A/CN.9AVG.III/W P21.
483 UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB4 , Commentary by the UNCTAD Secretariat on the Draft Instrument on 
Transport Law
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will be able to claim protective clauses in his contract with the sub-contractor who 
is not a “performing party” and therefore has no obligations towards the cargo 
concern.
This in addition to the opting out provisions of Art 7 and Art 9 on mixed contracts 
and contracting on the tackle-to-tackle basis respectively ensures that the 
identification o f the “performing party” will be difficult at times and at other times 
impossible to determine.
The liability o f the performing carrier must be separate from that of the carrier, 
although naturally only the carrier should be liable even for the parts of the 
contract performed by the performing carrier. However, once loss or damage is 
localised, the liability o f the performing carrier comes into play as cargo concern 
can sue him for the loss or damage; thus his liability needs to be addressed.
Under Art 15 o f the draft, the performing party may be liable in the same way as 
the carrier. It states;
"... A maritime performing party is subject to the responsibilities and 
liabilities imposed on the carrier under this instrument, and entitled to the 
carrier’s rights and immunities provided by this instrument i f  the occurrence that 
caused the loss, damage or delay took place (a) during the period in which it has 
custody o f  the goods; and (b) at any other time to the extent that it is participating  
in the performance o f  any o f  the activities contemplated by the contract o f  
carriage ”
During the negotiations, doubts were expressed as to the appropriateness o f such a 
provision including all performing parties. It was thus suggested that this liability 
should be limited to the maritime performing carrier defined in Art 1 (f) as one 
who performs the carrier’s responsibilities during the carriage by sea.484 The non- 
maritime performing carrier should be excluded from the liability provisions of the 
instrument. It was argued that it would be unfair to base the performing parties’ 
liability on the draft when he might not even know that he is carrying as part of a 
multimodal transport contract. This fact is exacerbated when the performing 
carrier in a non-sea carrier.
484 A/CN.9/544 para 31
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To address this problem, the working group excluded the non-maritime 
performing carrier. Art 15 o f  the draft therefore applies only to the maritime 
performing carrier. If damage occurs under such a contract, the shipper can raise a 
claim against the contracting carrier on the basis of the instrument. However, if the 
loss is localised, he can also bring an action against the performing party. This 
action will be on the basis o f another international or national mandatory law. This 
again highlights the problem o f the lack o f uniformity and predictability as to the 
applicable regime.
Another issue that remains to be resolved within the rights o f third parties is the 
Himalayan Clause; its inclusion within this instrument shows the determination of 
the drafters to ensure uniform treatment o f all parties in a multimodal transport
485carnage.
5.1.3.7 Conflict of Conventions.
The network system o f liability adopted by the instrument was meant to avoid any 
conflicts o f conventions within this carriage. However, as seen from the 
provisions on the liability regime and the possibility o f opting outs it is obvious 
that the problem of conflict with other conventions continues.
In addition to this is the fact that some of the international conventions have 
multimodal provisions, which might also lead to a conflict situation in cases where 
both rules will apply. For instance, Art 2(1) of the CMR states that the CMR will 
apply to carriage involving other modes o f transport if  the truck carrying the goods 
are carried on the other mode of transport unloaded. From the deliberations of the 
working groups it was clear that the Role o f the CMR as Europe’s leading 
international convention influenced the choice o f the network system.486 This was 
based in part on the hope that it will avoid conflict with other conventions. The 
stance that the contract covered by the instrument being door-to-door will not
485 Sturley M, “Scope o f  Coverage under the UNCITRAL draft Instrument” (2004) 10 The Journal o f  
International Maritime Law p 152
486 Ckarke, M “A Conflict o f  Conventions: The UNCITRAL/CMI draft transport instrument on your 
doorstep” (2003) 9 The Journal o f  International Maritime Law 33, see also, Sturley, M “Scope o f  
Coverage under UNCITRAL DRAFT INSTUMENT” (2004) 10 The Journal o f  International Maritime 
Law 147
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trigger the applicability o f the CMR has been expressed within academia.487 The 
decision in Quantum Ltd. v Plain Trucking Ltd,488 rejected this stance, and held 
that where carriage takes place by various modes of transport, the land leg of that 
carriage will be subject to the CMR, reading art 1 (1) of the CMR as making the 
convention applicable to the road carriage from the beginning o f the road leg.489 
In that case the contract was for the carriage of a consignment of hard disc from 
Singapore to Dublin. The waybill on its face stated that the goods might be carried 
by other means including road unless specifically excluded by the carrier. The 
waybill then specified that the goods would be carried by Air France from 
Singapore to Charles De Gaulle Airport and by road from Charles de Gaulle 
Airport to Dublin airport.
From Charles de Gaulle, the goods were loaded on a trailer operated by Air 
France’s sub-contractors to Ireland. The trailer was shipped across the channel to 
England, unfortunately during the road carriage to Holyhead; the goods were lost 
in a ‘hi-jacking’.
Air France admitted liability for the loss, but argued that the carriage was subject 
to their terms and condition and not on the Warsaw Convention, which had ended 
at Charles de Gaulle airport.
The claimants on their part contended that the contract was for the carriage of 
goods by air and by road and that the CMR therefore governed the road leg of the 
carriage. The Commercial Court held that the CMR did not apply to the road part 
o f the journey. Stating that the CMR could not apply to a part o f a contract, it had 
to apply to the whole carriage.
On appeal, the Court concluded that the CMR applies to a road part o f a mixed 
carriage or a multimodal contract even though a consignment note was not issued. 
The court o f Appeal therefore decided that the CMR applied to the road leg of the 
transport.
487 Clarke, M A Conflict o f  Conventions: The UNCITRAL/CMI draft transport instrument on your 
doorstep” (2003) 9 The Journal o f  International Maritime Law 33,
488 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 133
489 See also Chap 1
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This implies that the current provision of the instrument as it is, will lead to 
conflict with the CMR in that both will apply to the same set o f loss or damage.
The Swedish Delegation in this regard proposed that to avoid conflict, the 
instrument should only apply to instances in which the goods are taken off the 
trailer for carriage.490
Likewise Art 18(4) o f the Montreal Convention on the carriage o f goods by Air 
also stipulates that if  carriage is by air and another mode under an air waybill 
covered by the convention, the whole carriage will be subject to the convention. In 
both cases, the draft instrument will also be applicable thereby causing a conflict 
situation.
To address the issues o f conflict, Art 83 and 84 of the Instrument states that, 
contracting States may grant priority to another International Convention already 
in force at the time the UNCITRAL Convention enters into force, provided the 
instrument applies mandatorily to the contract o f carriage o f goods by a mode of 
transport other than by sea. This article however is still within bracket and might 
be modified.
The International Road Transport Union 491 expressed the view that the draft as it 
was conflicted with the CMR. Stating that Arts 27, 89 and 90 led to conflict with 
the CMR, on the grounds that the combination o f the 3 articles exposed 
contracting states party to the CMR to violations o f art.5 o f the convention and the 
provisions o f Art 41 (1) o f the Vienna Convention on the interpretation o f treaties. 
Holding that the provisions o f the draft will break the unity o f the land transport 
law, as two regimes will potentially apply to land transport, they called on the 
drafters to limit their draft to door-to-door. Or delete Art 90.
The UNCITRAL draft instrument is intended to provide a modern regime to 
replace the two main liability regimes in the area o f carriage o f goods by sea. 
Overall, it appears that most of the criticisms on the draft as an appropriate 
liability regime for multimodal transport have been greatly based on the fact that it
490 A/CN.9/W G III/WP.26 p.2-3
491 Document presented by the IRTU, to UNCITRAL on the draft Instrument “Infringement o f  the 
contract for the International Carriage o f  goods by Road (CMR)
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is based solely on a maritime instrument. Determined to reform the Maritime 
conventions and bring them in line with commercial realities, the instrument at a 
later date included multimodal transport. This fact accounts for one of the main 
criticisms o f the draft; the fact that it covers only what is termed “wet multimodal 
transport” or “transmaritime multimodal.”492 This stance has been variously 
criticised, especially within academia.493
Tetley has questioned the feasibility of a convention that attempts to incorporate 
so many different and independent components under one regime, and advocates 
what he calls a two-track approach; The fast track under which the CMI or 
UNCITRAL will modify the maritime conventions and the slow track which will 
allow the more detailed work on the draft to deal with other relevant issues such as 
door-to-door carriage.494
Rosaeg, also points out that this liability regime should not be extended to 
circumstances for which it was not intended, such as for road carriage and periods 
of storage, as maritime rules and the reasons for it exception and limits do not 
necessarily apply during this stages.495
UNCTAD, on their part has also criticised this draft, as over-extending its remit 
which it should limit to door-to-door. It warns that this draft as a result o f 
extending to non-sea carriage is in conflict with other unimodal conventions.496 
UNECE also raises it voice to call for this draft to limit itself to maritime carriage 
only. It states that the desirability o f a multimodal convention cannot be denied 
but a maritime convention is not the right instrument.497 The UNECE believes that 
an acceptable multimodal convention would be better achieved by consultations 
among all stakeholders interested in multimodal transport especially those outside 
o f maritime transport.
492 P. Delebecque, “ The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage o f  Goods by Sea” [2003] CMI 
Yearbook 208 at p.227
493 Beare, “ Report o f  the third meeting o f  the International Sub-committee on issues o f  Transport Law” 
N ew York 7-8 July 2000, CMI Yearbook 2000 234
494 Tetley , Reform o f  Carriage o f  goods- The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA, (2003) 28 
Tul.Mar. L.J, 1-144
495 Rosaeg, E, « The Applicability o f  Conventions for the Carriage o f  Goods and for Multimodal 
Transport » [2002] LMCLQ 236
496 Commentary by the UNCTAD Secretariat on the Draft Instrument on Transport Law, 
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB4- 13th March 2004, UNCITRAL Document A/CN.9/W G. Ill/ WP21, Annex
497 “United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE): Comments to the UNCITRAL draft 
instrument on transport law” prepared by the UNECE Secretariat. 
www.comoitemaritime/draft/draft.html., A/CN.9/W G III/W.21 addl
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The extension o f a maritime regime to land based carriages may not be a prudent 
move in the light o f the criticisms levied against maritime regime, and the fact that 
this regime is visibly more different from the other unimodal regimes can be taken 
as an indication that a sea regime might not provide a strong and acceptable basis 
for multimodal transport.498
It is asserted here that the draft instrument in its present format is inappropriate in 
multimodal transport; it leaves many key questions unanswered. The submission 
here is that the draft instrument in its present setting will not change in any 
significant manner the unpredictability and uncertainties in the liability regime in 
multimodal transport. Unfortunately, as seen above, many o f the relevant 
provisions are rather complex and contain ambiguous wordings, which leave much 
scope for different interpretations within different jurisdictions. This will greatly 
affect the appeal o f this instrument as an international uniform liability regime in 
the field o f multimodal transport.
O f particular concern in MT is the lack o f clarity in a number o f key issues 
pertinent in MT, notably the applicable liability regime, the burden o f proof, 
allocation o f liability especially for concurrent causes, the party liable and the 
limits o f liability under the instrument.
While it is hoped that an international regime would be enacted for multimodal 
transport, it is clear that the UNCITRAL draft instrument does not provide a 
solution to the MT problems.
The main reasons for this conclusion can be summarised as follows:
1) The applicable law 
The adoption o f the network system of liability chosen by this instrument leads to 
uncertainty in ascertaining the applicable law. The working o f the network system 
in multimodal transport has brought about a lot o f uncertainty, and the drafts 
choice o f the network system means that nothing will change; the same problems
498 Tetley, on the contrary, advocates that the Hague Visby Rules should be used as the basis for 
multimodal transport as 75% o f  trade is performed under these rules. With the Hamburg Rules coming 
in as second choice for the basis o f  multimodal transport, Tetley, W. Reform o f  Carriage o f  goods- 
The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA, (2003) 28 Tul.Mar. L.J,
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will be faced. The calls now are centred on pulling efforts to bring about uniform 
liability within multimodal transport.499
The draft does not seem to offer any clear liability regime as compared to what 
already obtains in multimodal transport. The complexity of the regime can be said 
to add to the complexity o f this regime without providing any added benefits to the 
parties. The draft does not provide a uniform liability regime throughout all stages 
of the transport, instead it abdicated in favour o f mandatory international 
conventions in cases o f unlocalised loss and imposes a maritime regime to the 
whole transport when loss cannot be localised: Thereby extending exclusively 
maritime provisions to land based carriage.
2) The basis o f liability
Although the basis o f liability is based on the principle of presumed fault, it is made 
up of a combination o f both The Hague Visby and the Hamburg Rules with extensive 
modifications. This means that the advantages gained under this rules from judicial 
interpretation and certainty are lost. Of particular concern are the exceptions to 
liability laid down in Art 14 (2) which have added two new exceptions in addition to 
the exceptions found under Art IV I -  (q), Exceptions which go to erode the liability 
of the carrier. Art 14 (4) on concurrent causes is also unclear; the provision of 50/50 
liability between the shipper and the carrier for concurrent causes obviously shifts the 
burden of proof on to the cargo concern. This is a clear departure from the current 
system of liability within maritime carriage and reflects a shift from the established 
principle of risk allocation between cargo and carrier. It is not yet known how this 
provision will interact with Art 14 1-3 on the burden of proof. This issue will have to 
be further debated to establish if  loss due to concurrent loss should follow the 
maritime regimes or change to a new approach.
The uncertainty will be exacerbated in the case o f multimodal transport.
3) The drafting style
The complexity and style of drafting is one of the issues that have been raised and 
criticised about the instrument. The provision on exceptions has been criticised as
499 Haak, “ The Harmonization o f  intermodal liability arrangements” 5th IVR Colloquium-Vienna -27 
and 28th January 2005
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marking a return to the old style o f drafting, in an era in which increasingly the 
style of drafting is less detailed and mostly entails general provisions. This was the 
stance adopted for the Hamburg Rules and in the recent COTIF and Montreal 
Conventions; their drafting style is less detailed than their predecessors.500
Despite the criticisms o f the draft as an appropriate liability instrument for 
multimodal transport, it still represents at present the most realistic hope for a 
regime that will cover multimodal transport. Hope is placed on the work currently 
being done within the working groups; with the continuous consultations and 
deliberations there is hope that the different provisions will be adjusted and 
amended to adequately deal with the current problems. If however, this new 
attempt fails again, the ball will pass on to national legislators who will draft new 
national laws to cover multimodal transport. This will lead to more proliferation of 
laws and will render the harmonisation process more difficult.
Another option however, may be to start again with a clean slate this time inviting 
all stakeholders in multimodal transport.
In response to Tetley’s comment;
“...will anyone explain when this convention will apply or will not 
apply?’’501
I can answer with certainty when it will not apply, when a sea leg is not included 
under the contract. This can be said to be the main criticism o f the instrument in 
governing multimodal transport; its own limits.502 The fact that it limits itself to 
only “wet” multimodal transport implies that another law has to be found for 
“complete” multimodal transport including “wet” and “dry” multimodal transport. 
This will further increase the liability regimes and create further uncertainty and 
unpredictability in multimodal transport.
500 Carriage o f  Goods by Air: A Guide to the International LEGAL Framework Report by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2006/1
501 Tetley, W “ Reform o f  Carriage o f  Goods- The UNCITRAL Draft and the Senate COGSA “99” 
(2003) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 10
502 Tetley W “ ibid
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In conclusion, it has been shown that the instrument is laudable as it seeks to 
modernise the liability regime in sea carriage but it will not specifically solve the 
current problems o f multimodal transport.
5.1.4 The UNECE initiative503
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Inland committee 
and party for combined transport convened two meetings to consider the possibilities 
for the reconciliation and harmonisation of civil liabilities in multimodal transport; 
here the views of experts and relevant International Organisations were examined.504 
The work, which is presented as the ISIC draft was presented to the Commission in 
the later parts of 2005 and is later examined.
This Commission also sponsored a seminar, which brought together specialists in the 
field of multimodal transport to discuss the issue of the problem of “intermodal 
transportation and carrier liability.”505 The main aim of the work o f this group was to 
study the problems associated with multimodal transport liability and propose 
possible solutions for the future. Although the work of this group was mostly to affect 
Europe, its problems were shown to be truly international. It was strongly re-iterated 
that the absence o f uniform liability in multimodal transport led to uncertainty and 
increased the cost of handling claims.
5.1.4.1 The UNECE ISIC Draft 506
The first draft of a non-mandatory European alternative for the regulation of 
multimodal transport was submitted to the Economic Commission for Europe
507by a panel o f experts in 2006. This draft is intended to be the basis o f further 
deliberations and discussions to find a satisfactory solution for the current 
multimodal transport problems.
503 The UNECE started its work on multimodal transport as far back as the 1960’s. It was responsible 
for The Rome Draft o f  1970, and contributed significantly in the TCM drafts
504 See Trans/WP.24/2000/3 held on the 12-13th o f  July 1999 and the 24-25th o f  January 2000
505 ECE/TRANS/136 Com (97) 243.
506 Integrated Services in the intermodal chain (ISIC)
507 Prof. M.A.Clarke (S. Johns College-Cambridge) Prof. R Herber ( University o f  Hamburg), Dr R. 
Lorenzon (Institute o f  Maritime Law Southampton), Prof Ramberg (University o f  Stockholm)
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In cognisant o f the importance o f multimodal transport globally and the impact 
the lack o f predictable rules was having in Europe, the Economic Commission 
has prioritised ‘interm odal’ transport and commissioned different working 
groups to deal with the different aspects.508 The overall aim of the commission 
in this area is to improve the quality, efficiency and transparency o f intermodal 
transport chains.
The United Nations Economic Council for Europe which is responsible for the 
CMR has since 2000 been considering the issue of an appropriate civil liability 
regime for multimodal transport operations.509 Following two working sessions 
with the industry on the subject, the UNECE mandated a working party on 
Intermodal transport and logistics to consider the establishment o f a civil 
liability regime applicable to European intermodal transport covering, road, 
rail, inland waterways and short sea shipping. Additionally, it also had the duty 
to monitor the field o f multimodal transport and propose solutions at the Pan- 
European level.
On deliberations with the relevant stakeholders, among who were road carriers, 
rail carriers, multimodal transport operators and shippers, the consensus was 
reached that the existing liability regime was in need o f urgent harmonisation 
to provide a reliable, predictable, and cost effective civil liability system, 
especially in the light o f the recent proliferation among national legislations of 
multimodal transport laws.
It was thus felt that if  a global mandatory regime was not immediately feasible; 
a regional approach should be taken to aim at a solution in due course.
508 The directorate o f  Energy and Transport (DG TREN) o f  the European Commission launched a study 
for the implementation o f  an action plan “The Freight Integrator Plan”. This plan is aimed at improving 
the quality, efficiency and transparency o f  the [intermodal] transport chain. The project, which is called 
integrated services for Intermodal chain, therefore seeks to provide the Commission with the necessary 
information to successfully implement an action plan for multimodal transport. The project has a road 
map for this action, which consists o f  different relevant tasks; o f  which improving intermodal liability 
and documentation is one o f  seven.
509 “Reconciliation and Harmonisation o f  Civil Liability Regimes in Intermodal transport, Note by the 
Secretariat” Joint ECMT/UNECE Working Party /Group on Intermodal Logistics, forty sixth session, 
Paris, 4 lh Oct 2006, ECE/Trans/WP24/2006/5
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Taking into considerations the various developments internationally to achieve 
a solution on multimodal transport and the urgent need of transport users and 
providers, it was thought prudent to focus on developing a civil liability regime 
for multimodal transport based on land based regimes including short sea 
shipping, one which will take into consideration the objectives of European 
transport policy.
In this light, the UNECE Working Party reviewed the work o f the UNCITRAL 
draft document for the carriage o f goods [wholly or partly] [by sea], and 
concluded that the draft instrument would only establish
“ Let another layer o f  international Maritime based transport /aw”
That did not adequately address the concerns of the European transport 
operators and their clients and would lead to a conflict with existing land 
transport conventions in Europe.
Therefore, during the 30th session o f the Commission o f the UNECE, the view 
was expressed that the first draft o f a non-mandatory European alternative for 
the regulating o f multimodal transport should be prepared. The purpose of the 
draft would be to provide a;
“Simple, transparent, uniform and strict liability fram ework placing  
liability on the multimodal transport operator. ”510
In this section we will examine the provisions o f the draft to assess its impact 
on the multimodal transport liability problem. In this light only provisions 
dealing with the Multimodal liability will be examined.
5.1.4.2 The ISIC Non-Mandatory Draft of Uniform Liability Rules for
Intermodal Transport511
Unlike the UNCITRAL draft convention which limits its multimodalism to 
multimodal transport with a sea leg, and the provisions in the different 
unimodal transport conventions which limit multimodal transport to their
510 Integrated Services in the Intermodal Chain (ISIC) Final Report Task B; Intermodal Liability and 
Documentation. European Commission- DG TREN, TREN/04/M D/S07.38573, Southampton, 28lh 
October 2005.
511 Integrated Services in the Intermodal Chain (ISIC) Final Report Task B; Intermodal Liability and 
Documentation. European Commission- DG TREN, TREN/04/M D/S07.38573, Southampton, 28th 
October 2005.
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respective modes, this draft aims at covering total multimodal transport
512regardless o f the combination o f modes chosen.
In answer to the myriad o f problems found in multimodal transport and in the
light of all the failed and failing solutions, the draft proposes a strict liability
513regime for the multimodal transport within a non-mandatory instrument.
1) The Liability of the MTO
The essence o f the strict liability is found in Part 3 “Liability o f the Transport
Integrator”514 Art 8 o f the draft and it states that,
“I The transport integrator shall be liable fo r  the total or partial loss
o f  the goods or damage to the goods occurring between the time 
he takes over the goods and the time o f  delivery, as well as fo r  any 
delay in delivery.
2 Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered 
within the time expressly agreed upon by the parties to the 
contract o f  transport, or in the absence o f  such agreement, within 
a reasonable time having regard to the circumstances o f  the case.
3 I f  the goods have not been delivered within 90 days follow ing the 
date o f  delivery determined according to paragraph 2, the 
claimants may treat the goods as lost
4 The transport integrator shall not be liable fo r  any total or partial 
loss o f  the goods, or damage to the goods, or delay in delivery o f  
the goods to the extent that it was caused by circumstances beyond 
the control o f  the transport integrator. ”
The first point of note is the fact that a draft on multimodal transport departs 
totally from the network system of liability embracing total uniformity o f law. The 
[integrator] MTO is held strictly liable with his only defence being that found 
under Art 8.4 “circumstances beyond the control o f  the transport integrator”.
512 Although the original remit o f  this group was to cover all modes o f  transport including short sea 
carriage but excluding sea carriage, the draft that was produced was inclusive o f  all possible liability 
regimes
513 See chapter 6 for a discussion o f  the concept o f  strict liability within multimodal transport.
514 The term ‘integrator’ is used in place o f  the multimodal transport operator to provide constitency 
between the draft and the title o f  the initiative which is ISIC
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This standard is not new in the transport field in the sense that it resembles the 
strict liability o f the common carrier and it appears to be stricter than the liability 
of utmost care found within the CMR.
Practically, this standard can be found under every transport regime that 
exonerates the carrier for acts beyond his control. A typical example will be the 
defences of inherent vice o f the goods and acts of the consignee; acts over which 
the carrier has no control.
O f particular importance in this case is the fact that the catalogue o f exceptions 
found in the unimodal conventions has been replaced with such a simple standard, 
which will be simple to use and understand.
This draft hereby lays down a uniform liability regime, which is certain and 
predictable, applicable irrespective o f the geographical location, o f the loss or 
damage, the modes used or even the carriers. This draft is therefore free from the 
criticisms which have plagued the network system o f liability, under which 
different liability regimes become applicable when loss or damage is localised, or 
the criticism o f the UNCITRAL draft that in addition to the applicability of 
different laws, clauses meant for maritime transport are superimposed on land 
based transport in case o f unlocalised loss or damage. This is avoided in this draft, 
which does not originate from one particular mode o f transport but the product of 
consultations between the different stakeholders interested in transportation. This 
is likely to provide a balance draft in which the different interests o f the different 
groups are addressed.
The delay in suit experienced from the network system in which time and money 
is spent in adducing evidence to localise loss or plead numerous exceptions is 
avoided. This would also reduce the legal burden of establishing the relevant 
regime, thereby also reducing the need to adduce factual evidence to clarify the 
party liable.
The question that has to be answered is the acceptability o f this system o f liability 
within the carrying fraternity. It is submitted here that there will be some initial
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resistance as they come to terms with this draft, but the simplicity of the draft will 
eventually prevail.515
2) The Limitation
One o f the criticisms that run through most of the conventions is the low limit of 
liability. Some o f these limits were established in the 1920’s and the 1930’s under 
considerably different conditions from those existing today. Increasingly, there 
have been different calls for an increase in these limits within the different modes 
notably within the carriage o f goods by air.
Reflecting this trend the draft chooses the highest limit applicable in any transport 
convention, 17 SDR per kilogramme o f gross weight. This choice provides an 
adequate monetary limit whenever loss or damage occurs during multimodal 
transport. While there is no change when the carriage concerns air and rail carriage 
as this figure represents the figure within their respective regimes, there is a great 
change in the case o f carriage by sea from 2 SDR and in road carriage from 8.33 
SDR to 17 SDR respectively.
Such a limit should ensure a fall in litigation especially in cases in which the 
parties seek to break the limits by proving wilful misconduct or gross negligence 
in a quest to gain unlimited liability.
The draft also allows the parties to agree on a higher limit than provided in the 
draft, thereby effectively allowing for freedom of contract.
Although the limits are unbreakable, this does not present a problem to the parties 
as they are allowed to opt-out o f the provisions.
3) A Non-Mandatory Regime
On the whole, a mandatory regime would be more effective as it ensures that the 
same law applies to all similar cases.
The choice o f a non-mandatory regime lies in the fact that it will allow a certain 
freedom of contract. The parties would be free to opt out o f the whole convention. 
If they fail to opt out the whole convention will be applicable.516 By opting for
515 See Chapter 6
516 Similar to the provisions o f  the 1980 United Nations Convention on the International Sale o f  Goods.
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such a non-mandatory instrument, the draft endorses the concept o f model laws, 
the advantage o f which lies in the fact that these laws apply only when the parties 
agree to make it applicable to their contract, so it is hardly resisted.
This is obviously an incentive, as the opting out does not prevent parties to 
incorporate the provisions into their contract and thereby gain through contractual 
means the benefits o f the draft.
A non-mandatory instrument would not conflicts with the other international 
conventions, which have established their individual rules for liability, thus it will 
be more acceptable to the transport industry. Such “soft law” however, lacks the 
kind of legal status needed for true uniformity.
4) Conflict of Conventions
O f prime importance is the potential o f substantial conflict with other international 
unimodal transport conventions. The draft seeks to provide a uniform liability 
regime applicable throughout carriage irrespective of localisation. The draft does 
not allow the parties to invoke the liability provisions o f any other transport 
convention; neither does it abdicate in favour o f another as under TheUNCITRAL 
Draft. The question here is if  this will not lead to a conflict o f conventions in 
certain instances in which the draft and another unimodal convention might be 
applicable.
By the provisions o f The Hague Visby rules, this will not cause a problem as the 
rules is triggered by the issue of a bill o f lading or similar transport document 
evidencing a contract for the carriage o f goods by sea. In the case o f the CMR, it is 
not so straightforward. We have seen in the different jurisdictions that the 
provision of Art 1 o f the CMR is interpreted differently. While in Germany, such a 
multimodal transport contract will not be considered to be a CMR contract as it 
fails to be one for the exclusive carriage by road, in England the Quantum case has 
finally settled the law on that point, holding that the CMR applies to a part of a 
multimodal transport contract.517
517 Quantum Corp Ltd v. Plane Trucking Ltd [2001] 2 Lloyd’s R ep.133, reversed [2002] EWCA Civ 
350
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Under the CIM a conflict situation might occur as it extends its scope of 
application to lines complementary to rail carriage and included in the list. In this 
case the solution might be to ensure that multimodal lines are not included in the 
list.
In the event that loss or damage occurs during carriage by air, it is unlikely that 
any conflict will take place.
Art 38.1 o f the Warsaw Convention states that the convention will apply to the air 
leg o f a multimodal transport contract provided the contract falls within the ambit 
of Art 1.1 which limits the convention to carriage o f good by air. Since this 
contract is not a contract for the carriage o f goods by air this convention will not 
apply to it.
5) Parties Liable
The draft seeks to avoid the problem o f whom to sue by ensuring that only the 
MTO is liable. In Art 1 in which the different parties are defined, the draft defines 
the transport ‘intergrator’1 (f), the consignee, 1(C), and the consignor 1(b) as the 
parties that fall within the ambit o f the draft. The draft does not define the 
performing party inspite o f the acknowledgment that in multimodal transport, the 
‘integrator’ can contract the whole carriage to other carriers.
This exclusion might be to ensure that it is clear who the liable party is by 
avoiding the ambiguity o f the exact status o f the performing carrier. In this sense 
the draft is made simple and any other action falls outside its parameters.
The question here is the practicality o f this omission. It is clear that the claimants 
in some instances would sue the “performing carrier”. When this happens, another 
law will be applicable to the localised loss or damage.
This omission also brings into focus the concept o f the Himalaya and circular 
indemnity clauses which the transport ‘integrator’ will have to rely on to extend 
the benefit o f the rules and to protect performing parties. This might discourage 
actions against the performing parties.
The proposed regime is seen here as a great leap forward in the quest for a liability 
regime for multimodal transport.
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By providing a simple and transparent strict liability for the MTO it eliminates 
most of the problems that have plagued multimodal transport so far. It seeks to 
ensure that there is a uniform liability regime irrespective of where loss or damage 
occurred, irrespective o f the jurisdiction in which this case is brought.
It deals in a simple fashion with the problem o f the liable party, and the status of 
the contract thereby ensuring that no conflict exists between this draft and 
unimodal conventions.
It increases the limits o f liability to appease some factions and discourage others 
from lawsuits.
And finally it completely eradicates the problem of the sum total o f all unimodal 
exceptions applying in multimodal transport and will succeed in avoiding the 
resistance o f the strong transport lobby as it states its obvious non-mandatory 
status.
This draft as a whole holds a lot o f promise. It’s potential to act as the focal point 
in the discussions o f a multimodal convention or directive is strong. It is hoped 
that this would form the basis o f the discussions leading to the international 
convention that multimodal transport has been waiting for.
5.2 REGIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Numerous regional organisations have established laws and regulations to regulate 
multimodal transport in their respective regions, thereby acknowledging the 
tremendous importance placed on this mode of transport. Model laws on the lines of 
the UNCTAD/ICC rules are no longer considered to be sufficient in this field. 
However, these different rules only go to exacerbate the problem of a proliferation of 
liability regimes and applicable laws in this field. Within the different Regional 
Multimodal transport laws, there is some consistency, in that they all are based on the 
UNCTAD/ICC rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention: The Draft ASEAN 
Framework agreement on Multimodal transport,518 the ALADI Agreement on
518 The Countries in this group are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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International Multimodal Transport 1996,519 The ARDEAN Decision 331 of 4th 
March as Modified by Decision 393 of 9 July 1996 ‘International Multimodal 
Transport,520 and the MERCOSUR52'Partial Agreement for the Facilitation of 
Multimodal Transport o f Goods, 27 April 1995. It must be noted here that the fact that 
the some countries are members o f multiple agreements is likely to lead to conflict 
within multimodal transport regulation in Latin American.
5.3 National Initiatives on Multimodal transport
The failure of the Multimodal Transport Convention and the absence of an 
applicable liability regime in multimodal transport has left national legislature with no 
option but to modernise their various laws taking multimodal transport into account; 
These accounts for the fact that currently more than 10 Countries have enacted 
legislation to cover multimodal transport.522 Most of these countries have adopted the 
modified network system o f liability either of the UNCTAD/ICC rules or as found in 
the Multimodal Transport Convention. The enacted laws are generally mandatory and 
often specifically provide that any derogation will be null and void.
In this section, we seek to examine the some of the provisions o f these laws and 
assess their impact on the uniformity and eventual predictability of multimodal 
transport liability. Due to the impracticality of examining all the laws, we will limit 
our inquiry to the laws that are more elaborate or deviate from the more common 
terms under which multimodal transport operates. In this light we will examine the 
regimes in the Netherlands, Germany and China.
5.3.1 Multimodal Laws in the Netherlands
The Dutch New Civil Code (“Burgerlijk Wetboek”), which entered into force in 1991 
in the Netherlands, contains provision for multimodal523 transport in its Book 8, title
519 5,9 Member States include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Chili, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
520 This is made up o f  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela
521 The Countries in this group are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
522 Argentina; 1998, Brazil; 1998, China; 1993,1997,1999, Colombia; 1999, Ecuador; 1999, Germany; 
1998, India; 1993, Mexico; 1993, Netherlands; 199land Paraguay; 1997
523 The Dutch Law book mostly refer to it as combined transport
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2, Chapter 2- sections 40-50. The law that has been in force since 1991 contains 
elaborate provisions on multimodal transport.
It defines multimodal transport in its Book 8 section 40 as;
“The contract fo r  combined transport o f  goods whereby the carrier (combined 
operator) binds him self towards the consignor in one and the same contract, to the 
effect that carriage will take place in part by sea, inland waterways, road, rail, air, 
pipeline or by means o f  any other mode o f transport ”
The multimodal transport covered by the law can be said to be complete multimodal 
transport, meant to apply to all modes o f transport used in the carriage of goods.
This definition is very wide and states the modes applicable. This stance had been 
previously proposed by the TCM in the 1972 attempt but rejected under the 1980 
convention.524 In that instance the definition o f modes was thought to be restrictive as 
it enumerated the modes without the qualification similar to that in the Dutch law, “by 
means o f  any other mode o f  transport” after enumerating the stated modes. This 
qualification can be interpreted as allowing any future modes to be covered by the 
law.
The liability regime adopted by the law is the network system, which is applicable in 
multimodal transport especially under those contracts using the UNCTAD/ICC rules. 
This ensures that the law is similar to what already obtains in multimodal transport. 
This system ensures that the relationship between the carrier and shipper is regulated 
by the regimes that would have applied to the different parts of the contract.
Art 41 states that,
“In a contract o f  combined carriage, each part o f  the carriage is governed by 
the judicial rules applicable to that part. ”
This provision brings into play the problem of determining what part of the transport 
loss or damage occurred to establish the relevant law. The regime, which becomes 
applicable to the loss or damage as a result o f localisation, is also used to determine 
the other elements of the case. Thus unlike the UNCITRAL instrument which limits 
the application of mandatory regimes to certain aspects of liability, the Dutch law 
ensures that the whole case is covered by the same law.
524 Transport Combine de Marchandise,(TCM) UN Doc. Trans/370, M assey, E.A « A critical look at 
the TCM”, (1971 )3  JMLC 725
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Art 46 ensures that within the legal relationships between the parties the requirements 
of applicability are satisfied, particularly the documentation. It states,
Section 46
1) “For that part o f  the carriage according to the contract entered into by the 
parties will take place as carriage by sea or inland waterways, the CT 
document is deemed the bill o f  lading.
2) For that part o f  the carriage according to the contract entered into by the 
parties will take place as carriage by road, the CT document is deemed to 
be a consignment note.
3) For that part o f  the carriage according to the contract entered into by the 
parties will take place as carriage by rail or air, the CT document is 
deemed to be a document fo r  such carriage provided it also complies with 
the requirements therefore ”
The problem of the applicability o f another convention is seen here. A typical case 
would be the applicability o f the Hague Visby Rules when no Bill of lading or similar 
document of transport has been issued. Art 46 tries to deal with such cases, which 
invoke the hypothetical case and the legal fiction by providing assistance in dealing 
with them. This article however provides an exception in the case of rail and air 
carriage by providing that the multimodal transport document must satisfy the 
requirements set by rail and air conventions. The fact is that a normal Multimodal 
transport document will not satisfy these requirements with the conclusion that both 
of these conventions will hardly apply to multimodal transport under The Dutch Civil 
code. In such cases the civil code will apply.
In the case of non-localised loss or damage, Art 42 of the Civil Law will become 
applicable. This article states that,
“ 1. I f  the combined transport operator does not deliver goods to destination 
on time and in the state in which he has received them, and i f  it has not been 
ascertained where the fact causing the loss, damage or delay has arisen he shall be 
liable fo r  the damage arising there from, unless he proves that he is not liable 
therefore on any o f the stages o f the transport where loss, damage or delay may have 
occurred.
2 Any stipulation derogating from this article is null”
Art 43 states;
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“ I f  the combined carrier is liable fo r  the damage resulting from damage, total 
or partial loss, delay or any other damaging fact, and i f  it has not been ascertained 
where the fact leading hereto has arisen, his liability shall be determined according to 
the regime which applies to that stage or to those stages o f the transport where this 
fact may have arisen and from  which the highest amount o f  damaged result. ”
The liability of the carrier under article 42 is unclear, does the phrase 'he is not liable 
on any o f the stages o f  the transport ’ mean that he has to adduce evidence acceptable 
under all the modes to show that he is not liable? Or does it merely require him on a 
balance of probabilities to pinpoint the possible modes where damage could have 
occurred and seek to exonerate him? Either way his burden is still particularly 
onerous and likely to lead to a case in which the carrier might find he is strictly liable 
even in cases where neither he nor his servants may have been negligent.
Article 43 on its part imposes the highest level of liability on the carrier when he 
cannot localise loss or damage. This provision is very favourable to the claimant. And 
can be seen as a provision that will ensure that the CTO does all in his power to 
ensure that the loss or damage is localised.
The same stance is taken in the case of time limitation, Art 1722 (2) states;
“ I f  in a contract o f  combined carriage o f  goods, the person instituting the 
action does not know where the fact given rise to the action has occurred, o f  all the 
relevant statute o f  limitation the most favourable one to him shall apply ”
This rule allows the most favourable time limit to apply to the claimants in case of 
unlocalised loss or damage.
The Dutch Civil Law provisions can be said to be very favourable to the claimants 
especially in case of unlocalised loss where it ensures that the claimant has the 
advantage and the burden of proving otherwise is on the carrier. These rules apply 
mandatorily in Holland and cannot be derogated from.
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5.3.2 Multimodal Laws in Germany
While the Dutch Civil Code covers ‘total multimodal transport’, the German 
alternative covers all the different modes of transport apart from sea carriages.
The German Transport Reform Act 1998 introduced one identical law for the 
transportation o f goods on land; road, rail, inland waterways, by so doing reformed an
525important part o f Germany’s transport law. (The Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)).
Prior to this law transport law in Germany was quite fragmentary with different rules 
for;
Inland transport by road o f more than 75 km 
Inland transport by road under 75 km 
Carriage o f household goods by road 
Transport on inland waterways 
Transport by air 
Sect 407 (3) states that,
“The provisions o f  this subsection will apply whenever the goods are to be 
carried over land, on inland waterways or aircraft.
This act, which is based on the CMR 1956, applies in a uniform manner to 
carriage of goods over land-based and air modes and has modified slightly the 
basis of liability of the carrier.526 Under the old law, the carrier was liable for 
loss or damage based on presumed negligence, but under the CMR the carrier 
has a more stringent basis of liability, which is predicated on utmost diligence 
or utmost good care.
This law however does not cover carriage of goods by sea. The provisions of 
the HGB remain unchanged for maritime carriage.
The Act also adopts the network liability system as its basis o f liability in its 
Art 452 of the HGB. If  the loss or damage is localised, the carrier will be liable 
according to the rules that would have applied to that mode if the parties had 
made a unimodal transport contract for that mode. However, the parties can
525 This new law is found in the Handeldesetzbuch 5commercial Code) This code contains new  
paragraghs 407-475h.
526 The fact that the act also covers air transport has been criticised see Johannes Trappe, “The Reform 
o f  German transport Law” [2002] LMCLQ 393 at pg 395. This provision w ill probably not have the 
chance to apply as air transport within a country is not as prevalent as road or rail carriage.
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agree that even in case o f localised loss or damage, the general provisions 
should app ly .527 The parties are also allowed to agree on different terms of
528liability to the extent that the applicable laws allow for such a variation.
When the loss or damage is not localised, the general transport rules will 
apply.
The limits o f liability are placed on the same level as the CMR, 8.33 SDR per 
kilo of goods lost, although the parties are allowed to contractually vary the 
limits to either an amount higher or lower than the stated amount.
The time limitation provision is one year and three years in case of wilful or 
reckless conduct with knowledge that loss will occur.
In the case o f the German law we see a case in which the law regulates 
multimodal transport without sea carriage. This therefore means that different 
laws will still apply to the multimodal transport of goods. The network system 
and the opting outs allowed to lower the limits also means that neither the 
applicable law nor the limits of liability will be predictable.
5.3.3 Multimodal laws in The Peoples Republic of China
There are 3 main laws applicable to multimodal transport in the Peoples Republic of 
China;
1) The Maritime code 1993 Chapter IV, Section 8
2) Regulations covering International Multimodal transport o f Containers
3) The Contract Law of 1999, Chapter 17 Section 4 on contracts for Multimodal 
transport
Generally, the relevant provisions in The Contract law 1999 apply to all commercial 
contracts in China, including all contracts of carriage and multimodal transport. 
However, Art 123 of the law specifically states “ifthere are provisions as otherwise 
stipulated in respect to contracts in other laws, such provisions shall be followed". As
527 Art 425d (2)
528ibid
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there are two different laws specifically stipulated for multimodal transport, the 
Maritime code and the regulations for containers, only multimodal carriage otherwise 
than by sea and in containers will be governed by the Contracts Law 1999. In this 
respect, multimodal transport covering road, rail and air transport are covered by the 
Contract law 1999.
In The Peoples Republic o f China thus one can state that 3 different rules apply to 
multimodal transport.
1) The Maritime Code 1993
Chapter IV, section 8 o f the Maritime code governs multimodal transport in which a 
sea leg is involved. In five Articles (102-106) it caters for multimodal transport from 
its definition to its liability regime. On matters concerning the definitions of the 
multimodal transport operator, the multimodal contract and document, and period of 
responsibility; it follows like provisions in other multimodal transport rules notably 
the UNCTAD/ICC rules.
As concerns the basis o f liability, the Code also uses the network system of liability in 
its Article 105. It states that in case o f localised loss or damage, the relevant 
provisions will apply to the loss or damage. However, it also specifies that only the 
provisions concerning liability and limits will apply. Meaning that on other matters 
such as the time limitation, the code will apply. Provisions such as this noted above 
bring about fragmentary application o f laws and run the risk of conflicts with other 
laws.
If however, damage cannot be localised, the liability of the MTO will be determined 
by the provision in the code governing the carrier’s liability.529 Predictably his 
responsibility for the goods, limits both time and money are fashioned after the Hague 
Visby Rules, including benefiting from the exceptions of nautical fault. Unlike the 
Hague Rules however, the code engages the carrier liability in cases of delay.530 
The limits are therefore pegged at 2SDR per kilogram of gross weight of the goods 
lost or damaged which ever is higher unless the value of the goods have been declared 
by the shipper and inserted in the bill o f  lading or a higher limit has been agreed on
529 The basis o f  liability is based on the Hague and Hague Visby Rules
530 Art 50
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between the carrier and the shipper. His liability for delay in delivery is limited to an 
amount equivalent to freight payable for the goods delayed.
2) Regulations Governing International Multimodal Transport of Containers 
1997
This regulation applies to the international multimodal transport of goods in 
containers and came into force in 1997. It limits itself to the carriage of good in 
containers by waterways, highways and rail; it does not cover carriage by air.
This regulation governs international multimodal transport by containers; it states that 
this regulation apply to;
“ ...The international carriage o f  goods by containers from  one place in one 
country at which the international containers are taken in charge by the international 
MTO to a designated place o f  delivery situated in another country”531
The liability of the MTO is stated in Art 27 and also contains the network system of 
liability making the MTO liable for loss or damage during the period in which goods 
are in his charge for carriage.
When loss, damage or delay can be localised, the rules and regulations governing the 
particular stage at which the loss or damage occurred will apply.
When loss cannot be localised, art 4 of the Regulations will apply to the whole 
carriage.
When the multimodal transport includes carriage by sea, the limits of liability 
applicable will be governed by the Maritime code of China, and when the multimodal 
transport does not cover carriage by sea, the liability shall be regulated by the 
relevant laws; In this case the Contract Law of 1999.
The question here is the feasibility of this regulation. What is the implication that a 
national regulation purports to regulate international carriage of goods in containers 
between two states. In the cases of international conventions there is always the 
requirement of a connection with a contracting state, in this case ‘what is the link’?
531 Art 4
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This provision will conflict with other international regimes for international 
multimodal transport, in the sense that both this regulation and other mandatory laws 
will apply to the same contract. The main problem with this provision is the fact that 
it purports to apply to inward and outward international multimodal transport contract 
with China. It thus covers even those contracts made out of China. This regulation, 
which is a domestic one, extends out side as well.532 The question is if this might not 
violate the rule o f law.
3) The Contract Law, 1999 
Section 4 chapters 17 of the contracts law applies to contract for multimodal transport. 
In its five articles, it covers the relevant provision for multimodal transport. As stated 
earlier, this is the residual part o f multimodal transport which is covered neither by 
the Maritime code nor the Regulations for the international multimodal transport of 
containers. In this respect, it will cover exclusively land and air based multimodal 
transport.
The proliferation of national laws with slightly different varying provisions on 
multimodal transport will constitute further fragmentation o f an area, which is already 
very fragile in terms of the proliferation of laws applicable. These laws have added to 
the applicable laws and could lead to resistance later from those jurisdictions when a 
body of jurisprudence and precedence would have grown around the laws giving them 
a certain value of predictability within these jurisdictions.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the attempts over the years by International 
Organisations Regional and National bodies to solve the problem of an 
unpredictable liability regime; so far none has been able to provide viable 
solutions to the global multimodal transport problem.
532 Most laws on carriage o f  goods apply only to out-ward bound carriage. However, the US COGSA  
“99” will apply to both out-wards and inwards carriage. This stance has been greatly criticised 
especially by the Canadians as supplanting their COGWA, as all trade with the US will now also be 
covered by the US COGSA 99. See the Submission o f  the Canadian Maritime Association Regarding 
the US COGSA , sixth draft (Sept 1999) in Tetley, W. “Reform o f  Carriage o f  goods -  The 
UNCITRAL Draft and the Senate COGSA 1999 Lets have a two tract approach” (2003) 28 Tulane 
Maritime law journal 1-144
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This is due primarily from the fact that they are mostly based on unimodal 
concepts; we have seen the network principle of liability used by nearly all the 
proposals apart from the draft o f the UNECE which has not yet had been 
deliberated on.
Another aspect o f this problem is the attachment to the principle o f presumed 
liability for multimodal transport. It was asserted in chapter 3 that this is indeed a 
liability theory that cannot be sustained in multimodal transport.
Given the unanimous acceptance that a new liability regime is needed in 
multimodal transport, it is time to abandon the old ways in which unimodal 
conventions have been used as a base for multimodal transport.
A long-term solution would be one in which a convention is drafted for 
multimodal transport which takes into consideration only multimodal transport 
concerns. Given that within multimodal transport concerns we find unimodal 
transport concerns, such an instrument will be able to cover unimodal transport as 
well.
Such an instrument will involve a formidable task, and such a task would be viable 
only if  a new theory o f liability in multimodal transport is introduced, one which 
will to a great extent solve the problems o f an uncertain and unpredictable liability 
regime in multimodal transport.
However, with the work been carried out within UNCITRAL and UNECE it can 
be stated that there is yet hope for multimodal transport.
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CHAPTER 6
A MODERN LIABILITY REGIME FOR MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The liability regime for multimodal transport established within transport law has 
been shown to be unpredictable and outmoded.533 Both the organisational 
arrangement and the current technical options on which multimodal transport is 
based fails to accommodate the future growing demand of this mode. UNCTAD 
responded to the challenge by drafting the U. N. Multimodal Transport Convention, 
but failed to adequately address the pertinent questions of what the liability regime 
should be, as it was based on unimodal ideals.534 Thus currently, The Hague-Visby 
Rules, The Warsaw System Conventions, The CMR, The CIM/COTIF, The CMNI 
together with their numerous amendments and supplements and national mandatory 
laws govern liability and allocate risk within multimodal transport.
This proliferation o f applicable liability regimes is exacerbated by the fact that these 
different liability regimes differ with regards to their basis o f liability, exemptions, 
time limits and monetary limit. Thus the risk allocation is never certain at the 
formation o f the contract, thereby depriving the parties o f valuable information 
concerning their risk coverage.
Recent developments characterized mostly by The UNCITRAL Draft tend to point 
towards an eventual resolution that is also largely based upon the existing unimodal 
system of liability as it seeks to extend sea carriage to accommodate multimodal 
transport as well. This inclusion o f multimodal transport within the discussions of 
sea transport convention is laudable, but as the circumstances dictates it covers only 
‘wet multimodal transport’; failing to include all combinations o f modes in 
multimodal transport. The solution, it was argued in this thesis is not to extend a 
unimodal convention to cover multimodal transport because o f the obvious bias 
such an extension would have vis-a-vis the other unimodal transport conventions,
533 See Chapter 2 and 3
534 See Chapter 4
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but to have an independent convention relating to multimodal transport and also 
possibly unimodal transport.
Uniformity in the liability regime in multimodal transport will present considerable 
advantages. It will eliminate the plethora of unimodal conventions and national laws 
which dominate multimodal transport and promote multimodal transport by 
ensuring that only one applicable liability regime governs this mode, irrespective of 
the loss or damage history.
A uniform and predictable liability regime would reduce litigation cost, especially 
transaction cost involved in handling claims.535
The success o f any such new liability regime will depend on the adequacy with 
which existing arrangements can address the current legal challenges. Presently the 
reality shows a readiness to address key issues with increasing calls within 
multimodal discussions to bring forth a liability regime that reflects multimodal 
realities; a uniform liability regime based on strict liability.536 This basis it is 
contended will eliminate the possibility that numerous carriers may be held 
responsible and numerous laws applicable for loss under a single transport contract.
It must be acknowledged here that attempting to elaborate a long-term framework 
for liability in multimodal transport would be fruitful if the basis o f liability is 
changed to reflect multimodal realities. In this light, it is proposed that the presumed 
liability regime that runs through the different transport conventions and applies to 
multimodal transport be modified or changed.
Drawing from the previous chapters, this chapter will raise the argument that, since 
the present allocation o f liability in multimodal transport is uncertain; a new 
allocation o f liability is needed. This chapter will then argue for a change o f the 
liability regime to a strict liability regime with limits.
The discussions in this chapter leads to the conclusion that strict liability with limits 
by way o f a mandatory single convention in multimodal transport will lead to the 
predictability and certainty that is needed in multimodal transport.
535 INTERMODAL Transport liability (1999) on line: http:/interpool.com/tcl/disc 1/0000005.htm
536 Regina Asariotis, “Towards Improved Intermodal Freight in Europe and the United States: Next 
Steps, Report o f  the ENO Transportation Foundation, Policy Forum held, November 1-20 1998. Here 
Asariotis asserted that the most cost effective solution for multimodal liability would be the full and 
strict liability o f  the contracting carrier.
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Specifically, this chapter will discuss the concept o f strict liability as an 
appropriate basis o f  liability in multimodal transport from a law and economic 
perspective. The basic principles o f the economic analysis o f accident law will be 
examined to show how from a theoretical perspective, the optimal components for 
the allocation o f loss between the parties should take place.
Against this backdrop, the proposed strict liability o f the MTO would be assessed 
to judge its feasibility as an appropriate liability basis in multimodal transport.
6.1 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There is widespread support for the opinion that the time has come for a single 
uniform liability regime to be introduced in this mode of transport, to eradicate the 
unpredictability that acts as a hindrance to the further development in this mode.537 
The question that needs answering is what should this regime be? What should it 
be based on and should it be mandatory or not; this chapter thus seeks to examine 
the form such a regime should take.
In the search for a predictable and certain liability regime, one is bound to 
acknowledge the truth that,
"... in commercial matters it usually 
matters very little what law or form  is adopted as long as it is 
adopted by everyone concerned. There are many antique documentary 
form s in circulation and many old rules, but they serve a purpose  
because there are accepted i f  documents and fo llow ed i f  rules.
From this view point, there is no one best rule fo r  liability, and 
arguments about a best rule, while capable o f  being on the level 
o f  rational debate, are ju s t not weighty. Commerce will flo w  i f  the 
limit o f  carrier responsibility is lowered to ten pence a ton or i f  it is 
raised to ten thousand gold franc o f  millesimal fineness o f  999
537 Implementation o f  multimodal transport rules: Report prepared by UNCTAD Sec., 
www.org/en/docs/po/sdte/tlbd/2.en.pdf. Hannu Honka, “The Legislative Future o f  Carriage o f  Goods 
by Sea: Could it not be the UNCITRAL Draft” (2004) 46 Scandinavian Studies in Law 92 at p. I l l
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parts. I f  the liability is low, shippers will buy insurance, i f  the limit 
Is high then in a sense the shippers o f  valued goods are being 
Subsidised. The argument can be good, bad or indifferent, but all 
the merchant wants to know is, iWHAT IS THE RULE?”538
The above quote epitomises the attitude o f certain authors who contend that what 
is needed in multimodal transport today is knowledge.539 The largest problem in 
multimodal transport is the lack o f  information as to what liability regime would 
apply. As stated in the quote, once it is clear what the liability exposure for each 
party is, parties will take appropriate measures to ensure that they are 
appropriately covered preferably by insurance. In the light of the unpredictability 
and uncertainty in multimodal transport, it has been asserted that cargo and 
liability insurance have become key players in maintaining a workable multimodal
540transport.
What we need here, are not default solutions at every turn, but a uniform liability 
regime that would truly reflect multimodal realities, however,
“...Making the law uniform will not make it better 
Unless we know which solution is better? ”541
The search for a better solution has been a transport preoccupation for such a long 
time dating back to the 1930’s when the possibility o f multimodal transport rules 
was first discussed.542 In 2000,543 the UNCTAD Secretariat sought to find the 
answer to a better solution by circulating a questionnaire to all governments and
538 Legal impediments to Intermodal transportation (The Slait Report), Maritime Transportation 
Research Board, 1971, Reviewed by Robert Khurash [1971] 3 JMLC, 831, at 833, See also C.E. 
M cDowell “ Containerisation: Comments on Insurance and Liability [1971] 3 JMLC 503 p. 511
539 Nicholas de la Garza, “ UNCITRAL’s Proposed Instrument on the International Marine Carriage o f  
Goods » (2004) 32 Transportation Law Journal 95 at p.98 See also Micheal F. Sturley, “Changing 
Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments about Hague, Visby, and 
Hamburg in a vacuum o f  Empirical Evidence” (1993) 24 JMLC 119 at p. 123
540 William J. Coffey “Multimodalism and the American Carrier” [1989] 64 Tulane Law Rev p. 569
541 Gordley, Comparative legal research [1995] 43 AJCL pg. 555
542 This attempt was made by the international institute for the unification o f  private law UNIDRIOT, 
UPD1963, and ET.XL.II DOC.29
543 Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility o f  an international legal instrument. UNCTAD Secretariat,
U N C TA D /SD TE/TLB/2003/1
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industry as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations and a 
few experts on multimodal transport to assess the current lines on which 
multimodal liability should be reformed, this stance was to ensure that all sectors 
were taken into consideration in what ever solutions were proposed. Replies were 
received from all sectors; governments, non-governmental organisations, operators 
o f transport services, freight forwarders, terminal operators, liability insurers as 
well as shippers and other transport users.
This was to allow UNCTAD to re-evaluate the factors that are needed to bring 
about an acceptable level o f predictability in multimodal transport. The different 
proposals for an appropriate liability regime ranged from calls for a new 
convention to cover all transport modes, to extensions of unimodal conventions to 
cover multimodal transport.544 This proposal included many possibilities; however, 
it must be acknowledged that any new law will only be acceptable if  it brings 
positive and real benefits by eliminating most o f the uncertainties and 
unpredictability in multimodal transport liability.
6.2 THEORITICAL BASIS OF STRICT LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL 
TRANSPORT
The theoretical basis o f liability in multimodal transport can be regarded as 
concerning two basic debates; the determination o f which system o f liability 
would best suit multimodal transport, a uniform or network system, and the basis on 
which this liability regime should rest; presumed liability as obtains in unimodal 
transport or strict liability.
6.2.1 Presumed or Strict liability
Liability based on fault and presumed liability has been the basis o f liability used in 
transport law.545 In some cases however, the law can go further, and imposes 
liability without fault; in which case the carrier is liable irrespective o f fault. The 
proposition that strict liability might be the proper basis o f liability in multimodal
545 Presumed liability has been discussed in chapter 3 and 4
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transport might be a welcomed change. This principle was under consideration and 
discarded in the discussions concerning multimodal transport.546 Strict liability has 
also been proposed within the scope of different transport modes547 and within 
academic circles.548
In the carriage o f goods by air there was a movement towards an absolute system of 
liability, away from the presumed fault concept as laid down in the 1929 Warsaw 
Convention.549
As far back as 1933 strict liability was an option in the Rome Convention and its 
amendment in 1952 for damage caused by aircrafts to 3rd persons on the surface.550 
In 1966 the Montreal Interim Agreement endorsed such a basis, as did the 1971 
Guatemala City Protocol. The Montreal Protocol No 4 of 1975 also imposed a strict 
liability for the air carrier.
Additionally, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
and the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liabilities of Operation o f Nuclear Ships 
both advocated for strict liability.
Following the disaster o f the Torrey Canyon incident o f 1967, The International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage was enacted in 1969 
famously referred to as the 1969 CLC. This convention imposed strict liability on 
the ship owner for oil pollution up to a certain limit, a requirement for compulsory 
insurance and liability channelled exclusively to the shipowner.551
546 UNCTAD Secretariat, International Intermodal Transport Operation, U N Doc. TD/B/AC .15/7, at 
17-19, See also Maritime Administration; is it time for a Change? Proceedings o f  a symposium on 
Cargo Insurance and Transportation liability (1973): Department o f  transport. How ever this principle 
was rejected by the preparatory group on intergovernmental bodies involved in the preparation o f  the 
Hamburg rules, 3rd Session Report, 4-20 February, 1974, Un D oc, A /C N .9.88
547 In Air Transport, Peter Martin, “50 Years o f  the Warsaw Convention and the practical Mans Guide 
[1979] 4 Annals o f  Air and Space law 233 p.236, in the case o f  carriage by seam see John Kimball 
“Shipowners Liability and the Proposed Revision o f  the Hague Rules” [1975] 7 JMLC 217 p.249
548 See Regina Asariotis Supra at note 535 p. 45
549. Peter Martins, "50 years o f  the Warsaw Convention. A Practical Man's Guide" (1 9 7 9 )  IV  
Annals o f  Air and Space Law (1 9 7 9 )  233
550 Bin Chang: "Strict And Absolute Liability: A reply to charges o f  having inter alia misused the 
terms Absolute Liability" ( 1 9 8 1 )  VI Ann o f  A&S Law 3-1 3 .  Peter Martins, "50 years o f  the 
Warsaw Convention. A  Practical Man's Guide" (1 9 7 9 )  IV  Annals o f  Air and Space Law (1 9 7 9 )  
233.  Werner Guldiman, "A future system o f  liability in air law" (1991) XVI Annals o f  Air and 
Space Law 53 at p 93.
551 Tanikawa, H., “A Revolution in Maritime Law: a History o f  the Original Legal Framework on Oil 
spill liability and Compensation,” in the IOPC Funds’ 25 Years o f  Compensating victims o f  Pollution 
Incidents, London, The IOPC Funds, 2003.
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Also in the 1970’s there was a move from fault liability towards strict liability in 
other areas o f the law, especially motor vehicle law.552 Calabresi553 advocated the 
return to an absolute system o f liability from the fault theory, all based on a 
predetermination o f who will incur the least cost, and that person made to pay for 
the accident. He will then know in advance that he will pay and therefore will have 
the incentive to reduce the risk o f accidents. The question here was if the person 
could avoid the accident. Pearson554 also states that there is no need to inquire into 
fault; rather it will be a determination of or identification o f who generated the risk 
or who would have avoided the risk of the accident. The risk creator would then be 
required to insure against such a risk.555
Although the strict liability basis o f liability is quite contrary to traditional maritime 
rules, its adoption under the 1969 CLC is now widely accepted, paving the way for 
any arguments as to the use o f strict liability within (maritime) carriage.
The reason for this basis o f liability was predicated on the fact that the plaintiff 
could not carry out any action to prevent loss and when loss occurs could not 
adduce evidence to prove negligence. He merely needed to prove that damage 
occurred and the defendant is liable, apart from cases in which the plaintiff is 
negligent.
Such a system will bring about simplicity into multimodal transport, because of the 
sheer certainty as to the liability regime, since no exception clauses are implied. 
This will lead to saving in time; cost and the burden o f proof will cease to be a 
‘burden’.556
The rationale for advocating such a basis o f liability in multimodal transport is 
based on the fact that the carrier is more equipped to bear the loss o f any such 
accident. This stance was summed up by Roscoe Pound as
552 Ngwafor, E N, A p r o p o s e d  no f a u l t  a u to m o b i l e  in s u r a n c e  s c h e m e  1 9 8 0  Thesis, 
unpublished. Atiyah, "Accident compensation and the law", (4th ed. London.). De Percq, "In defence o f  
the fault principle" (1 9 5 9 )  Uz Minn L Rev 4 9 9  at 500.
553 81 Y ale LJ 1058 at 1060-64., Calabresi, G, “The cost O f accident” (1970) 75 at p. 135
554 Pearson Report. Vo I 2.
555 Fletcher, "Reciprocity o f  risk between parties: The party who subjects the other to the greatest risk 
ofinjury must compensate" (1 9  72) 85  Harv L R 537 .
556 J A Kluwun, "Analysis o f  criticism s o f  the fault system" (1 9 6 7 )  Ins LJ 3 8 9  at 3 91 .  Merryolt, 
"Testing the criticism s o f  the fault concept" (1 9 6 8 )  Ins Couns J 112.
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"A strong and growing tendency where there is no blame on either side, to ask 
in view o f  the exigencies o f  social justice, who can best bear the loss."557 
In the light o f these developments, advocating a like system in multimodal transport 
is conceivable.
6.2.1.1 The Meaning of Strict Liability in Multimodal Transport
Strict liability here means that the carrier is liable for loss, damage or delay without 
fault. Generally in the case o f carriage of goods such a liability already occurs 
within the conventions which make the carrier liable for the acts o f his servants and 
agents.558 The carriers fault is not at issue, the causal link between the servants or 
agents act creates the trigger for his liability.
It must be noted here that in strict liability, the usual defences remain, except that 
they go to show the absence o f fault, for fault is no longer required. In strict 
liability, once the prescribed conditions are met liability arises strictly, in the sense 
that none o f the usual defences apply to the carrier not that no exceptions are 
prescribed. Within strict liability theory, there is always room for certain force 
majeure exceptions, such as grave natural disaster and fault o f the consignee. Strict 
liability in multimodal transport is therefore based on strict liability but with certain 
exceptions in cases in which the carrier could not have prevented the loss with 
utmost care and goodwill.
Modern carriage trends as seen in the case of multimodal transport means that the 
MTO does not perform the carriage contract alone. He contracts all or parts of the 
contract to others and assumes responsibility for the carriage door-to-door.
In multimodal transport the reality of the carriage ensures that the MTO finds he is 
held to a strict liable than the presumed fault under which his liability is based. The 
inclusion o f different carriers and their servants and agents in addition to carriage in
557 R oscoe Pound: "The spirit o f  the law" (1920) at p 189.
558 Liability for the acts o f  servants and agents has been a part o f  all the different unimodal transport 
conventions, it is predicated on the fact that the servant carries out the carriage on behalf o f  the carrier 
who should then bear responsibility for his acts carried out in the course o f  his duty. This has fuelled 
the use Himalaya Clauses and circular indemnity clauses to protect the servant or agent who is sued. 
See Norfolk Southern Railway Co v. Kirby (2004) 543 US 14, 125 S ct 385
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containers conspires to ensure that when loss or damage occurs, and the place of 
loss is indeterminate the MTO is held to a strict liability.
This liability is similar to the contractual obligations under common law, under 
which the carrier was held liable as a matter of public policy to care for goods under 
his custody for carriage.559This liability was imposed without fault in addition to the 
warranties o f seaworthiness.560
This strict liability o f the common carrier and the negligence liability of the private 
carrier were the basis o f liability under the common law. Here the carrier was 
presumed to be liable once the cargo owner could prove that the goods were lost or 
damaged. The exigencies o f transportation dictated that this basis o f liability was 
modified to what obtains in current international unimodal transport conventions 
today; Presumed liability with exceptions to suit each mode.
In this respect, the proposed strict liability would be tantamount to going back to the 
traditional basis o f liability for the carrier but with the added advantage that 
improvements in technology means that the risk o f loss, damage or delay is less than 
in the common law era. This justifies the difference which is now proposed, instead of 
including all the common law exceptions, we have a civil law type exception of force 
majeur, an act which is beyond the control o f the carrier; Cases such as the fault of the 
consignee or consignor and inherent vice.
Multimodal transport is o f enormous commercial value in international trade, but 
the benefits arising from it must be weighed against other factors.
Although loss and damage in multimodal transport is o f enormous consequence to 
parties concerned because o f the issue o f localisation, the question that presents 
itself here is if strict liability will lead to a predictable liability regime in multimodal 
transport.
559 Graham McBain, “Time to Abolish Common Carrier Liability [2005] JBL 553, Nugent v. Smith 
(1876) 1 C.P.D. 19, Forward v. Pittard (1785) 1 T R 27
560 See Chapter 3 which treats the liability o f  the carrier
6.2.1.2 STRICT LIABILITY AND LOSS ALLOCATION
Support for strict liability is found in the trend that emerged during the 1960’s in 
doing away with fault liability and introducing a system of liability irrespective of 
fault and linked to monetary compensation. During this period, the civil liability in 
tort entered a new phase effectively replacing the existing system of liability in some 
areas with a system o f liability and insurance. Fault liability was no longer a match for 
the less expensive insurance-based liability. This system was thought to be equitable 
and above all practical to embrace legal systems that were based on unequal 
bargaining powers.
This system o f liability was assisted along the way by three reasons, which militated 
against fault liability as an appropriate basis of liability.
A tort system based on fault was thought to be too expensive to administer 
Litigation was fraught with delay
There was unpredictability o f outcome on cases based on fault
The concept of law and economics thereby laid down indicators on how loss or 
damage to goods within this new theory can be allocated in a way as to increase 
social justice. Here the question o f the most efficient risk distribution and allocation 
to bring about equity between the parties is based on who can best manage the 
activity.561
The economic theory starts with the presumption that in a perfect world market 
forces will allocate liability in a most efficient way.562 This assumption does not 
take into account the transaction cost which will impede the working o f such a 
system. Failing the working of this system, the liability regime applicable plays a 
vital role in the allocation o f risk in carriage cases.563 The implication is that when 
transaction costs are considered, the optimal liability system will allocate loss to one 
who could avoid it cheaply, as the goal o f an optimal legal liability system is to 
allocate liability to those parties who can most efficiently minimise the lost at the 
least cost.
561 Coase, “The Problem o f  Social Cost, (1960) 3 Journal o f  Law and Economics, 1, 7-8, A Polinsky, “ 
An Introduction to Law and Economics (1991) 38 Wayne Law Rev. 1-113
562 Calabresi, G, “The cost O f accident” (1970) 75 at p. 135
563 David S. Peek, “Economic analysis o f  the Allocation o f  Liability for Cargo Damage: The Case o f  
the Carrier or is it? [1998] 26 Transportation L.J. 73 at p. 91
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Within transportation law, the capacity to do that is usually predicated on the "deep 
pocket" o f the carrier and his capacity to pass it on as freight, so that in the end all 
share the loss. This is o f particular relevance in the case o f multimodal transport in 
cases in which either non o f the parties is at fault or the loss or damage cannot be 
localise, leading to enquiries as to who is liable. In such cases the MTO is held 
liable although there is no proof o f fault. A peculiarity of Multimodal transport is 
that fault is only relevant when loss or damage can be localised, once it is 
unlocalised, the liability o f the carrier is strict. This proposed basis would only be 
sanctioning a practice already present in multimodal transport. This strict liability of 
the carrier would be based on the fact that he will be in a better position to manage 
the risk.
Prof Freezer also held that
"if there is any guiding principle as to who can best bear loss, it seems to be 
that it is the party who can absorb it with the least injury to him self and in 
such a way as will produce a minimum o f  consequential problems o f  social 
adjustment fo r  h im self ...»564
The law and economic principle states that the loss should be borne by the ‘superior 
risk bearer”, the one who is most able to mitigate the damage, or the one who can 
predict and prevent the loss or the one who can more effectively bear the damage to 
or the loss of the goods. In carriage cases, it is the carrier who is in a better position 
to bear the risk o f such loss during carriage, who should take precautions.
This brings into play the option o f precaution, shippers and carriers can only take 
precautions as to risk if  they have the necessary information, and precautions is 
about cost. Thus the question arises as to who is the better cost avoider. These 
transaction costs usually take the form o f packing, loading, stowing etc. The 
question is who is better placed to minimise such cost? In order to minimise 
transaction cost, thus, liability should be allocated to the party who can most 
cheaply avoid loss. The MTO stands in a better position to take precautions to 
minimise lost as he has stronger control over goods during carriage.
564 Freezer, "Capacity to bear loss as a factor in the Decision o f  Certain Types o f  Tort Cases" (1930) 
78 UPL Rev 805 at 809.
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The problem is exacerbated in the case of multimodal transport in which many 
different basis o f liability will fall to be applicable following localisation. In such 
cases, it becomes complicated to ascertain when one basis of liability starts and 
when the other stops. Such confusion will obviously lead to an inadequate level of 
care.
Another factor that will have an influence on multimodal allocation o f risk would be 
the cost resulting from establishing who is liable for what loss. Elimination of this 
cost will result if  the liability regime was strict liability
However, according to the Coase theorem, it will make no difference how the law 
initially allocates liability for cargo loss or damage on a theoretical framework.565 
Because parties would negotiate to reach the most efficient risk allocation regardless 
of what law is imposed. For this reason, changing the liability will have no impact 
on the determination o f which party will ultimately be liable for cargo damage. 
Therefore any new allocation o f risk from one party to another will not change the 
party’s behaviour, i.e. making the carrier more liable will not change his level of 
care. If the carrier would have avoided the risk more efficiently, the parties would 
have negotiated an agreement shifting the risk to him.
A result o f this reasoning is that in the context o f liability for loss or damage to 
goods. It would make no difference whether liability is allocated to the shipper or 
the carrier. Shifting liability to the carrier would lead to a situation in which more 
freight will be demanded from the cargo concern. If the cargo owner bears the 
responsibility he will pass on the cost to the end user o f the product.
However, if strict liability is imposed on the MTO for damage, loss or delay, it 
invariably will be based on the notion that the MTO is in a better position to bear 
the risk.566 Economic literature on accident law has demonstrated that other liability 
theories may be put in place to achieve a certain result.567 In the case o f multimodal 
transport, the unilateral accident theory holds true. Under that theory, in case of
565 Coase, “The Problem o f  Social Cost, (1960) 3 Journal o f  Law and Economics, 1, 7-8
566 Katz, "The function o f  tort liability in technology assessment" (1969) 38 CM L Rev 587. 
Calabresi, "Does the fault system  optimally control primary accident cost?", 33
Law and Contemporary Problems, p 429. The Decision for Accident: An approach to non-fault 
allocation o f  cost" (1965) 78 Harv L Rev 73. IMCO Document CT C N/5/Annex III.
567 Shavell, S. Economic A nalysis o f  Accident Law, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, (2004) 175
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unilateral accident in which only one party can influence the accident risk, both the 
negligent and the strict liability theories will lead to a higher care level, but only 
strict liability would lead to an efficient level of activity by the carrier to reduce 
loss.
The result is that the development o f a test for strict liability should be based on 
whether it is more important to control the MTO or the cargo concern. If it is proven 
that the influence o f the MTO on the activity is far more important than the cargo 
owner this may be an argument in favour of strict liability.568
It is also important to stress that in cases in which the victim can also influence the 
outcome, in case o f bilateral accidents, a liability rule should be chosen which 
provides an incentive to the victims to take optimum care. A typical case would be 
the case o f contributory negligence.569
In applying this rule to multimodal transport, it is argued that there is a strong 
economic argument in favour o f a strict liability rule. Although loss and damage in 
multimodal transport may not be purely unilateral, as the cargo owner can contribute 
to ensuring that loss in minimised by appropriate packing, the influence on the 
goods by the carrier is far superior to the influence the shipper can have. Thus 
according to the economic test, it may be more important to control the MTO’s 
activities than those o f the cargo concern which points to the establishment of a 
strict liability regime.
Including contributory negligence as a defence may modify such strict liability, 
which in this case is fair, as it would ensure that the carrier is not liable for the faults 
of the cargo concern.
Objection to this system o f liability has been based primarily on the argument that it 
will lead to high insurance cost for the MTO.570 The question is if  it usually leads to 
high insurance cost, which is reflected as high premiums, higher transporting cost 
and higher prices for the goods.
568 Landes, W. and Posner R, The positive Economic theory o f  tort, (1981) Georgia Law Review 877 at 
p.907
569 Haddock D, and Curran C. An Economic Theory o f  contributory negligence, (1985) Journal o f  
Legal Studies 49 at p.73
570 Rossmore, A E "Cargo insurance and carrier liability. A new approach" (1974) 6 JMLC 425-427. 
M assey supra, p 739. M cD ow ell, C E "Containerisation: Comments on insurance and liability" 
(1972) 3 JMLC p 506.
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6.2.1.3 Disadvantages of Strict Liability
1) Morality
The most celebrated criticism o f strict liability is the immorality of holding one 
liable when it cannot be proven that he has been negligent. This basically stems for 
the general rule that loss should lie where it falls.571 Strict liability has often not 
gained support based on the belief that it will dampen incentive within carriers to 
take adequate precautions to avoid the loss.
Extinguishing liability altogether will offend the morality of the advocates of a fault 
based liability system. Those who believe that the only liability sustainable is one 
based on fault: that one should be liable for their fault. To then totally absolve one 
even for the faults o f his servants would be immoral.
Contrast against the dictum by Massey, who states that:
"The ideal legal system should encourage minimisation o f  loss and damage and 
permit efficient distribution o f  those losses that inevitably occur. The insurance 
market could then function in a legal framework focused on efficiency. Such a 
focus means abandoning the traditional basis o f  fau lt liability, leaving the 
search fo r  rectitude to theologians, philosophers and pundits rather than to 
those administering the allocation o f  resources within the transportation 
network. I  recognise that this suggestion may cause a certain hesitation by those 
who are inclined to view the world in moral terms and believe in the importance 
o f  rooting out the impure o f  heart and making them pay fo r  their transgressions. 
However, the adaptation o f an amoral approach is not quite as radical as it 
may sound since insurance has already by and large immunised wrongdoers 
from  the consequences o f their actions.
571 Richard Epstein “A theory o f  Strict liability” (1972) 2 J. Leg Stud. 151, Donald Dworkan, “Is 
Wealth Value” (1980) J. Leg. Stud. 191
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2) Over-deterrence
Strict liability has been criticised in Economic theory on the grounds that it will lead 
to over-deterrence. This risk is particularly strong in cases o f new developments and 
new technology. This is based on the grounds that if new industries are exposed to 
all risk foreseeable and unforeseeable, they will be deterred from pursuing 
innovations where risks might be unknown.572
3) Negligence o f the Plaintiff
It has also been argued that strict liability will lead to a level o f negligence on the 
part o f the plaintiff who will be compensated under the law.
4) Regressive tax
Strict liability might have a regressive effect in practice. This stems from the fact 
that the award is spread to all end users o f the product. This will affect two groups 
of people, those who will pay a higher price and those who will not be able to afford 
it. In this sense this liability has been said to lead to a regressive tax.
6.2.1.4 The Advantages of Strict Liability in Multimodal Transport
The outcry against the use o f the presumed fault concept as the basis o f liability in 
multimodal transport is predicated on the fact that localisation o f loss is usually 
difficult at the best o f times to achieve. And when such loss has been localised, it may 
also be difficult to benefit from the exception clauses, by adducing evidence to show 
an absence o f fault in a case in which a performing carrier’s agent performed the 
carriage thousand o f miles away. The advantage of strict liability in this case is that it 
will take away the need for localisation. The MTO will be liable regardless of where 
loss took place and regardless o f who was in charge o f the goods. This will not only 
reduce the cost of adducing evidence to localise loss, but also completely eliminate 
the problem of suing performing carriers. Because there will be no incentive to go 
after any other person, as the MTO is strictly liable. The efficacy o f this will however 
depend on the limit of liability placed on the MTO. If his liability coverage is very 
little, the cargo concern might have reason to still seek to sue the performing third 
party who not being privy to the contract might be sued in tort for the full amount.
572 Richard Posner, “Strict Liability , a Comment”, (1973) 2 J.Leg. Stu. 205
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1) CARE OF THE CARGO
O f prime importance is the implication that no liability will lead to negligence and 
therefore loss and damage. Deterrence has been hailed as one of the attributes of a 
fault based system o f liability, thus as a corollary it is assumed that no-liability will 
lead to more cargo damage and loss.
If that is the case then the present system especially as exemplified in the Hague 
Rules with its catalogue o f exceptions, should also lead to such loss and damage, 
because the width o f this exception ensures that the carrier is only liable in cases of 
gross negligence.
"... by fa r  the best way to achieve uniformity in the liability structure and 
thereby achieve expedited settlement and recovery at less cost, is to do away 
with the liability system altogether. The cargo shipper in the traditional way 
would then arrange cargo insurance to suit his own needs. "
Ramberg questions the utility of deterrence. In the field o f transportation he states
"...in fact, it may be seriously doubted whether the sanction o f  damages has any 
preventive effect at all in this particular field. Presumably the drive o f  carriers 
to uphold efficient and safe traffic, stimulated by the accentuated competition in 
the carriage o f  cargo, would be a more realistic motive fo r  exercising due 
diligence in the case o f  goods than would fea r  o f  being held liable in damages 
to some cargo owner. Since the liability is normally insured, the preventive 
effect is even more diluted, the only risk being a possible increase o f  premiums 
on account o f a ‘bad’ record."
2) COST
The administrative cost of a negligence rule is higher than that o f a strict liability rule. 
To apply a negligence rule, a court will first have to determine the level of care then
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decide if that level o f care has been met. In the case of strict liability, all the Court 
need to do is determine whether or not the defendant caused the plaintiff injury. Strict 
liability is thus easy to administer and cheaper to the parties and the Courts.
Cargo loss or damage is ultimately borne by one o f 4 persons, the cargo owner, (made 
up of the shipper, consignee, seller, consignor or cargo owner), the cargo insurance, 
the carrier and the liability insurer. Ultimately, in most cases uncertainty in the 
allocation of loss between the parties means that there is usually double insurance 
leading to more cost to the parties. The choice of strict liability will reduce the cost 
spent overall and eliminate uncertainty.
Although the cost o f cargo insurance will go up, it is believed that it will stabilise in 
the long run due to the elimination of the cost normally incurred in trying to claim 
subrogation rights.
Cost to be avoided will include lawyers' fees, etc which will greatly reduce overall 
cost o f administering the policy. Cost o f freight will come down because of the 
elimination liability insurance therefore cost o f overall transport will generally fall.
4) SAVINGS TO THE CARGO CLAIMANT
Improvement o f the loss experience o f the cargo owner will reduce his cost of 
insurance in the form o f no-claims bonus; therefore it will be advantageous for him to 
choose careful carriers. This too will act as an incentive to carriers, because although 
fault will not make them liable, it will affect their business. This has been described as 
the ‘insurance function of strict liability. Holding the carrier liable will permit him to 
spread the risk to all its customers.
6.3 The Insurance argument
“Throughout this century, o f  controversy, certain arguments have reappeared 
virtually every time the subject has been discussed. The most prominent o f  these
573might be characterised as the “Insurance Argum ent”.
573 M.Sturley, “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments 
about Hague, Visby and Hamburg in a vacuum o f  Empirical Evidence” (1998) JMLC 119 at 120
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The importance o f insurance on liability was effectively summarised by Jeffrey A. 
Greenblatt, when he stated that,
“...Commenting on cargo loss and carrier liability without understanding insurance 
mechanisms and economics is equivalent to determining chess moves by rolling
i .  , , 5 7 4dice .
The contention is that insurance plays a big role in transport liabilities and should 
therefore be taken into account when deciding any liability regime. The reality of 
transport dictates that the insurers are principal players as the cases are always 
decided between the cargo and liability insurance.
A clear understanding o f insurance concepts in liability law also brings into play the 
guiding principles o f law and economics. According to law and economics, when 
the preventive measures are less costly than the reduction o f the risk their adoption 
operates, the measures should be taken. However, when the risk cannot be prevented 
it should be covered by insurance to mitigate loss or damage.
The primary function o f insurance is not to prevent loss but to mitigate the effects of 
loss or damage caused by such loss by indemnifying the party likely to suffer 
hardship from such loss.575 Theoretically, in transport law, the entire risk can be 
assigned to either party; the carrier or the shipper, in practice the risk is allocated 
between both parties making it appropriate for each party to purchase insurance to 
cover their respective risk.576
In this regard two types o f insurance are prevalent; cargo and liability insurances. 
Cargo insurance covers the economic loss to shippers resulting from loss of or 
damage to the goods carried, while liability insurance in taken out by carriers to 
cover their liability for loss to or damage to goods carried during carriage.
The present practice of multimodal transport warrants that the shipper takes out 
cargo insurance; such insurance is paid irrespective o f inquiries as to culpability and
574 Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, “Insurance and subrogation: When the Pie is no Big Enough W ho Eats last?” 
(1997) 64 Univ. o f  Chicago L.Rev. 1335 at p. 1337
575 John Isaac, “ Cargo Insurance in Relation to through transport” Through Transport Seminar, 
(London: London Press Centre, 1978) 1
576 Stephen G. W ood “Multimodal Transportation; an American Perspective on Carrier Liability and 
Bills o f  Lading Issues” (1998) 46 Am. J.Comp. Law 403
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the insurer is subrogated to the shipper’s rights.577 In some instances, the carrier can 
provide cargo insurance if  the shipper pays a higher freight. Although this insurance 
is always on “all risk”, it is not all losses that are covered by insurance.578 In some 
instances there is no cover for delay.
Cargo insurance ensures that the shippers are compensated for loss or damage, even 
when the carrier can exonerate him self by an appropriate exception clause. In cases 
in which he cannot so exonerate himself the insurer pays the shipper and is 
subrogated to the latter’s right against the carrier.579
Carrier liability insurance which is taken out by the carrier is usually based on the 
mode used and may vary from country to country as a function o f the extent of the 
carriers ‘legal liability’. This carrier liability will compensate the shipper for loss or 
damage in cases in which the carrier’s liability is clear, when there is a dispute, 
cargo insurers usually pay the shipper. The resolution o f who is liable becomes a 
matter between the insurers.580
In multimodal transport, liability insurance follows the network principle of 
liability, thus the MTO who is an Ocean carrier would have his liability pegged to 
the Hague Visby Rules limits, while the Road Carrier will have his on the CMR 
limits. Thus it is imperative for the shipper to buy insurance as he would have no 
idea who might be liable and under what basis and limits, by so doing he is 
protecting him self and mitigating whatever loss or damage he might suffer. To be 
certain that loss will be compensated, shippers are encouraged to take out insurance. 
A fact that stands out o f this situation is that in multimodal transport, the carrier’s 
liability might be double or even triply insured, by the MTO, the different 
performing carriers, and even the freight forwarding agent in certain instances. 
(Cargo insurance makes 4) This must be a windfall for the insurance industry and a 
re-assuring fact for the shipper.581 There is thus an overlap o f insurance by the 
different parties, which brings up the transportation cost o f the goods. Additionally,
577 Kurosh Nasseri “The Multimodal transport Convention” (1998) 19 J. Mar.L. & Com. 231 p.234
578 Raymond P. Hayden, Sandford E. Brook, “Marine Insurance: Variety Combination and coverage”
(1991) 66 Tul.L.Rev. 311 at p. 320
579 M.E de Orchis, “Maritime Insurance and the Multimodal Muddle” (1982) 17 ETL 691 at p. 704
580 William Driscoll, Paul B. Larsen “ The Convention on International Maritime Transport o f  Goods” 
(1982) 57 Tul .L. Rev 193 at p. 198
581 Richard Butler, “Trade Law uniformity remains out o f  reach” LL. List IntT (1999) online: 
WESTLAW (newsletter)
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duplicative cost occurs when more than one insurer incurs cost in maintaining the 
system for the same set o f  goods.
If the liability regime was strict liability, with the carrier bearing all the loss or 
damage, the need for cargo insurance will be eliminated so will be the costs 
associated with double insurance. The desire for cargo insurance will still be strong 
because o f prompt payments, and to cover cases o f insolvency.582 
The currently applicable insurance system in multimodal transport burdens the 
parties with unnecessary cost that uniformity of carrier regime would reduce. And 
even if the status-quo favours insurers, they too face problems in cases of 
unlocalised loss when they have to deal with multiple liability regimes while trying 
to litigate their claims. The courts are therefore left with the duty o f resolving the
583legal complexities o f multimodal transport and the different insurance regimes.
To take care o f  this uncertainty, both types o f insurance; cargo and liability are 
bound to raise their premiums.
Thus the argument for a uniform and efficient system in multimodal transport 
persists, as uniformity and predictability would encourage swift and efficient 
transportation and insurance settlements.
In the case o f strict liability, the liability o f the MTO will be increased; this will 
theoretically push up liability insurance while cargo insurance will decrease, as 
shippers will experience a higher level o f settled claims. Carriers will however, 
offset this against freight which will go up. It is normally not certain to what extent 
a rise in carrier’s liability will be reflected in the premiums as other market forces 
also play a role in determining the premiums.584 A strongly contested debate is 
which of the insurances are more expensive;585 it is also asserted that this cannot be 
determined because o f the absence o f reliable empirical evidence.586
582 Michael F. Sturley, “changing liability rule and Marine insurance: conflicting empirical arguments 
about Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a vacuum o f  empirical evidence” (1993) 24 JMLC, 119 at p. 143,
583 Michael F. Sturley, “Restating the law o f  Marine Insurance: a workable solution to the Wilburn 
Boat Problem” (1998) 19 JMLC 41 at p.45
584 Michael F. Sturley, “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical 
Arguments about Hague, V isby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum o f  Empirical Evidence.” (1993) 24 JMLC 
119 at p .127
585 Lord Diplock, “Conventions and Moral-Limitation Clauses in Maritime Conventions(1970) 1 
JMLC 525, at p. 527
586 Michael F. Sturley, “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical 
Arguments about Hague, V isby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum o f  Empirical Evidence.” (1993) 24 JMLC, 
145
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It is expected that insurers might oppose change of the current liability system 
preferring that the status quo be maintained as it is profitable and workable for 
them.587
It has even been argued that the solution to the multimodal transport problem does 
not lie in a new convention but in a new insurance regime, one in which all risks are 
concentrated on one party which will eliminate overlapping, dual insurance and 
subrogation between the parties.588 Proponents o f this system argue that such a 
system will permit reductions o f insurance and fairness of compensation, as opposed 
to the costly adversarial unfair and frequently arbitrary fault based system. Such a 
strict system will encourage speedy settlements with no need for lawyers, courts and 
delays; since it is the insurance companies that pay for the damages.
The strict system o f liability would lead to certainty as to who is liable, the parties 
will know beforehand who and to what extent liability is predicated, enabling each 
to take out appropriate insurance. In the case o f cargo insurance it is usually 
important, as it would make up for any cases in which the MTO is not liable under 
the strict system or to make up the short fall likely to flow from the carrier’s limits 
o f liability.
When loss or damage occurs:
(1) The cargo claimant proves that goods have been lost or damaged.
(2) His insurer pays out to compensate him for his loss.
(3) His insurers are then subrogated to his rights against the carriers.
(4) His insurers claim against the carriers.
(5) The carriers refer them to their insurers.
(6) The carrier's insurers try to adduce evidence to exonerate carriers from
liability.
(7) The cargo insurers further adduce evidence in rebuttal.
Thus at the end o f the day it is the insurers who bear the cost o f any loss or damage,
and any workable liability would be one that takes into consideration this fact.
587 Jan Ramberg, “Freedom o f  Contract in Maritime Law, (1993) LMCLQ 178 at pg 156
588 Tony Young, “Position statement on multimodal liability” (1999): CIFFA homepage 
http:/ciffa.com/current issuestransportm u ltim odal transporthtml
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Another view that is being expressed increasingly is that o f no-fault insurance.589 In 
which case, the carrier is not liable and the cargo insurance pays for any loss or 
damage. The rationale for this view is that, ultimately the loss is invariably borne by 
insurance companies; either the cargo insurers or the liability insurers.
Advocates o f the no-fault liability systems maintain that the present carrier liability 
system in multimodal transport does not create certainty and predictability, thus a new 
system should be introduced: based on no-fault, as this system has showed 
considerable success in automobile cases.590 Massey591, states that
"Some thought be given to relieving carriers from  all liability and requiring the 
shipper and his insurer to bear the risk o f  loss in Toto,"
Holding that the present system leads invariably to dual liability and thus double 
overheads, including sales, commissions to the administration o f two policies, and 
when loss occurs, the cost o f establishing which insurers will bear the loss will fall on 
both insurers. This was also emphasised by Sassoon,592 that
"The system thus necessarily involves a certain amount o f  double or overlaps 
insurance, and moreover is premised on a risk allocation or distribution theory 
that is gradually but quite definitely being replaced in other cases o f  tort 
liability".
Under this theory, the carrier will no longer be held liable, but in case o f loss or 
damage, the cargo concerns will claim from their insurers, who in turn will know 
from the beginning that no subrogation rights will accrue. Thus instead o f a battle 
between the insurers accruing, it will be a matter o f distribution around the world 
insurance and re-insurance markets for cargo insurance.
589 Rossmore, A E, “ Cargo Insurance and Carriers Liability: A new approach (1974) 6 JMLC 425.
590 Claydon, W J, "Fair play", In tern a tion a l Shipp ing  Journal,  Jan 1 1994.
591 ibid, p 754.
592 Sassoon., supra (3 JMLC) p 760.
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6.3.1 THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ON PREDICTABILITY IN 
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
By their very nature all forms o f carriage whether multimodal or unimodal face 
certain risks inherent in transporting goods. Most obviously, they are subjected to 
the possibility that the goods may sink, be destroyed by fire, floods, crashes, or any 
other misfortune. To guard against the consequences o f such risk materialising, the 
parties to the transactions invariable take out insurance cover. So important is the 
need for such insurance that unless there is insurance, the parties are unlikely to 
obtain the necessary financing when needed. So why as Lord Diplock stated, that 
“When Conventions reach the stage o f  a diplomatic 
Conference, the ‘Deus et machina ’ the insurer is not 
mentioned in the cast”593 
In spite o f this, the “invisible hand” o f insurance has been a part o f transport 
liability history.594 During the deliberations o f The Hague Rules in 1924, insurance 
was an important factor in the debate that determined the amount o f liability o f the 
carrier.
Since then, insurance has taken the stage in the transport industry as the most 
effective way to manage the risks inherent in transporting goods. This allows 
carriers to transfer the risk o f carriage in the form o f liability to insurers for the price 
o f premiums, which they pay.
6.3.2 The Effect of Insurance on Multimodal Transport
The presence and effect o f insurance on multimodal transport has given this mode a 
reasonable level o f certainty. This has been done by the role o f insurance: It has
593 Lord Diplock. 'Conventions and morals' JMLC 525 (1990)
594 M alcolm Clarke, P olic ies and P erceptions o f  Insurance; An Introduction to Insurance Law  
Clarendon Press, (Oxford) 1997.
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even been asserted that multimodal transport survives because o f the presence of
595insurance.
1) The Litigation Process.
2) The Multimodal Contract.
3) The Legislation, and
4) The Judiciary.
1) The litigation process.
The reality in transportation law often means that it is the insurance companies who 
bear the final burden of either going to court or settling out o f court. The nature of 
carriage usually dictates that the parties take out both cargo and liability insurance, 
hence in the case o f any loss or damage the battle is, usually between two insurance 
companies. This gives insurers the power to decide in this way the future of a 
particular head of liability. Insurers can therefore stifle the development or 
refinement of liability by smothering it with settlements.596 The normal aspect of 
insurance is an out of court settlement, when insurers fight it is usually because of 
the size of the claim. This habit means that certain heads of liability fail to be 
litigated and thereby gain academic exposure to entitle them to receive the required 
legislative attention. In such a case any problems are contained not solved. A 
corollary to this is the fact that if  insurers feel that the law ought to be changed it 
will be easier for them to use the leverage they have to effect change.
6.3.3 The Multimodal transport Contract and Insurance
Insurance companies influence multimodal transport contracts in two ways; 
directives and the fact that multimodal transport does not attract any extra premium 
over and above what is required for unimodal transport.
595 Maria Eleftheria Katsivela “ Cargo, Liability and S elf Insurance, in considering uniformity o f  
Intermodal (Ocean and Land) Carrier Liability Regimes in the United States, Canada and 
Internationally, Pub CRT-2004-01 University o f  Montreal, p 12
596 M alcolm Clarke, P olicies and P erceptions o f  Insurance, Supra at note. 593 at p 272 296
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a) Following the coming into force of the Hamburg Rules, most mutual insurers 
sent out circulars to their club Members advising them on the necessary 
amendments brought about by the Hamburg rules. A part of one of the directives 
stated that, members should endeavour to always use The Hague and Hague Visby 
Rules unless it was in a situation in which the Hamburg Rules were compulsory. 
Failure to do so would result in cover being prejudiced. This point forcefully to 
the fact that the insurers have ways of making sure that the particular conventions 
they favour are implemented. This brings a certain degree of uncertainty once it is 
clear that the particular liability regime applicable is not strictly the one that 
would have been chosen by the carrier but that which would have been chosen by 
insurance companies.
b) Another factor that greatly influences multimodal transport is the
fact that no extra premiums are required. There is even the contention that 
multimodal transport might attract lower premiums because of the fact that it is
597considered to be more safe than traditional unimodal transport.
Additionally, the fact that there is a difference in premiums between multimodal and 
unimodal transport also accounts for the fact that most carriers use the same 
document for both types of transport, which also brings a degree o f complacency in 
multimodal transport.598
6.3.4 The power to influence legislation.
The effect of insurance is quite visible in the legislative field. A good number of 
legislative reforms were influenced by the fact that insurance cover could be gained. 
Apart from the Hague Rules, we have legislation such as the Employers Liability 
(compulsory Insurance Act) 1969, the Nuclear Installation Act (Licensing and 
Insurance Act) 1959 and the Unfair Contracts Act 1977 just to name a few. There is
597 Poole, 'Insurance A spect o f  Combined Transport’ Conference on multimodal transport organised 
by Lloyds o f  London :Press (1975).p. 3.
598 It was difficult to gain statistics from insurance companies because both modes where treated the 
same, even attempts to gain such information from the international Insures Union was not fruitful.
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thus hope that insurance will be able to positively influence multimodal transport if
need be. Insurance actually influences the law maker in the development and
delimitation of the law.599
6.3.5 The Power to influence the Judiciary.
The effect on the judiciary is less visible given the fact that courts are likely to 
interpret contracts and uphold legislation than formulate rules. Courts may also be 
inclined to be influenced by precedence and incline the decision to move towards 
what obtains in the particular field. In Morgans v. Launcnburg600 Lord Wilberforce 
stated that liability and insurance
“are so intermixed that judicially to alter the basis o f  liability 
without adequate knowledge ...as to the impact this might 
make upon the insurance system is a dangerous and in my opinion 
irresponsible thing”.
The judicial attitude today is to extend liability only in cases in which it is believed 
that affordable insurance can be had.
The questions that are thrown up by the place o f insurance in multimodal transport. 
Such as;
(1) What is the impact o f a two-tier liability regime, strict and presumed?
(2) Will claims management be different?
(3) Will premiums increase?
(4) Will freight increase?
(5) Will litigation increase?
Need answers.
In the last section we saw the place of insurance in facilitating strict liability; the 
question is the feasibility of this regime in multimodal transport.
599 B.A. Heppel and M H M athews, Tort Cases and M aterials(4'h Ed.) London 1991 591
600 [1973] A.C. 127 at 137
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6.4 STRICT LIABILITY AND THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
LIABILITY SYSTEM
The debate in multimodal transport as to the liability system has centred on the 
liability system that best suits multimodal transport. In this regard two main systems 
have gained prevalence; the Uniform liability regime and the network liability regime. 
The question here is which one will eradicate the liability problem in multimodal 
transport. In chapter 3 we noted that the network system of liability has fostered the 
unpredictability in multimodal transport importing into this regimes different liability 
regimes ranging from; presumed liability with varying exceptions and limits to utmost 
liability of the CMR with its own exceptions to stricter liability of the MP4.
The uniform system proposed by the convention, on closer examination was also 
based on a ‘modified network system’ of liability when attributing the limits. This 
meant that this system also ceased to be uniform, as the different parties strove to 
show where and when loss occurred to benefit from a particular limit of liability. 
What is needed in multimodal transport is a liability regime which is totally 
predictable uniform and seamless.
The presumed fault system of liability can be said to be the main stay o f the network 
system of liability because the liability needs to be the same to make any sense. The 
network system of liability by chaining the various liability regimes together ensures 
that the different conventions apply to loss damage or delay localised to their modes. 
A typical scenario will have the Hague Visby Rules applying to the sea potion, the 
CMR to the road section and the Warsaw convention to the air section o f the same 
multimodal transport contract. A liability regime which is different from that applied 
by these conventions will lead to added inconsistency and disharmony. Thus the 
presumed liability regime is also adopted by multimodal transport to be in line with 
the principles of network liability which it has chosen.
Strict liability as proposed cannot be operated within a network system as it will lead 
to a further proliferation of potential laws. Once loss is localised, the liability basis 
will be presumed while unlocalised loss will lead to an application of the strict 
liability model. This will maintain the statusquo within multimodal transport of 
unpredictability and uncertainty.
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The proposed strict liability will be easily applicable within a pure uniform liability 
system in which one law applies irrespective of localisation of loss, damage or delay 
and irrespective o f the party responsible for the goods at time of loss. To achieve true 
uniformity in this case, it will be imperative that parties are not allowed to invoke any 
part of any other laws to cover loss or damage in multimodal transport even when 
such loss has been localised to a particular mode.
The problem here is if  this will not conflict with the existing unimodal conventions. 
There will obviously be the contention that the existing conventions should be 
respected and applied in case of localised loss, in addition to the contention that the 
carriers liability exposure might be greater than his exposure under the different 
unimodal conventions under which he might have a recourse action.
When viewed from the point of view of the benefit that this system will bring to 
multimodal transport, it is worth effecting the requisite changes.
For the uniform strict liability to effectively apply, the nature of the multimodal 
transport contract would need to be reviewed. Presently, the popular stance is that it is 
viewed as a chain o f contracts to which different conventions apply, a corollary to 
which is that the different laws apply to it. If this contract is viewed as a contract sui 
generis, it will mean that no conflict of conventions will apply. The MT contract will 
be taken out of the domain of unimodal conventions which par excellence will cover 
parts of multimodal contracts.
Alternatively, the different unimodal transport conventions will have to be modified 
to take into account this reality. Their multimodal provisions could be modified, and 
the definition of their scope of application clarified to ensure that it does not conflict 
with multimodal transport, otherwise the multimodal transport provisions in unimodal 
transport conventions will contradict this uniform basis.
6.4.1 STRICT LIABILITY AND THE BASIS OF LIABILITY
The importance of the basis of liability is a central issue in multimodal transport as it 
lays down the rules under which the carrier is liable for loss or damage. As noted in 
Chap 3, the basis in transport law is presumed liability. This is the liability system 
which operates in multimodal transport in varying degrees.
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The question that needs to be asked here is if the differences between the conventions 
are so different and exclusive to their particular modes that uniform legislation would 
not be able to address the specific problems and differences in each mode.
Can the strict liability system as a uniform basis of liability apply to all modes of 
transport, or are they so different that they require different liability regimes. If the 
answer to this question is no, then a uniform system will be difficult to implement.
All transport conventions as noted were drafted to create an equitable risk allocation 
between the shippers and carrier interest. These conventions are therefore seen as 
compromises in which the carrier surrenders a part of his contractual freedom for 
certain benefits; exceptions of liability and limits. Although all conventions ascribe to 
these rules and find their origins in either the common law or civil laws systems, the 
end result is a form o f presumed fault liability.601
Under The Hague Visby Rules, compulsory duties, which cannot be contracted out of, 
are set out with exceptions and limits o f liability.
The basis of liability and the burden o f proof used in multimodal transport is usually 
pegged to that which obtains in unimodal transport by default as the liability regime is 
also pegged to unimodal liability. This it is contended here is one of the major hurdles 
to a predictable liability regime. What is needed here is therefore a basis that is 
predictable and certain.
6.4.2 STRICT LIABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY
As also noted in Chapter 3 especially, there are exceptions to liability in all the 
different modes of transportation and multimodal transport in subject to all these 
exceptions. An ideal situation will be one in which the exceptions are reduced. This 
was done in the Multimodal Transport Convention 1980.602 The benefits o f this
601 Under the common law, exceptions were available to the carrier, but the carrier had to prove the 
existence o f  the exception and prove that there was no negligence. W hile under the civil law, the 
concept was more fluid and the carrier needed to prove “force majeur” exceptions; overwhelming force 
or forces beyond the control o f  the carrier.
602 Art. 16 o f  the convention which states that the MTO will be liable ‘unless the multimodal transport 
operator proves that he, his servants or agents have taken all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.’ without the catalogue o f  exceptions as found in 
the Sea and land modes.
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cannot be realised as the convention has not yet come into force and is unlikely to do 
so at this time. However, even if it came into force the difference would not be felt, as 
it will involve adducing evidence to show that the MTO was not negligent. This as 
seen from chapter 3 is indeed a heavy burden to discharge in multimodal transport.
6.4.3 STRICT LIABILITY LIMITS OF LIABILITY
The limits of liability are always a vital part of any liability regime and are thought to 
map out the financial burden for loss or damage to goods. It is also a measure of what 
cargo insurance needs to take out to make up for what ever loss the carrier is not 
entitled to pay because he has limited liability. In the case of multimodal transport, 
this is difficult as the carrier can never tell which of the limits will apply until the 
carriage has started and damage incurred. What is needed is a limit that is predictable 
and not one that varies as to the mode to which loss is localised.603 
O f particular note in multimodal transport is the interplay between strict liability and 
limits of liability. The limits that are set will eventually determine the efficacy of this 
system. After all it is always about the risk allocation of both parties. If the limits are 
high enough, the cargo concern will have no incentive to sue the performing carrier 
even in cases in which the loss is localised. Because, his suit might be out of 
jurisdiction and he might have to satisfy the burden o f proof under the particular 
liability regime. However, if  the limits are low, the cargo concern will obviously have 
an incentive to sue the performing carrier who was in charge o f the goods at the time. 
An alternative will be the case of channelling liability in which case the cargo concern 
cannot under the contract sue anyone other than the MTO. Such a principle can only 
be enforced within a mandatory convention.604
603 Patrick Vlacic “Monetary Limitation o f  liability-For how long” [2006] II Diritto Marittimo 438, 
p.447, P Griggs & R. W illiams, Limitation o f  liability for Maritime Claims ( 4 th ed,. 2005)
604 Michael Faure and Wang Hui, “Economic analysis o f  Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage” 
(200 6 )3 7  JMLC 179, p. 198
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6.5 FAULT LIABILITY VERSUS STRICT LIABILITY AS THE BASIS 
OF LIABILITY IN MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The question o f multimodal liability and the rationale for liability taken by the 
different standards o f liability shows the emergence of the scholarly analysis of two 
important issues.
Should liability be based on fault or strict?
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that both written provisions of carriage law as 
seen from international conventions and decided cases have unanimously imposed a 
presumption o f liability on the carrier for safe carriage of goods.605 
There are questions which invariably stem out of this treatment o f the multimodal 
transport, should one retain the presumption of liability as a fundamental ideal in 
multimodal transport, or seek to change the basis to strict liability.
The choice o f a system o f liability must begin with a careful assessment of the goals 
and interest it is meant to safeguard. In multimodal transport the main aim of all 
concerned must be the fair and rapid settlement o f claims without undue or 
unnecessary delay and financial loss. This simple task takes on huge proportions 
when the different modes interplay and different interests are sought to be 
safeguarded.
At first glance, the fault system as exemplified by the presumption o f liability seems 
to be o f considerable benefit to the different parties.606 Proving fault however greatly 
increases cost and delays and might leave the victims without compensation for their 
injuries what has been referred to as the "negligence lottery".607
605 Chapter 3
606 Larsen, Paul B, "Air Traffic Control: A recommendation for a proof o f  fault system without a 
limitation o f  liability" (1966) 32 JAL & C pg 9.
607 Franklin, Mark A, "Replacing the N egligence Lottery: Compensation and selective re-imbursement" 
53 (1967) V A L R e v  774.
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Further it is becoming extremely difficult to define the exact scope of care required. 
The standard o f care applied is likely to change with changing technology. Thus fault 
which represents a standard o f behaviour, good or bad, changes with geographical 
location and with technological change.
The main problem faced in multimodal transport in using this presumption of liability 
stems from the fact that it invariably leads to a multiplicity of liability regimes and 
liability basis.
Whenever loss is localised, the liability regime is that which would have applied if a 
contract was concluded using that particular mode of transport. When loss is not 
localised then the contract o f carriage becomes the applicable law.
Additionally even when loss is localised to a particular mode o f transport, the 
(carrier) MTO would find that the different conventions might be interpreted 
differently in different jurisdictions,608 as the courts of different countries tend to 
adopt variant approaches to the interpretation o f these Articles.
The MTO thus finds out that whenever loss is localised, he is subjected to a 
particular mandatory unimodal regime, with varying degrees o f strictness as to the 
bases o f liability ranging from presumed to strict,609 and when loss is unlocalised 
he finds him self subject to a strict regime o f liability, as he is unable to exonerate 
him self if he does not know where loss or damage occurred thus he will not be 
able to adduce evidence to show that he was not negligent, subject however to 
situations in which the claimant is at fault.
608 In som e cases under Art 17 o f  the CMR, the carrier is held to a stricter liability, i.e. France, 
Belgium , Holland, Spain, Italy, w hile in others notably Germany, Switzerland and Austria, his 
liability is based on negligence.
609 From,; (1) Liability for negligence with onus o f  proof on the claim ant (private carrier).
(2) Liability for negligence with onus o f  proving non-negligence on carrier.
(3) Liability for negligence with onus o f  proving non-negligence on carrier with exceptions  
(Hague Rules).
(4) Strict liability, regardless o f  negligence with exceptions for claimant's fault.
(5) Strict liability regardless o f  negligence without exceptions.
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In the 1960s and 1970s the trend was to move from a fault based to a system of 
liability regardless o f fault notably in fields such as workmen's compensation, 
automobile accidents, product liability etc.
When elaborating the different unimodal concepts, especially the Warsaw 
Convention, its promoters discarded the idea of absolute liability, because of the 
state o f the industry. It was deemed restrictive to impose such liability to loss or 
damage during carriage regardless o f negligence.610
As technology grew, the risks linked to technological factors decreased and in 
some areas there was a move towards absolute liability.
This was particularly present in the Warsaw Convention when the series of 
changes - initiated moves towards a strict liability regime, which led leading 
commentators to regard it as the "Warsaw Shambles".611
From the introduction in the Montreal Interim Agreement o f 1966 of a strict 
limited liability system which resulted from the failure o f the fault system to 
ensure that victims o f aircraft accidents were adequately compensated, to the 
Guatemala City Protocol which replaced liability o f fault rule o f the Warsaw 
Convention in case o f passengers (Art IV replacing Art 17 o f Warsaw), to the 
Montreal No 4 Protocol o f 1975. And more recently the Intercarrier Agreement of 
Kuala Lumpur o f 1995, which imposes absolute liability o f up to 100,000 SDR 
then thereafter, reverts to presumed liability.
This change was possible in the carriage o f goods by air because o f the particular 
difficulty in exonerating themselves through the defence o f "all necessary 
measures".612 This difficulty led to the Warsaw Convention being viewed as a 
strict liability convention as opposed to one based on the presumed negligence.
610 The 1933 Rome Convention, strict liability was an option for damage caused by aircraft to 3rd 
persons on the surface and retained when in 1952 the Convention was revised.
611 Prof Cheng, "Wilful M isconduct: From Warsaw to Hague and from Brussels to Paris" (1977) 
11 Ann o f  Air & Space Law, pg 55.
612 See Chapter 5 on the liability regimes in unimodal transport.
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The difficulty faced in carriage by air in adducing evidence to satisfy the 
requirement o f an effective rebuttal is reflected in multimodal transport. In this 
case the evidence to be adduced is not always primary evidence, but might be 
secondary in the sense that the evidence would have to be furnished by the sub­
carrier under whose care loss or damage occurred, with the implications of time 
and money spent in adducing such evidence.
In light o f such changes in unimodal concepts,613 it is logical that the dogmatic 
attachment to unimodal concepts which has plagued multimodal transport 
contracts might lead to similar calls for a change to strict liability.
6.6 Harmonisation of Multimodal Transport law
The question within multimodal transport remains how to achieve uniformity in the 
liability regime in multimodal transport.
The facts emerging from a survey o f transport conventions confirms the sentiments 
which are increasingly been expressed, that unification does not always produce 
harmonisation.614 Many reasons have been given for this view;
1) Fragmentary. Harmonised law is in constant need o f supplementary legislation to
keep it up to date with relevant developments in the particular field. If law is
static, it will be by-passed especially in this era o f swift global economic changes. 
Because of the changes in technology, most businesses go out and create rules 
and standards which are later on emulated by legal systems
2) Time Factor. The processes of promulgating the different laws are usually time 
consuming. In addition to that, some of the laws are out o f date before they come
613 Chapter 5 on the liability regimes in unimodal transport looks at the different changes in the basis o f  
liability and the rationale behind these changes.
614 M istelis., “Is Harmormonisation a necessary evil? The future o f  harmonisation and the new sources 
o f  international trade law” in Foundations and Perspectives o f  International Trade Law(2001) para.l- 
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into national law, usually a result of the administrative red tape normally 
involved in converting such conventions into national law.
3) Technological changes. This is usually based on the fact that Conventions 
‘Freeze’ the law not allowing for amendments as required to keep pace with 
the developments in the law. The was brilliantly stated by Rosett, when he 
stated that 'as time changes ...codification becomes the enemy o f  substantive 
reform ’615
6.6.1 The Emerging Trend in Harmonisation.
The history o f harmonisation in transportation had for a long time taken the form 
o f international conventions in the various modes. The processes which 
culminated into these conventions took a long time and money. This has changed 
and now we find different methods used in harmonising laws; the future of 
harmonisation was summed by Ramberg, as an era in which the parties to 
commercial transactions would regain their right to choose their own solutions 
from the available rules and codes without governmental interference.616 So far in 
the case o f multimodal transport the industry has had to deal with model laws, 
mostly based on the UNCTAD/ICC rules for a multimodal transport document. 
Now there are increasing calls for a return to none legislative means of 
harmonisation.617 In the form of;
1) International Commercial Custom; model rules and contracts clauses, codes, 
and guidelines formulated by interested parties on the bases o f trade 
practices618. The IMO legal committee is currently considering whether a code 
might be a suitable instrument in the field o f third party insurance for ship
615 Rosett, A. 'U nification, Harmonisation, Restatement, codification and R eform ing International 
Commercial law .(1992) 40 AJCL.683
616 Ramberg, in the 1992 Donald O'May Lecture, at the Institute o f  Maritime Law Southampton 
(1993) LMCLQ 178 at 191
617 The Economic impact o f  carrier liability on Intermodal freight transport, European Commission, 
London Jan 2001. p 2
618 The ICC has been noted for the different self regulating instruments it has helped to formulate to 
facilitate trade, rules such as; the UNCTAD/ICC Rules on multimodal transport document 1992, 
INCOTERMS 2000,ICc international code on direct selling 1999, the ICC model contract for 
international franchising contracts 2000, ICC guidelines on advertising and marketing on the internet 
1998.
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owners. This is self regulation and has been the remit of organs such as the 
ICC who have created numerous rules which have later on been solemnised 
into legislation.
2) A modern restatement o f the general principle of law prevailing in that 
field.619 This idea was also taken up by the European community, when Ole 
Lando was commissioned to prepare the general principles o f a European 
contract law.620 UNIDRIOT was also engaged in a similar venture, in the field 
of international contracts to propose rules aimed at reflecting all legal systems 
of the world.
3) There are yet others who feel that social goals and further improvements in 
the law can only be achieved under diverse rules as this creates a need for constant 
re-evaluation o f the law.621
Harmonisation by self regulation is not direct but indirect and gains force from the 
fact that it is adopted by private bodies. Increasingly, world wide acceptance has 
given credence to these rules in international trade. These rules are accepted 
because they are flexible and can be adopted in their entirety or modified to suit 
specific contracts or national laws. The success o f these rules is obvious; it works 
because it is the joint effort o f the people who are directly affected by it. The rules 
are often a result of surveys and are changed when needed. Harmonisation through 
self regulation by private bodies is cost effective and efficient; these normally 
need no public funding and are therefore not subject to any administrative red 
tape. This trend towards self-regulation is worthy o f praise as it fills in a lacunae 
in the law and is useful in developing useful reliable and fair rules capable o f 
complementing other laws. One must however not loss sight o f the fact that self
619 R David, 'The international Unification o f  Private law ’ Encyclopaedia o f  comparative law 65 
(1971)
620 Ole Lando ‘European Contract Law ’ 31 Am. J. Comp. L (1983) 653
621 Ureil Prococcia., ‘The case against Lex Mercatoria’ in Jacob S. Z iegel (edn.), N ew  
D evelopm ents in International Commercial Law. Oxford (Hart) 1998 pp 87
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regulation was not conceived as an alternative but as a complement to harmonised 
efforts sought to be achieved by international conventions.622
Harmonisation o f transport law is considered as the most viable method of gaining 
predictability in multimodal transport. The fact that the different modes are 
recognising the importance o f including multimodal provisions in their various 
regimes is a clear indication that it is considered as important. The fact that the 
different regimes are quite similar in their essential liability ingredients means that 
such a mode is feasible. A unified liability regime is the law of the future, as 
multimodal transport is the mode o f the future. Such a regime will bring 
predictability and certainty in transportation of goods, it will eliminate costly 
enquires as to where loss or damage occurred.
6.6.2 PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Having looked at the possible methods o f harmonisation, the question still remains 
what should form the substance o f this harmonise law to bring about certainty in 
multimodal transport liability.
Since the policy objectives of the law constitutes the material from which legal rules 
are formulated, it seems clear that reform of the law demands that these policy 
objectives be determined and made clear in advance. The more explicit the objectives, 
the clearer the rules would be, like structures which depend on their foundations.
In multimodal transport, calls for harmonisation are particularly strong given the fact 
that the proliferation of different laws makes it difficult to pinpoint the particular legal 
regime applicable.
The problem with multimodal transport is that its policy foundation is neither steady 
nor clear. Even the highest authorities are not particularly instructive on the matter.
622 Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisation o f  Law by means o f  Standard Contracts and General 
Conditions (1968) 17 Int. & Comp. L Q. 569 pp 661
275
Take the recent case o f Sonicare v EAFT. The courts were in favour of determining 
the case on the basis of traditional bailment, in spite of the obvious multimodal 
transport contract.
This case and a few preceding cases on multimodal transport, show no clear statement 
of the policy upon which multimodal liability ought to be based even in the presence 
of a multimodal contract623. Although it is not difficult to see that the course taken in 
the case was motivated by a strong desire to do justice to the claimant by the common 
law itself as International Unimodal Conventions have shown themselves incapable of 
formulating a coherent and firm policy to serve as a foundation upon which 
multimodal rules may be erected. Is it now time for the legislature to step in?
However, the quest remains the same.
6.7 A New Instrument for Multimodal Transport
“Until there is a change o f  human perceptions and attitude, and perhaps a shift in 
calculation o f  economic benefits, the drafting o f  a single convention [for 
multimodal transport] remains a dream ”624
This quote by Indira Carr epitomises the feeling in multimodal transport. After 
numerous attempts at enacting a convention on multimodal transport, the feeling 
within academia is that attitudes towards this mode must change.
We have seen increasingly that the attitudes have changed as there are increasing 
calls for a separate liability regime in multimodal transport. The most perceptible 
change is the one that now accepts that multimodal transport should depart from 
unimodal transport concepts.
Variously, there have been calls from the different stakeholder groups that there is 
an urgent need for a multimodal transport convention. What is not clear is what 
that instrument in multimodal transport should be;625 the calls have ranged from 
calls that it should be a;
623 Sony Chemicals Europe B.V. v .M/V Ingrita, [1997] AMC 755 (D Maryland 1996),
624 Indira Carr, International Trade Law, (2004) p. 415
625 UNCTAD Questionnaire, The feasibility o f  an international legal instrument, 
U NCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1,13 January 2003, the questionnaire and answers form the different 
groups
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1) New International Multimodal transport Convention
2) New International Generic transport Convention
3) New International Unimodal Convention with an extended Multimodal
Arm
4) New Private Non-mandatory Convention and,
5) A Protocol to the 1980 Multimodal transport Convention.
In this section an examination is carried out to determine which of these 
suggestions will meet the aspirations o f a predictable liability regime in 
multimodal transport. This will be done by examining it against certain pivotal 
principles o f multimodal transport, principles that will have an impact on any new 
liability regime;
Predictability
Avoidance o f friction and compatibility with other transport conventions
Avoidance o f Double insurance
Acceptance
6.7.1 A NEW INTERNATIONAL MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
CONVENTION.626
With the increasing growth o f multimodal transport, it is evident that a convention 
is required to regulate it. The existing conventions in transportation o f goods being 
unimodal conventions cannot meet the needs and aspirations o f  multimodal 
transport. The question is the feasibility o f such a new convention; will the 
different stakeholders accept it? Will it gain enough ratification where the 1980 
one did not? What will it need to meet with approval? This particular 
recommendation was made to the UNCTAD commission charged with researching 
what regime should be appropriate.627 This group reasoned that this will be a 
viable option because at the time the convention was drawn there was not enough 
publicity to allow inform choices; additionally certain elements were not attractive
626 3 9% o f  respondents favoured a new liability regime, see chap 4. Implementation o f  Multimodal 
transport rules. Report prepared by UNCTAD Secretariat. 
www.UNCTAD.org/en/docs/pdsdetlbd2.en.pdf.
627 The Feasibility o f  an international legal instrument, UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1
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to the shipping interest. The above reasons are quite valid but are not exhaustive; 
because the convention did not come into force because it was a half hearted 
attempt to regulate multimodal transport. By seeking to satisfy all factions its 
provisions failed to take into consideration the essential factors important for a 
viable liability regime in multimodal transport. A new regime in multimodal 
transport has as a major impediment the fact that the different modes will reject it 
if it conflicts with their provisions; this was one of the reasons why the 1980 
regime did not gain the required support. Its provisions were thought to be 
different in certain respects especially its limits. This option is thus a difficult one 
in terms o f acceptability. The ad hoc working group on multimodal transport law 
reviewed the status o f multimodal transport and concluded that the multimodal 
transport convention was not a feasible option that the way forward lies in self­
regulation.
6.7.2 A PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS MULTIMODAL 
CONVENTION 1980
This convention was drawn up to fill in the lacunae in the law introduced by 
multimodal transport. This convention after 26 years has failed to come into force 
because it has not had the requisite ratifications needed. The convention failed to 
illicit the appropriate backing especially from the major shipping nations.628 The 
raison d ’etre for the 1980 Multimodal convention still stands,629 and now the calls 
are from a wider group as the problems caused by a lack o f predictable laws are 
affecting international carriage adversely. The question that demands an answer is 
what provisions will need to be modified by the protocol? The responses o f the 
UNCTAD questionnaire shows that there is indeed wide support for something to 
be done, however even this calls are made within the context o f avoiding any 
conflict with unimodal regimes. It is clear that this has been an albatross on the 
back o f this regime, this inability to ride alone without hanging on the strings of
628 Kindred and Brooks, M ultim odal Transport Rules, The Hague, 1997
629 The IATA Intercarrier Agreement 1995. Also see chapter 5 on the Multimodal Transport
Convention.
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unimodal transport. The fact is that this convention needs to be rejected and we 
need to go back to the drawing board afresh.
This option might seem unattractive when viewed in the light o f the time it took 
for the 1980 convention to be ready for signature; but time cannot be the decisive 
factor.
6.7.3 PRIVATE NON-MANDATORY AGREEMENTS
Private agreements in the footsteps o f the Intercarrier Agreement 1995 might be 
the way forward.630 It is believed by some that, the solution, which can eradicate 
the problems faced by multimodal transport, is the use o f model rules in the form 
o f the UNCTAD/ICC rules. The advantage o f model rules lie in the fact that they 
seek to inform and to provide a model which can be used. It is not a statute 
which is rigid and needs to be adopted without change.631 Such rules will require 
extensive research into the topic, setting down specifically the particular system that 
it will operate in international multimodal transport and the implication of 
competition law on such agreements. This method was recommended by the ICC ad- 
hoc working group on multimodal transport as the way forward, in this regard they 
came out strongly in support o f the UNCTAD/ICC Rules.632
1) The underlying Principle.
The basic underlying principle which should run right across the rules should be 
stated, re-iterating the fact that there are intended to reflect the common rules already 
in existence. The difficulty here would be to make the rules more innovative. A more 
likely way would be to take a new perspective.
2) The Expected role of the rules.
What is expected is that such rules would bind and apply because of their persuasive 
character. However it is also hoped that such rules will affect favourable future
632 Implementation o f  multimodal transport rules, supra note 626 sect. 46
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advances in multimodal transport especially in the light of the advances being made in 
transport technologies. It is hoped that this will made minor adjustments possible to 
keep abreast with developments.
3) A model for Legislation.
It would be hoped that such rules would influence legislation in this field. This would 
be particularly helpful to underdeveloped countries which have no special rules on the 
topic and to international panels in drafting future laws. A look at national legislation 
shows a strong bias in favour o f developed countries, it is the hope of all that south- 
south countries will also take appropriate steps to introduce multimodal rules in their 
various countries.633
1) Help to those drafting multimodal contracts.
This should also help parties in drawing up their contracts.
The advantages of such model laws are more appropriate in this modem era with vast 
changes, in that the agreement would act as a mere guide which may be modified 
or further added to within certain limits to suit particular requirements.
6.7.4 A NEW UNIMODAL TRANSPORT CONVENTION WITH AN 
EXTENDED MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT ARM
This is o f particular importance now because o f the on-going work by the working 
group o f UNCITRAL in considering a draft convention on the carriage o f goods 
by sea with an extension to multimodal transport contracts involving a sea leg.634 
Under the draft, the maritime liability regime will be applicable also to claims 
arising out o f multimodal transport involving a sea leg, in particular,
a) in cases where loss cannot be localised ; and
633 See chapter 5
634 UNCITRAL document A/CN.9/W G/III/W P.21.
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b) in cases where loss was attributable to a land or air leg 
o f  transport but no international unimodal convention applied.
This draft was initiated by CMI under the auspices of UNCITRAL to update the 
legislation in the carriage o f goods by sea, especially after the limited success 
achieve by the Hamburg Rules o f 1978.
In the light o f the technological development in transportation and especially the 
growth and importance o f multimodal transport, it is expected that any new 
unimodal transport conventions must include multimodal transport if  they wish to 
gain recognition.
Any such convention however, will not solve the problem in multimodal transport 
as it will be self limiting;
1) It is basically a unimodal transport contract extended to cover the obvious; 
carriage subsequent and precedent to the main transport contract.
2) Par excellence it fails to solve multimodal specific problems.
Such a document is feasible in the light o f the fact that very few provisions are 
exclusive to sea transport. Such exclusive provisions can then be put in special 
sections while the rest o f the draft deals with issues o f extended responsibility to 
cover per and on-carriage. This is o f particular importance especially in the 
carriage o f goods in containers which is often under a multimodal transport 
contract. As a follow up to this extended responsibility, the draft also does not 
differential between a sea carrier and an agent allowing carriers to act in both 
capacities.
Additionally the new Montreal convention on the carriage o f goods by air 1999 
also takes into consideration the multimodal transport problem, this re-enforces 
the fact that any new unimodal transport convention cannot afford to ignore 
multimodal transport.
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6.7.5 A NEW GENERIC INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT
CONVENTION635
The most widely advocated change in multimodal transport recommended to solve 
most of its problems is the results likely to accrue from harmonisation o f carrier 
liability in transportation law generally. The contention among legal writers636 is 
that any harmonisation o f carrier liability meant to unify the different unimodal 
convention will regulate and eradicate the unpredictability problem in multimodal 
transport.
However, one must not lose sight o f the fact that calls for this solution usually 
follows shortly after an outcry as to the unpredictability o f multimodal liability, 
and is usually thus in the context o f multimodal liability. Herber R stated that637
"In form er times, where unimodal transportation was the normal kind o f  
carriage o f  goods, one could afford to apply different kinds o f  liability 
regimes. In the course o f  the container revolution, multimodal transport has 
become the more modern and effective way o f  handling most o f  cargo 
transactions at least in international trade. The fa c t that the liability rules 
fo r  the various modes o f  transport differ so fundam entally as they actually 
do complicates extremely the legal settlement o f  damages occurring during 
transportation. This is one ... very practical reason fo r  thinking o f  a means 
to achieve greater uniformity between the various liability regimes. "
He then went on to lament the effect that divergent rules have on multimodal 
transport, that all
635 Multimodal transport: The feasibility o f  an international legal instrument, 
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1. para. 29
636 A sariotis, “Towards Improved M ultimodal freight in Europe, and the United States p.42
637 Herber. R, "Towards the Harmonisation o f  Carrier Liability Regimes" (1992) 94. II Diritto 
Marittimo 734.
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"attempts to [improve additional Rules in multimodal transport] to this end have ... 
been undertaken with little result as long as the divergences between the unimodal 
rules are so fundam ental as they are at present."
These sentiments are concurred here, that multimodal transport problems are but an 
off-spin o f such divergences, among the different multimodal convention. The 
problems caused by such divergences are impediments to coherent multimodal 
transport. The greatest problem in transport law is considered to be the differences 
between the rules governing the different transport modes; different basis of liability, 
different limits, different documents and time bars etc. These differences represent a 
formidable problem when one attempts to combine them into a single contract as is
638the case in multimodal transport.
For a long time now, there is the assumption that harmonisation of laws in 
transportation is not only desirable but probable the most important development in 
the field of international carriage.639 This conclusion was clearly and unequivocally 
drawn from the frequency with which enabling agencies such as the CMI, 
UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL and UNCTAD have churned out international harmonised 
laws for over 100 years.
Calls for a generic convention in transportation to cater for all modes of transport also 
carries the implication that all other international conventions, regional agreements 
and national legislation will have to be replaced. This in itself has enormous 
implications for the transport industry and will entail a lot o f compromises to meet the 
aspirations and particular problems of each mode. The question is if  this is a realistic
638 De Wit., M ultimodal transport: Carrier liability and documentation. L lo y d ’s o f  London Press 
1995,p  7.
639 Diana Faber, at a Seminar in London stated that, “ ... The Multimodal industry is investing heavily 
in improving its services and it is a very sophisticated industry, yet the same cannot be said for its legal 
infrastructure; There is a large number o f  transport conventions which are potentially applicable to any 
contract. This means that enormous sums which would be better applied commercially, are spent in 
legal disputes as to whether the contract terms apply or the convention and if  so which convention 
should apply to govern the relations between the parties. The way forward is to abolish all the 
individual conventions and introduce one which would govern all transport contracts, by whatever 
means o f  transport and whether unimodal or multimodal.”
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expectation; especially in the light of the lengths of time that has taken each 
convention to fine tune its law to suit its particular problems.
The only way to uplift itself from this muddle would be by applying a liability 
standard which is compatible with multimodal transport. In this world of 
multimodal transport with its changing landscapes the logical suggestion would be 
the use o f a liability regime that will be compatible with multimodal transport. 
Having examined the various ways o f harmonisation, notably by international 
conventions and by self regulation, and the potential basis o f liability, different 
conclusions have been arrived at;
1) The first conclusion is that, predictability and certainty can only be 
attained through uniformity in multimodal transport in the form of a 
mandatory international convention. However, it should be 
appreciated that any such convention will meet with hostility from 
the different modal transports as conflicting with their respective 
provisions. The one solution guaranteed to be acceptable to all 
parties concerned will be one in which all modes o f transport are 
implicated in the form o f the ultimate transport convention for all 
modes o f transport. As noted earlier, the differences and 
divergences in the different transport conventions acts as an 
impediment to facilitating international trade. Such a convention 
should be mandatory with no opting out allowed to parties to ensure 
that there is certainty especially as regards the liability and 
limitation provisions. This is because a non- mandatory convention 
will be unable to maintain the integrity o f transport rules. This 
convention should be accompanied by maximum promotion to allow 
all parties concern to fully understand it and to facilitate the national 
procedures for ratifying it.
2) The second conclusion arrived at is the basis o f liability to be used 
in this convention. After examining the potential liability regimes 
which can become applicable in multimodal transport, it is clear that 
with the changes in transport technologies, presumed fault has lost 
its place in transportation generally. The new way o f transporting
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goods is by containers in fast ships, goods are arriving at their 
destination quicker with less loss and damage record. It has also 
become difficult to state at what stage such loss could have 
happened. Presumed liability is based on the localisation of loss or 
damage, in multimodal transport localisation is often not obvious, 
thus this principle plays a limited role. The basis o f liability should 
then be strict liability. This will tie in with the current climate where 
goods arrive faster with less loss or damage. In such a case once 
loss or damage occurs the question as to the extent o f liability is 
eliminated. This will reduce time and cost in adducing evidence to 
show that the carrier is at fault. The fact is that this will not in 
anyway change the status-quo as the loss normally falls on 
insurance. There is already in existence a limited strict liability in 
air carriage which can be extended to full strict liability on all 
modes.
3) The third conclusion is that there should be limits o f liability. This 
will ensure that the parties at the commencement o f each contract 
will know what to expect. The shippers shipping high value goods 
will take extra insurance to ensure that they are fully compensated 
for any loss or damage. The carriers on their part will take out 
insurance to cover any loss or damage to goods. This will ensure 
that cost is kept at a minimum as resources are not wasted in 
localising loss or damage and pinpointing the liability regime 
applicable. This will facilitate international trade greatly.
285
CONCLUSION
This thesis concludes that multimodal transport should take an active part in the legal 
and institutional regulation of a liability regime in transportation, much in the way of 
one liability system that will be made applicable to all modes of transport to support 
predictability and certainty in global multimodal transport.
This thesis has showed that the legal regulation of multimodal transport is in an 
unacceptable doctrinal state today because it developed not from any firm and clear 
policy as to what multimodal transport should be, but from the view point of social 
convenience and rough justice; because it was regarded as a chain contract, all the 
applicable regimes in that chain were made available and applicable to it.
Devoid of an applicable convention, inconsistencies have piled up as the different 
contractual rules strive to achieve the desired effect in case unlocalised loss or when 
none o f the mandatory conventions would apply to localised loss.
The only way to up-lift it from this ‘muddle’ would be to apply a uniform liability 
regime which would take into consideration the realities of multimodal transport and 
be capable on an institutional level of regulating all transport modes.
Presently, there should be great anxiety in all quarters involved in multimodal 
transport that although much has been said about the importance and the need for a 
uniform liability regime nothing has as yet materialised.
This thesis has been involved in looking at this problem by providing answers to some 
pertinent questions asked in the introduction;
a. Why is liability unpredictable in multimodal transport?
b. What solutions have been proposed? and
c. Is there a better solution?
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1- What makes multimodal transport unpredictable?
The first three chapters provided three different answers to this question.
The primary conclusion to be drawn from chapter one is that the unpredictable and 
uncertainty is linked to the way in which multimodal transport is interpreted and 
regarded. This has been responsible for also implementing the liability regime of all 
the modes implicated in any given carriage. Specifically, it was proven here that the 
reality in (multimodal) transport has moved away from enquires as to the mode(s) to 
be used to expectations that the carrier will provide all necessary services to ensure 
that the goods are carried to destination. On this bases it was argued that since the 
basic expectation have moved from modes used to total transport, the liability regime 
should also reflect this move.
In the second chapter, it was shown that the nature o f multimodal transport dictated 
that numerous parties formed part o f the transport chain. This led to questions of the 
identity of the carrier especially in the light o f the identity of carrier and demise 
clauses in multimodal transport documents. It was concluded that the emphasis here 
should be on ensuring that the MTO was the only one who should be sued in case of 
loss or damage. It was asserted here that this problem compounded the multimodal 
transport problem. The solution might be in channelling responsibility to the MTO but 
within a mandatory convention.
Chapter three on its part went on to out-line the applicable liability regime in 
multimodal transport. To critically assess the nature o f this regime, the current 
liability rules were examined through the example of a hypothetical case.
Specifically, the unimodal conventions are also examined to show the extent o f the 
differences and therefore of the level of unpredictability faced in multimodal 
transport.
The conclusion here is that the unpredictability in the liability regime is exacerbated 
by the use of the presumed liability regime which is inappropriate in multimodal 
transport.
This liability regime in multimodal transport, ignores the basic rationale behind the 
concept and fractionalises multimodal transport by introducing a liability regime that 
is potentially multiple.
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The reason for this is simple the constructs of unimodal regimes have been 
superimposed on to multimodal transport unmodified. Therefore multimodal transport 
is equated to unimodal transport and the liability regimes applicable to unimodal 
transport are made applicable to multimodal transport. This it is asserted here, is 
problematic as the differences in the different liability regimes in transportation are a 
hindrance to international trade. But when these regimes are required to co-exist in the 
same contract as is the case in multimodal transport, chaos reigns; because all these 
liability regimes have different basis of liability, different limits of liability and 
different exemptions from liability.
Thus when a contract is concluded in this mode, there are no clear cut rules for 
determining the applicable liability regime. The parties face the possibility that any of 
these potentially liability regimes can apply.
All the above factors mean that the liability regime is unpredictable and hampers the 
growth of this mode o f transportation while also slowing it down as the most dynamic 
mode of carriage so far.
This state o f affairs led different groups to propose solutions to bring about 
predictability in multimodal transport.
2 What Solutions have been proposed to curb this Problem?
Chapters 4 and 5 of this work examined the solutions proposed by different groups. 
This part concludes that although the 1980 multimodal transport convention failed to 
illicit the required support to bring it into force, it put in place building blocks on 
which the current rules on multimodal transport are based.
Specifically, this thesis came to the conclusion that, the Multimodal Convention 
would not have changed the multimodal landscape because its basis principles when 
interpreted gave similar results to what obtained under the network system of liability. 
The thesis also enumerated some reasons why the convention has not been ratified. 
Here it was contended, that this convention was closely modelled after the Hamburg 
rules and thus suffered from the imperfections of the rules together with its own short 
comings. The conclusion here is that what is needed is a new convention which will
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severe the ties it has to any form o f unimodal conventions and reflect the current 
practice o f carrying goods multimodally.
Chapter five is dedicated to the attempts by different bodies to regulate multimodal 
transport: Groups ranging from United Nations bodies to regional and national 
legislature. Here the different attempts are examined and the conclusion reached is 
that they,
like their predecessors o f 30 and 20 years are basing their solutions on unimodal 
transport solutions.
Specifically, the laudable elaborate attempt by the UNCITRAL is examined and the 
conclusion is that it falls short of what is expected within multimodal transport, 
because its accent is on sea carriage together with its specific opting out provisions 
which ensures that unpredictability will continue to exist under its wings.
All this attempts had one thing in common; they sought to maintain the status-quo 
existing in transportation and thereby failed to address the substantive issues relevant 
to a successful multimodal transport regime. In this regard they all ascribe to the 
presumed liability o f the carrier which can no longer be sustained in multimodal 
transport.
There is a wide range o f Academic opinion on this problem; some proposals have 
been advanced which are quite similar to those adopted by private and international 
organisations as noted above. The views were beautifully summarised by UNCTAD 
and range from calls to examine the different elements of multimodal transport; basis 
of liability, type of liability, and limitations of liability and whether the convention 
should be mandatory or not.
However, there are also some, who feel that the best way to achieve predictability 
would be through the harmonisation of all transport laws into one uniform law 
applicable to all contracts of carriage irrespective of mode.
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3) What is the most viable solution?
The liability regime that is believed will bring about predictability is discussed and 
justified in chapter 6 of this work. These Chapters emphasise the fact that inherent in 
the nature of multimodal transport is the fact that we ought to emphasis what has been 
described as it flexibility, that much preached and much desired, although in our 
present climate much less practised virtue of multimodal transport. This flexibility 
which allows the contract to be executed by one using any mode(s) deemed 
appropriate is fast emerging as the new form of international transport contract. It is 
thus important that this flexibility is enhanced by an appropriate liability regime that 
will allow growth.
The unpredictability in the liability system in multimodal transport stems not so much 
from the fact that unimodal concepts are being used but more from an inability on the 
part of multimodal transport to formulate its own liability regime and move away 
from archaic transport concepts.
1) A proposed liability regime for multimodal transport
Having examined the different potentially applicable liability regimes and the 
suggestions for a solution, it is strongly believed that the liability regime that would 
bring about predictability would be one that is strict with limits, and the method of 
achieving this liability would be by harmonising all transport conventions and making 
one true liability regime applicable to all modes of carriage.
Such a liability regime will bring abut predictability in multimodal transport as it will 
eradicate the need to localise loss, eradicate the need to seek to sue performing 
carriers, reduce cost of adducing evidence to prove or rebut liability under the 
presumed liability system.
Specifically, this chapter examined the question of risk allocation within multimodal 
transport using economic parameters and concludes that the basis of presumed 
liability even in unimodal transport can no longer be sustained. The arguments put 
forward for the use of fault liability have become archaic. Following on this, the 
thesis strongly advocates that the presumed liability be replaced with strict liability. It
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also asserts that if the base on which presumed liability can no longer be justified, the 
unimodal conventions should also be allowed to benefit from the mandatory 
multimodal transport convention when it is eventually drafted.
The work than goes ahead and examines the likely route such a harmonised law will 
take. Such harmonised rules will reduce the uncertainty as to the predictable liability 
regime, uncertainty as to the basis of liability applicable, uncertainty as to the 
documents required and their interpretations, uncertainties as to the burden of proof 
and time limits. By removing a number of duplicate information flows such as found 
in the present system, and rationalising the responsibilities o f the carrier, the ideal 
liability regime can be sketched. In this proposed situation, there is a seamless 
liability regime which is applicable regardless of type of loss or damage or place of 
loss or damage.
2) Principles on which the proposed solution is based.
The proposed solution is based on two principles. First of all it is based on uniform 
liability in all modes of carriage by the harmonisation of all transport conventions and 
laws.
Such harmonised laws will reduce the fears of the different stakeholders that such a 
basis will lead to an increase in cost, on the contrary, it will lead to reduced cost as 
costs associated with claim handling and litigation will be eliminated. This will also 
do away with the conflict between and among conventions. Any other solution in 
multimodal transport will invariably lead to the same problems of conflict with 
existing unimodal transport conventions.
The second principle is based on strict liability with limits; uniform harmonised laws 
in this case will reduce the costs associated with litigation and premiums.
Such a strict liability will also mean that there is no duplication for insurance as cargo 
insurance will play a different role. Insurance here will be used to mitigate the risk of 
loss and damage and also the risk of liability.
The liability issue in a way is about insurance, on the one hand is the issue of the 
reality of the risk of shipping goods which the cargo owner assumes and on the other
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hand is the risk o f  liability o f  loss or damage to the goods which is assumed by the 
carrier, and the insurer is in the middle dealing with both parties.
In a normal loss and damage scenario, the actual parties concerned are the cargo and 
liability insurers, who respectively have to claim for the loss and pay for it. In the 
light of these findings, insurance reform may be an alternative solution to the 
multimodal transport problem.
The tasks now is for politicians to come together and draw a uniform convention 
which is clear and simple and one that will create certainty; and most important of all 
one that is fair and equitable to all parties. This will be possible if one liability regime 
were to govern all transportation of goods regardless of modes because at the end the 
different liability regimes are more similar than different and all aim at one thing 
certainty and predictability in their respective modes.
The main bottlenecks towards a predictable liability regime have been identified by 
this work. For each of them suggestions can be made for improvements.
It is recognised that the existing legal framework existing in multimodal transport is 
fragmentary and unsatisfactory. The problem seems to be the direction that a solution 
should take due to conflicting interest. This is particularly felt in issues such as the 
system of liability and the basis of liability. This problem can be put down to 
insufficient communications among the different parties involved in multimodal 
transport at a global level. It is highly recommended that such contact should be 
solicited before the new regime is promulgated to ensure that it will have the requisite 
support from all sectors. The need for such dialogue especially for these matters is 
crucial to the success of the new rules. There is every confidence that this is a 
workable solution but unlike the 1980 convention, it must inform and educate its stake 
holders to ensure acceptance and facilitation.
In the light of the fore-going it is now time to call on the different private and UN 
organisations such as UNCTAD, UNCITRAL, ICC, CMI and UNIDRIOT concerned 
with harmonisation of law to initiate informal international seminars and workshops 
to debate these issues in a frank and sincere manner by all parties involved to bring to 
light viable solutions preferably along the lines enumerated in this work.
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After examining the merits of multimodal transport and the importance of this mode 
in the overall globalisation of transport laws,
After noting the confusion caused by the proliferation of liability regimes in 
international transport,
Having acknowledged the fact that global transport requires global rules,
This work recommends that multimodal transport should assume a modem role in 
international trade and transport. The promulgation of rules to govern multimodal 
transport will be sufficient to cover all types of unimodal transport contracts. The era 
in now ripe for a truly universal transport rule to cover all forms of transportation.
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APPENDIX
United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods
UN Doc. TD /M T/CONF/17 (1980)
The S ta tes  p a r t ie s  to this Convention,
Recognizing:
(a) That international multimodal transport is one means of 
facilitating the orderly  expansion o f  world trade;
(b) The need to stimulate the development o f  smooth, economic and 
efficient m ultim odal transport services adequate to the requirements of the 
trade concerned;
(c) The desirability  o f  ensuring the orderly development of 
international multim odal transport in the interest o f  all countries and the 
need to consider the special problems o f  transit countries;
(d) The desirability  o f  determining certain rules relating to the 
carriage o f  goods by international multimodal transport contracts, including 
equitable provisions concerning the liability o f  multimodal transport 
operators
(e) The need that this convention should not affect the application o f  
any international convention or national law relating to the regulation and 
control o f  transport conventions.
(f) The right o f  each state to regulate and control at the national 
level multimodal transport operators and operations.
(g) The need to have regard to the special interest and problems of 
developing countries, for example, as regards introduction o f  new 
technologies, participation in multimodal services o f  their national carriers 
and operators, cost efficiency thereof and maximum use o f  local labour and 
insurance;
(h) The need to ensure a balance o f  interests between suppliers and 
users o f  multimodal transport services;
(i) The need facilitate customs procedures with due consideration to 
the problems o f  transit Countries;
A g ree in g  to the following basic principles:
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(a) That a fair balance of interests between developed and 
developing countries should be established and an 
equitable distribution activities between these groups of 
countries should be attained international multimodal 
transport;
(b) That consultation should take place on terms and 
conditions service, both before and after the introduction 
o f  any new technology in the multimodal transport of 
goods, between the multimodal transport operator 
shippers, shippers' organizations and appropriate national 
authorities;
(c) The freedom for shippers to choose between multimodal 
au, segmented transport services;
(d) That the liability o f  the multimodal transport operator 
under the Convention should be based on the principle o f  
presumed fault or neglect;
H ave d ec id ed  to conclude a Convention for this purpose and
ha, thereto agreed as follows:
PART I 
General provisions 
Article I 
DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes o f  this Convention:
1. "International multimodal transport" means the carriage o f  good by at 
least two different modes o f  transport on the basis o f  a multimodal 
transport contract from a place in one country at which the goods are 
taken in charge by the multimodal transport operator to a place 
designated for delivery situated in a different country. The operations 
o f  pickup and delivery o f  goods carried out in the performance o f  a
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unim odal transport contract as defined in such a contract shall not be 
considered  as international multimodal transport.
2. “ M ultim odal transport operator” means any person who on his own 
b eh a lf  or through another person acting on his behalf  concludes 
m ultim odal transport contract and who acts as a principal, not as an 
agent on b eh a lf  o f  the consignor or o f  the carriers participating in the 
m ultim odal transport operations, and who assumes responsibility for the 
performance o f  the contract.
3. "Multimodal transport contract" means a contract whereby a multimodal 
transport operator undertakes, against payment o f  freight, to perform or to 
procure the performance o f  international multimodal transport.
4. "Multimodal transport document" means a document which evidences a 
multimodal transport contract, the taking in charge o f  the goods by the 
multimodal transport operator, and an undertaking by him to deliver the 
goods in accordance with the terms o f that contract.
5. "Consignor" means any person by whom or in whose name or on whose 
behalf a multimodal transport contract has been concluded with the 
multimodal transport operator, or any person by whom or in whose name 
or on whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the multimodal 
transport operator in relation to the multimodal transport contract
6. "Consignee" means the person entitled to take delivery o f  the goods.
7. "Goods" includes any container, pallet or similar article o f  transport or 
packaging, if  supplied by the consignor.
8. "International convention" means an international agreement concluded 
among States in written form and governed by international law.
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9. "Mandatory national law" means any statutory law concerning carriage of 
goods the provisions o f  which cannot be departed from by contractual 
stipulation to the detriment o f  the consignor.
10. "Writing" means, inter alia, telegram or telex.
Article 2 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
The provisions o f  this Convention shall apply to all contract s of 
multimodal transport between places in two States, if:
(a) The place for the taking in charge o f  the goods by the 
multimodal transport operator as provided for in the 
multimodal transport contract is. located in a Contracting 
Skate, or
(b) "The place for delivery o f  the goods by the multimodal 
transport operator as provided for in the multimodal transport 
contract is located in a Contracting State.
Article 3 
MANDATORY APLICATION
1. When a multimodal transport contract has been concluded which
according to article 2 shall be governed by this Convention, the
provisions o f  this Convention shall be mandatorily applicable to such 
contract.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right o f  the consignor 
to choose between multimodal transport and segmented transport.
Article 4
REGULATION AND CONTROL OF MIULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
1. This Convention shall not affect, or be incompatible with, the
application o f  any international convention or national law relating to the 
regulation and control o f  transport operations.
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2. This Convention shall not affect the right o f  each State to regulate 
and control at the national level multimodal transport operations and 
multimodal transport operators, including the right to take measures 
relating to consultations, especially before the introduction of new 
technologies and services, between multimodal transport operators, 
shippers, shippers' organizations and appropriate national authorities on 
terms and conditions o f  service; licensing o f  multimodal transport 
operators; participation in transport; and all other steps in the national 
economic and commercial interest.
3. The multimodal transport operator shall comply with the 
applicable law o f  the country in which he operates and with the 
provisions o f  this Convention.
PART II 
Documentation
Article 5
ISSUE OF MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT
1. When the goods are taken in charge by the multimodal 
transport operator, he shall issue a m ultim odal transport docum ent which, 
at the option o f  the consignor, shall be in either negotiab le  or non- 
negotiable  form.
2. The m ultim odal transport docum ent shall be signed by the 
m ultim odal transport operator or by a person having au thority  from him.
3. The signature on the multim odal transport docum ent may be in 
handw riting, printed in facsimile, perforated, stam ped, in symbols, or made 
by any other mechanical or electronic means, i f  not inconsisten t with the 
law o f  the country where the multimodal transport docum ent is issued.
4. I f  the consignor so agrees, a non-negotiab le  multimodal 
transport docum ent may be issued by making use o f  any mechanical or 
other means p reserv ing  a record o f  the particulars stated in article 8 to be 
contained in the m ultim odal transport document. In such a case the
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multim odal tran sp o r t  operator, after having taken the goods in charge, shall 
deliver to the consignor a readable document containing all the particulars 
so recorded, and such docum ent shall for the purposes o f  the provisions of 
this C onven tion  be deem ed to be a multimodal transport document.
Article 6
NEGOTIABLE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT
1. W here a m ultim odal transport docum ent is issued in negotiable
(a) It shall be m ade out to order or to bearer;
(b) I f  m ade out to order it shall be transferable  by
endorsem ent;
(c) I f  m ade out to bearer it shall be transferable  without 
endorsem ent;
(d) I f  issued in a set o f  more than one orig inal it shall indicate the 
num ber o f  orig inals  in the set.
(e) If  any copies are issued each copy shall be marked “non- 
negotiable copy .”
2. Delivery o f  the goods may be demanded from the multimodal 
transport operator or a person acting on his beha lf  only against surrender of 
the negotiable multim odal transport docum ent duly endorsed where 
necessary,
3. The multimodal transport operator shall be discharged from his 
obligation to deliver the goods if, where a negotiable multimodal transport 
document has been issued in a set o f  more than one original, lie or a person 
acting on his behalf  has in good faith delivered the goods against surrender 
o f  one o f  such originals.
Article 7
NON -N EGO TIA BLE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
1. Where a multimodal transport document is issued in non 
negotiable form it shall indicate a named consignee.
2. The m ultim odal transport operator shall be discharged from his 
obligation to deliver the goods if  he makes delivery thereof to the consignee
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named in such non-negotiab le  multimodal transport document or to such 
other person as he may be duly instructed, as a rule, in writing.
Article 8
CO N TEN TS OF THE M ULTIM ODAL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT
1. The m ultim odal transport document shall contain the following 
particulars:
(a) The general nature o f  the goods, the leading marks necessary for 
identification o f  the goods, an express statement, i f  applicable, as to the 
dangerous character o f  the goods, the number o f  packages or pieces, and the 
gross w eight o f  the goods or their quantity otherwise expressed, all such 
particulars as furn ished  by the consignor;
(b) the apparent condition o f  the goods;
(c) The nam e and principal place o f  business o f  the multimodal 
transport operator,
(d) Name o f  the consignor;
(e) The consignee, i f  named by the consignor,
(The p lace  and date o f  tak ing  in charge o f  the goods by the multi 
m odal t ran sp o r t  opera to r;
(g) The p lace  o f  d e l ivery  o f  the goods;
(h The date  o f  the period  o f  de livery  o f  the goods at the p lace o f  
de livery ,  i f  exp ress ly  agreed  upon be tw een  the parties ;
(i) A s ta tem en t ind ica ting  w hether  the m u ltim odal transport 
docum en t is n ego t iab le  or non -nego tiab le .
(J) The p lace  and date o f  issue o f  the m u ltim odal transpo rt 
docum ent.
(k) The s ignature  o f  the m ultim odal tran sp o r t  ope ra to r  or o f  a 
person  hav ing  au tho ri ty  from him.
(1) The fre ig h t for each mode o f  tran spo rt,  i f  exp ress ly  agreed 
be tw een  the par ties ,  or the fre igh t inc luding  its cu rrency , to the extent 
payab le  by the co n s ig n ee  or o ther ind ication  tha t f re igh t is payab le  by 
him.
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(m) The in te n d e d  jo u rn e y  route , modes o f  transpo rt  and places o f  
t ran sh ip m en t,  i f  know n  at the time o f  issuance  o f  the m ultim odal 
transpo rt document.
(n) The s ta tem ent re fe r re d  to in paragraph  3 o f  a r tic le  28;
(o) Any o th e r  p a r t ic u la rs  w hich  the parties  may agree to insert in the 
m ultim oda l t r a n s p o r t  docum en t,  i f  not inconsis ten t w ith the law o f  the 
country  w here  the  m u lt im o d a l transpo rt  docum ent is issued.
2. The ab sen ce  from  the m u ltim oda l docum ent o f  one or m ore o f  the 
pa r t icu la rs  re fe r re d  to p a rag raph  1 o f  this a r tic le  shall no t affect the 
legal ch a ra c te r  o f  the docum en t as a m ultim odal tran sp o r t  docum ent 
p rov ided  tha t it n e v e r th e le s s  m eets  the requ irem en ts  set out in paragraph 
4 o f  a r tic le  1.
Article 9
RESERVATIONS IN THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT 
1.. I f  the m u lt im oda l t ran sp o r t  docum en t con ta ins  particu la r  
co nce rn ing  the genera l na tu re ,  lead ing  m arks, num ber  o f  packages  or 
pieces  or w e igh t  or q u an ti ty  o f  the goods w hich  the m u ltim oda l transport 
opera to r  or any person  acting  on his b e h a l f  know s, or has reasonab le  
g rounds to su spec t tha t the docum ents  do not accu ra te ly  rep resen t the 
goods ac tua lly  taken  in charge , or i f  he has no reasonab le  m eans o f  
check ing  such p a r t icu la rs ,  the m ultim odal t ran sp o r t  o p e ra to r '  (or a 
person  acting  on his b e h a l f  shall insert in the m u ltim oda l transport 
docum en t a re se rv a t io n  spec ify ing  these  in accu rac ies ,  g rounds  for 
su sp ic ion  or the absence  o f  reasonab le  m eans o f  check ing
2. If  the multimodal transport operator or a person acting on his 
behalf fails to note o:l the multimodal transport document the apparent 
condition o f  the goods he is deemed to have noted on the multimodal transport 
document that the goods were in apparent good condition.
Article 10
EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT DOCUMENT 
Except for particulars in respect of which and to the extent to which a 
reservation permitted under article 9 has been entered:
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(a) The multimodal transport document shall be prima facie evidence 
o f  the taking in charge by the multimodal transport operator o f  the goods as 
described therein; and
(b) Proof to the contrary by the multimodal transport operator shall not 
be admissible i f  the multimodal transport document is issued in negotiable from 
and has been transferred to a third party, including a consignee, who has acted 
in good faith in reliance on the description o f  the goods therein.
Article 11
LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENTS OR OMISSIONS
When the multimodal transport operator, with intent to defraud, gives 
in the multimodal transport document false information concerning the goods 
or omits any information required to be included under paragraph 1. (a) or (b) 
o f  article 8 or under article 9, he shall he liable, without t i l e  benefit of the 
limitation o f  liability provided for in this Convention, for any loss, damage or 
expenses incurred by a third party, including a consignee, who acted in on the 
description o f  the goods in the multimodal transport document issued.
Article 12 
GUARANTEE BY THE CONSIGNOR
1. The consignor shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the multimodal 
transport operator the accuracy, at the time the goods were taken in charge by 
the multimodal transport operator, o f  particulars relating to the general nature 
o f  the goods, their marks, number, weight and quantity
and, if  applicable, to the dangerous character o f  the goods, as furnished by him 
for insertion in the multimodal transport document.
2. The consignor shall indemnify the multimodal transport operator 
against loss resulting from inaccuracies in or inadequacies o f  the particulars 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The consignor shall remain liable even 
if the multimodal transport document has been transferred by him. The right of 
the multimodal transport operator to such indemnity shall in no way limit his
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liability under the multimodal transport contract to any person other than the 
consignor.
Article 13 
OT'HER DOCUMENTS
The issue o f  the multimodal transport document does not preclude the 
issue, if  necessary, o f  other documents relating to transport or other services 
involved in international multimodal transport, in accordance with applicable 
international conventions or national law. However, the issue o f  such other 
documents shall not affect the legal character o f  the multimodal transport 
document.
PART III
Liability o f  the multimodal transport operator 
Article 14 
P E R IO D  OF R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y
1. The responsibility o f  the multimodal transport operator for the goods 
under this Convention covers the period from the time he takes the goods in his 
charge to the time o f  their delivery.
2. For the purpose o f  this article, the multimodal transport operator is 
deemed to be in charge o f  the goods:
(a) From the time he has taken over the goods from:
(i) The consignor or a person acting on his behalf; 
or
(ii) An authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations 
applicable at the place of taking in charge, the goods must be handed 
over for transport;
(b) Until the time he has delivered the goods:
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(i) By handing over the goods to the consignee; or
(ii) In cases where the consignee does not receive the goods 
from the multimodal transport operator, by placing them at 
the disposal o f  the consignee in accordance with the 
multimodal transport contract or with the law or with the 
usage o f  the particular trade applicable at the place of 
delivery; or
(iii) By handing over the goods to an authority or other third party 
to whom, pursuant to law or regulations applicable at the place 
of  delivery, the goods must be handed over.
3. In paragraph 2 o f  this article, reference to the multimodal transport 
operator shall include his servants or agents or any other person of whose 
services hr makes use for the performance o f  the multimodal transport contract, 
and reference to the consignor or consignee shall include their servants or agents.
Article 15
THE LIABILITY OF THE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT OPERATOR FOR 
HIS SERVANTS, AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS 
Subject to article 21, the multimodal transport operator shall be liable for 
the acts and omissions o f  his servants or agents, when any such servant or agent 
is acting within the scope o f  his employment, or o f  any other person o f  whose 
services he makes use for the performance o f  the multimodal transport contract, 
when such person is acting in the performance of the contract, as if  such acts and 
omissions were his own.
Article 16 
BASIS OF LIABILITY
1. The multimodal transport operator shall be liable for loss resulting 
from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if  the 
occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay in delivery took place while 
the goods were in his charge as defined in article 14, unless the multimodal
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transport operator proves that he, his servants or agents or any other person 
referred to in article 15 took all measures that could reasonably be required to 
avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
2. Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered 
within the time expressly agreed upon or, in the absence o f  such agreement, 
within the time which 1 twould be reasonable to require o f  a diligent
multimodal transport operator, having regard to the circumstances o f  the case.
3. I f  the goods have not been delivered within 90 consecutive day: 
following the date o f  delivery determined according to paragraph 2 of the 
article, the claimant may treat the goods as lost.
Article 17 
CONCURRENT CAUSES
Where fault or neglect on the part o f  the multimodal transport 
operator, his servants or agents or any other person referred to in article 15 
combine with another cause to produce loss, damage or delay in delivery the 
multimodal transport operator shall be liable only to the extent that the loss, 
damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault or neglect provided 
that the multimodal transport operator proves the part o f  the loss damage or 
delay in delivery not attributable thereto.
Article 18 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
1. When the multimodal transport operator is liable for loss 
resulting from loss o f  or damage to the goods according to article 16, his 
liability shall be limited to an amount not exceeding 920 units o f  account per 
package or other shipping unit or 2.75 units o f  account per kilogram o f  gross 
weight o f  the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
2. For the purpose o f  calculating which amount is the higher in 
accordance with paragraph 1 o f  this article, the following rules apply:
(a) Where a container, pallet or similar article o f  transport is used to 
consolidate goods, the packages or other shipping units enumerated in the 
multimodal transport document as packed in such article o f  transport if
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deemed packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid, the goods in such 
article o f  transport are deemed one shipping unit.
(b) In cases where the article of transport itself has been lost or 
damaged, that article o f  transport, if  not owned or otherwise supplied by the 
multimodal transport operator, is considered one separate shipping unit.
3. N otw ithstanding  the provisions o f  paragraphs 1 and 2 o f  the article, 
if  the international multimodal transport does not, according to the contract, 
include carriage o f  goods by sea or by inland waterways, the
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liability o f  the m ultim odal transport operator shall be limited to an amount 
not exceeding 8.33 units o f  account per kilogram o f  gross weight o f  the 
goods lost or dam aged.
4. The liability  o f  the multimodal transport operator for loss 
resulting from delay in delivery according to the provisions o f  article 16 
shall be limited to an am ount equivalent to two and a ha lf  times the freight 
payable for the goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight payable 
under the m ultim odal transport contract.
3. The aggregate liability o f  the multim odal transport operator, under 
paragraphs 1 and 4 or paragraphs 3 and 4 o f  this article, shall not exceed the 
limit o f  liability for total loss o f  the goods as determ ined by paragraph 1 or 
3 o f  this article.
6. By agreement between the multim odal transport operator and the 
consignor, limits o f  liability exceeding those provided for in paragraphs 1, 3 
and 4 o f  this article may be fixed in the multim odal transport document.
7. "Unit o f  account" means the unit o f  account m entioned in article 31.
Article 19 
LOCALIZED DAMAGE 
When the loss o f  or damage to the goods occurred during one 
particular stage o f  the multimodal transport, in respect o f  which an 
applicable international convention or mandatory national law provides a 
higher limit o f  liability  than the limit that would follow from application o f  
paragraphs 1 to 3 o f  article 18, then the limit o f  the multimodal transport
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operator's liab ility  for such loss or damage shall be determined by reference 
to the prov is ions  o f  such convention or mandatory national law.
Article 20 
N O N -CO NTRACTUA L LIA B IL IT Y
1. The defences and limits o f  liability provided for in this 
Convention shall apply in any action against the multimodal transport 
operator in respect o f  loss resulting from loss o f  or damage to the goods, as 
well as from delay in delivery, whether the action be founded in contract, in 
tort or o therw ise.
2. i f  an action in respect o f  loss resulting from loss of or 
damage to the goods or from delay in delivery is brought against the 
servant or agent o f  the multimodal transport operator, i f  such servant 
or agent proves that he acted within the scope o f  his employment, or 
against any other person o f  whose services he makes use for the 
performance o f  the multimodal transport contract, i f  such other 
person proves that he acted within the performance o f  the contract, 
the servant or agent or such other person shall be entitled to avail 
h im self o f  the defences and limits o f  liability which the multimodal 
transport operator is entitled to invoke under this Convention.
3. Except as provided in article 21, the aggregate o f  the 
amounts recoverable from the multimodal transport operator and from 
a servant or agent or any other person o f  whose services he makes use 
for the performance o f  the multimodal transport contract shall not 
exceed the limits o f  liability provided for in this Convention.
Article 21
IF LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO LIM IT LIA BILITY
1. The multimodal transport operator is not entitled to the 
benefit o f  the limitation, o f  liability provided for in this Convention if  
it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an 
act or omission o f  the multimodal transport operator done with the 
intent to cause such loss, damage or delay or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of article 20, a servant or 
agent o f  the multimodal transport operator or other person o f  whose
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services he makes use o f  in the performance o f  the multimodal 
transport contract is not entitled to the benefit o f  the limitation of 
liability provided for in this Convention if  it is proved that the loss, 
damage or delay in delivery re5ulted from an act or omission of such 
servant, agent or other person, done with the intent to cause such loss; 
damage or delay or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, 
damage or delay would probably result.
PART IV Liability o f  the consignor 
Article 22 
G ENERAL RULE 
The consignor shall he liable for loss sustained by the multimodal 
transport operator i f  such loss is caused by the fault or neglect o f  the 
consignor, or his servants or agents when such servants or agents are acting 
within the scope o f  their employment. Any servant or agent o f  the consignor 
shall be liable for such loss if  the loss is caused by fault or neglect on his 
part.
Article 23
SPECIAL RULES ON DANGEROUS GOODS 
The consignor shall mark or label in a suitable manner dangerous 
goods as dangerous.
2. Where the consignor hands over dangerous goods to the multimodal 
transport operator or any person acting on his behalf, the consignor shall 
inform him o f  the dangerous character o f  the goods and, if  necessary, the 
precautions to be taken. I f  the consignor fails to do so and the multimodal 
transport operator does not otherwise have knowledge o f  their dangerous 
character:
(a) the consignor shall be liable to the multimodal transport operator 
for all loss resulting from the shipment o f  such goods; and
(b) the goods may at any time be unloaded, destroyed or rendered 
innocuous, as the circumstances may require, without payment of 
compensation.
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3. The provisions o f  paragraph 2 of this article may not be invoked 
by any person i f  during the multimodal transport he has taken the goods ir his 
charge with know ledge o f  their dangerous character.
4. If, in cases where the provisions o f  paragraph 2 (b) o f  this article 
do not apply or may not invoked, dangerous goods become an actual danger 
to life or property, they may be unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous, as 
the circum stances may require, without payment o f  compensation except 
where there is an obligation to contribute in general average or the 
multimodal transport operator is liable in accordance with the provisions of 
article 16.
PART V 
Claims and actions 
Article 24
N O T IC E OF LOSS, DAM AGE OR DELAY
1. Unless notice o f  loss or damage, specifying the general nature of 
such loss or damage, is given in writing by the consignee to the multimodal 
transport operator not later than the working day after the day when the goods 
were handed over to the consignee, such handing over is p r im a  fa c ie  
evidence o f  the delivery by the multimodal transport operator o f  the goods as 
described in the multimodal transport document.
2. Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the provisions of 
paragraph 1 article apply correspondingly i f  notice in writing is not given 
within six consecutive days after the day when the goods were handed over to 
the consignee.
3. If  the state o f  the goods at the time they were handed over to the 
consignee has been the subject o f  a joint survey or inspection by the parties or 
their authorized representatives at the place o f  delivery, notice in writing need 
not be given o f  loss or damage ascertained during such survey or inspection.
4. In the case o f  any actual or apprehended loss or damage the 
multimodal transport operator and, the consignee shall give all reasonable 
facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.
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5. No com pensation shall he payable for loss resulting from delay in 
delivery unless notice has been given in writing to the multimodal transport 
operator w ithin 60 consecutive days after the day when the goods were 
delivered by handing over to the consignee or when the consignee has been 
notified that the goods have been delivered in accordance with paragraph 2
(b) (ii) or (iii) o f  article 14.
6. Unless notice o f  loss or damage, specifying the general nature of 
the loss or dam age, is given in writing by the multimodal transport operator to 
the consignor not later than 90 consecutive days after the occurrence of such 
loss or damage or after the delivery o f  the goods in accordance with 
paragraph 2 (b) o f  article 14, whichever is later, the failure to give such 
notice is prim a facie evidence that the multimodal transport operator has 
sustained no loss or damage due to the fault or neglect o f  the consignor, his 
servants or agents.
7. i f  any o f  the notice periods provided for in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of 
this article terminates on a day which is not a working day at the place of 
delivery, such period shall be extended until the next working day.
8. For the purpose o f  this article, notice given to a person acting on 
the multimodal transport operator's behalf, including any person o f  whose 
services he makes use at the place o f  delivery, or to a person acting on the 
consignor's behalf, shall be deemed to have been given to the multimodal 
transport operator, or to the consignor, respectively.
Article 25 
LIM ITATION OF ACTIONS
1. Any action relating to international multimodal transport under this 
Convention shall be time-barred if  judicial or arbitral proceedings have not 
been instituted within a period o f  two years. However, i f  notification in 
writing, stating the nature and main particulars o f  the claim, has not been given 
within six months after the day when the goods were delivered or, where the 
goods have not been delivered, after the day on which they should have been 
delivered, the action shall be time-barred at the expiry o f  this period.
2. The limitation period commences on the day after the day on which 
the multimodal transport operator has delivered the goods or part thereof or,
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where the goods have not been delivered, on the day after the last day on which 
the goods should have been delivered.
3. The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during 
the running o f  the limitation period extend that period by a declaration in 
writing to the claimant. This period may be further extended by another 
declaration or declarations.
4. Provided that the provisions o f  another applicable international 
convention are not to the contrary, a recourse action for indemnity by a person 
held liable under this Convention may be instituted even after the expiration of 
the limitation period provided for in the preceding paragraphs if  instituted 
within the time allowed by the law o f the State where proceedings are 
instituted; however, the time allowed shall not be less than 90 days 
commencing from the day when the person instituting such action for 
indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action 
against himself.
Article 26 
JURISD ICTIO N
1. In ju d ic ia l  proceedings relating to international multimodal transport 
under this Convention, the plaintiff, at his option, may institute an action in a 
court which, according to the law o f  the State where the court is situated, is 
competent and within the jurisdiction o f  which is situated one o f  the following 
places:
(a) The principal place o f  business or, in the absence thereof, the 
habitual residence o f  the defendant; or
(b) The place where the multimodal transport contract was made, 
provided that the defendant has there a place o f  business, branch or agency 
through which the contract was made; or
(c) The place o f  taking the goods in charge for international multimodal 
transport or the place o f  delivery; or
(d) Any other place designated for that purpose in the multimodal 
transport contract and evidenced in the multimodal transport document.
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2. No judicial proceedings relating to international multimodal transport 
under this Convention may be instituted in a place not specified in paragraph 1 
of this article. The provisions o f  this article do not constitute an obstacle to the 
jurisdiction o f  the Contracting States for provisional or protective measures.
3. Notw ithstanding the preceding provisions o f  this article, an agreement 
made by the parties after a claim has arisen, which designates the place where 
the p laintiff may institute an action, shall be effective.
4. (a) Where an action has been instituted in accordance with the
provisions o f  this article or where judgement in such an action has been 
delivered, no new action shall be instituted between the same parties on the 
same grounds unless the judgement in the first action is not enforceable in the 
country in which the new proceedings are instituted;
(b) For the purposes o f  this article neither the institution o f  measures
to obtain enforcement o f  a judgement nor the removal o f  an action to a 
different court within the same country shall be considered as the starting o f  a 
new action.
Article 27 
A RBITRA TIO N
1. Subject to the provisions o f  this article, parties may provide by
agreement evidenced in writing that any dispute that may arise relating to
international multimodal transport under this Convention shall be referred to 
arbitration.
2. The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option o f  the claimant, 
be instituted at one o f  the following places:
(a) A place in a State within whose territory is situated:
(i) The principal place o f  business o f  the defendant or, in 
the absence thereof, the habitual residence of  the 
defendant; or
(ii) The place where the multimodal transport contract was 
made, provided that the defendant has there a place of 
business, branch or agency through which the contract 
was made; or
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(iii) The place o f  taking the goods in charge for international 
multimodal transport or the place o f  delivery; or
(b) Any other place designated for that purpose in the arbitration 
clause or agreement.
3. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the provisions of 
this Convention.
4. The provisions o f  paragraphs 2 and 3 o f  this article shall be 
deemed to be part o f  every arbitration clause or agreement and any term of 
such clause or agreem ent which is inconsistent therewith shall be null and 
void.
5. Nothing in this article shall affect the validity o f  an agreement on 
arbitration made by the parties, after the claim relating to the international 
multimodal transport has arisen.
PART VI 
Supplem entary provisions 
Article 28 
CO N TRA CTU A L STIPULATIONS
1. Any stipulation in a multim odal transport contract or multimodal 
transport docum ent shall be null and void to the extent that it derogates, 
directly or indirectly, from the provisions o f  this Convention. The nullity o f  
such a stipulation shall not affect the validity o f  other provisions o f  the 
contract or docum ent o f  which it forms a part. A clause assigning benefit o f  
insurance o f  the goods in favour o f  the multim odal transport operator or any 
similar clause shall be null and void.
2. Notw ithstanding the provisions o f  paragraph 1 o f  this article, the 
multimodal transport operator may, with the agreem ent o f  the consignor, 
increase his responsibilities and obligations under this Convention.
3. The multim odal transport document shall contain a statement 
that the international multimodal transport is subject to the provisions o f  
this Convention which nullify any stipulation derogating there from to the 
detriment o f  the consignor or the consignee.
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4. W here the claim ant in respect o f  the goods has incurred loss as a 
result o f  a s tipu la tion  which is null and void by virtue o f  the present article, 
or as a resu lt o f  the om ission o f  the statement referred to in paragraph 3 of 
this article, the m ultim odal transport operator must pay compensation to the 
extent required  in order to give the claimant com pensation in accordance 
with the p rov is ions  o f  this Convention for any loss o f  or damage to the 
goods as well as for delay in delivery. The multimodal transport operator 
must, in addition , pay com pensation for costs incurred by the claimant for 
the purpose o f  exerc is ing  his right, provided that costs incurred in the action 
where the fo regoing  provision  is invoked are to be determined in accordance 
with the law o f  the State where proceedings are instituted.
Article 29 
G ENERAL AVERAGE
1. N othing in this Convention shall prevent the application of 
provisions in the m ultim odal transport contract or national law regarding the 
adjustm ent o f  general average, i f  and to the extent applicable.
2. With the exception o f  article 25, the provisions o f  this 
Convention relating to the liability o f  the multim odal transport operator for 
loss o f  or dam age to the goods shall also determine w hether the consignee 
may refuse contributing in general average and the liability o f  the 
multim odal transport operator to indemnify the consignee in respect o f  any 
such contribution made or any salvage paid.
Article 30 
OTHER CONVENTIONS
1. This Convention does not modify the rights or duties provided for in 
the Brussels International Convention for the unification o f  certain rules 
relating to the limitation o f  the liability o f  owners o f  sea-going vessels o f  25 
August 1924; in the Brussels International Convention relating to the 
limitation o f  the liability o f  owners o f  sea-going ships o f  10 O ctober 1957; 
in the London Convention on limitation o f  liability for m aritime claims o f  
19 N ovem ber 1976; and in the Geneva Convention relating to the limitation 
o f  the liability o f  owners o f  inland navigation vessels (CLN) o f  1 March 
1973, including am endm ents to these Conventions, or national law relating
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to the l im ita tion  o f  Liability  o f  owners o f  sea-going ships and inland 
navigation vessels.
2. The p rov is ions  o f  articles 26 and 27 o f this Convention do not prevent 
thEl app lica tion  o f  the mandatory  provisions o f  any other international 
convention re la ting  to matters dealt with in the said articles, provided that 
the dispute arises  exclusively  between parties having their principal place o f  
business in States parties to such other convention. However, this paragraph 
does not affect the application o f  paragraph 3 o f  article 27 o f  this 
Convention.
3. In liab ility  shall arise under the provisions o f  this Convention for 
damage caused by a nuclear  incident if  the operator o f  a nuclear installation 
is liable for such dam age:
(a) Under e ither the Paris Convention o f  29 July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the F ield  o f  N uclear Energy as am ended by the Additional 
Protocol o f  28 January  1964 or the Vienna Convention o f  21 May 1963 on 
Civil Liability for N uclear Damage, or am endments thereto; or
(b) Every virtue o f  national law governing the liability for such 
damage, provided that such law is in all respects as favourable to persons 
who may suffer dam age as either the Paris or Vienna Conventions.
4. Carriage o f  goods such as carriage o f  goods in accordance with 
the G eneva Convention o f  1°, May 1956 on the Contract for the International 
Carriage o f  Goods by Road in article 2, or the Berne Convention  o f  7 
February  1970 concern ing  the Carriage o f  Goods by Rail, artic le  2, shall 
not for States Parties to C onventions govern ing  such carriage be 
considered  as in ternational m ultim odal transport w ith in  the m eaning o f  
artic le  1, paragraph  1, o f  this Convention, in so far a, such States are 
bound to apply the provisions o f  such C onventions  to such carriage o f  
goods.
Article 31
UNIT OF A CCOUNT OR M ONETARY UNIT AND CONVERSION
1. The unit o f  account referred to in article 18 o f  this Convention 
is the Special D raw ing Right as defined by the In ternational M onetary 
Fund. The am ounts  referred  to in article 18 shall be converted  into the 
national currency  o f  a State accord ing  to the value o f  such currency on the
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date o f  the ju d g e m e n t  or, award or the date agreed upon by the parties. The 
value o f  a na tiona l currency , in terms of the Special Drawing Right, o f  a 
C ontracting  S tate  w hich is a m em ber o f  the International Monetary Fund, 
shall be ca lcu la ted  in accordance with the method o f  valuation applied by 
the In te rna tiona l M onetary  Fund, in effect on the date in question, for its 
operations and transac tions .  The value o f  a national currency in terms of 
the Special D raw ing  Right o f  a Contracting  State which is not a member of 
the In terna tiona l M onetary  Fund shall be calcu la ted  in a manner
determ ined  by tha t State.
2. N ev er th e le ss ,  a State which is not a mem ber o f  the
In ternational M onetary  Fund and whose law does not permit the 
application  o f  the p rov is ions  o f  paragraph 1 o f  this artic le  may, at the time 
o f  signature, ra ti f ica tion ,  acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time 
thereafter,  dec lare  that the limits o f  liability  p rovided  for in this 
Convention  to be app lied  in its terri to ry  shall be fixed as follows: with 
regard  to the lim its  prov ided  for in paragraph 1 o f  article 18, to 13,750 
m onetary  units per package or o ther sh ipping unit or 41.25 m onetary units 
per k ilogram  o f  gross w eight o f  the goods, and with regard  to the limit 
provided  for in paragraph  3 o f  article 18, to 124 m onetary  units.
3. The m onetary  unit re ferred  to in paragraph  2 o f  this article 
corresponds to 65.5 m illig ram s o f  gold o f  m illesim al fineness nine hundred 
The conversion  o f  the am ount referred  to in paragraph  2 o f  this article into 
national currency shall be made accord ing  to the law o f  the State 
concerned.
4. the calcu la tion  m entioned in the last sen tence o f  paragraph 1 o f
this artic le  and the conversion referred to in parag raph  3 o f  this article
shall be made in such a manner as to express in the national currency o f  
the
Contracting State as far as possible the same real value for the amounts in 
article 18 as is expressed there in units o f  account.
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5. C ontracting  States shall communicate to the depositary the manner 
o f  calculation pursuant to the last sentence o f  paragraph 1 o f  this article, or 
the result o f  the conversion pursuant to paragraph 3 o f  this article, 
as the case may be, at the time o f  signature or when depositing their 
instruments o f  ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or when 
availing them selves  o f  the option provided for in paragraph 2 o f  this article 
and w henever there is a change in the manner o f  such calculation or in the 
result o f  such conversion.
PART VII 
Customs matters 
Article 32 CUSTOM S TRANSIT
1. Contracting States shall authorize the use o f  the procedure of 
customs transit for international multimodal transport.
2. Subject to provisions o f  national law or regulations and 
intergovernmental agreements, the customs transit o f  goods in international 
multimodal transport shall be in accordance with the rules and principles 
contained in articles I to VI o f  the annex to this Convention.
3. When introducing laws or regulations in respect o f  customs transit 
procedures relating to multimodal transport o f  goods, Contracting States 
should take into consideration articles I to VI o f  the annex to this Convention.
PART VIII 
Final clauses 
Article 33 D EPOSITA RY
The Secretary-General o f  the United Nations is hereby designated as 
the depositary o f  this Convention.
Article 34
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, A CCEPTA NCE, A PPRO V A L AND
ACCESSION
1. All States are entitled to become Parties to this Convention by:
(a) Signature not subject to ratification, acceptance or approval; or
(b) Signature' subject to and followed by ratification, acceptance or 
approval; or
(c) Accession.
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2. This Convention shall be open for signature as from 1 September 
1980 until and including 31 August 1981 at the Headquarters of the United 
Nations in New York.
3. After 31 August 1981, this Convention shall be open for accession 
by all States which are not signatory States.
4. Instruments o f  ratification, acceptance, approval and accession are 
to be deposited with the depositary.
5. Organizations for regional economic integration, constituted by 
sovereign States members o f  UNCTAD, and which have competence to 
negotiate, conclude and apply international agreements in specific fields covered 
by this Convention, shall be similarly entitled to become Parties to this 
Convention in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 o f  this article, 
thereby assuming in relation to other Parties to this Convention the rights and 
duties under this Convention in the specific fields referred to above.
Article 35 
RESERVATIONS 
No reservation may be made to this Convention.
Article 36 
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the 
Governments o f  30 States have either signed it not subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval or have deposited instruments o f  ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the depositary.
2. For each State which ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this 
Convention after the requirements for entry into force given in paragraph 1 o f  
this article have been met, the Convention shall enter into force 12 months 
after the deposit by such State o f  the appropriate instrument.
Article 37
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DATE OF APPLICATION
Each C ontracting State shall apply the provisions o f  this Convention 
to multimodal transport contracts concluded on or after the date o f  entry into 
force o f  this C onvention in respect o f  that State.
Article 38
RIGHTS A N D  O BLIG A TIO N S UNDER EXISTING CONVENTIONS
If, according to articles 26 or 27, judicial or arbitral proceedings are 
brought in a C ontracting State in a case relating to international multimodal 
transport subject to this Convention which takes place between two States of 
which only one is a Contracting State, and if  both these States are at the time 
o f  entry into force o f  this Convention equally bound by another international 
convention, the court or arbitral tribunal may, in accordance with the 
obligations under such convention, give effect to the provisions thereof.
Article 39 
REV ISION  AND A M END M EN TS
1. At the request o f  not less than one third o f  the Contracting States, 
the Secretary-General o f  the United Nations shall, after the entry into force of 
this Convention, convene a conference o f  the Contracting States for revising 
or amending it The Secretary-General o f  the United Nations shall circulate to 
all Contracting States the texts, o f  any proposals for amendments at least 
three months before the opening date o f  the conference.
2. Any decision by the revision conference, including amendments, 
shall be taken by a two thirds majority o f  the States present and voting. 
Amendments adopted by the conference shall be com municated by the 
depositary to all the contracting States for acceptance and to all the States 
signatories o f  the Convention for information.
3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, any amendment adopted by the 
conference shall enter into force only for those Contracting States which have 
accepted it, on the first day of the month following one year after its acceptance 
by two thirds o f  the Contracting States. For any State accepting an amendment 
after it has been accepted by two thirds o f  the Contracting States, the amendment
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shall enter into force on the first day o f  the month following one year after its 
acceptance by that State.
4. Any amendment adopted by the conference altering the amounts 
specified in article 18 and paragraph 2 o f  article 31 or substituting either or both 
the units defined in paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 31 by other units shall enter 
into force on the first day o f  the month following one year after its acceptance by 
two thirds o f  the Contracting States. Contracting States which have accepted the 
altered amounts or the substituted units shall apply them in their relationship 
with all Contracting States.
5. Acceptance o f  amendments shall be effected by the deposit of a 
formal instrument to that effect with the depositary.
6. Any instrument o f  ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
deposited after the entry into force o f  any amendment adopted by the conference 
shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as amended.
Article 40 
DEN UN CIA TION
1. Each Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time 
after the expiration o f  a period of two years from the date on which this 
Convention has entered into force by means o f  a notification in writing 
addressed to the depositary.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect on the first day o f  the month 
following the expiration o f  one year after the notification is received by the 
depositary. Where a longer period is specified in the notification, the 
denunciation shall take effect upon the expiration o f  such longer period after the 
notification is received by the depositary.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto, have affixed their signatures hereunder on the dates indicated.
DONE AT Geneva, this twenty-fourth day o f  May, one thousand nine 
hundred and eighty, in one original in the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic.
ANNEX
Provisions on customs matters relating to international multimodal
transport of goods
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Article 1
For the purposes o f  this Convention:
"Customs transit procedure" means the customs procedure under which 
goods are transported under customs control from one customs office to 
another.
"Customs office o f  destination" means any customs office at which a 
customs transit operation is terminated.
"Import export duties and taxes" means customs duties and all other 
duties, taxes, fees or other charges which are collected on or in connection with 
the import/export o f  goods, but not including fees and charges which are 
limited in amount for the approximate cost o f  services rendered.
"Customs transit document" means a form containing the record of data 
entries and information required for the customs transit operation.
Article II
1. Subject to the provisions o f  the law, regulations and international 
conventions in force in their territories, Contracting States shall grant freedom 
o f  transit to goods in international multimodal transport.
2. Provided that the conditions laid down in the customs transit 
procedure used for the transit operation are fulfilled to the satisfaction o f  the 
customs authorities, goods in international multimodal transport:
(a) Shall not, as a general rule, be subject to customs examination 
during the journey except to the extent deemed necessary to ensure compliance 
with rules and regulations which the customs are responsible for enforcing. 
Flowing form this, the customs authorities shall normally restrict themselves to 
the control o f  customs seals and other security measures at points o f  entry and 
exit;
(b) Without prejudice to the application o f  law and regulations 
concerning public o: national security, public morality or public health, shall 
n o t  h e  s u b j e c t  t o  any customs formalities or requirements additional to 
those o f  the customs transit regime used for the transit operation.
Article 111
In order to facilitate the transit o f  the goods, each Contracting State shall:
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(a) If  it is the country of shipment, as far as practicable, take all 
measures to ensure the completeness and accuracy o f  the information required 
for the subsequent transit operations;
(b) If  it is the country o f  destination;
(i) Take all necessary measures to ensure that goods in customs 
transit shall be cleared, as a rule, at the customs office of 
destination o f  the goods;
(ii) Endeavour to carry out the clearance o f  goods at a place as near 
as is possible to the place o f  final destination o f  the goods, 
provided that national law and regulations do not require 
otherwise.
Article IV
1. Provided that the conditions laid down in the customs transit 
procedure are fulfilled to the satisfaction o f  the customs authorities, the goods 
in international multimodal transport shall not be subject to the payment of 
import/export duties and taxes or deposit in lieu thereof in transit countries.
2. The provisions o f  the preceding paragraph shall not preclude:
(a) The levy o f  fees and charges by virtue o f  national regulations on 
grounds o f  public security or public health;
(b) The levy o f  tees and charges, which are limited in amount to the 
approximate cost o f  services rendered, provided they are imposed under 
conditions o f  equality.
Article V
1. Where a financial guarantee for the customs transit operation is 
required, it shall be furnished to the satisfaction o f  the customs authorities of 
the transit country concerned in conformity with its national laws and 
regulations and in international conventions.
2. With a view to facilitating customs transit, the system o f  customs 
guarantee shall be simple, efficient, moderately priced and shall cover
Article VI
1. Without prejudice to any other documents which may be required 
by virtue o f  an international convention or national law and regulations, 
customs authorities o f  transit countries shall accept the multimodal transport 
document as a descriptive part o f  the customs transit document.
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2. With a view to facilitating customs transit, customs transit 
documents shall be aligned, as far as possible, with the layout reproduced 
below.
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